



Jagged blue frontiers:

The police and the policing of boundaries in South Africa

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"Because they [the police] are posted on the perimeters of order and justice in the hope that their presence will deter the forces of darkness and chaos, because they are meant to spare the rest of the people direct confrontations with the dreadful, perverse, lurid, and dangerous, police officers are perceived to have powers and secrets no one else shares."

Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices and Possible Role Models*, 1970.

"SAPS Members, My Family. Together pushing back the frontiers of evil."

Nathi Mthethwa, Minister of Police, *Speech at the SAPS National Commemoration Day*, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 5 September 2010.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements.....	ii
List of Acronyms	iii
Abstract	v
Preface	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Literature review	7
2.1 Pre-professional policing and the boundaries of human communities	7
2.2 Colonial policing.....	10
2.3 Police culture.....	12
2.4 National borders and the policing of illegal flows of people and goods	14
2.5 Counterinsurgency policing	17
2.6 Place-based and hot spots policing.....	19
2.7 Firearm violence and firearm control	21
2.8 Conclusion	23
2.8.1 Police as guardians and enforcers of boundaries.....	23
2.8.2 Police as instruments of othering.....	23
2.8.3 Police and the penetrability of boundaries	23
2.8.4 Beyond boundary threats and police adaptation.....	24
2.8.5 Danger and cross boundary policing	24
2.8.6 The layering of police boundary work	24
Chapter 3: Conceptual and theoretical framework	26
3.1 Police versus policing	27
3.1.1 Policing	27
3.1.2 The police.....	27
3.3 Boundaries, frontiers and the ‘cleaning’ work of the police	28
3.4 Deterrence and rational choice	31
3.5 Crime control, crime reduction, crime prevention and homicide	32
3.5.1 Crime control.....	32
3.5.2 Crime prevention	32
3.5.3 Crime reduction.....	34
3.5.4 Current applications of crime control, reduction and prevention	34
3.6 Police reforms, crime control and crime reduction/prevention	35
3.6.1 Problem-oriented policing.....	35
3.6.2 Intelligence-led policing	37
3.7 Policing of places.....	38
3.7.1 The place of the crime	38
3.7.2 Routine activities theory	38
3.7.3 Crime hot spots.....	39
3.7.4 Place-based and hot spots policing.....	40
3.8 Research question and propositions.....	43
Chapter 4: Methodology	45
4.1 Qualitative research methods	45
4.1.1 Primary sources	45
4.1.2 Secondary sources.....	47
4.2 Quantitative research methods	48
Chapter 5: Out of the wilderness – policing in South Africa prior to 1948	50
5.1 The colonial period and the policing of boundaries.....	50

5.1.1 The Dutch East India Company, firearm control and the containment of indigenous threats	50
5.1.2 The proliferation of firearms and the escalation in colonial insecurity	51
5.1.3 Emergence of more ordered and aggressive policing	53
5.1.4 Colonial frontier policing through subjugation and conquest	54
5.2 The creation of the Union of South Africa	57
5.2.1 The establishment of the national police	57
5.2.2 Police responses to rebellion and insurrection by white South Africans	58
5.2.3 Suppression and control of black South Africans: Role of SAP	61
5.3 Conclusion	63

Chapter 6: The SAP and the fortification of apartheid boundaries of 1948-1994... 64

6.1 Reinforcing the borders of South Africa: The cases of Rhodesia, South West Africa and Mozambique	64
6.1.1 SAP in Rhodesia	65
6.1.2 SAP in South West Africa	65
6.1.3 Mozambique: the impact of the Nkomati Accord	68
6.2 SAP and the enforcement of internal apartheid boundaries	69
6.2.1 The police and 'petty' apartheid	69
6.2.2 Day-to-day policing in black townships	70
6.2.3 Public disorder policing	71
6.2.4 The intensification of SAP militarisation	74
6.3 The rise of counterinsurgency approaches within the SAP	80
6.3.1 The SAP Security Branch	81
6.3.2 Lethal shadow policing and fighting dirty	82
6.3.3 Aspiring to win hearts and minds	84
6.4 Reforming under fire: The restructuring of SAP	85
6.5 Racialised firearm control and firearm crime	86
6.5.1 Firearm licensing	86
6.5.2 Firearm crime and violence under apartheid	87
6.5.3 Types of firearms used in crime	89
6.5.4 Emergence of firearm focused police operations	92
6.6 Conclusion	93

Chapter 7: The policing of boundaries in post-apartheid South Africa 96

7.1 The emergence of the SAPS and the reconfiguration of boundary policing	96
7.1.1 A new police for a new South Africa	96
7.1.2 SAPS resistance to the requirements of policy change	97
7.2 High crime zones and the SAPS' operational approach to policing	100
7.2.1 Crime mapping and its impact	100
7.2.2 Prioritisation of high crime areas for police interventions	100
7.2.3 Nature of high crime spaces	101
7.3 Boundaries and policing adaptation	104
7.3.1 Dabbling in community policing	104
7.3.2 Reforming public order policing	105
7.3.3 Investigation of violent crime: Specialisation and de-specialisation	106
7.4 Border protection and responding to organised crime	107
7.5 The centrality of firearms in violent crime	108
7.5.1 Firearm availability and crime: 1994-2013	108
7.6 SAPS and firearm control	111
7.6.1 Operation Rachel	111
7.6.2 Emergence of a national firearm strategy	112
7.6.3 Overhaul of firearm control legislation	114
7.6.4 Illegal Firearm Investigation Units	115

7.6.5 Central Firearms Registry.....	117
7.6.6 Firearm amnesties and firearm recoveries.....	119
7.6.7 Firearm control: Institutional weaknesses.....	119
7.7 High-density policing.....	125
7.8 Conclusion	126
Chapter 8: SAPS high-density policing operations 1994-2015	127
8.1 Tactical police approaches to high crime areas.....	127
8.1.1 High density policing	127
8.1.2 'Iron fist inside the velvet glove'?.....	130
8.1.3 Criminal threat framing and othering	131
8.1.4 Influence of counterinsurgency doctrine	133
8.2 SAPS high-density operations: 1996-1999	135
8.2.1 National operations.....	135
8.3 Operation Crackdown (2000-2003).....	138
8.3.1 Operation overview	138
8.3.2 Operational logistics	139
8.3.3 Operational outcomes	139
8.3.4 Parallel operations	140
8.3.5 Self-evaluation of Operation Crackdown by government.....	141
8.4 Operation Sethunya (2003-2004).....	141
8.5 Targeting repeat offenders and 'wanted' persons	144
8.6 Provincial operations: 2006 and beyond	145
8.6.1 Gauteng: Operation Iron Fist, Operation Trio and Operation Big Wave	145
8.6.2 Operation Combat.....	146
8.7 National Festive Season operations and the 2010 FIFA World Cup.....	147
8.7.1 Festive Season operations.....	147
8.7.2 High-density policing for the 2010 FIFA World Cup.....	148
8.8 Operation Fiela-Reclaim (2015)	148
8.9 Conquering high crime places.....	151
8.10 High-density operations and imprisonment.....	152
8.11 Conclusion.....	154
Chapter 9: Impact of SAPS high-density operations	155
9.1 SAPS crime data: the good, the bad and the ugly	156
9.1.1 About SAPS crime data	156
9.1.2 Much ado about crime counting and interpretation	157
9.1.3 Murder: As good as it gets	159
9.1.4 Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA).....	164
9.2 The potential crime reduction effect of SAPS high-density operations: A study of SAPS station-level data, 1994/95 – 2014/15	166
9.2.1 Study objective.....	166
9.2.2 Research method	166
9.2.3 Sample design	169
9.3 Results	172
9.3.1 Trends in annual reported cases of murder.....	172
9.3.2 Trends in annual reported cases of IPFA	174
9.3.3 Trajectory pattern types	176
9.3.4 Analysis: Association between murder and IPFA	179
9.4 Discussion	182
9.4.1 Potential crime reduction effect of SAPS high density operations.....	182
9.4.2 Absence of an inverse association	183
9.5 Conclusion	187
Chapter 10: Conclusion	189

10.1 Boundaries, othering and crime control in South Africa	189
10.2 High-density operations and the reduction in violent crime in post-apartheid South Africa.....	190
10.3 Police frontierism	191
10.3.1 <i>Defining police frontierism</i>	192
10.3.2 <i>Varieties of police frontierism</i>	193
10.4 Looking forward: The policing of boundaries in a future South Africa.....	196
Bibliography	199
Appendixes	284
Appendix 1: Average annual reported murders: 1994/95 – 2014/15 for the 133 sample of high crime station areas.....	285
Appendix 2: Average annual reported cases of IPFA: 1994/95 – 2014/15 for the 133 sample of high crime station areas.....	286
Appendix 3: Line charts - Annual cases of murder & IPFA (132 station areas)	287
Appendix 4: Listing of 34 police areas where apparent immediate inverse relationships between IPFA and murder were observable	306

List of tables and charts

Table 5.1: Arms and Ammunition confiscated by the SAP, 1922 Rand Strike	60
Table 6.1: Massacres allegedly perpetrated by SAP, 1984-1989	78
Chart 6.1: Firearm licence approvals: 1984-1990	87
Chart 6.2: Reported loss and theft of licensed firearms	89
Chart 6.3: Armed robbery rates per 100,000 (1987-1992)	89
Chart 6.4: Firearm homicide rates per 100,000 (1983-1992)	89
Chart 6.5: Percentages of types of firearms used to commit murder and attempted murder where a conviction was secured	90
Chart 6.6: Illegal possession of firearms by non-whites and SAP response	91
Table 6.2: Firearm Units' firearm and ammunition seizures	92
Table 7.1: SAPS 169 high crime priority station areas	101
Chart 7.1: Murder of SAPS personnel 1994/95-2014/15	103
Chart 7.2: Border Police firearm seizures, 1997/1998 to 2014/2015	111
Table 7.2: Operation Rachel 1995-2008	112
Table 7.3: IFIU location and personnel numbers	117
Chart 7.3: Firearms recovered by the IFIUs: 1994-1996	119
Chart 7.4: SAPS Firearm loss and theft: 2001/2002 to 2014/2015	120
Table 7.4: Loss/theft of SAPS firearms from high violent crime SAPS station areas: 2005/2006-2010/2011	120
Chart 7.5: Loss/theft of SAPS firearms vs. recoveries of SAPS firearms, 2004/05-2014/15	123
Table 8.1: Major SAPS operations timeline, 1996-2015	129
Table 8.2: Composition of the NATJOINTS	134
Table 8.3: Operation Sword and Shield – arrests ('wanted persons')	136
Chart 8.1: Number of police station areas targeted by Operation Crackdown per province	138
Table 8.4: Operation Sethunya reported successes	144
Table 8.5: SAPS focal stations for Operation Fiela-Reclaim (as at 19 June 2015)	149
Chart 8.2: Operation Fiela-Reclaim police actions: 1 April – 21 July 2015	151
Chart 8.3: South Africa: Average annual prison population: 1995-2013/14	153
Chart 8.4: Criminal cases brought before the courts: 1996/97 – 2012/12	153
Table 9.1: NVCS – Reporting incidents of murder to the SAPS	160
Chart 9.1: Total firearm homicides in South Africa: 1994-2007	162
Chart 9.2: Homicide rate in South Africa (per 100,000), 1994-2007	162
Chart 9.3: Non-natural deaths in South Africa by instrument (Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria), 1999-2008	163
Chart 9.4: IPFA total (national): 1994/95-2014/15	165
Table 9.2: High crime station areas excluded from sample	170
Table 9.3: Treatment sample - 132 high crime SAPS station areas	171
Table 9.4: Elevated IPFA levels and national SAPS high-density operations	175
Chart 9.5: General trajectory pattern types - murder and IPFA	178
Table 9.5: Trajectory pattern type by SAPS station area	178
Figure 10.1: Varieties of police frontierism	196

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List of Acronyms

AAA	Arms and Ammunition Act
ACCU	Area Crime Combating Unit
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
ATM	Automatic Teller Machine
BOPE	Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais
CAS	Crime Administration System
CCI	Crime Combatting and Investigation
CCU	Crime Combatting Unit
CCTG	Crime Combatting Task Group
CIAC	Crime Information Analysis Centre
CMR	Cape Mounted Rifles
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CFR	Central Firearms Registry
CPF	Community Policing Forum
DA	Democratic Alliance
DFO	Designated Firearm Officer
DPCI	Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation
EU	European Union
FAMP	Frontier Armed and Mounted Police
FCA	Firearms Control Act
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIU	Firearm Investigation Unit
GFSA	Gun Free South Africa
GIS	Geographical Information System
IBIS	Integrated Ballistics Identification System
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
IFIU	Illegal Firearm Investigation Unit
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
ILP	Intelligence-led Policing
IPFA	Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISD	Internal Stability Division
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JASA	Justice Alliance of South Africa
KZP	KwaZulu Police
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MRC	Medical Research Council
NATJOC	National Joint Operational Centre
NATJOINTS	National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
NCCS	National Crime Combatting Strategy
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NFA	National Firearm Agreement

NFP	National Firearm Plan
NIMSS	National Injury Mortality Surveillance System
NP	National Party
NPA	National Peace Accord
NWMP	North West Mounted Police
OB	Ossewabrandwag
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PIA	Protection of Information Act
POP	Problem-oriented Policing
PROVJOC	Provincial Joint Operational Centre
PROVJOINT	Provincial Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure
PWV	Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SAC	South African Constabulary
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAHA	South African History Archive
SAMR	South African Mounted Riflemen
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SAR	South African Republic
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SB	Security Branch
SDU	Self-Defence Unit
SWA	South West Africa
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNISA	University of South Africa
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UPP	Unidades the Polícia Pacificadora
US	United States
VPUU	Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading
WHAM	Winning Hearts and Minds
WHO	World Health Organization

Abstract

Social and territorial boundaries have been fundamental to the approaches and practices of policing bodies in South Africa for centuries, from the mounted colonial paramilitary forces of the 1800s to the 21st century professional police. Boundaries have not only been a central mechanism that the police have consistently used to control and regulate the general population, but have also been catalysts for change in terms of operational policing strategies and tactics. This has typically been the case when a threat has been ascribed to a bounded area and/or populations that reside within the confines of the boundary, or on the other side of the boundary. The nature of the such a threat is considered to be even more severe when communities within the bounded space, or on the other side of the boundary, acquire significant quantities of firearms and ammunition, as this provides such populations with the lethal technology to defy and contest the police's coercive authority and ability to conserve boundaries relating to the maintenance of order and the enforcement of laws.

South Africa is a distinctly relevant case study for an examination of the relationship between boundaries and the police as for the past three and a half centuries South Africa's diverse policing history has been profoundly framed by territorial, social and political boundaries. The police and the proto-police have been at the sharp edge of the application of authority by assorted forms of government, and have often acted to safeguard the interests of economic and political elites. That is, the police and formal policing bodies have been required to subdue and suppress groups and individuals that resisted or threatened the process of state building and resource extraction. The police were also regularly deployed to protect the territorial borders of South Africa from menacing others.

By means of this historical analysis of South Africa, this thesis introduces a new concept, 'police frontierism', which illuminates the nature of the relationships between the police, policing and boundaries, and can potentially be used for future case study research. It is an alternative way of conceptualising policing, one in which police work is fundamentally framed by social and territorial boundaries. Such boundaries delineate perceived safe or 'civilised' spaces from dangerous or 'uncivilised' ones. The police tend to concentrate their resources in the frontier zone immediately adjacent to the boundary in order to preserve or extend the boundary of safety and 'civilisation', and restrict, subdue or eliminate those individuals, groups or circumstances from the 'uncivilised' spaces that a government authority or elites have deemed to be a threat to order and peace.

An essential dynamic of this policing approach is that the boundary and the adjoining frontier zone strongly influence police practices and behaviour in this context. In particular, territorial and social delineations amplify and distort existing police prejudices against those communities on the other side of the boundary. The police often engage in othering, where the communities of interest are viewed negatively, and are predominantly seen as agents of disorder and law breaking. This othering may lead to an intensification of aggressive police behaviour towards the targeted communities.

Preface

The idea for this thesis was born out of a tapestry of first-hand observations, personal musings and published scribblings about firearm control and firearm violence in South Africa and other African countries over a period of 15 years (1998-2013). During this time I was working under the auspices of two South African-based think tanks, namely the Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Institute for Security Studies, both of which required of me to frequently traverse most of sub-Saharan Africa. During these travels I undertook research and interacted with government officials, civil society organisations and ordinary people on firearms-related issues. I was also privileged to have been able to frequently participate in the high-level United Nations discussions and negotiations in New York and Geneva with government representatives on how to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

One of the most insightful experiences was a six-year collaboration (2006-2011) with police officials responsible for firearm control in Southern African countries through the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). The principal area of engagement was the development of standard operating procedures for the implementation of Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials (2001). For me, a key insight gained from this involvement with SARPCCO was that firearm control legislation has little or no effect unless there is the necessary government backing, as well as specialised police personnel that are willing and capable to implement such legislation.

Another influential element underpinning this thesis is an unpublished think piece on firearms and borders in Southern Africa that I penned on the behest of Professor Peter Vale. The paper was subsequently presented at a small scholarly gathering in Paris organised by the US-based Social Science Research Council in 2000. The basic argument was that firearms had played a fundamental role in making and maintaining state borders in Southern Africa. There was a lively debate about this premise after a leisurely lunch of delectable French cuisine and fine red wine, and consequently I was enthused to engage in more intellectualising and research on this theme. However, other commitments and distractions got in the way. A doctoral thesis therefore seemed to be an ideal opportunity to revisit this idea more than a decade later.

Despite having authored a variety of publications on firearm violence and control, this thesis is nonetheless an entirely new piece of work. It has been researched and written over a three-year period in which I have made use of every available spare moment in and amongst full-time work commitments and family life. Aspects of earlier versions of this thesis have been presented at four conferences between 2014 and 2017. To date, parts of this thesis have also formed the basis of two publications: a chapter in the Oxford Textbook on Violence Prevention edited by Cathy Ward and Peter Donnelly in 2015; and an article in *Sur – International Journal on Human Rights* that Daniel Mack, a fellow arms control activist and researcher, prodded me into writing (also in 2015).

Chapter 1: Introduction

It is widely acknowledged across various academic disciplines, particularly in sociology and criminology, that the police are the coercive vanguard of state authority within the confines of the state's territory. That is, in most countries the police are the preeminent government body that has the sanctioned right to use violence as a means to maintain order and enforce the law within the borders of the state. In this regard, the law (and the interpretation thereof) creates the distinction between non-offenders and offenders, with most of coercive resources of the police being directed towards the latter. The police are also one of the essential guardians of the state's territorial borderlines where they seek to prevent the entry of persons and goods that have been determined by government authorities to be unwelcome and dangerous.

Hence, the police are often popularly portrayed as the 'thin blue line' between order and chaos, in which they protect the innocent and guarantee public safety (Brogden, 2005, Glaser and Parker, 2001, Terrill, et al., 2003); and are the definitive security cordon that makes civilisation possible (Critchley, 1978). Moreover, numerous national police organisations have incorporated the notion of a thin blue line into their institutional insignias as an emblematic representation of the primacy of this guardian role. However, the boundary roles of the police extend beyond wardenship to also include the construction and dissolution of boundaries.

In pursuing its law and order mandate the police systematically divide their territorial areas of responsibility into clearly identifiable and distinctively named administrative sub-parts, such as districts, sectors, zones, precincts and 'beats'. Police resources and personnel are subsequently allocated to these various sub-parts on the basis of the perceived policing needs and priorities. These areas are extensively mapped, and the maps are prominently displayed in rooms used by police strategists and decision-makers. These maps are then overlaid with key information concerning criminal offending, and crime hot spots are highlighted (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005). Due to the systematic and cohesive nature of most institutional police cultures (Foster, 2003), police personnel are acutely conscious of such territorial boundaries, and the police names and terms that have been ascribed to these areas tend to be assimilated into the internal police lexicon. Moreover, as portrayed by Holdaway (1983), areas (or 'the ground') assigned to police stations to administer can be viewed by those police that patrol them as their territory into which no police from other areas may enter without their consent.

Both crime control and crime prevention, which are principal vocations of the police, presuppose crime to be a tangible, bounded phenomenon that can be restrained, tamed or even forestalled. In the case of crime prevention, the police ultimately seek to eradicate the frontier between criminality and non-criminality by implanting a series of measures that will result in a "non-event" being secured (Forrester, et al., 1990:44). That is, the absence of criminal offending, but such

offending would have occurred if the crime prevention measures had not been implemented (Welsh and Farrington, 2012:128). In particular, some of the most prominent crime prevention approaches to policing, namely problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, and place-based policing are essentially applied within the context of a definable and bounded physical space.

Problem-oriented policing seeks to methodically identify and intricately analyse varieties and clusters of problems within a community that may ultimately result in criminality and disorder (Goldstein, 1990). Intelligence-led policing seeks to detect, reduce and disrupt criminal activity by locating intelligence at the heart of police decision-making. Intelligence-led policing places a strong emphasis on the gathering and analysis of pertinent information about criminals and criminality (Ratcliffe, 2008) in explicit geographical areas in order to devise and implement effective policing strategies where they are “expected to yield highest dividends” (Tilley, 2006:313). Place-based approaches counsel the police to locate geographical areas with high concentrations of crime at the centre of their strategies and practices (Braga, et al., 2011), and then concentrate their skills and resources in relation to these areas, rather than distributing the resources evenly over their entire territorial jurisdiction (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005).

Police culture, actions and branding contribute towards the construction and maintenance of a social boundary between police organisations and the populations they are required to police. That is, the police have often tended to behave in a detached fashion towards civilians, and are suspicious of non-police persons (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, Terrill, et al., 2003). They wear a badge and/or a unique uniform, and mostly drive clearly identifiable vehicles. In some instances the police even reside within their own barracks, separated from mainstream society. These distinctive police features are considerably more evident when the police are deployed in response to incidents of public disorder, such as volatile protest action. In such circumstances the police will often be armed with shields, body armour and an array of weaponry, and behave in an aggressive manner as they advance in linear formation to disperse or quell the unrest.

The police are often not neutral or benign, especially in the manner in which they dispense violence (or the threat thereof) in the name of policing. Consequently, the police are feared in many contexts (Bittner, 1970). In unequal and heterogeneous societies the police regularly impose a plethora of less palpable dividing lines relating to the governance of class, race and ethnicity. Scholars and public commentators in the United States (US), for example, have frequently noted the discriminatory disparity in the coercive practices of various police organisations towards different racial and ethnic groups. In some US cities, such as Los Angeles, Miami and Ferguson, the police have employed considerably more coercive practices against African American and Hispanic ethnic minorities than compared to the Caucasian population (Escobar, 1999, Hawkins and Thomas, 1991, Kienscherf, 2014). In other countries an entire ethnic or racial group was systematically criminalised at one time, such as was the case with black populations living in South Africa under apartheid rule (Brewer, 1994) and in Rhodesia (Good, 1974); Jews in Nazi occupied countries during World War II

(such as in Hungary and Poland)(Cole, 2003); and Aboriginal populations in Australia (Chan, 1996, Cunneen, 2001).

Marxist scholars have frequently asserted that the police have been an instrument of upholding ruling class hegemony, and ensuring their control over labour (Haas, 1982, Robinson and Scaglione, 1987, Storch and Engels, 1975). This is supported by countless historical examples of the police harrying trade union movements and breaking workers strikes violently, and at times even using lethal force. The Marikana massacre that took place in August 2012 in South Africa's platinum mining belt is an apt example. In this instance 34 striking miners were fatally shot and 78 were wounded by a large contingent of well-armed police personnel during an unprotected strike. Evidence uncovered by journalists and researchers has suggested that some of the deceased had possibly been executed by the police (Marinovich, 2012). Both published research and documentary films have strongly suggested that the police, acting in "toxic collusion" (Mpofu, 2012) with mine owners and national government, adopted this strong-armed approach in an attempt to discourage widespread destabilisation of the social boundary arrangements between mine workers and mining elites (Alexander, et al., 2012, Desai, 2014, Dixon, 2014).

Despite the broad recognition in mainstream police scholarship that territorial, social and cultural boundaries are fundamental to both the police as an organisation and police work, there has been little consideration of the texture, potency and fluidity of such boundaries. Boundaries are typically presented as being part of the context and interactions of policing, with their significance being largely understated. However, as noted by human geographers, boundaries are dynamic spatial expressions of power, and have the capacity to, amongst other faculties, delineate, limit and control interactions between people, as well as people's access to resources and opportunities within social spaces (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, Minghi, 1963, Sibley, 1995).

Boundaries are particularly potent when they are combined with the abject othering of bounded spaces and the people therein. This often translates into a social ordering expressed in terms of inclusion and exclusion (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002) that frequently leads to the depersonalisation, stigmatisation and vilification of the bounded area and community therein by the boundary makers and boundary enforcers (Sibley, 1998, van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002). More severe othering usually manifests when the delimited space and population are perceived to be threatening (Bauman, 1997). In this regard, boundary architects and boundary defenders have employed excessive violence against the othered groups within othered spaces in order to diminish or eliminate the apparent threats they present.

The police are a key instrument of violent bounded othering, particularly in relation to places occupied by concentrations of individuals and groups that have been identified as being a nuisance, unruly, criminal or extremist. Moreover, this boundary work is not uniform as the police use varying forms and degrees of violence over time in relation to the severity of perceived or actual threats

presented by othered places and people. For instance, low levels of criminality in a particular neighbourhood may result in a small number of random police patrols where suspected criminals are stopped and searched by the police. However, rioting in the same neighbourhood will normally lead to the deployment of large numbers of police personnel who may use lethal force to assault, and possibly even shoot those involved. Therefore the concept of the 'thin blue line' is arguably a misnomer, as the boundary resources and efforts of the police expand and contract over time in relation to othered spaces and the actual or perceived dangers that they present. Furthermore the edges of the 'blue line' can vary between being smooth and jagged, depending on the degrees of violence used by the police.

The availability of firearms within othered spaces and amongst othered communities has the tendency to significantly heighten the threat profile of such people and places for the police. That is, when operating in such othered areas the police are at increased risk of being injured or killed. In addition, the specific populations that the police seek to control tend to become less amenable to the law enforcement and order maintenance efforts when armed with firearms. The police typically respond by making use of more protective equipment, such as bulletproof vests and armoured vehicles (Hill and Beger, 2009, Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). They also tend to employ more belligerent and militarised strategies. In addition, police personnel are more extensively armed, and often tend to discharge their firearms when threatened (Warren and James, 2000). Consequently, most governments, and the police in particular, take extraordinary measures to prevent or restrict othered groups, or people living in othered spaces, from acquiring firearms. This can take the form of restrictive firearm control legislation and disarmament measures.

The central premise of this thesis is that within the operational environment of policing, boundaries profoundly influence the strategies and actions of the police, particularly when combined with the othering of populations and individuals on the other side of the boundary or within the bounded space. In some instances threatening dynamics beyond the boundary directly contribute to changes in police structures and policing methods. This is particularly the case when bounded othered communities acquire significant quantities of firearms and ammunition, as such weapons provide the othered populations with the lethal technology to more vigorously defy and contest the police's coercive authority and ability to conserve boundaries relating to the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the law.

South Africa is a distinctly relevant case study for an in-depth examination of the relationship between boundaries and the police, as for the past three and a half centuries South Africa's diverse policing history has been profoundly framed by territorial, social and political boundaries. The police and the proto-police have continuously been at the sharp edge of the application of authority by assorted forms of government, and have often acted to safeguard the interests of political and economic elites. That is, the police and formal policing bodies have been required to subdue and suppress groups and individuals that resisted or threatened the process of state building and resource extraction. The police were

also regularly deployed to protect the territorial borders of South Africa from menacing others.

Between the late 1600s and the early 1900s, armed policing bodies, often in cooperation with the military, were central to protecting and extending the borders of territories that the colonial authorities and affiliated commercial entities sought to control. Such policing was militarised, racially biased and violent. Populations, particularly indigenous groups that resisted the consolidation and expansion of colonial control over the territories that now constitute the Republic of South Africa were pacified and disarmed. Colonial policing bodies were also central to ensuring the preservation of racial and class boundaries, namely white settler dominance over other racial groups, and the growth of the capitalist economy.

A centrally organised professional police force was established shortly after the unification of South Africa in 1910. Apart from crime control responsibilities, this police organisation was one of the preeminent bulwarks of white political and economic hegemony as the police were mandated to implement an array of coercive measures that sought to continue to suppress and disempower other racial groups, particularly black South Africans. Related to this, the police were also the frontline prefects of enforcing laws and policies that restricted the movement of black South Africans between rural and urban areas, which was a method of maintaining order, and ensuring sufficient cheap labour for the economy, particularly in the mining and manufacturing sectors. The police frequently fought beside the military against liberation movements and their affiliates, and sought to contain unrest in black townships.

The police in South Africa were reconfigured after the 1994 all-race democratic elections. In the context of elevated levels of violent crime the police devoted most of their energies to stemming and combatting such criminality. Day-to-day policing resources were skewed in favour of wealthier areas. This was primarily an attempt to stem the high levels of violent crime from spilling over from poorer zones where it was concentrated, namely urban and peri-urban townships and informal settlements, into more upmarket suburbs and business districts. In such high crime places the police's foremost crime combatting strategy was the use of large-scale, high-density 'saturation' operations, which were often undertaken in conjunction with the military. Such operations prioritised the arrest of large numbers of suspected offenders and the confiscation of contraband, especially firearms.

The control of firearms has historically been a key matter of concern for policing bodies and the police in South Africa. Between the 1650s and the early 1990s the government authorities generally sought to prevent black people from acquiring firearms. The reason for this was that access to such lethal technology would more substantially enable black people to challenge the discriminatory political and social boundaries relating to race and class. Hence the police were at the forefront of restricting access to firearms and disarming those populations considered to be a threat to the political and socio-economic status quo.

There were, however, some incongruities in the execution of this racially partisan firearm control regime. Over the centuries a small minority of black South Africans, which were considered to be loyal to the dominant political authority, were permitted to lawfully possess firearms. Such concessions essentially had boundary preservation objectives, as these individuals were required to use their firearms to enforce and even defend colonial and apartheid discriminatory laws and policies. Furthermore, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, the police clandestinely armed cultural and criminal groups within some black and coloured communities in an attempt to undermine the mobilisation efforts of anti-apartheid organisations. The liberation movements, such as the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, countered these underhanded police tactics by smuggling arms to their members and sympathisers in conflict-affected areas.

By the early 1990s illegal firearms were widely available in most urban townships and informal settlements, which led to a dramatic escalation in criminality and interpersonal violence in these areas. Such criminality, especially various forms of armed robbery, also began to affect a number of wealthier spaces that had traditionally experienced lower levels of crime. In an effort to curtail this crime wave and prevent a further blurring of boundaries between safe and dangerous places, the police prioritised the seizure of illegal firearms and the arrest of those persons that were unlawfully in possession of firearms.

Given South Africa's history of policing and current state of affairs described above, this thesis primarily seeks to analyse how boundaries have influenced the operational approaches of the police in South Africa, and what impact these policing approaches have had on violent crime. In pursuing this objective, this thesis will be comprised of a further nine chapters.

Chapter 2 is comprised of a literature review that considers the relevant literature on the relationship between the police, policing and boundaries. Both relevant international and South African literature is reviewed. Chapter 3 contains the theoretical and conceptual framework. Chapter 4 includes an explanation of the research methodology that was used. A history of the policing of boundaries with a particular focus on firearm control from the early colonial period until the establishment of the Union of South Africa (1910) is discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains a historical analysis of how the police enforced and maintained various boundaries during the post-unification and apartheid periods (1910-1994). Chapter 7 comprises an assessment of the creation of the SAPS and the nature of police boundary work in post-apartheid South Africa, and includes a focus on firearm controls as a boundary control mechanism (1994-2016). Chapter 8 contains a detailed account of the major high-density police operations that the SAPS have pursued in high crime areas since 1994/5. Chapter 9 examines the potential impact that SAPS high-density operations may have had on murder levels in 132 high crime police station areas between 1994/95 and 2014/15. Chapter 10 comprises some concluding remarks on the relationship between the police and boundaries in South Africa the implications thereof for conceptualising and understanding the police and policing in general.

Chapter 2: Literature review

This chapter is comprised of a literature review that seeks to ascertain the state of knowledge on the relationship between various boundary manifestations and the police. In particular, it seeks to assess the extent to which theory, evidence and analyses have contributed to our understanding of the ways in which the many facets of police work are shaped by, and shape, real and abstract boundaries. The pertinent scholarship is diverse and is scattered across several academic disciplines, such as criminology, geography, history, sociology, anthropology, psychology and political studies. Given this considerable diversity and multiplicity of the publications on this topic it was not possible to explore every nook and cranny of academic writing on boundaries and the police. Hence this chapter principally appraises the relevant criminology and human geography literature, but also takes into consideration key texts from other academic fields where appropriate.

In this regard, this chapter reviews the literature that relates to the following six policing-related themes namely: pre-professional policing; colonial policing; national territorial borders and policing; police culture; counterinsurgency policing; and place-based policing. In so doing it will seek to identify common characteristics and dynamics concerning the relationship between boundaries and the police that will frame and inform the South African case study in the later chapters of this thesis. Given that firearm control is a key consideration of this thesis, the literature on the relationship between firearm availability, policing and boundaries is also considered in this chapter.

Across all the themes there is a distinct Anglo-American bias in the literature given that the study of the police and boundaries have traditionally been dominated by scholars from North American and British universities. There are however some publications that focus on other geographical contexts, particularly Latin America and Australia, which will also be included in this literature review. The modest body of research on policing and the police in South Africa, which is predominantly historical and ethnographic in nature, has also been included and referenced where applicable in this chapter.

2.1 Pre-professional policing and the boundaries of human communities

The link between boundaries and policing predates the emergence of the professional police in the early 19th century. Public and private policing bodies tended to materialise with the establishment of large human settlements with the mandate of maintaining order and providing protection from suspicious and predacious outsiders. The literature on these early forms of policing is mostly limited to examining and describing policing practices in medieval England. Scholarly writings suggest that most communities in England at the time were self-policed through a system of social controls, such as customs and patronage obligations to the landed aristocracy and the Crown, principally tithing and pledging. Tithing, for example, required community members to declare that they would not steal, and would timeously inform the authorities of any known thievery. Pledging entailed community members undertaking “to stand as

security for other villagers in a variety of circumstances at the manorial court...[including the] guarantee of good behaviour" (Postles, 1996:419). Those community members who were negligent of their crime control responsibilities were liable for a fine that was administered by representatives of the Crown (Griffiths, 2010, Lee, 1901, Rawlings, 2006).

The literature on policing in medieval England generally depicts a country in which villages and towns, due to their policing measures, were distinctive places of relative order and safety. The countryside, by contrast, was portrayed as a foreboding and unruly space that was inhabited by dangerous others who had been banished and shunned by 'civilised' communities. Frequent references are made to travellers on roads being harassed and robbed by armed bandits and highwaymen (Carpenter, 1983, Hanawalt, 1998, Summerson, 1979). Similar representations of this urban-rural juxtaposition are also made in the published texts on social control and policing in western continental Europe during the Middle Ages (Emsley, 1983) (Dean, 2014); in the 'Old West' frontier period in North America (McGrath, 1987, White, 1981); and in Mexico in 19th century (Frazer, 2006, Vanderwood, 1992).

Towards the end of the 13th century, plague, famine and excessive exploitation of the peasantry in England by the aristocracy and clergy weakened the social cohesiveness of many communities. There is relative consensus among policing historians that these socio-economic conditions resulted in the greater mobility of the population of England, and hence an increase in the relative size of populations of strangers, outsiders and foreigners. This in turn contributed to increased insecurity and fear of crime in many villages, towns and cities (Lee, 1901, Palmer, 1993, Rawlings, 2006). These threatening developments on the other side of the boundary of civility motivated King Edward I to proclaim the Statute of Winchester (1285), which activated a more widespread regulation and formalisation of policing functions. These were to be administered by a series of Crown representatives, such as justices of the peace, constables and sheriffs. The Statute also led to watchmen (or night watch) becoming an integral component of community security (Summerson, 1992).

A large proportion of the literature of pre-19th century policing focuses on the watchmen, which were specifically established to maintain order and enforce the law within the clearly definable boundaries of boroughs, wards and parishes under the supervision of constables. Watchmen, who were typically enlisted from, or underwritten by the local community, guarded the gates of these communities, and patrolled the streets enforcing after dark curfews (Tobias, 1972). These communities widely regarded outsiders as the greatest threat to their safety, with the watchmen being required, by order of the King, to arrest any strangers encountered after sunset that could not verify their identities. Therefore, most historians writing on this topic imply that the watchmen acted as a type of shield against the terrors of the night, although their level of efficiency and effectiveness has been a moot point (Beattie, 2001, Reynolds, 1998).

There has been considerable scholarly debate concerning the impetus behind the emergence of the professional police, more specifically the creation of Metropolitan Police in London in 1829 by an Act of Parliament. The literature has been categorised as being broadly comprised of two schools of thought, which Palmer (1988) has titled: consensual and conflict. Both intellectual camps nonetheless concur that major societal shifts within England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries had rendered the watchmen system to be largely inadequate. That is, within many communities the traditional boundaries of policing had become porous as the watchmen and constables could no longer sufficiently regulate the movement of outsiders, as well as maintain adequate order within their spheres of control (Palmer, 1993). The authorities in many North American cities were confronted by similar social problems in the mid-1800s, and consequently adopted more organised, public-funded policing approaches based on the Metropolitan Police model (Moore and Kelling, 1983).

Consensual police historians suggest that the formation of the Metropolitan Police was primarily motivated by the need for a more impartial and proficient policing service in the face of perceived rising crime levels in London (Beattie, 2012, Crichtley, 1978, Palmer, 1988, Reith, 1938). According to Emsley (2014:16), at the time “more and more crime and disorder were regarded as things which should not exist in civilised society”. Researchers and commentators also point to the emergence of specialised commercial policing ventures in London in the early 19th century to target theft and robbery (such as the Bow Street Runners and the Thames River Police), as evidence to support this argument. Historians of the conflict school, however, have suggested that the Metropolitan Police principally emerged as a result of class conflict driven by the industrial revolution and the rapid population expansion within London that subsequently led to an increase in public disorder and radicalism (Hart, 1965, Miller, 1999, Palmer, 1988).

Following the creation of the centralised Metropolitan police, most of the literature contends that the traditional policing boundary work of crime control was consolidated, and extended to the edges of the city in a more coordinated fashion, with regular patrols being conducted both during the day and night. The mounted patrolling of the main thoroughfares into London within a 20-mile radius of the city, which had been initiated by the Bow Street Runners in 1758, was strengthened under the Metropolitan Police (Roth, 1998). Public disorder, such as riots, was also more effectively contained (Emsley, 2006, Smith, 1985).

As argued by Storch (1976:481), the modern police became an “all purpose lever of urban discipline” targeting the unruly commercial and leisure undertakings of the working class (such as drinking in public, cock fighting and prostitution), not only in London, but in other English cities too. Furthermore, districts frequented by the ‘dangerous classes’, namely the poor, immigrants and undesirables, received a disproportionate amount of police attention, including raids and mass arrests. In Liverpool for example, Brogden (1991:3) noted that a “police cordon sanitaire [was] drawn around the disreputable slums (‘rookeries’)”. Therefore some of the literature with a class emphasis has suggested that the early professional police were akin to apostles of order, as by policing public spaces in

such a forthright manner, they were ultimately seeking to advance the urban frontiers of civility as a means to domesticate disorderly spaces (Ignatieff, 1979, Inwood, 1990, Jones, 1983, Storch, 1976).

Scholars have pointed out that similar developments and trends were observable in major cities in the US in the 19th century (Johnson, 1979, Liebman and Polen, 1978, Uchida, 2015). That is, pervasive social crises and moral panics contributed to the creation of more distinct police bodies that focused on crime control and order maintenance. Researchers that have applied a class analysis in this regard have suggested that the creation of the police was principally driven by capitalist considerations, namely the need for a cheap and compliant workforce for the booming economy (Harring, 1976).

As with policing in England, writings on the 'new' police in US cities have indicated that the police frequently targeted and were more aggressive towards outsiders, strangers and those who did not adhere to community norms, particularly ethnic minorities (Kelling and Moore, 1988). Many of the police organisations were also compelled to enforce a series of moral codes, such as against drunkenness, vagrancy and prostitution. However, these social mores were inconsistently applied given excessive levels of corruption within police departments in a number of major cities (Monkkonen, 1981).

2.2 Colonial policing

It is widely recognised in the colonial policing literature that notions of territory and the boundaries between territories yielded different policing methods by colonial authorities, especially in Africa and Asia. These boundaries were determined by the nature of the terrain that the colonisers sought to occupy and traverse, as well as their commercial and political interests, combined with the available coercive capacity. There is consensus in the literature that there was a town-and-country differentiation in policing approaches. That is, policing resources were concentrated in major towns with urban policing bodies devoting their energies to surveillance, order maintenance and crime prevention. In the hinterland, however, policing bodies were the frontline of preserving and enforcing colonial interests (Baker, 2008, Brogden, 1987, Cole, 1999, Johnston, 1996).

Fanon (2004:3) succinctly sums up the nature of the relationship between boundaries and the security forces of the colonial administration as follows: "The colonized world is a world divided in two. The dividing line, the border, is represented by the barracks and the police stations. In the colonies, the official, legitimate agent, the spokesperson for the colonizer and the regime of oppression, is the police officer or the soldier". Similarly, Anderson and Killingray (1991:2), two of the most distinguished scholars in this field surmise: "The colonial policeman – be he a European officer or a local native recruit – stood at the cutting edge of colonial rule".

Scholars of colonial policing have consistently claimed that the uncertain and distant nature of the territorial frontier of the colony that was in close proximity

to hostile and uncivilised 'natives' necessitated a mobile and militarised policing model. Soldiers often performed police work, or the police were backstopped by the military. These frontier policing bodies frequently used force to impose imperial authority, as well as facilitated and protected access to markets for colonial authorities and commercial enterprises. The sparseness of the frontier necessitated that these policing entities had to be highly mobile, and hence most were on horseback (Ahire, 1991, Alemika, 1993, Das and Verma, 1998, Gutteridge, 1970, Killingray, 1986, Killingray, 1991, McCracken, 1992, Roth, 1998, Tankebe, 2008). Therefore, it is generally implied in the literature that territorial boundaries, combined with negative notions of 'others' that resided beyond or in close proximity to colonial frontier, had an impact on the characteristics of both policing culture and policing behaviour.

Models of policing varied between colonial administrations (Arnold, 2008, Mawby, 2008), but in general the colonial policing entities were typically required: "to delegitimise indigenous customs; to impose centralized social control; and to incorporate local society as a branch of imperial society" (Brogden, 1987:10). Furthermore, they were also the prefects of tax and trade controls; reinforced the authority of indigenous groups that were allied to the colonial government; and even facilitated the further territorial extension of the colony and the 'civilisation' of indigenous populations (Anderson and Killingray, 1992). In some instances these frontier forces massacred specific othered population groups, as was the case with: the San ('Bushmen') in Southern Africa (Penn, 2013); Aborigines in Tasmania (Reynolds, 2001); and the *Tejanos*¹ in Texas (Johnson, 2005).

However, the available settler policing personnel for the frontier policing forces was typically meagre relative to the size of the territory to be policed, which meant that "the maintenance of the 'thin blue line'...[became] a conjuring trick of enormous proportions" (Anderson and Killingray, 1991:5), which required the deputation of policing resources from certain indigenous groups. Those population groups considered to be martial in outlook and loyal to the colonial power were typically recruited for policing duties, with such 'ethnic' police being deployed in many cases to act as a buffer between the settlers and those considered to be colonial subjects. In this regard, the model of 'strangers policing strangers' was often pursued, where police from one ethnic group were deployed to police another (Baker, 2008, Enloe, 1980, Finnane, 1991, Hawkins, 1991).

There is a body of North American historical literature that specifically focuses on frontier policing, particularly the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) and the Texas Rangers. These agencies plied a distinct type of militarised policing during the late 19th century on the frontline of settler migration and colonial expansion. The NWMP were deployed to enforce law and order, and clamp down on the illicit liquor and firearm trade with the Native Americans on the Canadian Prairies (Baker, 1998). This frontier force "provided a tangible and symbolic practice for the Canadian government to assert authority over the

¹ These were Texans who had originated from Mexico.

North-West by utilizing the visibility of police as a method of supporting settler expansion and promoting economic development” (Morrison, 1974). Pejorative historical records present the NWMP as being instrumental in ‘taming’ the frontier, as well as responding to, and containing the threats posed by Native American ‘savages’ (Monaghan, 2013:123).

The Texas Rangers were created to protect settlers from attacks from Native Americans and Mexicans in the unstable border regions with Mexico. The Texas Rangers became a ferocious force, and following Texas’s war of independence, became responsible for acts of brutality, including extrajudicial killings (Monaghan, 2013, Weiss, 1994). Subsequent to the imposition of the prohibition on alcohol in the US in 1920 the Texas Rangers were required to respond to the large scale smuggling of alcohol from across the border with Mexico, as well as an escalation in related banditry (Webb, 1977). Both the NWMP and the Texas Rangers were also deployed in support of coal mining companies in the late 19th century to forcefully break labour strikes and forestall the labour unionisation in frontier regions, as coal production was essential to expansion of the railway system in North America (Webb, 1977).

A further boundary theme in the colonial policing literature is that policing bodies have been described as being fundamental to the preservation of class and racial divisions. It is widely referenced that, by means of the punitive measures, policing bodies ensured an acquiescent working class to meet the requirements of the colonial economy, as well as protected the lives and property of the ruling elite from the poor that were perceived to be threatening and disorderly (Ahire, 1991, Brogden, 1987, Das and Verma, 1998, Deflem, 1994, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Tankebe, 2008). In some instances, certain ethnic or indigenous groups were specifically defined as ‘criminal’ by means of legislation, as was the case in Northern India under British imperial rule (Dinnen and Braithwaite, 2009). Moreover, Nigam (1990) suggests that class and racial boundaries were upheld through the disproportionate territorial allocation of policing resources, skewed in favour of areas where the political and commercial elites resided.

2.3 Police culture

In the extensive literature on police culture and sub-cultures there is some consensus that the formation and perpetuation of customs, attitudes, beliefs and actions of individual police personnel are shaped by the context of policing. That is, police culture(s) are derived from the amalgamation of the experience and environment of policing and the organisational culture of the police, which in turn has been informed by previous experiences of policing (Brown, 1988, Burton, 2003, Crank, 1990, Klinger, 2004, Reck, 2015). Janet Chan, for example, whose work has been influenced by concepts of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ developed by Bourdieu (1985), has found that in the context of Australian policing, “police cultural practice results from the interaction between the socio-political context of police work [the ‘field’] and various dimensions of police organizational knowledge”(Chan, 1996:109).

Scholarly work on the impact of situational factors on police behaviour in police-citizen interactions is especially relevant to this thesis as this literature sub-set implies that boundaries, particularly those associated with class, race and ethnicity, have a significant impact on how the police behave. Since the pioneering work of Skolnick (1966) and Weick (1969) there have been a multitude of studies that have sought to assess the influence of the external or operational environment on police behaviour and actions. A common finding of many of these studies is that the danger and uncertainty associated with police work underlies police behaviour and actions in operational spaces (Barker, 1998, Crank, 2004, Cullen, et al., 1983, Paoline, 2003, Reuss-Ianni, 1983, Rubinstein, 1973, Skolnick, 1994, Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, Terrill, et al., 2003, Westley, 1970).

However, the available literature indicates that in the operational environment the police do not consistently experience or perceive danger; and that policing areas are comprised of both safe and unsafe spaces, the risk profiles of which change over time. For example, with regards to the Royal Ulster Constabulary in context of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland, Brewer (1990:657) noted that "political violence occurs unevenly across the province as a result of the geographical structure to its divisions, so that the danger which members of the force face is not of equal proportion".

A similar conclusion is drawn by Holdaway (1983) in his acclaimed ethnographic research within a relatively poor UK urban policing sub-division, which was given the fictitious name of 'Hilton'. Holdaway found that the police perceived that any place could potentially be a zone of danger, but that danger was not constantly experienced throughout 'Hilton'. Nonetheless, one space was viewed as being "constantly dangerous, demanding vigilance from the officers who visit[ed] it... [namely] a hostel for homeless black youths, many of whom have been convicted for criminal offences" (Holdaway, 1983:39).

The influence of actual or perceived danger on police actions has received considerable attention in the research on police use of excessive force. In general, studies suggest that the police tend to be more violent in places that are othered by the police and/or threatening to the police. For instance, in urban areas afflicted by deep racial/ethnic inequalities which correspond with the residential segregation of racial/ethnic communities, research has revealed that there is a high probability that the police will consistently discriminate against marginalised racial/ethnic groups, at times violently. This is reportedly due to the combination of ingrained racial prejudice of dominant societal groups; institutionalised police racism; and frequent antagonistic interactions between the police and the individuals from marginalised racial/ethnic groups (Northam, 1988, Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, Terrill and Reisig, 2003, Waddington, 1999a) (Blalock, 1967, Herbert, 1996, Jacobs and O'Brien, 1998, Zauberman and Levy, 2003). Some contemporary case study examples of this dynamic include the New South Wales Police (Chan, 1996, Jacobs and O'Brien, 1998); and the Los Angeles Police Department (Escobar, 1993, Maya, 2002).

Critically there is a body of literature that attributes changes in policing strategies and tactics to an overarching threat framing with regards to dangerous policing environments and populations. For instance, studies on contemporary police militarisation in the US and the United Kingdom (UK) have suggested that the conceptualisation of a government's response to crime as a war metaphor (such as 'the war on drugs'), combined with closer police collaboration with the military, has largely driven the proliferation and widespread acceptance of paramilitary police units and military-style crime fighting methods (Fisher, 2010, Hall and Coyne, 2013, Jefferson, 1990, Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). It has also been noted that the militarisation of police also has the potential to change police attitudes and problem-solving methods, and may result in the police perceiving highly aggressive tactics "as a viable approach for handling increasingly diverse situations" (Kraska and Paulsen, 1997:267).

The literature on the criminal activities of the police has demonstrated that recurrent interactions between the police and the criminal underworld has the capacity to corrupt individual police members, and possibly even the entire police organisation (Brogden, 2005, Johnson, 1979, Punch, 1985). This dynamic is strongest with those police that operate at the frontier of the illicit economy, such as vice squads and units that are specifically designed to respond to organised crime. The reason for this is that such police personnel are in regular contact with dubious individuals and social networks that have strong interests in adversely influencing police personnel in order to mitigate the potential for disruption or termination of their criminal enterprises. In addition, this environment is often characterised by: large amounts of accessible illicit money and goods; police often having to use discretion to respond to ethically ambiguous circumstances; and a lack of adequate internal oversight mechanisms (Dombrink, 1988, Eddy, et al., 1988, Miller, 2003, Miller, 2013, Monkkonen, 1981).

Some scholars have also found that police culture has been an impediment to the significant uptake of community-oriented policing approaches. In principle such a policing approach requires the police to move away from being an aloof and a clearly bounded organisation, and work closely with community members, groupings and businesses to jointly determine solutions to neighbourhood problems. In reality this approach entails the blurring of the traditional police-community boundary, with the police being required to relinquish some decision-making authority on crime control to outsiders and non-professionals within a less structured and less predictable setting (Best and Quigley, 2003, Dicker, 1998, Glaser and Parker, 2001, Paoline, et al., 2000).

2.4 National borders and the policing of illegal flows of people and goods

The nexus of policing and boundaries features prominently in the multidisciplinary literature that links the transnational movement of illicit people and activities to national territorial border controls. A common intellectual thread in this literature is that national borders tend to become more visible, 'harder' and 'thicker' when certain flows of people and goods are deemed to be a security threat and/or a hazard by those states that are the intended

destination for the flows. As emphasised by Pickering (2004) many governments and influential conservative pressure groups in wealthy states have widely regarded these illicit flows as criminal and harmful to an established way of life. The policing response often entails an increase in the size and resources of border policing agencies.

The majority of published studies on the policing of national borders relate to government responses to undocumented migrants and drug trafficking. Furthermore these studies are principally concerned with what Andreas (2009:3) has termed the “geographical fault lines that divide rich and poor countries”, more specifically: the US-Mexico border; the exterior borders of the European Union (EU); and the edges of Australia’s territorial waters. Publications on transnational drug trafficking take into consideration a range of Latin American and Asian countries, such as Colombia, Peru, Afghanistan and Burma. Nonetheless, analyses of policing and border control in these geographical contexts are largely superficial.

In the case of the policing of the US-Mexico border there has been a significant securitisation of the US border police since the 1980s, in response to a deep-seated moral panic that the American way of life would be eroded by large scale illegal flows of drugs and immigrants from Mexico (Palafox, 2000) (Purcell and Nevins, 2005). As evidence scholars point to the dramatic increase in the Immigration and Naturalisation Service’s budget, personnel strength and arrest levels, particularly in the 1990s. In addition, there was massive investment in border control equipment and surveillance technology (Cornelius, 2001, Nevins, 2002). According to some researchers and human rights advocacy groups, these border dynamics, combined with inadequate accountability measures for the border policing agencies, have led to abusive behaviour and the excessive use of violence by border police towards undocumented migrants and drug smugglers (Hing, 1995, Huspek, et al., 1998, Trevino, 1998). A historical account of the US Border Patrol suggests that violence has been intrinsic feature of this policing body, which emerged from “the everyday politics of enforcing US immigration restrictions” (Hernandez, 2010:5).

Some scholars have identified a similar securitisation of the national territorial boundaries of EU member states. That is, there has been a significant increase in border protection resources and capabilities in numerous EU member states since the 1990s in response to concerns and moral panics about undocumented migrants, drug traffickers and suspected terrorists (Alscher, 2005, Bigo, 2001). Moreover, Lutterbeck (2004) has indicated that in response to the transnational illegal flows of people and goods many European governments have militarised their border police. There are currently no comprehensive studies of the impact of the securitisation of borders on the behaviour of border police in the EU. However, reports by human rights watchdogs have indicated that some security agencies have used excessive force in apprehending and constraining undocumented migrants (Andrijasevic, 2010, Fekete, 2005). Ethnographic research on the border police in Evros (Greece) indicated that the Greek border police often denied humanitarian assistance to undocumented migrants in the interests of protecting the Greek/EU border (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015).

In response to determined attempts by undocumented migrants and asylum seekers to reach Australian soil by boat, particularly from 2000, the Australian government securitised and criminalised the issue, and mandated the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to deter and/or detain such persons. Apprehended migrants and asylum seekers were thereafter confined to detention facilities in neighbouring Pacific island states, such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea, in order to determine if they should be granted asylum in Australia. Criminologists have pointed out that this development has had major implications for the police. Firstly, the AFP's border control responsibilities were further extended into Australia's territorial waters, which necessitated an increased police budget and further specialisation in ocean-based policing (Grewcock, 2010, Howard, 2003, Maley, 2001). Secondly, by being the frontline response in the Australian government's highly controversial policy on migrants and asylum seekers, the AFP arguably became 'politicised' (Pickering and Weber, 2013).

The existence of dynamic and symbiotic interactions between the methods of organised criminal groups that facilitate illicit flows of people and goods across national borders and responses by the border police is well documented, most notably in relation to the illegal activities over the US-Mexico border and drug smuggling from Colombia. That is, attempts by the police to fortify borders against illicit trafficking are characteristically met with more innovative responses by smugglers in order to circumvent these border protection measures. This in turn leads to further border reinforcement efforts by the police (Bright and Delaney, 2013, Campbell, 2009b, Payan, 2006). Furthermore, a number of studies have indicated that strict border control measures may lead to the centralisation and increased sophistication of organised criminal groups, which consequently presented more ominous threats to the integrity of national borders than the small-scale uncoordinated smuggling activities had previously offered (Andreas, 2001, Bagley, 1988, Shannon, 2015).

A number of scholars have indicated that some national policing authorities, recognising the difficulties of maintaining comprehensive national border control with respect to illicit flows of people and goods, have adopted transnational (or internationalised) strategies as a means to counter perceived dangers posed by such cross-border activities. Various publications have pointed to the intelligence-gathering, training, advisory and operational roles that the police of some recipient states of illegal trafficking (especially the US and Australia) have undertaken in those states that are perceived to be a source of, or intermediaries for, these cross-border activities (Hameiri, 2009, Toro, 1999) (Howard, 2003, Pickering, 2004, Weber, 2007). The transnationalisation of border control has also entailed the patrolling of international waters in order to target vessels ferrying illegal drugs and undocumented migrants (Andreas, 2003); as well as establishing multilateral, 'harmonised' policing responses with a range of other states, as has been the case in the EU (Calderoni, 2010, Sheptycki, 1995).

Likewise, studies on cross-border undocumented migrancy and organised criminal activities frequently infer that the permeability of national borders

results in those states that are the destinations for such illicit flows mandating policing bodies, or even creating specialised police agencies, to apprehend such persons and seize such contraband (Dorn and South, 1990, Maley, 2001). This in effect means that the territorial area of border enforcement is effectively shifted from the national border into the interior of the affected state (Coleman, 2007). For example, in the case of undocumented migrants, the police and specialist immigrant enforcement agencies monitor and inspect businesses where they perceive immigrants to be employed illegally (De Genova, 2002).

There is a small collection of publications that give some consideration to the relationship between national borders and the police in South Africa. As with much of the international literature, the publications focusing on South Africa are concerned with national border control in terms of organised crime and undocumented migrants. These writings generally only make passing reference to the police's borderline patrolling responsibilities and its collaboration with the South African military in this regard (Brewer, 1994, Cawthra, 1993). The collection of publications on transnational organised crime commonly bemoans the porosity of South Africa land and sea borders, and the limitations that such a state of affairs in relation to the policing of cross-border organised crime in the post-apartheid period (Gastrow, 1998, Minnaar, 2003a, Shaw, 1998).

The literature on undocumented migrants indicates that there has been considerable othering and criminalisation of such persons by both government and the general public in South Africa (Croucher, 1998, Matsinhe, 2011, Morris, 1998). There has been no comprehensive research on how the police have interacted with undocumented migrants other than minor references to the police's oppressive measures and excessive harassment of migrants (Crush, 2001, Masuku, 2006). Nonetheless, a Johannesburg-based study indicated that undocumented migrants had bribed police officials in order to avoid arrest, which was in effect a means to "purchase territorial access" (Landau and Monson, 2008:330).

2.5 Counterinsurgency policing

The literature that specifically considers the role of the police within the context of counterinsurgency (or counter-terrorism) strategies and actions has manifest boundary connotations. Such policing typically seeks to quell or restrict a collective threat or insurgency that is territorially delimited. In addition, counterinsurgency policing encapsulates some of the most extreme forms of pejorative othering. Those that are targeted by the police are often regarded as 'the enemy', and such police actions are framed as being part of a 'war' on crime, insurrection or terrorism. This form of policing is often undertaken in close collaboration with the military, which often results in a blurring of lines between these two security agencies. The counterinsurgency approach frequently entails the use of unsavoury and heavy-handed police tactics to either neutralise the threat or discourage communities from supporting those targeted by the police. As part of counterinsurgency approaches some police agencies have pursued 'hearts and minds' interventions, which were mostly socio-economic and

infrastructure projects geared towards cultivating police legitimacy within the affected communities.

A significant proportion of the publications in this area relate to Britain's counterinsurgency strategies in colonial Malaya during the 1950s. The reason being is that Malaya was one of the few cases where the police played a pivotal role in combating the anti-colonial uprisings as they were considered to be more effective in gathering intelligence; more attuned to local conditions; and were inexpensive as compared with the military (Dixon, 2009, French, 2011, Hutchinson, 1969). There was distinct use of boundary mechanisms in the Malaya campaign, in particular 'clear and hold' tactics and the creation of 'New Villages'. This entailed the deployment of vast numbers of police and soldiers into targeted areas, and the relocation and resettlement of some 500,000 dispersed local people into densely populated settlements respectively (Hack, 2009).

There is also a series of publications on counterinsurgency policing undertaken by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) during 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland between the mid 1970s and late 1990s. Such a strategy largely emerged out of the difficulties and dangers faced by the RUC in policing a divided society where the police lacked sufficient legitimacy amongst the nationalist/republican population of Northern Ireland as they had historically been disproportionately targeted by the police (Weitzer, 1995). Hence, this provided "vast scope for aggressive, paramilitary-style policing of nationalist communities" (Mulcahy, 2013:9).

Much of the scholarly literature emphasises that the RUC sought to delegitimise and emasculate the threat posed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) through the 'criminalisation' of the IRA and its actions. According to Ellison and Smyth (2000:81), the key motivation for this was to "isolate the republican movement from a wider support base". It is also underscored that the RUC became more militarised, and more focused on surveillance and infiltration in an attempt to defeat the IRA. This process subsequently led to the imprisonment of numerous IRA operatives (Feldman, 1991, Mulcahy, 2013, NiAolain, 2000, Ryder, 1989). Publications on policing in Northern Ireland also indicate that elements within the RUC (such as the Special Branch) actively colluded with those Ulster loyalist paramilitaries that perpetrated lethal attacks on suspected IRA members and supporters, as well as ordinary civilians (Rolston, 2005).

There is a modest literature on counterinsurgency policing in Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa that deals with the period between the 1960s and 1980s. It indicates that aggressive forms of militarised policing were pursued against liberation movements and their supporters. Forced population relocations, similar to the Malaya New Village system, and area-specific 'hearts and minds' programming were pursued by the police and military in Rhodesia (Cilliers, 1985) and South West Africa respectively (Herbstein and Evenson, 1989, Stiff, 2004). The publications on counterinsurgency in South Africa mostly focus on the Security Branch within the police and their methods of surveillance and intelligence gathering (which often involved torture); and their relentless

pursuit of leaders and cadres from the banned liberation movements (Cawthra, 1993, O'Brien, 2001, Prior, 1989).

A notable thematic area within the counterinsurgency policing literature that has implicit boundary dimensions is that of police death squads. The relevant publications, which have a predominant Latin American focus, characteristically emphasise the extreme violence perpetrated by such covert police groups, usually in the form of torture, assassinations and 'disappearances' of opposition leaders and activists. Scholars have intimated that death squads have tended to be active in communities where the police lacked legitimacy, and where there has been concentrated opposition to government. Hence, death squads, in an attempt to weaken support for the opposition, have used violence to terrorise such communities into submission (Campbell and Brenner, 2002, Mason and Krane, 1989, Sluka, 2000). Likewise, death squads have undertaken 'false flag' operations with the objective of undermining the credibility of opposition groups in specific areas by performing assassinations and acts of sabotage in such a manner that it appears to have been undertaken by the opposition groups (Rolston, 2005).

The work of Martha Huggins and others has also shown that death squads associated with the police have been used as a mechanism of social cleansing in the 'war on crime', in which drug peddlers, street urchins and suspected robbers have been killed by specialised police units in trouble spots in a number of Latin American countries. This has particularly been the case in Brazil (Huggins and Mesquita, 1995, Penglase, 1994). Furthermore, Huggins' research indicates that such organised extrajudicial violence may intensify and proliferate where there are acute institutional rivalries and 'turf battles' between various police agencies. This has especially been the case where "rewards of extra income, power, and prestige went to those who gathered the most valuable information in the shortest possible time" (Huggins, 1997:221).

There is a small collection of publications on police death squads in South Africa, most of which are autobiographical recollections (De Kock and Gordin, 1998) and journalistic synopses (Pauw, 1991, Pauw, 1997) of prominent members of such death squads. Some academic articles have been penned and mostly draw data from the abovementioned published first-person accounts and the evidence presented to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ellis, 1998, Gottschalk, 2000). The common analysis of the South African police death squads in these publications has been aptly portrayed by Pauw (1997:16) as follows: "They were apartheid's ultimate and most secret weapon. When all else had failed...they were sent out to finally 'solve the problem'".

2.6 Place-based and hot spots policing

An important sub-set in the academic writings on contemporary police work and boundaries is what has been termed by criminologists as 'placed-based' policing (Beck and Lee, 2002), 'hot spots' policing (Weisburd, 2008) and 'situational problem-oriented' policing (Braga, 2005). These concepts direct the police to locate those geographical areas that have high concentrations of crime at the

centre of their crime reduction strategies and practices, rather than an exclusive focus on victims and perpetrators (Tilley, 2012). That is, police are required to identify places where priority crimes are clustered and then concentrate their resources within these clearly defined areas, rather than evenly distributing the resources over their entire territorial jurisdiction (Braga, et al., 2011). The philosophy underpinning this approach asserts that such a focused police deployment escalates the apprehension risk for potential criminals (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005). The logic therefore follows that reducing crime in hot spots has the potential to reduce the overall crime rate (Nagin, 2010).

The genesis of hot spots policing scholarship has been in the US, and can be traced back to an experiment in the use of a crime prevention patrol technique in Kansas City in the early 1970s. The findings of this experiment were uninspiring, suggesting that increased and focused police patrols only had a negligible impact on crime reduction (Braga, 2005, Kelling, et al., 1974). However, the unit of analysis in this study was the neighbourhood or 'patrol beat', not hot spot. Hence, with the benefit of hindsight, a nil response was almost inevitable (Braga and Weisburd, 2010). Over the past two decades a more robust evidentiary base has accrued, predominantly derived through experimental and quasi-experimental studies, which indicate that hot spots policing can result in a noticeable reduction in crime, particularly where more proactive policing approaches are pursued (Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, et al., 2004, Sherman and Weisburd, 1995, Weisburd and Eck, 2004).

A seminal work in this area is Lawrence Sherman's 1990 theory of the deterrent effects of place-based police crackdowns, which was comprised of an examination of 18 US case studies. For Sherman, crackdowns were broadly defined as "sudden increases in officer presence, sanctions, and threats of apprehension either for specific offenses or for all offenses in specific places...with a clear goal of enhancing general deterrence of the misconduct" (Sherman, 1990:1). The crux of this theory is that crackdowns result in reductions in crime in crime hot spots by creating heightened uncertainty among offenders and potential offenders over the level of risk of apprehension if they commit criminal acts. It follows that these individuals may then overestimate the actual risk of apprehension and subsequently desist from offending in those areas (Sherman, 1990).

Sherman has now become one of the most cited scholars of policing research, and his crackdown theory has been used to study crackdowns and other types of hot spots policing (Cohen, 2011). It has also been extended and refined by Sherman and other criminologists, especially Christopher Koper, David Weisburd, Ronald Clarke and Anthony Braga, who have drawn on evidence-based studies and experiments (mentioned above).

There has been some consideration amongst scholars of the long-term strategies of place-based policing. For, Sherman (1997a), a key objective is to "regain a threshold level of public order and safety...[after which] the effectiveness of family, community, schools and the labour force could be substantially increased". However, the long-term impact of hot spots policing has not been a

focal area of scholarly investment (Tilley, 2004). Recently, however, most of these theoretical offerings have been codified into the 'Hot Spots Patrol Theory of Causing Crime Reduction Effects', as part of a concerted effort to build scholarship in the emerging area of 'evidence-based policing' (Sherman, et al., 2014, Weisburd and Telep, 2014).

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has pursued place-based policing as a central crime control philosophy since the mid-1990s. This hot spot oriented approach has been central to policing at the precinct level, but has also informed the design and implementation of regular large-scale saturation police operations in high crime areas over the past two decades. Surprisingly, the South African scholarship in this area is undeveloped, with the relevant publications mostly entailing descriptions of place-based policing, with limited analysis being provided (Burger, 2007a, Pelsner, 2000). The few more detailed exceptions relate to the SAPS' use of crime mapping to respond to criminality (Breetzke, 2006, Breetzke, 2010, Vigneswaran, 2014).

2.7 Firearm violence and firearm control

The literature on firearm violence and firearm control straddles a variety of disciplines in the health sciences, law and social sciences. Nonetheless, it has principally been in criminology and public health where the most rigorous research on this topic has been pursued. There has also been considerable overlap, as both criminology and public health are inter-disciplinary in nature, and draw on common academic rootstock, such as sociology, psychiatry and psychology. The extensive literature on firearm control does not make extensive connections with the policing and boundaries, other than in those place-based policing studies that have a specific focus on firearm crime.

There is growing scholarly consensus, in the US and in other countries that the greater the availability of firearms, the higher the risk for firearm violence, particularly in violence-prone contexts. However, causation is yet to be proved (Hemenway and Miller, 2000, Hepburn and Hemenway, 2004, Killias, 1993, Miller, et al., 2002, Sherman, et al., 2014). For example, a US study published in 2013 found that there was "a robust relationship between gun ownership and firearm homicide rates" (Siegel, et al., 2013:2102). Linked to this have been a range of studies that have indicated correlations between legislated firearm controls (particularly background checks) and reductions in firearm violence (Cook and Ludwig, 2013, Monuteaux, et al., 2015, Ruddell and Mays, 2005, Wintemute, et al., 1998, Wright, et al., 1999).

Studies in other countries have indicated that the introduction of more stringent firearm controls can result in a reduction, or an accelerated reduction in firearm homicides, as is the case of: Austria (Kalesan, et al., 2016); Australia (Kapusta, et al., 2007); Brazil (Chapman, et al., 2006); Canada (De Souza, et al., 2007, Leenaars and Lester, 1997, Leenaars and Lester, 2001); and New Zealand (Beautrais, et al., 2006). A more recent systematic review of 130 studies from ten countries found that there was a link between the "simultaneous implementation of laws targeting multiple firearms restrictions" and reductions in firearm deaths

(Santaella-Tenorio, et al., 2016:140). However, despite the wealth of research and analysis, the unknowns are immense. A 2005 review of the US research on the impact of firearm legislation/policy and firearm violence reduction, which still holds credence today, found that causality is yet to be incontrovertibly established (National Research Council, 2005).

There is currently a growing body of literature on the role of law enforcement interventions with regards to firearm crime within certain cities. Studies of a select number of proactive targeted policing interventions that focus on illegal firearms have suggested that such interventions can contribute to a reduction in firearm crime, with scholars highlighting policing operations in Kansas City, New York City, Indianapolis, Richmond, Boston and Pittsburgh (Braga, 2001, Braga and Pierce, 2005, Golden and Almo, 2004, Hahn, et al., 2005, Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006, Ludwig, 2005, Sherman and Rogan, 1995).

In the predominantly US literature on police culture some scholars have suggested that exposure to dangerous spaces and populations, namely in areas with higher levels of homicide and density of firearm availability, accounts for individual incidents of excessive use of force by police in such environments, especially firearm discharge (Fyfe, 1980, Fyfe, 1988, Jacobs and O'Brien, 1998, MacDonald, et al., 2001, Sherman and Langworthy, 1979, Terrill, 2003). This dynamic is commonly referred to as the danger-perception theory. Added to this there are studies that suggest that US police are more likely to discharge their firearm against a suspect where the suspect is armed with a weapon or there is a suspicion that he/she may be armed (Meyer, 1980, White, 2002).

There is a diverse range of publications on firearm violence and firearm controls in South Africa. This literature is mostly qualitative and includes a common boundary premise, which has been expressed in varying degrees of analytical depth, namely that firearm control by government authorities, particularly the police, has been crucial for crime prevention, injury reduction and the consolidation of state power (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008, Chetty, 2000, Gould, et al., 2004, Hansmann and Hennop, 2000, Hansson, 1998, Hennop, et al., 2001, Keegan, 2005, Kirsten, 2007, Lamb, 2008, Meek and Stott, 2004a, Minnaar, 2003a, Oosthuysen, 1996, Storey, 2008). There have been a small number of quantitative studies that have presented surveillance data on the reduction in firearm injuries and deaths in post-apartheid South Africa, which have attributed this decline to the Firearms Control Act (FCA) (2000) (Abrahams, et al., 2012, Campbell, et al., 2013, Matzopoulos, et al., 2014, Mthembu-Salter and Lamb, 2008).

Only a handful of studies have assessed operational police actions in relation to firearms (Cachalia, 2007, Chachiua, 1999, Hennop, 2001a, Hennop, 2003, Meek and Stott, 2004b). These publications have predominantly focused on the high politics of establishing the operations, and on the types of weapons and ammunition collected by the police as a consequence of these operations. However, there have been no rigorous follow-up studies or assessments of the manner in which the police have responded to firearm crime and implemented

firearm controls, especially since the promulgation of the Regulations of the Firearms Control Act (Act 60 of 2000) in 2004.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the multidisciplinary literature that gives some consideration to the interactions between boundaries and the police is noticeably varied in nature and analytical depth. It frequently suggests that various manifestations of boundaries can potentially influence the police as an organisation and police work; and likewise that boundaries can be fundamentally influenced by the actions of the police. The above selective assessment of the available literature indicates that there are six key features that characterise interactions between the police and boundaries. These six features are detailed below.

2.8.1 Police as guardians and enforcers of boundaries

Policing bodies and the police have historically been tasked with securing and guarding both territorial and social boundaries. The watchmen fortified and defended the perimeters and gates to parishes and wards in medieval England. Mounted policing forces patrolled the territorial frontiers of European colonies in order to protect settler communities. Contemporary police have regularly attempted to seal off and reinforce national land borders. Within cities the police have also been central to reinforcing and maintaining residential boundaries relating to class, race and ethnicity, especially when these residential boundaries correspond with socio-economic disparities and concentrated criminality.

2.8.2 Police as instruments of othering

The police's wardenship and enforcement of boundaries have consistently been framed by pejorative othering towards certain populations that exist in spaces beyond the boundaries. Such groups are typically considered by dominant groups in society and government to be disorderly, deviant and undesirable. In this regard the police have traditionally been primed to hound, bar and repel those othered outsiders that attempt to traverse significant boundaries, whether it be national borderlines or socioeconomic dividing lines; and pursue and dispel those that succeed in crossing over. Such populations of others include, for instance, undocumented migrants, suspected terrorists, drug smugglers and those social and racial/ethnic groups regarded as criminal or potentially criminal. The police also seek to buttress boundaries in order to prevent the infiltration of goods that have been labelled as illicit and harmful.

2.8.3 Police and the penetrability of boundaries

The penetrability of territorial and social boundaries is often determined by the actions (and inactions) of the police and other security agencies towards othered groups that exist beyond these boundaries, such as undocumented migrants, terrorists and criminalised racial groups. The actions of the police in turn are influenced by perceptions of the potential threats that such othered groups pose to the security and wellbeing of dominant societal groups and government that

reside on the inside of these boundaries. In particular, boundaries have tended to become activated and more impenetrable in times of moral panic and widespread pejorative views in relation to othered groups, with the police subsequently engaging in intense monitoring, physical bolstering and patrolling at the edges of boundaries. The police have also made boundaries more impassable by displaying aggressive boundary enforcement behaviour such as harassing, arresting and assaulting those othered persons that seek to transcend the boundaries. Likewise, boundaries are more porous for othered groups when such groups are not considered to be a significant threat to the status quo, with police boundary enforcement activities accordingly being less noticeable.

2.8.4 Beyond boundary threats and police adaptation

The perception that othered groups beyond boundaries present serious threats to government and dominant groups in society has, at times, contributed to the adaptation, and even the transformation of police organisations and police doctrine. This has subsequently led to changes in policing strategies and tactics. Such was the case in the professionalisation of the police in London and a number of US cities in the 19th century. The emergence of severe violent threats, as in the form of liberation struggles and terrorism, for example, has given rise to the counterinsurgency and militarised forms of policing. The acquisition of firearms by othered groups has tended to intensify notions of threat.

2.8.5 Danger and cross boundary policing

The police have consistently undertaken policing actions against othered population groups within spaces beyond the boundaries that they traditionally seek to secure. A significant contributing factor to the actions and behaviour of the police in these contexts has been a sense of close proximity to danger by the police. Where areas are considered dangerous, the police are more likely to behave aggressively, and may even display excessive force against the population groups they seek to police. Such danger is a combination of police prejudice towards the othered population groups and hostile behaviour from such groups. This has been exacerbated when firearms are widely available in such areas, and has typically resulted in the police being armed too. Further to this, the police have often pursued firearm seizure operations in such areas in an attempt to diminish such danger.

2.8.6 The layering of police boundary work

The guardianship and enforcement of boundaries by the police has at times been extended both beyond the actual boundary, as well as inside bounded spaces, through the construction of policing layers. This has been particularly evident in the manner in which wealthy states have policed their national borderlines. That is through constructing extraterritorial enforcement measures with other states to deter othered groups that reside well beyond the borderline; and introducing policing techniques and models within the bounded spaces that target othered people and goods (such as illegal drugs) that have been able penetrate the border.

Despite highlighting these six key features our understanding of the dynamic nexus between boundaries and the police still remains considerably limited, even within the US literature where majority of analyses and related studies have been undertaken. Hence, this area of scholarship requires considerably more scrutiny, conceptualisation and study. A South African case study is highly relevant as police organisations in South Africa have been keenly preoccupied with maintaining and enforcing both territorial and societal boundaries for centuries.

Chapter 3: Conceptual and theoretical framework

The universal assumption underpinning the idea of modern policing is that the police can deter criminal offending and maintain public order. That is, they are vested with the authority, strategies and skills to apprehend those suspected of committing a wide range of criminal acts in order for suspected offenders to be sentenced and imprisoned, or punished, if found guilty of their crimes. The logic flowing from this assumption is that the incarceration of criminal offenders would deter prospective offenders from committing crime due to the perceived risk of incarceration and punishment (Pratt, et al., 2008, Tittle and Rowe, 1974, Weisburd and Eck, 2004, Wilson, 1983). Furthermore, it has been contended that the police can also “deter crime without actually apprehending criminals because their very presence projects a threat of apprehension if a crime were to be committed” (Apel and Nagin, 2011:417).

Nonetheless, there is a sizeable body of criminological literature that infers that the ability of the police to deter, control, prevent or reduce crime in its totality is at best limited (Kelling and Moore, 1989, Radelet, 1986). Eminent scholars such as Manning (1997) and Reiner (2010) have argued that the police are essentially marginal to control of crime and the maintenance of order. The principal reason for this, they argue, is that the causes of crime and the foundations of order are located in the nature and dynamics of the society, which are largely external to the authority of the police. For Manning, police work is pantomime, where the police endeavour to bluff the public into believing that the police are actually controlling crime (Manning, 1997).

Other institutionally focused critiques of the work of the police claim that following an organisationally-based reform process the police can more effectually deter, control, reduce or prevent crime. However, such reforms entail the transformation of the police from an overly-reactive to a proactive agency that cultivates a more nuanced understanding of crime and formulates responses that are strategic, targeted and context-specific (Braga, 2001, Eck and Maguire, 2000, Goldstein, 1979). A common conception within this literature is that the police will be particularly effective when they focus their resources on the intersection of high-risk places, high-risk people and high-risk times for violent and opportunistic crime (Sherman, 1992). It is from this strand of scholarly work about the crime prevention and reduction potential of the police that this thesis draws its inspiration.

In the sections below the key theoretical concepts used in this thesis will be outlined, namely the distinction between police and policing; as well as crime control, crime prevention and crime reduction. In addition, there will be an exploration of the relevant academic debates and theories that are fundamental to reflecting upon the relationship between the work of the police and boundaries in South Africa. In this regard, deterrence, rational choice and place-based policing will receive considerable attention. The central research question and main propositions of this thesis will be presented in the final section of the chapter.

3.1 Police versus policing

3.1.1 Policing

An explicit distinction can be made between policing and the police. Policing is a diverse and pluralistic set of social acts that are pursued by individuals and entities with conferred authority, either through consent or coercion. The police are social institutions that undertake certain types of policing, and became increasingly prominent as government institutions from the early 19th century. It is important to note that policing is not the exclusive preserve of the police in contemporary societies. In fact, the majority of policing is actually dispensed by a broad range of non-state actors, such as religious bodies, private companies and community organisations (Johnston, 1992, Loader, 2000, Shearing and Stenning, 1987, Stenning, 2009).

Criminologists have proposed various definitions of policing, with the formulation by Bayley and Shearing being one of the most influential. They contend that policing is “the self-conscious process whereby societies designate and authorise people to create public safety” (Bayley and Shearing, 1996:586). This definition builds on Shearing’s earlier definition, which conceived policing to be a process geared towards “the preservation of peace” defined in relation to security and protection from risk (Shearing, 1992:399). However, for the purposes of this thesis, which has a South Africa specific focus on state policing, Bayley and Shearings’ definition is not sufficiently explicit.

Reiner (2010), for example, has formulated a more contextualised and detailed definition, which is more applicable for this thesis. He asserts that policing entails processes and actions that seek to preserve “the security of a particular social order, or social order in general...[and] what is specific to policing is the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance – either immediately or by initiating penal processes” (Reiner, 2010:5).

3.1.2 The police

Over the past two centuries modern governments have typically established official police agencies to enforce the law, maintain public order and keep the peace. However, studies of government policing bodies have consistently shown that the police have undertaken a diverse range of activities, many of which are outside of the ambit of order maintenance and law enforcement, such as responding to socio-economic and health problems in poor neighbourhoods (Bittner, 1970, Reiner, 2010). Consequently, there has been considerable debate and discord over how to define the police.

One of the more workable approaches to the conceptualisation of the police has been to focus on the means allocated to the police, namely their official mandate to employ coercive force to perform their duties (when required). Many of the earlier scholars of Anglo-American policing, influenced by Max Weber’s theory of the state (Weber, 2009), suggested that the police are characterised by their

monopoly of the legitimate use of force within the territorial boundaries of the state (Friedrich, 1980, Morgan and Newburn, 1997, Reiss, 1971). Furthermore, in order to exercise this mandate formal police structures, sub-divided into various specialisations, and directed by means of standardised rules and procedures, were constructed (Angell, 1971). However, Weber did emphasize that force is not the only instrument of state control, and that the state has other less severe means to assert its authority, namely through influencing morality and common values (Terpstra, 2011).

The police's monopoly of the legitimate use of force has been viewed by many scholars as being more symbolic in nature given the increased pluralisation of policing away from direct state control (Jones and Newburn, 2002, Loader, 2000, McLaughlin and Levi, 1995, O'Mally and Palmer, 1996). In addition, the legitimate coercion feature is not common currency for all police agencies globally, especially in non-democratic states where consent by citizens is not a key component of governance. Hence, the definition penned by Karl Klockars, that the police are "institutions or individuals given the general right to use coercive force by the state within the state's domestic territory" (Klockars, 1985:12) is one of the more useful definitions to study the police and their approach to policing in the South African context.

The continuum of policing by government police agencies proposed by Mawby (2008) provides further nuance for understanding policing systems in different contexts. This continuum is delineated by two extremities of policing systems, namely "control-dominated" and "community-oriented". The control-dominated system is typical to non-democratic environments where the government is widely regarded as illegitimate by those that it seeks to govern. In this system, policing institutions tend to be centrally organised, militaristic in approach, and prioritise the maintenance of order through the use of force or the threat thereof. The community-oriented system usually occurs in fundamentally democratic states where there is a high level of trust between communities and the police, and where the police are widely viewed as providing a legitimate public service that is receptive to the needs of the community. In such situations police authority is usually decentralised to the regional, city and municipal levels (Mawby, 2008).

3.3 Boundaries, frontiers and the 'cleaning' work of the police

The literature that considers the relationship between the police, policing and boundaries is reviewed in Chapter 2. This section seeks to provide a more theoretical synopsis in this regard.

Boundaries have the capacity to, amongst other faculties, delineate, limit and control interactions between people, as well as access to resources and opportunities within social spaces (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, Minghi, 1963). Boundaries can occur naturally (such as rivers); can be erected (such as walls); or can even be imagined or socially constructed (such as informal borders between neighbourhoods). As noted by the influential human geographer David Sibley, socially constructed or socially defined boundaries are dynamic spatial

expressions of power, which often facilitate the “relegation of weaker groups in society to less desirable environments” (Sibley, 1995:ix). Furthermore, such boundaries can become instruments of “purification” where they are employed to conserve homogeneity, as well as emphasise and reject difference (Sibley, 1988).

Hence boundaries emphasise and enforce the difference and distinctiveness of communities on both sides of boundaries. This often results in the emergence of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ abject differentiation, which often translates into a social ordering expressed in terms of inclusion and exclusion (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002). This process is often referred to as ‘othering’, a social construction that leads to the depersonalisation, stigmatisation and vilification of the weaker community by the stronger community (Sibley, 1998, van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002).

A frontier, which is also referred to as a ‘borderland’ (Kristof, 1959), is an area that is in close proximity to, and coupled with a territorial boundary demarcating the edge of a collective of people or an area inhabited by people. The internal dynamics of a frontier are intimately affected by the existence of the boundary, and conversely the nature of the frontier often determines the future outcomes for the boundary (Newman, 2003, Newman and Paasi, 1998). For instance, frontier dynamics have the potential to reinforce, propel or even eliminate the boundary. Hence, it is entirely conceivable that institutions that operate within the frontier are fundamentally influenced by the immediacy of the boundary, as well as the frontier conditions.

The term frontier has been most widely utilised in the historical literature on colonisation to describe areas on the territorial threshold of settler authority “where there is a lack of a single source of legitimate authority” (Legassick, 2010:6). It acts as a buffer between the edge of the relative safety of the ‘civilised’ colony and the dangerous ‘wilderness’, and is a fluid space between two divergent worlds (Anderson, 1996, Forbes, 1968, Turner, 1921). Frontiers have also received some attention in the field of international relations in the context of international border management and conflict (Prescott and Triggs, 2008, Ruggie, 1993). In recent years the frontier concept has been more widely applied in a variety of other academic disciplines, particularly in relation to urbanisation and city governance where the spaces occupied by the poor and marginalised become regarded as places of savagery and disorder (Garreau, 1992, Gray and Mooney, 2011, Leitner, et al., 2007, Smith, 1996).

Territorial rules and norms (or territoriality), which dictate the conditions under which people may interact and access resources and opportunities, are conceivably embedded within boundaries (Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999, Lyman and Scott, 1967). Transgressions of these rules and norms can result in forms of negative communication or punitive action from those authorities that uphold the boundaries. Consequently, boundaries are intrinsically instruments of social power and control as they have the potential to impact on the movement of people and on their available choices (Paasi, 1998, Sack, 1986, Sack, 1993). Hence, space is generally “domesticated” by government and civic authorities

(Mbembé and Rendall, 2000:261) by creating and upholding boundaries as a method of governing (Cooper, 1998, Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, Kettl, 2006).

Zygmunt Bauman's scholarship in relation to purity and 'order-building' is particularly relevant for intellectualising about the role of the police in relation to social, political and territorial boundaries. For Bauman, the state has a definite idea of purity, and consequently pursues order-building strategies geared towards uniformity, regularity and certainty as a means to realise this notion of purity (Bauman, 1997, Bauman, 2000). Such strategies include the construction and clarification of "binding divisions, classifications, allocations and boundaries" (Bauman, 1997:18). Those individuals and groups that are considered an offence or a threat to establishing and maintaining order and cleanliness by the state are therefore regarded as 'others', 'strangers' or even 'dirt'. Consequently, such others need to be sanitised, expunged or contained, with policing bodies being amongst the foremost instruments of the state's "cleaning activities" (Bauman, 1997:12). Hence the police could be viewed as agents of social-spatial sanitation that are at the vanguard of efforts to domesticate these unruly spaces (Smith, 1996).

Within the literature that conceptualises the nature of police work, there is considerable reference to the 'cleaning', 'tidying' and 'sweeping' imperative of the police in relation to societal disorder and deviants (or 'dirt' or 'scum') (Balch, 1972, Brogden, 1987, Chan, 1996, Shearing, 1981). Police typically mind the boundaries of cleanliness to "keep people in their place" (Waddington, 1999b:31). When such persons are encountered the police "reproduce order" (Ericson, 1991:8) by compelling conformity in line with the dominant notion of purity prescribed in law, or removing or expelling such persons from the sanitised and orderly places.

Many Marxist scholars hold a similar view on the police, which they see as the defenders of class divisions, racial segregation and social order. That is, the police are a coercive 'apparatus' (Costa Vargas, 2013) that protects the privileged position of the dominant classes, and through its organisational culture and actions it quite literally keeps the working class, marginalised racial/ethnic groups and the poor in line (Davis, 1992, Hallsworth, 2006, Harring, 1976, Hawkins and Thomas, 1991, Marenin, 1982, Reiner, 2010). A similar notion of the police has been adopted in 'internal colonization' literature (Gutiérrez, 2004). For this school of thought the police are viewed as a type of occupying force that protects the interests of the dominant racial classes and maintains the territorial and socio-economic subjugation of marginalised racial/ethnic populations (Blauner, 1969, Marx, 1970).

Where disorder is considered to be overly acute the police have tended to respond forcefully and decisively to dispel such disorder, and at times have employed organisational innovations in this regard. For example, in response to a moral panic concerning armed robberies in 1972 in London, the Metropolitan Police initiated a 'clean-up' of public parks. Park keepers were replaced by police patrols, and new anti-mugging squads were created. Suspected drug users, prostitutes and robbers were harassed or arrested by the police (Hall, et al.,

2013). Similarly, as described by Brogden (1991:1) in his account of police work in Liverpool in the period between the two World Wars, the mandate of the police was “to keep the Liverpool streets clean, as a kind of uniformed garbage-men – moving along those engaged in acts of petty disorder and miscreance”.

In some contexts police have pursued a type of ‘social cleansing’ against alleged or potential criminals, particularly young men. This has entailed the deliberate killing of such individuals by the police or covert groups linked to the police in countries such as Indonesia (van der Kroef, 1985), Kenya (Musila, 2009), and El Salvador (Faux, 2006, Zilberg, 2004). Similar dynamics have occurred in Brazil and Honduras, but, in addition to the targeting of suspected criminals, numerous delinquent boys have allegedly died at the hands of the police (Berkman, 2005, Huggins, 1997, Penglase, 1994).

In reflecting on the frontier (‘front region’) of the coercive nature of ‘dirty work’ of the police, Dick (2005:1385) suggests that in maintaining and enforcing order and cleanliness “the fragile and contingent boundaries of professional ideology [of the police] are rendered permeable, requiring active re-construction”. That is, at the margins between order and disorder police encounters with those deemed to be ‘undesirable’ might be overly coercive due to the nature of the context and the pejorative view of the police towards the ‘undesirables’.

3.4 Deterrence and rational choice

Deterrence and rational choice are vital to understanding and analysing police action and behaviour, and are premised on the notion that individuals will ultimately make decisions that are based on the probable consequences of those decisions. In this regard, individuals are likely to engage in deviant and menacing behaviour unless robust controls and punishments that target such behaviour are routinely enforced and imposed (Burke, 2009, Cohen, 1985, Garland, 2001).

The idea of the inevitability of crime and associated ‘rational actor’ behaviour is a common thread interwoven within both the Classical and Neo-Classical (founding) schools of criminological thought. The former views individuals as rational beings who are entirely responsible for their own actions, and hence should be appropriately and proportionately punished for any wrongdoings. The latter approach adopts an altered interpretation of the ‘rational actor’ model, suggesting that children and mentally ill people are inhibited from expressing free will, and therefore are less accountable for their actions than competent adults (Burke, 2009, Moyer, 2001). The prominent ‘General Theory of Crime’ devised by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) contends that people are consistently alike, and that criminal acts are primarily and constantly the result of rational self-interest and low self-control, and weak social and material bonds with families and societal groups on the part of the criminal (Gottfredson, 2009).

For deterrence scholars, individuals commit crime when the benefits are appealing. Hence, punishment for criminal behaviour is integral to maintaining a harmonious society with it being essential that such punishment be likely, evident and promptly applied. Crime is thereby averted by the reasoned

calculation by individuals that the pain of punishment (or the perceived risk thereof) outweighs the impetus for the crime (Akers, 1990, Waldo and Chiricos, 1972). Hence, essential to deterrence theory is sufficient communication to potential offenders about the consequences and sanctions of criminal actions (Geerken and Gove, 1975).

From the 1970s, rational choice found new disciples among conservatives in some Western governments (particularly in the US and the UK), as well as in academia, in what has become known as 'new right' or 'popular punitivism'. This approach emerged out of a deep cynicism of the prevailing emphasis on social welfare and rehabilitation in the criminal justice sector at the time. The new right wholeheartedly embraced deterrence as a core principle and advocated a 'get tough' approach to crime control. Such conservative governments consequently prioritised more intensive policing actions, speedier criminal justice processing, and more severe punishments for criminal offenders (particularly imprisonment) than had previously been undertaken (King, 1981, Packer, 1968, Pratt, et al., 2005, Pratt, et al., 2008, Tierney, 2010).

3.5 Crime control, crime reduction, crime prevention and homicide

3.5.1 Crime control

Crime control is comprised of overlapping social ordering activities pursued by formal (criminal justice institutions of the state) and informal societal entities (such as the family and community) with the intent of regulating behaviour towards conformity and imparting justice (Garland, 2001). It has been widely used as a catchall term that encompasses a wide variety of responses to crime and criminality. In some cases it is used interchangeably with terms such as crime reduction and crime prevention (see below). The purposeful use of the term in practical applications, however, has predominantly been applied in the context of formal state responses to crime.

3.5.2 Crime prevention

The concept of crime prevention is contested by those who practise and study it (Cornish and Clarke, 2003, Hughes, 1998, Tilley, 2005, Wortley, 2001). It has a "catch-all nature that defies disciplining" and "incorporates not only the practices of the entire criminal justice system, but also those of many other social and public policies...private citizens and private enterprise" (Gilling, 1997:1). Debates about the nature, dynamics and purpose of this hazy concept have been informed by deep ideological schisms, and reflections of fundamentally different philosophical interpretations of crime (Stenson and Cowell, 1991, Sutton, et al., 2014). This has resulted in a definitional conundrum, where a wide range of development, upliftment and infrastructural activities and processes can potentially be portrayed as crime prevention.

Crime prevention purists have asserted that crime prevention is ultimately intended to lead to "securing a non-event" (Forrester, et al., 1990:44), namely "to prevent crime or criminal offending in the first instance – before the act has been committed" (Welsh and Farrington, 2012:128). Hence, it has been suggested that

interventions should ideally only be depicted as crime prevention where the crimes and criminality that were specifically targeted were noticeably forestalled. However, this approach can be problematic for policy makers and implementers of programmes with crime prevention intentions, as logically crime prevention initiatives can only effectively be identified in hindsight (Sherman, 1997b).

A widely used definition of crime prevention, particularly by practitioners, is contained within the United Nations Economic and Social Council 2002 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime. This document broadly defines crime prevention as a composition of “strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes” (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2002:3).²

Arguably the most influential and often cited crime prevention scholar is Lawrence Sherman. His landmark paper, ‘Thinking about Crime Prevention’, postulates that crime prevention is the positive outcome of “practices” and “programmes” that take place in seven “institutional settings”: communities; families; schools; labour markets; places; police agencies; and other criminal justice agencies. “Practices” are those existing activities that are customarily and widely pursued on a daily basis with a view to reduce the risk of exposure to, or in response to, crime. “Programmes” are specific interventions that seek to bring about improved crime prevention through establishing, modifying or confining routine practice (Sherman, 1997b).

Different means of categorisation of crime prevention have been suggested, with there being two general categorisations in common usage. The first approach distinguishes three types of crime prevention: situational, community and developmental (Tonry and Farrington, 1995). Situational crime prevention entails the establishment of physical and environmental measures and barriers (such as target hardening) in order to intensify the risks and diminish the rewards of certain offending (Clarke, 1995). Community crime prevention involves efforts to influence social conditions that contribute to crime in residential areas. Interventions can include changes in the design of the residential areas, and the formation of crime deterrence social organisations, such as neighbourhood watch organisations (Hope, 1995). Developmental crime prevention prioritises resources and programmes for individuals, families, schools and communities in order to reduce the risk and/or promote resilience in relation to criminal offending. Some examples of such programming include parenting and early childhood development interventions (Homel, 2005).

The second crime prevention approach adopts a modified version of the public health model that distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary harm prevention. Primary crime prevention involves programmes focusing on environmental design, the wellbeing of individuals and groups, and education.

² For example, this definition has been adopted by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), which seeks to promote international standards of crime prevention and criminal justice.

Secondary prevention entails early identification of potential offenders, individual interventions, and neighbourhood programmes with youth-at-risk. Tertiary prevention encompasses the rehabilitation and reform of offenders, mainly through correctional facilities and programmes (Brantingham and Faust, 2009).

3.5.3 Crime reduction

Compared to crime control and crime prevention, 'crime reduction' is a less theoretically complex and more modest concept. In essence it entails responses that are geared towards containing and curtailing existing patterns of crime and criminality. It is seen as an expedient term "as it enables one to count crime events before and after an intervention and to allocate any positive effects" (Frank, 2006:15).

The terms crime reduction and crime prevention are frequently used interchangeably both in popular discourse and in academic publications. The Australian Institute of Criminology (2003:1) has even suggested that "there is no empirical basis for the use of one term over the other". However, in studying the actual impact of policing on crime and criminality a clear distinction between the two terms is essential.

3.5.4 Current applications of crime control, reduction and prevention

According to Garland (2001) the principal Anglo-American governmental response to crime has embraced two intertwined but disparate approaches. The first is an "adaptive strategy" advocating crime prevention and partnership arrangements with civil society and the private sector. The second is a "sovereign state strategy", which emphasises "enhanced control and expressive punishment" (Garland, 2001:140), which has been backed by a well-resourced criminal justice sector that underscores the investigation of crime. That is, a "new penology of risk control" has been combined with an "old penology of vengeance and vindication" (Garland, 2004:169). As indicated in the assessment of the 'new right' above, this second approach has emerged out of the widespread public and government perception that high levels of crime had become 'normalised', and that established criminal justice approaches were no longer sufficient to ensure security and order. This approach gives greater prominence to the crime reducing potential of the police and to policing activity in general (Garland, 2001:187).

Similarly, a dual approach to crime has been pursued in many post-independence African countries. However, the application has differed markedly from the Anglo-American approach. That is, for most African states the maintenance of order and deterrence, which has typically been harsh and retributive, has taken precedence over the prevention and investigation of crime (Baker, 2002a, Simon, 2000). The protection of the ruling elites has been prioritised at the expense of the safety of the general population (Francis, 2012, Goldsmith, 2002). This is largely due to a legacy of exploitive colonial state formation, authoritarian leadership, insurrection, and high levels of income inequality (Baker, 2008).

Police ethos in most African countries has been informed by a distinctive militaristic or paramilitary history and culture (Hills, 2007, Marenin, 1982). Opportunistic crime control relationships have nonetheless been forged between the state and elements of civil and 'uncivil' society (and at times the private sector) in most African countries. Such partnerships have generally not been progressive crime prevention endeavours, but have rather entailed the delegation of repressive policing responsibilities to customary authorities or community entities. In a number of post-conflict environments donor-driven Anglo-American crime prevention initiatives have been pursued, but have often been unsustainable or inappropriate (Baker, 2009, Brogden, 2004, Brogden and Nijhar, 2005, Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003).

Apartheid South Africa shares a common experience of post-colonial policing with other African countries, as the criminal justice sector was preoccupied with crime control, and pursued explicit punitive and deterrence-oriented strategies and practices to instil fear and subservience among the black majority (as well as severely restrict their movements), and compliance among the white minority (Shaw, 1996, Shaw, 2001, Singh, 2008). This changed in the mid-1990s, following South Africa's first inclusive democratic elections, with the African National Congress government adopting the prevailing Anglo-American (contrasting) response to crime, with both crime prevention and "getting tough on crime" being simultaneously endorsed and promoted (Rauch, 2004, Samara, 2003).

3.6 Police reforms, crime control and crime reduction/prevention

There is a sizeable group of scholars focusing on policing that has postulated that the work of the police can more meaningfully control, reduce and prevent crime following significant changes to police organisations. This scholarship originates from critiques of Anglo-American policing that emerged from the 1970s alleging that police effectiveness had been stymied due to its overly reactive, 'fire-brigade' posture and a lack of strategic prioritisation of addressing the causes of specific crimes; as well as an absence of long-term thinking (Tilley, 2006). Three of the main reformist approaches include: Problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing and community policing. According to Ratcliffe (2002), this new thinking on policing was swiftly embraced by many other national police agencies. Problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing have been used in numerous contexts to respond to violent crime, including firearm-related crime, and consequently they will be considered in detail below.

3.6.1 Problem-oriented policing

Herman Goldstein coined the term 'problem-oriented policing' (POP) in 1979, which he further developed in a book published in 1990, as a paradigm shift to what Goldstein regarded as a reactive, narrow and inward-focused approach to police work in the US at that time. That is, the predominant approach of policing was purportedly to focus on the internal functioning of police institutions rather than on the objectives of policing.

POP is conceived to be a pre-emptive policing strategy that seeks to more coherently identify and analyse particular priority crimes, especially those that acutely affect communities. Its subsequent objectives are to formulate targeted and more effective responses, combined with frequent evaluation and communication with affected communities. In terms of a POP approach, senior police managers are required to identify the persistent and recurring crime-related problems, with rank-and-file police personnel playing a key role in assisting with this process (Goldstein, 1990). Spelman and Eck (1987:46) have described POP as a “state of mind” that entails “clear-headed analysis” of the problem and an uninhibited search for solutions.

Flowing directly from Goldstein’s POP manifesto, a number of POP models have been developed, with two of the most widely used outlined below. Spelman and Eck (1987) have distilled Goldstein’s concept into the four-step SARA model, an acronym for the following four steps. *Scanning*: those efforts that seek to precisely identify and prioritise the relevant problem(s). *Analysis*: a focused assessment of the causes, scope and effects of the problem(s). *Response*: actions, at times customised, with the objective of alleviating the problem(s). *Assessment*: an evaluation of the impact of the response. The other prevalent approach to POP is the Problem Analysis Triangle, which emphasises the three general features that POP can conceivably influence in order to control, prevent and reduce crime. These features include the location(s), the offenders (or potential offenders), and the victims or complainants (Bullock and Tilley, 2003).

POP has been pursued in many policing precincts in the US, and has also been internationalised, with it being practised in Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, a number of Scandinavian countries, as well as South Africa (Scott, 2000). POP has typically been implemented in the context of precinct, neighbourhood and city policing, but the ethos has also been incorporated into much larger scale approaches to policing. In a comprehensive review of policing in the US, it was suggested that “there is strong research evidence that the more focused and specific the strategies of the police, the more they are tailored to the problems they seek to address, the more effective the police will be in controlling crime and disorder” (Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, et al., 2004:5).

In a more recent review of the literature on POP by Weisburd, et al. (2010:141) it was suggested that this approach to policing has “emerged as one of the most widely accepted and used strategies in US policing.” It was further reported that there had been “an overall modest but statistically significant impact of POP on crime and disorder”. However, in practice, POP has only been adopted with respect to specific components of policing and not in the revolutionary manner envisaged by Goldstein (Cordner and Biebel, 2005, Knutsson and Clarke, 2006, Weisburd, et al., 2010).

POP approaches have been used in an attempt to address firearm violence. In such cases, the police have typically concentrated on reducing illegal possession, carrying, and misuse of firearms in hot spots, and among high-risk individuals. For example, a study of the Comprehensive Homicide Initiative (a POP strategy)

in Richmond, California revealed that this intervention had significantly contributed to a decline in the homicide rate. In particular, firearm homicides decreased from 46.0 (between 1990 and 1994) to 26.2 (between 1995 and 1998) per 100,000 annually (White, et al., 2003).

Similar studies on POP approaches in Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, New York and Pittsburgh have suggested that POP can significantly contribute to a reduction in firearm-related homicide. However, POP as a firearm-violence reduction approach has primarily been pursued at the neighbourhood and city level. No studies have been undertaken to consider its applicability at a state/province or even national level despite there being some scholarly agreement that it could possibly operate effectively at countrywide and even transnational levels (Bullock and Tilley, 2003).

3.6.2 Intelligence-led policing

In 1993 the UK Audit Commission published a groundbreaking report on the state of British policing, titled: 'Helping With Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively'. The report provided a constructive critique of British policing at the time, and suggested that in order for policing to be more effective its work had to be “driven by [reliable and timely] intelligence”, and that “prolific offenders” should be systematically targeted, rather than just crime. This report was complemented four years later by another influential report authored by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, titled: 'Policing With Intelligence'. Scholarship in this area quickly gained momentum, and the term: Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) was coined (Maguire, 2000, Ratcliffe, 2003).

ILP has been presented as an innovative conceptual philosophy of policing that principally seeks to detect, reduce and disrupt criminal activity by locating intelligence at the heart of police decision-making. ILP places a strong emphasis on the gathering and analysis of pertinent information about criminals and criminality, particularly criminal groups and repeat offenders, including those who perpetrate homicide (Ratcliffe, 2008) in order to devise and implement effective policing strategies where they are “expected to yield highest dividends” (Tilley, 2006:313). ILP is seen to be an evolving concept, one that is moving towards the problem-solving approach of POP (Ratcliffe, 2008).

Ideally for ILP intelligence should be generated through: the sharing of information within the policing structures; collaborative partnerships between detectives and uniformed police, as well as with other relevant government agencies (including local government) and community organisations; technical surveillance; undercover investigations; and the use of informants (Maguire, 2000). Computer-based information technology is typically used to collate, assess and analyse the amassed information (Ratcliffe, 2002).

Senior police management commitment to ILP and an organisational culture that is receptive to change are considered to be essential for ILP uptake (Cope, 2004, Gottschalk, 2008, Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008). A study of ILP implementation in New Zealand has shown that the acceptance and application of ILP amongst

policing agencies requires a strong commitment to ILP from senior police officials, as well as a balance between two leadership styles, namely: “transformational” (leaders that motivate and inspire their subordinates to bring about change); and “transactional” (leaders that make use of their authority to initiate change), with more of an emphasis on the former. Other important uptake factors include: goal clarity and a strong link between the goals and day-to-day policing operations; informal management style; and a culture of technology use (Darroch and Mazerolle, 2012).

ILP does nevertheless have potential drawbacks, especially the ethical implications of the relationship between police and informers (with criminal records). That is, such intelligence can be tainted as it is drawn from a “murky world of half-truth, deception, innuendo and betrayal” (Billingsley, et al., 2001:5). Interactions between police and informers also have the capacity to promote corruption amongst the police and undermine police legitimacy (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999, Norris and Dunnighan, 2000, Porter and Warrender, 2009).

3.7 Policing of places

3.7.1 The place of the crime

There has been a growing recognition among criminologists of the importance of place and context in understanding crime patterns, crime dispersal, as well as crime prevention in urban areas (Weisburd and Braga, 2003). That is, the manner and processes by which the urban ‘backcloth’ has been fashioned have the capacity to shape criminal behaviour, activities and the public’s fear of crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995). The focus on the place of the crime stimulated the emergence of a new branch of criminology, namely ‘environmental criminology’ (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). There have also been concerted efforts to study the potential prevention of crime through ‘environmental design’ (Jeffery, 1977), which entails the arrangement and/or improvement of a place to make it less conducive to criminality (such as the introduction of street lighting).

3.7.2 Routine activities theory

The place-based approach to the study of crime and policing is chiefly informed by routine activities theory, which is an ecological theory closely related to rational choice theory. It holds that predatory crime occurs when there is a nexus in space and time of four elements: appropriate targets (such as people and/or property); the presence of motivated or prospective criminals; the absence of proficient ‘guardians’ (such as the police, informal policing processes and target hardening arrangements); and the absence of an ‘intimate handler’ (a family member or intimate partner that has the capacity exert social control over the potential offender) (Clarke, 1995, Cohen and Felson, 1979, Sherman, et al., 1989, Taylor and Gottfredson, 1986).

This theory posits that people (both victims and perpetrators) occupy and leave spaces at foreseeable times and in predictable ways, and that this pattern of

human behaviour creates opportunities for criminal offenders, and makes people more vulnerable to criminal acts (Burke, 2009). This is particularly the case in areas where guardianship and surveillance of the environment is weak, and intimate handlers are absent. 'Suitable targets' are consequently more at risk of being victims of crime when they are in close physical proximity to a significant population of potential offenders (Bennett, 1991, Cohen and Felson, 1979). This is more common in areas where offenders "feel that their chances of being identified are low, and may be confident that no one will intervene in their affairs" (Skogan, 1990:10). Hence, places themselves can be subject to routine activities, as well as "formal and informal regulation" (Sherman, et al., 1989:33).

Routine activities theory has been expanded upon by scholars specialising in place-based crime with Clarke (1992), for example, suggesting an additional element of "crime facilitators", such as cars, credit cards and weapons, which are the key tools for specific contact crimes. For criminologists concerned about the place of the crime there is agreement that there are specific features and characteristics of crime hot spots that facilitate a convergence of these various elements (Weisburd, 2008). Hence, from a policing perspective, crime can be potentially prevented if police are able to counteract the intersection of these elements, and/or the opportunities for crime (Braga, 2001).

3.7.3 Crime hot spots

There is acknowledgement by crime scholars that incidents of serious crime and criminality are generally unevenly distributed, and tend to be clustered in certain geographical hot spots (Pierce, et al., 1988, Sherman, et al., 1989, Weisburd, et al., 1992).³ There is also evidence to suggest that crime hot spots remain relatively constant over time (Groff, et al., 2010).

Hot spots are "criminogenic places" (Braga, et al., 2012) that tend to be located in urban areas, and are often characterised by high levels of poverty and structural density, transient populations, dilapidated buildings and infrastructure, and mixed residential and commercial usage. These spaces tend to provide elevated opportunities for crime and disorder, increased motivations for criminal actions, and are characterised by weakened social control (Stark, 1987).

Studies have shown that hot spots tend to be clustered together (Sherman, et al., 1989), but this is not a universal finding. There is also growing unanimity in the literature that hot spots are mostly "micro places", such as streets segments, blocks or clusters of buildings with chronic concentrations of crime (Hegarty, et al., 2014, Ratcliffe, et al., 2011, Sherman, et al., 1995).

Bars and taverns are common features of most hot spots. Such establishments have considerable potential to sustain or further degrade the hot spot as they present opportunities for would-be criminals as they tend to have cash holdings and are frequented by patrons with cash and other valuables (who can more

³ As Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) have pointed out, French and English researchers in the early to mid nineteenth century noticed that crime was not evenly distributed, with high levels of crime being clustered in certain areas.

easily be robbed when they leave the drinking establishment in an inebriated state). Such businesses may even attract potential criminals as patrons (Frisbie, et al., 1977, Roncek and Maier, 1991).

It has also been suggested that bars and taverns also disconnect individuals from their intimate handlers (Felson, 1986). They can also draw in large numbers of non-residents to the area, which can increase the anonymity of a place (Roncek and Bell, 1981), and “result in people ignoring or less effectively performing the guardianship activities that they might undertake in less busy areas” (Roncek and Maier, 1991: 726).

3.7.4 Place-based and hot spots policing

As a consequence of pondering about possible policing responses to hot spot crime, the concepts of ‘place-based policing’ and ‘hot spots policing’ have been devised by scholars of policing and crime. The literature on such place-based forms of policing is introduced and partially discussed in Chapter 2.

There are three general categories of overlapping approaches to hot spots policing: enforcement POP (typically custom-built responses); directed and aggressive patrols (deployed police have a specific objective); as well as crackdowns and raids (Braga, 2008). Within these three categories there are a diverse range of techniques, such as: roadblock checkpoints; stop-and-frisk; cordon-and-search; saturation patrols; ‘zero tolerance’ (or ‘broken windows’⁴) disorder enforcement; specific monitoring; and focusing attention on parolees and other individuals at high risk of criminal offending; specific crime reporting ‘hotlines’; and the arrest and incapacitation of criminal offenders (Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006, Marvell and Moody, 1996). Hot spots policing may also employ ILP techniques (Ratcliffe, 2008). Furthermore it may include police accountability measures⁵, where police commanders are held accountable by their superiors for crime patterns in the hot spot areas (Jang, et al., 2012, Karmen, 2000, Rosenfeld, et al., 2005).

Hot spots policing has become a stock strategy for those police agencies in the US with the requisite technology and skill base (Kochel, 2011). This style of policing has also been applied in numerous other countries, such as Argentina, Colombia, South Korea (Center for Evidence-based Crime Policy, 2014), Australia (Chilvers and Weatherburn, 2004), South Africa (Pelser and Rauch, 2001), Trinidad and Tobago (Wallace, 2014), and the UK (Ariel and Sherman, 2012). The actual magnitude of its global prevalence is nevertheless unknown.

⁴ Wilson and Kelling (1982) coined the concept of a ‘broken widows’ approach to policing, which has become highly influential in US policing circles. They suggested that overt urban disorder, such as vandalism, and the neglect of the physical environment would lead to more serious crime and deviant behaviour, and a further deterioration of affected neighbourhoods. They advocated for police (mainly through patrols) to assertively and indiscriminately tackle misdemeanour offences, such as public drunkenness, littering and vagrancy, with a view to promoting norms and behaviours that would foster healthier communities.

⁵ The most well known approach has been *Compstat*, which was pioneered in New York City in the mid-1990s, which required leading operational police officers to regularly account for their crime fighting efforts to senior administrators in a ‘war room’.

3.7.4.1 Establishing the link between place and deviant use of firearms

Available evidence from numerous US studies suggests that the lion's share of urban-based interpersonal firearm violence in public spaces occurs in crime hot spots. In the City of Boston, for example, Braga, et al. (2010) found that close to three-quarters of all firearm assaults between 1980 and 2008 occurred at five per cent of street segments and intersections in Boston. In Los Angeles, Uchida and Swatt (2013) have indicated that 43% of all gun crime in the city was confined to four administrative divisions.

Similar characteristics have been reported by police, journalists and researchers in a wide range of other countries, such as Australia (Ralston, 2011), Canada (Bell, 2013), France (McPartland, 2012), Jamaica (Barrett, 2013), Kenya (Ipsos Synovate Kenya, 2013), Mexico (Martínez-Viveros, et al., 2013), the UK (Whitehead, 2009) and South Africa (Legg, 2013).

Varieties of place-based policing have been used recurrently to target firearm crime. A key reason for this is that firearms can have a 'priming' or 'instrumental' effect. That is, the presence of a firearm may lead to an increased possibility of aggressive behaviour (Anderson, et al., 1998, Berkowitz and LePage, 1967, Lindsay and Anderson, 2000). In addition, firearms are more lethal when used during violent encounters, such as assaults and robberies, compared to sharp-force and blunt-force instruments. The reason for this is that a firearm allows a person with criminal intentions to kill multiple individuals while maintaining a non-intimate distance with a minimal degree of effort, which may not have been physically possible with another type of weapon (Zimring, 1991). Firearm prevalence can hence lead to an escalation in the level of violence in interpersonal arguments or disputes (Cook, 1991, Hepburn and Hemenway, 2004). It may additionally result in an increase in armed robberies, as such weapons enhance the opportunities for predatory crime, particularly when appropriate targets are accessible (Kleck, 1991).

The possession of firearms in high crime areas by actual or would-be offenders also has the potential to initiate a spiral of firearm violence, as it can lead to further increases in firearm possession for reasons of self-protection (Hauser and Kleck, 2013, Kleck and Kovandzic, 2009, Molnar, et al., 2004, Young, 1985) or group affiliation (such as gangs) (Bjerregaard and Lizotte, 1995). This in turn may beget even more aggressive behaviour. Increased firearm availability may accordingly increase negative perceptions of safety in the affected communities (Miller, et al., 2000).

Firearm violence, like other types of violence can result in increased disorder, which in turn leads to further physical and social degradation in the hot spot as individuals and families who value a stable community environment either leave the area (Kasl and Harburg, 1972, Skogan, 1990), or socially withdraw from community life due to anxiety and fear of crime victimisation (Kidd and Chayet, 1984). People with similar norms tend to refrain from settling in these areas, which in turn depresses house prices and local economic development. In such conditions there is a general corrosion of: adult supervision of youth; mutual

responsibility for physical and social conditions in the hot spot; as well as informal social control (Skogan, 1990, Stark, 1987, Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

Deterrence theory presupposes that firearm offences can be reduced, and even prevented if individuals do not carry illegal firearms⁶ or illegally carry⁷ firearms in hot spots. The logic of the theory therefore follows that magnifying the perceived risk of apprehension and sanction by the police can discourage such weapons carrying, and hence potentially prevent firearm crime in the immediate future. It has further been suggested that the police do not have to confiscate large numbers of firearms to see a decline in incidents of firearm crime, as long as the risk of sanction exists (Moore, 1980, Wilson, 1994). Nonetheless, firearm confiscations and arrests of offenders (for firearm offences) intensifies the perception of certainty of sanction, and removes firearms and potential offenders from the hot spot areas.

3.7.4.2 Place-based policing and firearm crime reduction: the evidence

A series of systematic experiments in the use of place-based policing to specifically target firearm crime have been pursued in the US cities of Boston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh; as well as in two Colombian cities, namely Bogotá and Cali (Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006). More recently, Wells, et al. (2012) evaluated a non-experimental type of hot spots policing operation in Houston; and Uchida and Swatt (2013), and Rosenfeld, et al. (2014) undertook a similar assessment exercise in Los Angeles and St Louis respectively. The common policing strategies in all cases were directed patrols with some elements of crackdown techniques being implemented, with offenders being arrested and illegally held firearms being confiscated.

In Kansas City, Sherman and Rogan (1995) undertook a detailed assessment of a six month intervention from mid-1992 that was solely comprised of crackdowns on illegal firearm possession. There were a considerable number of searches of individuals and arrests of offenders. Firearm seizures in the hot spot area during the crackdown increased by 65%, and there was a 49% decline in firearm crime during the intervention, with no comparable decline in the control area (Sherman and Rogan, 1995:673).

In Indianapolis, McGarrell, et al. (2001) piloted a similar experiment with the police in 1997 over a three month period. The main intervention entailed directed (targeted) patrol, which was compared with a strategy of general deterrence patrols in another part of this city. Total firearm crime declined by 29% in focal areas, with firearm assaults and armed robberies dropping by 40% (McGarrell, et al., 2001:137).

⁶ Illegal firearms are essentially those firearms that have either been illegally manufactured or modified; or have been legitimately produced, but are not in the possession of those individuals who are legally entitled to hold them.

⁷ Legislation may prohibit the carrying of a firearm in certain places (such as in public) or in a certain manner (such as being concealed).

In Pittsburgh, a 14-week directed patrol intervention was undertaken between July and October 1998. There was a 71% reduction in firearm injuries during the intervention in the targeted areas (Cohen and Ludwig, 2003:238). In Houston, there was a seven per cent reduction in firearm crime between November 2006 and August 2007 in the areas selected for directed patrols and arrest of those illegally carrying firearms (Wells, et al., 2012:261). In Los Angeles, a policing strategy dubbed Operation LASER, implemented between September 2011 and June 2012, was credited with a 7.2% post-intervention decline in firearm crime each month in the targeted areas in the immediate aftermath of the intervention (Uchida and Swatt, 2013:299).

In Bogotá and Cali, the authorities implemented firearm bans in the mid to late 1990s, restricting the carrying of firearms on certain days, such as weekends, paydays and public holidays. The bans were enforced through roadblocks, checkpoints, patrols and search-and-seizure policing actions. It was estimated that the enforcement of the firearm bans resulted in a reduction of firearm homicides of 15% and 10% in Bogotá and Cali respectively (Villaveces, et al., 2000:1208).

Hot spots operations have also been successful in disrupting illegal firearm markets where brokers of such weapons were targeted, as was the case with Operation Ceasefire in Boston (Braga and Pierce, 2005). Additionally, this intervention reportedly resulted in a reduction in firearm violence in the targeted areas through a strategy of clearly communicated threats of comprehensive police crackdowns on an entire gang if individual gang members were responsible for firearm offences (the 'pulling levers' approach) (Kennedy, 1998, Ludwig, 2005, Rosenfeld, et al., 2005).

3.8 Research question and propositions

As both this chapter and the previous chapter (which contained the literature review) have shown, existing theory and evidence infers that distinctive and crucial relationships exist between social and territorial boundaries and the activities of the police. In addition, the nature of police work appears to have been fundamentally shaped by the police's construction and maintenance of operational and administrative boundaries. Moreover, the academic literature implies that such boundaries have an even more potent impact on the strategies and actions of the police, particularly when such boundaries coincide with the othering of population groups on the other side of the boundary or within the bounded space. Over the past three decades there have been studies on place-based policing approaches, which entail a highly focused use of spatial boundaries to frame and direct the work of the police towards crime and disorder hot spots. As discussed above, evidence generated by these studies has indicated that some place-based police strategies have potential crime reduction effects.

As previously stated, South Africa is a pertinent case study for an analysis of the relationship between boundaries and the police, as this country's historical experience of policing appears to have been extensively shaped by various forms

of boundaries. That is, the police have habitually upheld and erected boundaries to pacify groups and individuals that were perceived to threaten the state and elite interests. The police were also frequently positioned to guard the South Africa's territorial borderline. Moreover, the police in South Africa have also made use of extensive place-based policing strategies in an attempt to control and reduce crime.

Hence, in this regard, this thesis will seek to address the following research question:

How have boundaries influenced the operational approaches of the police in South Africa, and what impact have these approaches had on the levels of violent crime?

With respect to this research question, this thesis will test the following four propositions:

- 1) The police in South Africa have enforced and maintained boundaries as a fundamental method of controlling crime.
- 2) The boundary work of the police has been primarily framed by the pejorative othering of populations that occupy the spaces on the other side of the boundaries that the police seek to enforce and maintain.
- 3) The enforcement and maintenance of boundaries by the police in relation to threatening populations leads to more aggressive operational changes within the police.
- 4) The policing of boundaries by the police in the form of high-density operations results in a reduction in violent crime.

Chapter 4: Methodology

A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods has been used in order to address the research question and propositions outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. These research methods, namely how the relevant data was collected and analysed will be described and assessed in the sections below. The advantages and limitations of each method will also be given due consideration.

4.1 Qualitative research methods

In the chapters that follow, both primary and secondary data sources have been utilised to determine and analyse the manner in which policing bodies aligned to the dominant political authority (prior to the establishment of the South African state in 1910) and the police have responded to violent crime, and have sought to control firearms in South Africa.

4.1.1 Primary sources

4.1.1.1 Publicly available documents

Archived and current official documents relating to the police and violent crime in South Africa were extensively reviewed, including the annual reports of the police in South Africa dating back to 1912. Documents presented to the parliamentary committees responsible for police oversight, as well as recorded discussions from such committee meetings were also considered. Speeches and public comments by Cabinet Ministers that have a police focus, as well as senior police officials, have also been assessed and referenced. These documents were particularly important with respect to chronicling firearm control efforts by the police and high-density police operations in post-apartheid South Africa (namely Chapters 7 and 8).

There is nonetheless a large amount of historic and current SAPS documentation that is not publicly available, which the police have been unwilling to share with researchers. This is particularly in relation to reports pertaining to police operations and detailed crime analysis. The main reason for this is the police have typically regarded such documentation to include sensitive information that may compromise police strategies and approaches, or may possibly cause embarrassment to the police institution should such information be made public. This state of affairs, which is common to police research throughout the world, did restrict efforts for this thesis to comprehensively study the police and their modes of policing in South Africa.

4.1.1.2 Key informant interviews

Due to significant gaps in publicly available information about SAPS high-density operations and certain aspects of the SAPS approach to firearm control, key informant interviews were conducted with a small cohort of key serving and retired SAPS officials that had previously occupied, or currently occupied senior positions in relation firearm control, firearm crime investigation and high-density SAPS operations.

A purposeful sampling selection method was employed given that only a small number of individuals possessed such relevant detail and insight in SAPS firearm control and high-density operations. Such an approach has been commonly used in qualitative research in situations where the individuals in question “are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest...[in addition to their] availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner” (Palinkas, et al., 2015:534).

The University of Cape Town’s Faculty of Law Research Ethics Committee provided ethics clearance for these interviews. The relevant data from these interviews was subsequently used and referenced in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 in order to provide a more detailed account of SAPS firearms efforts and high-density operations respectively.

These interviews were undertaken in 2015 and early 2016, which was a time of intense institutional turmoil within the SAPS, particularly at the senior management level, with two provisional police commissioners and a National SAPS Commissioner being dismissed during this period. In addition, the SAPS Central Firearms Registry was under intense scrutiny from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police, and was the subject of severe criticism in the electronic and print media following a series of corruption and administrative scandals. Consequently, one of the interviewees requested that his/her identity remain anonymous, as he/she was concerned that any comments linked to his/her name may have negative implications for his/her role within SAPS. The other interviewees were:

- Dr Johan Burger, former SAPS Assistant National Commissioner (responsible for national policy and strategy);
- Col Johan A P Burger, former programme manager for the SAPS Firearm Control Strategy;
- Mr Stan Joubert (retired), former National Commander of the Illegal Firearm Investigative Units;
- Gen Gary Kruzer, Deputy National SAPS Commissioner: Management Interventions
- Mr Martin Naude, former Head, Serious and Violent Crime, SAPS; and
- Ms Alice Pienaar-Marais, former senior SAPS firearm control officer and operational commander of Operation Sethunya

The interviewees were contacted directly either telephonically or by email to request an interview. During this process the interviewees were informed of the aim of the thesis and the general types of questions that would be asked during the interview process. The interviewees either knew the author of this thesis personally, or knew of his research credentials as he had previously published on firearm control issues in South African and other Southern African countries, and had interacted with senior SAPS firearm control officials on numerous occasions whilst managing the Institute for Security Studies’ Arms Management Programme. The interview with Col Johan A P Burger took place as a result of an

endorsement by Mr Stan Joubert, and likewise the interview with General Kruzer was the result of a recommendation from Col Johan A P Burger.

The interviews were face-to-face, and were based on a semi-structured questionnaire in which both open and closed questions were used, given the respondents' different ranks, roles and responsibilities within SAPS between 1994 and 2015. The questionnaire essentially sought to gauge the respondents' involvement in, and knowledge of, the SAPS' firearm control processes and interventions, as well as verify and corroborate published information in this regard. The interviews varied between 90 and 150 minutes in length.

The interviews were undertaken in Pretoria and Cape Town throughout 2015 and early 2016. The interviews with serving SAPS officials generally took place in their offices, while interviews with retired SAPS members were conducted in coffee shops and restaurants. The interviewees signed informed consent forms and were briefed about the focus of the thesis at the beginning of the interview, and about how their responses would be presented and referenced in the thesis. Four out of the seven interviewees consented to having their interviews recorded. Detailed notes were taken during all seven interviews. Relevant responses by interviewees are mainly included in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

The responses of the seven interviewees provided both operational and strategic insights into the planning and implementation of firearm control approaches and high-density operations by the police in contemporary South Africa. However, the responses of these interviewees were in no way representative of the entire population of senior and middle-ranking SAPS officials who were involved in such activities, and hence there was a risk of bias in the totality of responses provided by the interviewees.

Furthermore there was the possibility of recall accuracy, namely that there may have been discrepancies between the interviewees' recollection of events and the actual events, which may have diminished over time given that many of the interview questions related to events that had transpired in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Hence, the responses by the interviewees were principally used to supplement description and analysis that had been derived from published sources. Strong or controversial opinions expressed by respondents were referenced as such.

4.1.2 Secondary sources

In relation to secondary sources, this thesis takes account of the vast array of publications on the police and policing bodies in South Africa, both contemporary and historical. This written work however is of variable empirical and analytical rigour. These publications have mostly been penned by academics, activists and former policemen, and typically exist in the form of books, book chapters, monographs and journal articles. The Institute for Security Studies and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation have produced a significant publication stock on the police and policing over the past 20 years, and hence their work was widely referenced in this thesis. Numerous media

articles and opinion pieces have been used, especially for the most recent developments concerning the police in South Africa.

4.2 Quantitative research methods

Publicly available quantitative data on crime, violence and criminal justice were also accessed in order to enrich the qualitative analysis, particularly in relation to the post-apartheid period. Key data sources included: the Medical Research Council (MRC)/University of South Africa National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS); the Department of Correctional Services; the National Prosecuting Authority; SAPS crime data; and data published by the Independent Complaints Directorate/Independent Police Investigative Directorate. The strengths and limitations of this data, particularly SAPS crime data, are assessed in detail in Chapter 9.

A key outcome of the qualitative approach was a systematic and detailed examination of the relationship between boundaries and the police (particularly high-density police operations) in post-apartheid South Africa. Crucially this analysis was instrumental in determining the scope, range and focus of a quantitative assessment of the possible impact of such police actions on annual murder levels in South Africa. In this regard a retrospective case-series study of a representative sample of high crime SAPS station areas was undertaken in order to more directly evaluate the relationship between a distinctive form of boundary policing, namely high-density police operations, and murder levels in post-apartheid South Africa. The results are presented in Chapter 9. This chapter also provides a more detailed assessment of the case-series method, as well the strengths and limitations of the SAPS data.

No sophisticated statistical methods were employed in this regard. Rather SAPS station-level crime data on illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA) (as a proxy for high-density police operations) and murder is presented in the form of line graphs for the period of 1994/95 to 2014/15. This approach is employed to undertake, by means of visual inspection, a trajectory analysis of murder and IPFA data at the station-level. Such an approach can only illuminate potential relationships between the intensive policing of crime hot spots by SAPS and variations in the annual number of reported murders, and cannot be used as a means to test for, or indicate causation. Further details on the methodology used are included in Chapter 9.

Only in recent years has SAPS released electronic crime data on an annual basis, which has covered the current reporting year and the previous nine reporting years. Nonetheless, at the time of undertaking research for this thesis there was no publicly available electronic database of SAPS station-level data for the period 1994/95 to 2014/15. Hence, the official electronic SAPS station-level crime data for the period 2005/06 to 2014/15 (available on the SAPS website) was supplemented with data transcribed from archived hardcopy SAPS crime statistics reports for the period 1994/95 to 2004/05 for 170 SAPS station areas. The outcome was a Microsoft Excel spread sheet of 170 SAPS station areas for the period 1994/95 to 2014/15 for the following data categories: murder;

attempted murder; robbery with aggravating circumstances; and IPFA. The finalisation of this spread sheet was a laborious process. As mentioned above, only murder and IPFA data was used for the case series analysis as the focus of this dissertation is on murder in South Africa.

Chapter 5: Out of the wilderness – policing in South Africa prior to 1948

This chapter provides a historical analysis of policing by colonial authorities and the various governments within the territories that now comprise modern-day South Africa. It covers the period from the establishment of the Dutch East India Company's commercial enterprise in Cape Town in 1652 until the election of the National Party government in 1948. It is not possible to provide a detailed chronology or account for the every intricacy and nuance of what is a complex historical tapestry of policing in South Africa over this period of close to three centuries. This chapter rather provides a selective and highly condensed chronological account that considers the broad brushstrokes of how policing bodies functioned in the context of territorial and socially constructed boundaries, with a significant focus on firearm use and firearm control.

Firearms gave those policing bodies with strong linkages to the central colonial authority a superior means to perpetrate violence (as compared to weapons used by indigenous populations), which they fervently used to construct and safeguard such boundaries by repelling attacks from othered groups. In addition, firearms more easily allowed for the conquest and the subjugation of populations beyond the established colonial boundaries. Nonetheless, colonial and government authorities were deeply concerned that should groups designated as 'other' secure access to firearms then the security of the state and the integrity of its political and geo-racial boundaries would be severely threatened. Hence, policing agencies were frequently tasked with enforcing firearm controls, as well as confiscating firearms from those othered groups that posed a potential threat to the paramount political authority.

This chapter will also assert that militarism has historically been an intrinsic feature of policing in South Africa. That is, during the early colonial period paramilitary entities were established with a dual policing and military purpose. The martial orientation of these policing entities reverberated forward into the establishment of the Union of South Africa, and was nourished by the police's perpetually close relationship with the military, combined with an overarching ethos of state militarism. Michael Brogden, a prominent sociologist and historian of policing, has suggested that this militarism was so pervasive that for close to 200 years the police were effectively "an internal army of occupation acting (mainly) on behalf of the white incomers and their descendants against the indigenous population and against non-white migrant labour" (1989:3).

5.1 The colonial period and the policing of boundaries

5.1.1 The Dutch East India Company, firearm control and the containment of indigenous threats

Firearm possession and firearm controls were foundational policing and security elements of the Dutch East India Company's settlement in the Cape from the 1650s. That is, firearms provided European settlers with an exclusive and vastly superior technology of violence compared to the rudimentary weaponry

that was available to indigenous populations. The Cape was a hostile setting for the early European settlers who were greatly outnumbered in relation to surrounding Khoisan inhabitants. That is, in 1662 the total population of the Cape settlement was 394 (Europeans and slaves) as opposed to an estimated 50,000 Khoisan in the surrounding areas (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979).

Acclaimed historian, Noël Mostert, has described this embryonic colonial settlement as “a place of fear: fear of the environment, of the disciplines that ruled the station, of the natives...” (Mostert, 1992:123). A fort was constructed, and the protection and policing of the colonial enclave became the responsibility of all capable male settlers, who were required to carry a firearm and to defend the boundaries of the settlement, as well as the Company’s assets and interests if attacked. Non-compliant individuals were liable for a fine (Storey, 2008).

Trading in firearms, ammunition and gunpowder outside of the settlement was prohibited, as there were concerns that the territorial and social boundaries between the Dutch settlers and the Khoisan population, who were regarded as dangerous and inferior to Europeans (Mostert, 1992), would be severely threatened should the Khoisan acquire significant quantities of firearms (Storey, 2008). Jan van Riebeeck, the Company’s representative, who held a highly jaundiced view of the Khoisan, regarded them as a “brutal gang, living without any conscience” (Mostert, 1992:106), and proclaimed that:

As these tribes are somewhat bold, thievish, and not at all to be trusted each [settler] shall take good care that his arms and working tools...be well taken care of, that they may not be stolen from him by the savages... (Moodie, 1838:10).

Other boundary maintenance practices included the construction of a thorn bush barrier (‘almond hedge’) and watchtowers along parts of the colonial frontier, as well as regular mounted patrols in the border areas (Brogden, 1989, Elphick and Malherbe, 1979). However, from the early 1670s some Khoisan clans attacked European hunters and farmers along the territorial edge of the colony. The Company responded in a belligerent fashion by mustering Europeans and men from Khoisan clans that had aligned themselves to the Company and launched “punitive expeditions” against the perpetrators of the attacks in which livestock was confiscated (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979:13).

5.1.2 The proliferation of firearms and the escalation in colonial insecurity

The needs of the colonists, particularly access to meat (which was in scarce supply) and ivory resulted in a number of Dutch settlers ignoring the Company’s firearm control edicts. Khoisan labourers and servants were armed to assist with the hunting of wildlife (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979, Marks and Atmore, 1971). The practice of arming indentured or loyal Khoisan men continued throughout the 18th century, especially on newly established farms and settlements in the hinterland and along the frontiers of the expanding Cape Colony (Mostert, 1992, Storey, 2008).

From the late 18th century Xhosa men beyond the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony began to acquire firearms from Khoisan farmworkers who had

absconded from farms within the Colony due to poor working conditions (and had previously acquired firearms as a form of payment) (Penn, 1992). Many of these farmworkers even used their firearms in organised insurgency against the colony (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979). In addition, some dissident *trekboers*⁸ engaged in gunrunning across the borders of the Colony into Xhosa territory (Storey, 2008). By the early 1830s firearm smuggling had become a highly lucrative industry and was being carried out by a wide range of entrepreneurs, including hunters and Christian missionaries (Storey, 2008). This illicit firearm trade had also spread well beyond the eastern frontier regions into Natal and Zululand, as well as into the northern frontier territories.

In the latter part of the 19th century the bustling diamond mining areas in and around Kimberley in the British-administered territory of Griqualand West became a lodestone for firearm trading and trafficking (Marks and Atmore, 1971, Storey, 2008). Black market firearms and gunpowder often fetched a handsome price given the unlawful nature of the trade. For example, members of the Bastard community on the north western frontier reportedly had to part with as much as six oxen or a 'hundredweight' (50kg) of ivory in order to secure a musket of mediocre quality (Legassick, 2010).

The illicit and poorly regulated trade in firearms had serious security implications for the settler colonies. Such access to firearms reportedly emboldened some indigenous groups to engage in more frequent attacks against settler communities and rustle livestock, as was the case with the *!Kora* in the northern frontier territories from the 1830s (Leśniewski, 2010); and Venda raiders in the Soutpansberg in the late 1860s (Giliomee, 1981). The *Hlubi*, for example, used their firearms to defy colonial subjugation (Etherington, 1978). Around the same time firearm use by indigenous people began to feature more prominently in the various battles along the eastern frontier, as well as in the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) (Guy, 1971, Marks and Atmore, 1971).

In an attempt to reduce the growing threats in the frontier regions and the territories beyond that had been brought about by the illicit arms trade, the various colonial authorities tightened firearm control regulations in relation to the sale of firearms, ammunition and gunpowder to non-whites. In the Boer republics, namely the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State (established in 1852 and 1854 respectively), black persons were banned from owning firearms. The Boer authorities in the South African Republic resolved that any armed black person crossing into their territory would be put to death immediately (Storey, 2008).

In the British controlled colonies of the Cape and Natal black people were eligible to apply for licences to purchase firearms, but the licensing authorities only issued licences where they were satisfied that the individual seeking to acquire the firearm was a 'fit and loyal' person (Marks and Atmore, 1971). This racialised approach to firearm control was premised on the notion that most black persons,

⁸ Settlers of European descent who had sought to live in areas outside of the immediate authority of the Cape Colony, often living on, or beyond the frontiers of the Colony's boundaries.

if armed, would subsequently not be a compliant subject of the colonial authorities, and would most likely engage in menacing and defiant behaviour (Nasson, 2007). However, such a policing approach was largely ineffectual in the outer reaches of the colonies as enforcement was ad hoc, and there was a major demand for firearms amongst African populations combined with the highly lucrative nature of the trade (Atmore and Sanders, 1971, Miers, 1971).

5.1.3 Emergence of more ordered and aggressive policing

Armed aggression (and the threat thereof) from various indigenous populations in frontier regions notably contributed to the pursuance of more forceful and directed forms of policing by colonial authorities in these areas. As these territories were vast and sparsely populated policing became the responsibility of a variety of armed mobile and quasi-military policing entities. Some examples included: Cape Mounted Police, Cape Mounted Riflemen, the Natal Mounted Police, the *Transvaalsche Rijdende Politie*, Griqualand Border Police, the Stutterheim Mounted Police, and the Zululand Mounted Police (Brogden, 1989).

In line with colonial policing practices in other parts of Africa and Asia, many of the policing bodies mentioned above enlisted or coerced men into their ranks from local ethnic groups, such as the Khoisan and amaXhosa, as well as men of mixed descent. This was primarily informed by acute shortage of potential recruits from the European settler communities and financial considerations in that non-Europeans in military and policing formations could be paid lower wages than Europeans (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979, Switzer, 1993). This arrangement of staffing policing bodies with black recruits to protect and defend white privilege and rule was to be consistently perpetuated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.

As it was costly to maintain official mounted police detachments in the distant border areas the colonial authorities regularly endorsed the formation, or deputised, bands of 'loyal' armed men into semi-autonomous 'commandos' to perform policing and paramilitary functions. *Veldwachtmeesters* [field sergeants] or *veldkornetten* [field-cornets] usually headed these commandos, which were official representatives of the Cape Colony and tended to be prominent local farmers. In 1739 commando service became compulsory for white male residents in many of the frontier regions, but proxy conscripts in the form of black servants were permissible. From the early 19th century these commandos were often compelled by the colonial government to become auxiliary forces to military campaigns (Giliomee, 1981).

Communities targeted by such policing entities in frontier areas were predominantly Khoisan and amaXhosa, which the Cape Colony had declared to be inferior beings and 'aliens' (Du Toit and Giliomee, 1983, Freund, 1972). This bigoted view was reinforced amongst settler communities through competition over land between settlers and indigenous populations, combined with the constant threat of cattle raiding and attacks by indigenous people. These attitudes subsequently framed the heavy-handed actions of the commandos and other policing entities (Mostert, 1992, Penn, 1992, Senior, 1997).

Severe and lethal violence was meted out against targeted groups, irrespective of whether they had actually posed a serious risk towards white settlers (Penn, 1986, Williams, 1970). Members of the commandos customarily appropriated the livestock and land of communities that had been vanquished (Du Toit and Giliomee, 1983). The most violent episodes of commando violence were directed towards the San ('Bushmen') communities in the late 1770s, where commandos were sanctioned by the Cape colonial government to 'exterminate' or enslave San men, women and children for use as labour on *trekboer* farms (Adhikari, 2014, Dooling, 2009, Penn, 1992). Such genocidal violence was essentially a form of boundary policing, as the elimination of the San paved the way for an outward extension of the geographical boundaries of the Cape Colony (Elphick and Malherbe, 1979).

5.1.4 Colonial frontier policing through subjugation and conquest

From the middle of the 19th century policing bodies and the police were frequently directed to subjugate and conquer indigenous populations and opposition groups. This was derived from bigoted colonial views of such populations and groups, as well as plans by the various colonial administrations to expand the territorial boundaries of the colonies. In addition, these policing practices were acutely informed by armed resistance against and perceived threats to colonial rule that was exhibited by some indigenous communities. This corresponded with an increased formalisation of policing entities and more substantial deployments of colonial military resources to conflict areas.

5.1.4.1 Conquest and the eastern and northern frontiers

The conquest form of policing was particularly evident on the eastern frontier during the recurrent small-scale wars that were waged between the Cape Colony and amaXhosa communities during much of the 19th century, but was also prevalent in the northern border areas. These policing and military actions were also informed by prejudiced and panic-stricken attitudes of European settlers along the frontier who called for more aggressive policing action (Crais, 1992, Elbourne, 2000, Lester, 1998).

A prominent example was in 1850, when as a result of complaints by white farmers on the eastern frontier of excessive vagrancy and theft allegedly emanating from the Kat River Settlement (comprised of predominantly black residents), the local magistrate deployed the Xhosa Police⁹ to evict some 100 'squatters' and destroy their huts (Ross, 2003, Watson, 1996). These policing actions subsequently ignited rebellion within the Kat River Settlement. Rebels combined forces with amaXhosa troops in what was to become known as the Eighth Frontier War. The Cape Colony mustered a joint military and policing

⁹ The Xhosa Police were a policing body comprised of amaXhosa men established in the Eastern frontier region in the mid-1830s by the colonial authorities, and were referred to as the 'Kaffir Police' at the time. Their primary roles were to act as scouts and gather intelligence during periods of armed conflict with amaXhosa communities, and respond to stock theft and smuggling during times of relative peace.

response that included the militarised Cape Mounted Rifles, which indiscriminately destroyed houses in rebel areas (Mostert, 1992).

Similarly, in response to the armed attacks by the *!Kora* (mentioned above), which had become further emboldened in the 1860s and had effectively made large swathes of the northern frontier region ungovernable (Leśniewski, 2010), the Cape colonial government enacted the Northern Border Protection Act (1869). This made provision for considerable resources to be deployed to the troubled regions, including a large detachment of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP). The *!Kora* were initially subdued, but renewed their attacks on settlers along with other allied groups in the late 1870s. They were eventually routed by the combined efforts of the FAMP and commandos in 1879 (Dooling, 2009, Ross, 1975) and the colonial territorial boundaries were subsequently expanded and secured.

In another instance, in 1894, following the enactment of the Pondoland Annexation Act, the Cape Colony appropriated Pondoland, the last remaining non-settler controlled wedge of land between the Cape and Natal colonies. The annexation was achieved in practice through the threat of force with a contingent of militarised mounted police setting-up camp on the eastern borders of Pondoland. At the time there were accusations that Pondoland was: anarchic; had become a haven for fugitives from British justice; and that it was a staging ground for criminal assaults against colonial settlements and farms in the frontier regions (Theal, 1908). Cecil John Rhodes, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony at the time, indicated that the annexation was inevitable given “the impossibility of a barbarian native existing between two civilised powers” (Knowles and Knowles, 2005:59), and declared that “in dealing with [such] natives a show of force went a long way” (Harlow and Carter, 2003:513).

5.1.4.2 Forced disarmament

A key element of policing during this colonial period was forced disarmament. That is, the confiscation of firearms, ammunition and other weapons by the colonial authorities from population groups deemed to be dangerous or threatening to the consolidation of territorial and political control in the frontier regions. This was often facilitated by means of legislation that euphemistically framed such disarmament endeavours as a means to preserve ‘the peace’. However, such legislation codified the othering and oppression of targeted racial groups by either banning such groups from legally owning firearms, or only allowing those individuals deemed to be loyal to bear arms. According to Storey (2004:701), this was an element of a larger strategy “to despoil Africans of their land”.

A significant racially discriminatory disarmament process took place in the late 1870s in the aftermath of a series of armed conflicts with amaXhosa communities on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony (Stapleton, 2009). By means of the Peace Preservation Act (1878) black Africans in the Colony were compelled to acquire licences from the colonial authorities for their firearms and assegais, and surrender any unlicensed arms to magistrates (for which financial

compensation would be received). The penalty for disobedience was a stiff fine of 500 pounds Sterling or a seven-year jail term. There was also a distinct possibility that those who failed to comply with the provisions of the legislation would have to forfeit their arms, cattle and land (Storey, 2008). There was considerable protestation by black Africans against this racially discriminatory legislation, but most surrendered their arms begrudgingly (Odendaal, 2012), with 10,860 firearms and 15,764 assegais being collected. Some 31,076 pounds sterling was paid as compensation for the surrendered firearms (Kotze, 2003).

The Cape Colony adopted the same approach in Basutoland (now Lesotho) but was met with widespread resistance. This rapidly escalated into the 'Gun War' (1880-81) in which military and militarised police forces were deployed to quash the rebellion and enforce disarmament. At the time, racist considerations were clearly evident in the speeches of Bartle Frere, the governor-general of the Cape Colony at the time, who was one of the champions of the disarmament of the Basotho. Frere argued that firearm possession by indigenous groups had the potential to "increase their martial pride and conceit in their prowess...and belief in the invincibility of the owner, [and was] a direct incentive for insubordination and war" (Storey, 2004:709). In response to these disarmament attempts, the Basotho, which had resorted to guerrilla tactics, inflicted heavy casualties on the colonial forces. Consequently the Cape's ability to govern Basutoland was irreparably impaired. To save face, the Cape authorities abandoned their disarmament attempts, and Basutoland subsequently secured a separation from the Cape in favour of direct administration from Britain in 1884 (Atmore and Sanders, 1971, Storey, 2008).

In 1901 the Peace Preservation Act (1878) was once again assertively imposed throughout the Cape Colony. This was a martial law measure in response to concerns that raids by commandos from the Boer republics in the context of the Anglo-Boer War (see below) may ignite a rebellion by Afrikaners within the Colony. All civilians were required to apply for licences to retain their firearms, with the exception of rifles, which were to be surrendered to the authorities. However, as before, the Peace Preservation Act (1878) was not uniformly applied across all racial groups, with black inhabitants being effectively disarmed (Storey, 2008).

5.1.4.3 The Anglo-Boer War

The (Second) Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899 between Britain (which had acquired control of the Cape and Natal colonies) on the one side and the Boer republics, namely the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, on the other. The war endured until May 1902 when the Boer forces surrendered and Britain annexed the two republics thereby demolishing both territorial and political boundaries and eliminating the threat that the Boer republics had posed. A number of detachments from the mobile paramilitary police units, such as the Cape Mounted Rifles (formerly the FAMP), the Cape Mounted Police and the Natal Mounted Police were part of the orthodox military force during this war (Knight and Embleton, 2000).

In 1900 the British authorities established the South African Constabulary (SAC) within the war zone, which was a mobile paramilitary force with the specific objective of targeting Boer commandos (Curtis, 1902). Counterinsurgency tactics were also pursued, with police recruits actively participating in the 'scorched earth' strategy, which entailed the burning of Boer farmland and farmhouses, as well as the killing of livestock. The police were also involved in skirmishes with Boer commandos and in capturing enemy combatants (Downes, 2007, Hyslop, 2009).

Akin to the conquest campaigns on the eastern frontier, forced disarmament operations were conducted during and after the war in order to shore up the British control of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State (Grundlingh, 1991). The Boers were not the sole targets of disarmament as racially prejudiced firearm control was acutely perpetuated in the captured territory, with the SAC being required to seize firearms from approximately 50,000 black people, which they had obtained during the war (Warwick, 1983). This disarmament process was underpinned by: negotiations with relevant chiefs; the offer of financial compensation for surrendered firearms, and the threat of punitive actions against those that failed to comply (Grundlingh, 1991). The disarmament was actually part of a wider strategy to reclaim land that black people had occupied as a result of the war (Brogden, 1989).

5.2 The creation of the Union of South Africa

In 1910 the South African colonies under British administration, namely the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, the Transvaal Colony (formerly the South African Republic) and the Orange River Colony (formerly the Orange Free State) were amalgamated into the Union of South Africa, which subsequently became a dominion of the British Empire. The first three decades of the post-unification period were characterised by increased codification and enforcement of racial discrimination, and rampant labour market exploitation (especially in the mining sector). These dynamics culminated in rebellion, sedition and militant strikes by white miners on the Witwatersrand.

There was also intermittent belligerent small-scale protest action and rebellion by black South Africans in response to their continued subjugation, which included the continuation of the prohibition on legal firearm ownership by black South Africans. The police were at the forefront of quelling uprisings and insurrections in order to consolidate government control over the Union. The police were also tasked with enforcing social (racial) boundaries between white and black South Africans, as well as ensuring that there would be a compliant and cheap labour force to meet the demands of the growing South African economy.

5.2.1 The establishment of the national police

The creation of the Union led to a centrally directed, highly bureaucratised national police organisation being established, which incorporated police personnel from the four former colonies. This new national police body was christened the South African Police (SAP). The blueprint for the SAP was

extensively influenced by the structure and practices of the Royal Irish Constabulary, a martial, frontier-oriented colonial policing body that had been created in Ireland in the early 19th century (Brewer, 1994, Brogden, 1989). Hence, a militarised frontier policing ethos was seemingly hardwired into the DNA of the SAP. This was reinforced by the military traditions and characteristics that had pervaded the colonial policing entities prior to unification.

Due to government concerns that rebellion by both black and white communities was a distinct possibility, the SAP was assigned a clear military mandate in terms of both the Defence Act (1912) and the Police Act (1912). In particular, during wartime, SAP members could be conscripted into military service and serve under the command of the Union Defence Force. The role of the police was also fundamentally informed by moral panics within white communities at the time. According to Chanock (2001:48), in this context, the Union government perceived a primary duty of the police to be “the protection of the white suburbs from the threat, real or imagined from the black suburbs”.

The other main policing body was the South African Mounted Riflemen (SAMR), which, like the SAP, also recruited personnel from mounted policing entities that had operated in the four former South African colonies. During deliberations in parliament about the future of policing in the Union, Jan Smuts, who was to become Prime Minister, described the SAMR as a “small permanent striking force to deal with emergencies which arise suddenly and which you may nip in the bud” (Chanock, 2001:49).

The SAMR was structured and armed along military lines and was incorporated into the Union Defence Force. It had dedicated order maintenance responsibilities, particularly in rural districts in times of peace. Its primary tasks were the policing of stock theft and tax collection (Cooper, 1929), but was also to be an incontrovertible display of the emerging state’s coercive power (Beinart and Bundy, 1987). However, the SAMR was widely criticised by magistrates for being nepotistic and inept in the execution of basic policing tasks. In the late 1920s the SAMR was disbanded and its personnel were incorporated into the SAP, with rural policing largely being delegated to local farmers who were deputised as police reservists (Chanock, 2001).

5.2.2 Police responses to rebellion and insurrection by white South Africans

The Union government had to contend with a series of armed threats and uprisings by disgruntled Afrikaners between 1910 and 1948, which were mainly in relation to the Union’s support of Britain’s involvement in both World Wars, and employment dynamics in the mining sector. The police and the military were deployed to forcibly subdue these uprisings. Three prominent examples are highlighted below which aptly demonstrate this, namely: the 1914 rebellion; the 1921/22 Rand Strike; and attacks by the *Ossewabrandwag* in the early 1940s. When these events occurred there was considerable othering within government towards the groups engaging in anti-government violence.

5.2.2.1 The 1914 rebellion

In October 1914 an armed rebellion of approximately 11,000 men took place, which was spearheaded by disaffected Afrikaner veterans of the second Anglo-Boer War.¹⁰ The catalyst for the rebellion was the pronouncement by the government of South Africa's support for Britain's declaration of war on Germany (World War I). A requirement of such a commitment was for South Africa to invade neighbouring German South West Africa (now Namibia) (Chanock, 2001). The uprising was ultimately derived from a nostalgic desire by the rebels to re-establish, by means of force, the Boer republics within South Africa that would be free of British imperialist influences and demands (Davenport, 1963, Swart, 2004). The rebels' aspirations were bolstered by poverty and alienation among large segments of the Afrikaner population which had worsened following the unification process and rapid industrialisation (Fedorowich, 2003, Swart, 1998).

Despite the close historical and cultural ties between the leaders of the ruling South African Party government (particularly Louis Botha and Jan Smuts) and the rebel elite, there was considerable othering by the leadership towards the rebels, referring to them as "traitors" who would be subjected to "condign punishment" (Higginson, 2015:168). The government subsequently responded forcefully as at the time the rebellion had the potential to destabilise the underpinnings of fragile Union. Martial law was declared with the Union Defence Force and the SAP being deployed to bring an end to the uprising (Davenport, 1963).

During the rebellion the fighting primarily took place in frontier territories of South Africa namely in the western Transvaal, the north-eastern Free State and the northern Cape Province. In many of these areas the exercise of state power was weak, and as a result the rebels were able to seize control of these regions. The combined Union Defence Force-SAP forces engaged in cavalry assaults on rebel positions and camps and were able to reclaim rebel-held areas and disarm the insurgents in a matter of weeks. But it took an additional three months of military/police operations before the remaining rebel leaders eventually surrendered (Brewer, 1994, Fedorowich, 2003, Reitz, 1933).

5.2.2.2 1921/22 Rand Strike

The 1921/22 white mineworkers strike in the Witwatersrand area is one of the most notorious labour strikes in South African history. It was in reaction to attempts by mining companies to decrease wages and benefits, and hire a greater proportion of black employees (who could be paid lower wages) following a drop in the global gold price (Beck, 2014). The strike was highly militarised. Strikers armed themselves with a variety of weapons, including firearms, and were organised into 'commandos' (Alexander, 1999, Krikler, 1999). As the strike intensified vehement condemnation of the strikers increased amongst the wealthy and middle classes, and they were demonised in the

¹⁰ Some of these men were serving in the South African military at the time.

English language press. The Union government, under the leadership of Jan Smuts, declared these militant labour actions to be “subterranean, menacing dangers” and refused to negotiate with the strike leadership (Hirson, 1993).

By early 1922 the strike had metamorphosed into large-scale revolt against the Union government, with some strike leaders declaring their intention to establish a Republic (Hirson, 1993). Commandos attacked and shot at police, non-striking white mineworkers, and numerous black mineworkers. Poses of white strikers and sympathisers went on indiscriminate shooting sprees, specifically targeting black people in many areas throughout Johannesburg (Breckenridge, 2007, Krikler, 1999). Some commandos were also responsible for sabotage activities, such as the blowing-up of railway lines and power lines (Union of South Africa, 1924). The SAP and SAMR were unable to suppress the strike comprehensively and commandos captured some police stations, such as in Newlands, Fordsburg and Langlaagte. In effect the strikers were able to establish temporary liberated zones (Hyslop, 2009).

Due to concerns that the revolt might result in more widespread violence in South Africa, martial law was declared and the Union Defence Force was deployed to assist the police (Hyslop, 2009). The security forces made use of extreme force, including field artillery and aerial bombardment to crush the rebellion. It has been estimated that 250 people died during the police/military crackdown, with hundreds more being wounded (Cawthra, 1993).

Government security forces, including the police, undertook multi-phased house-to-house searches as a strategy to forcibly regain control of rebel-held areas. Suspected rebels were detained, and arms and ammunition were seized. In Brakpan, for example, the security forces undertook a follow-up operation a week after their initial detention and disarmament operations in order to apprehend and disarm those rebels who had fled the town before the operation but had subsequently returned to their homes (Krikler, 2005). Table 5.1 below provides a breakdown of the quantities of arms and ammunition that were confiscated by the security forces.

Table 5.1: Arms and Ammunition confiscated by the SAP, 1922 Rand Strike

Firearm type	Firearm quantity	Ammunition quantity
Rifles, service	118	3,628
Shot guns	117	1,629
Rifles, saloon	81	23,199
Rifles, various	194	2,766
Rifles, air	16	200
Revolvers and pistols	517	3,722

Source: Union of South Africa (1924)

5.2.2.3 Responding to the Ossewabrandwag

The SAP was reactivated into a highly militarised role following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, mainly in response to the security threats posed by the *Ossewabrandwag* (OB) (Ox Wagon Sentinel) within South Africa. The OB was a conservative Afrikaner social/cultural nationalist movement with fascist

inclinations that was vehemently opposed to South Africa's support of British war effort in relation to World War II. Some OB members and *Stormjaers* (a militant faction that grew out of the OB and then became a semi-autonomous group) engaged in sabotage and terrorist activities, and even plotted a coup as a strategy to topple the Union Government (Visser, 1976).

Police personnel were instructed to apprehend "enemy subjects" (OB members and supporters) (Shear, 2012), and the police raided the premises and farms of the suspected saboteurs and coup plotters. Arms and explosives were discovered and confiscated (Brewer, 1994). Following on from this operation, all policing agencies sought to purge OB members from their ranks, which resulted in the arrest and internment of 373 police personnel (Visser, 1976).

5.2.3 Suppression and control of black South Africans: Role of SAP

From its inception the SAP was at the forefront of enforcing the continued subjugation of black South Africans, and in particular mitigating the risk that they may rebel in large numbers against white minority rule. In this regard, the SAP pursued two key containment strategies, namely the pass system, and the continuation of racially prejudiced firearm control. Furthermore, the SAP used excessive force in response to strikes and insurrection by black population groups.

5.2.3.1 The pass system and firearm control

The pass system, which had been preserved from the colonial period, was a racist boundary mechanism designed to control the movement of black South Africans as a means to achieve racial segregation and guarantee cheap labour for the expanding economy. It required black South Africans to have an official work permit in order to enter and/or reside in major towns and cities. Those without such a permit were supposed to reside in designated rural areas. The SAP strictly enforced this system, in which those without a pass were harassed or arrested (Brogden, 1989, Davenport and Saunders, 2000). In this regard, policemen acted as geo-racial boundary maintenance prefects.

In terms of firearm control, the vast majority of black South Africans were prohibited from possessing firearms out of concern that it may result in armed violence and crime against white South Africans. In addition, there was a deep concern within the Union government, informed by past prejudices and experiences of frontier battles, that firearms could be used to achieve racial equality. This was clearly evident in the parliamentary deliberations concerning the Defence Act (1912) and deployment of non-white South African troops to support Britain during World War I. According to Nasson (2016:197), there was anxiety that "having Africans bearing arms and sharing duties with whites would erode the colour-bar by condoning equality in relations between black and white". The Union government position was reiterated during the parliamentary debates around South Africa's involvement in World War II (1939), where Jan Smuts declared in no uncertain terms: "To forestall any misrepresentation...prevent any possible misunderstanding...natives will not

under any circumstances, be equipped with arms of precision [firearms]" (Nasson, 2012:133).

The SAP was at the frontline of preserving and enforcing firearm access, as the police were responsible for the licensing and policing of civilian-held firearms. It appears that the SAP was efficient in implementing its biased firearm control mandate, as between 1910 and 1948 reporting on firearm-specific crime by black South Africans was almost entirely absent in the annual reports of the National SAP Commissioner. Where weapon-related crime was recorded it was typically crimes entailing knobkerries and knives.

5.2.3.2 Strikes and uprisings

Between 1910 and 1948 there were a series of strikes and uprisings by black South Africans in response to government policies and practices. Both the police and the military were frequently deployed to ensure that these incidents of protest did not result in more widespread insurrection by black people and disruption to the economy. The police therefore acted to preserve and defend the geo-racial and class boundaries within South Africa. Two of the most prominent uprisings by black South Africans that primarily involved the SAP are assessed below.

In October 1920, in the midst of a militant strike instigated by a faction of the Port Elizabeth Industrial and Commercial Workers' (Amalgamated) Union of Africa, a combined force of police and deputised white civilians massacred 24 black protestors outside a police station in the coastal city of Port Elizabeth. Prior to this massacre there had been general angst amongst white residents that the strike would rapidly escalate into widespread violence with black mobs attacking white homes and businesses. In the immediate aftermath of the shootings the local newspaper, the EP Herald, reported that the police had acted in self-defence following shots being fired from the crowd (which was later disproved by the Schweizer Commission of Inquiry). The EP Herald further stated that: "had the Police not taken the extreme steps they did, Port Elizabeth would, in all probability, have had a far greater and terrible tragedy to mourn and deplore" (Baines, 1993:5). These sentiments were shared by the Inspector of Labour, W. Ludorf who stated that: "[U]nless prompt action had been taken Port Elizabeth would have been in the throes of something too awful to contemplate...in my considered opinion the prompt action taken in firing is fully justified and quelled a very serious native revolt against constituted authority" (Baines, 1993:5).

In 1921 the SAP and the Union Defence Force used overwhelming force to suppress an uprising in Bulhoek (Eastern Cape province). In this instance a contingent of around 800 policemen opened fire on members of a religious sect of black South Africans, 'the Israelites', which was illegally occupying government land, and were armed with swords and assegais. Previous attempts by government authorities to disperse the squatters by means of negotiation and threat of force had failed (Webb and Holleman, 1997). A military-style police action was subsequently pursued, which led to the massacre of approximately

200 cult members, with over 100 being wounded and 141 being arrested. This police action ultimately terminated the uprising (Makobe, 1996, Makobe, 2012).

5.3 Conclusion

The construction of the various colonies that have now been incorporated into contemporary South Africa were intrinsically born out of violence as the colonial authorities and settlers of European descent sought to use force (or the threat thereof) to acquire land, malleable labour and political control, as well as extend and defend the borders of the colonies. At the frontiers of the colonial territories many indigenous populations and a number of renegade settler communities belligerently resisted such strong-arm processes.

Such a scenario directly resulted the creation of well-armed policing bodies, both formal and informal, whose customary *modus operandi* was to use excessive force in such areas to maintain and even extend these territorial boundaries by means of defeating and/or subjugating rebellious and threatening groups. In addition, these policing entities also regularly fought alongside detachments of soldiers in battles and skirmishes against the opponents of colonial governments. The combination of the boundary dynamics and intimate relationship with the armed forces resulted in the fashioning of a militarised and aggressive foundation and approach to policing in South Africa.

Within the territorial confines of the colonies, and later the Union of South Africa, policing bodies and the police were central to maintaining and enforcing boundaries relating to racial and class segregation. Strikes, protest action and rebellion by black people and working class Afrikaners were quashed as these forms of dissension were ultimately perceived as being geared towards weakening or eradicating these boundaries. Those population groups engaging in such actions were generally severely othered by government, which subsequently combated protests and insurrection by means of militarised and highly belligerent policing responses. The police tightly controlled the movement of black people, ensuring that only those with an official permit could cross over spatially defined racial boundaries to enter the sanctity of predominantly white residential and commercial areas. Such a strategy was also, in later years, to become a means to control crime and contain it in areas where black people were compelled to reside.

Given the conflictual nature of state formation in South Africa, the control of, and access to, firearms was a fundamental component of colonial and post-unification policing and the maintenance of social boundaries. Firearm possession was a security issue, but was also perceived to be a touchstone towards racial equality, and hence the colonial administrations sought to monopolise control over powder and shot, with firearm possession by othered groups, particularly black populations, being discouraged, restricted and eventually outlawed. Armed uprisings and rebellions against the prevailing socio-political order generated severe responses from both the colonial and the Union governments.

Chapter 6: The SAP and the fortification of apartheid boundaries of 1948-1994

In 1948 the National Party (NP) became the ruling party in South Africa. Historians generally regard this political development as the official commencement of the apartheid period, which was to herald the implementation of even more far-reaching racially discriminatory policies and legislation aimed at the comprehensive disenfranchisement and regulation of South Africa's black population. The police were at the front and centre of implementing these apartheid measures, and as this chapter will show, the policing of social boundaries consequently became even further engrained within the ethos and strategies of the South African Police (SAP). Throughout this period, opposition and violent resistance to government, principally within black communities, gained momentum with the SAP also being at the vanguard of the state's aggressive response to this unrest. Within the Southern African region the South African government progressively found itself surrounded by hostile states, a number of which harboured and supported South African liberation movements.

This chapter does not provide a detailed history of the SAP during the apartheid period, but rather assesses the interactions and relationships between territorial and social boundaries and the police. In this regard, it will principally review the various approaches that were used by the SAP to uphold and impose societal divisions, as well as respond to threats and insurrection within South Africa. In addition, it will consider the strategies that the SAP pursued in order to defend and fortify the national borderlines. Moreover, this chapter will explore the implications that the boundary work of the police had on the police as an organisation. Firearm control under apartheid will also be considered as the police actively sought to prohibit and prevent black people from acquiring firearms as a means to perpetuate their subjugation to white minority rule.

6.1 Reinforcing the borders of South Africa: The cases of Rhodesia, South West Africa and Mozambique

From the 1960s dynamics within a number of states in the Southern African region became more threatening towards the South African government, particularly Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (SWA) (now Namibia). The latter country was occupied by South Africa at the time. In both territories liberation movements had initiated armed insurgency against the white minority governments, with these liberation movements being sympathetic to the plight of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Southern Africa was to become an even more unwelcoming place for the apartheid government from the mid 1970s with Angola and Mozambique acquiring independence and subsequently being led by pro-communist governments. The SAP was deployed in significant numbers in both Rhodesia and SWA in an attempt to confine and/or eliminate the threatening conditions within these neighbouring countries. A brief assessment of these policing interventions is provided below.

6.1.1 SAP in Rhodesia

In the mid 1960s a SAP contingent of approximately 2,000 men was deployed to support the Rhodesian security services in the patrolling of border areas between Rhodesia and South Africa. The SAP also participated in joint operations with the Rhodesian security forces against insurgent groups. These South African policemen wore military-style uniforms, and were armed with military firearms. They devoted most of their energies to aggressive counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions with a view to killing or capturing guerrillas and destroying their bases. The overall strategy for the SAP was to assist the Rhodesian government to acquire complete control of areas where rebels operated (Cilliers, 1985).

Further to this, the Rhodesian security forces, with the support of SAP, established exclusion zones on the Rhodesian side of the border. The communities that had resided in those areas were subsequently resettled in newly established 'protected villages'. These depopulation measures were put in place to make the territory more conducive for the security forces to patrol, as well as pursue rebel fighters. It also thwarted the construction of guerrilla bases and undermined attempts by the guerrillas to recruit cadres and made it more difficult for them to acquire food and find shelter (Cilliers, 1985, Kesby, 1996).

In 1975 the South African government scaled down its economic and technical support to its northern neighbour, and withdrew most of the SAP personnel. This stemmed from the emergence of South Africa's détente regional foreign policy towards Southern Africa, a key component of which entailed lobbying and pressure by the South African government for there to be a cessation of hostilities in Rhodesia. It was the Rhodesian government's reluctance to sincerely pursue a ceasefire and political settlement with the principal liberation movements in that country that ultimately resulted in the departure of the South African policemen from Rhodesia (Barber and Barratt, 1990, Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2008).¹¹ However, the Rhodesian campaign was a watershed experience for the SAP, that thereafter began to increasingly use COIN measures within South Africa in areas where populations resided that the police regarded as being hostile towards the government (Ellis, 1998).

6.1.2 SAP in South West Africa

The SAP was the lead policing body within SWA between 1939 and 1981. The SAP generally policed this appropriated country in a similar fashion to how it policed South Africa, particularly in relation to the strict and often repressive enforcement of the 'native reserves' (bantustans) and a pass system for black inhabitants (Moorsom, 1977). However, the sparsely populated nature of this sizeable territory resulted in the preservation of a clearly delineated 'Police Zone' (also referred to as the 'Red Line' due to the way it was depicted on maps), which had been created by the previous German colonial administration.

¹¹ The armed conflict in Rhodesia came to an end in 1980 with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement and an internationally supervised election. This brought about an effective end to white rule, and Rhodesia was subsequently renamed Zimbabwe.

The Police Zone was comprised of the south-central regions of SWA, which included the cities and most of the major towns (where the white population resided), as well as industry and mining operations. The areas to the north of the Police Zone border were referred to as the 'Tribal Area' in which mostly black communities were located. The Police Zone did shift north under South African rule reflecting a need for the imposition of greater governmental authority in the northern regions in order to improve security within the Police Zone. Significantly more aggressive (and lethal) policing was pursued and condoned beyond the Police Zone (McKenna, 2011).

The perimeter of the Police Zone was a physical barrier in the form of fences, control points and police posts that had been erected to restrict the movement of black Namibians from the northern regions, such as Ovamboland, as well as animals as a measure to prevent the spread of livestock diseases. But it was also a symbolic policing barrier that enclosed an area that was subject to heightened levels of visible policing by the security forces. The SAP monitored and patrolled the boundary of the Police Zone intently (Toase, 2011). Up until 1977 black Namibians from outside of the Zone were only permitted to enter the security enclave with an official permit. The northern districts (outside of the Police Zone) remained considerably under-policed, and the SWA administration mostly relied on a combination of acquiescent traditional leaders and chiefs and deputised militia to enforce law, order and social control (Du Pisani, 2010, Toase, 2011).

From the 1960s the SAP adopted a pronounced paramilitary role in SWA and noticeably increased its boots on the ground. This was essentially in response to South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) launching an armed struggle against South African occupation. SWAPO guerrillas undertook small-scale attacks (including assassinations of a number of headmen with perceived allegiances to the South African administration), engaged in acts of sabotage against government targets, and laid landmines in the northern regions. SWAPO was also established a number of fledgling bases in these areas (Brown, 1995). SWAPO fighters were subsequently demonised by the South African authorities, including the SAP, and were regularly referred to as 'terrorists' (Cawthra, 1993).

Apart from enforcing regulations relating to the movement of black Namibians, the SAP targeted SWAPO activists and supporters through intimidation and arrest (Toase, 2011). Most of the internal SWAPO leadership were arrested and imprisoned on Robben Island (near Cape Town) in 1968 by means of anti-communist and anti-terrorism legislation (Brown, 1995). Organised protest was typically met with a repressive SAP response. For example, in 1971 thousands of residents of a major labour hostel in Katatura¹² made their compound "virtually a no-go area" for the police at night. The SAP responded with raids and mass arrests (Moorsom, 1977:78).

In the aftermath of SWAPO launching its armed struggle SAP actions outside of the Police Zone became considerably more heavy-handed. Between the mid

¹² Katatura is a large township on the outskirts of the city of Windhoek.

1960s and early 1970s SAP patrols, involving armoured vehicles and air support, were regularly deployed outside of the Police Zone in an attempt to capture and kill guerrillas entering SWA from neighbouring countries, as well as destroy SWAPO bases (Toase, 2011). The first SAP military-style raid (in collaboration with the SADF) was in Ongulumbashe where inexperienced SWAPO insurgents were routed by the well-armed SAP (Els, 2007). In 1971 a widespread strike and unrest led to the SAP and the South African military being granted emergency powers, which they then used to violently crackdown on strikers, particularly in areas beyond the Police Zone, such as Ovamboland. Strike meetings came under fire, and hundreds of strikers were arrested and imprisoned without trial (Moorsom, 1977).

In 1973 the SADF became the lead operational security agency in SWA. This was due to concerns within government that the SAP was no longer the appropriate body to counter the military threat posed by SWAPO (Seegers, 1996). In addition, the SAP had expressed disquiet about the limited resources at its disposal given that it was also involved in Rhodesian conflict at the time (Brown, 1995). This was a clear indication that the South African government's perception of the threatening dynamics within SWA had escalated, namely that SWAPO was perceived to have become a more formidable military force, and that hence the police could no longer unilaterally forestall it. This was reminiscent of the conflicts along the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony during the 19th century when troops were deployed in situations when policing entities could not adequately contain armed attacks from indigenous groups.

The SAP was almost entirely withdrawn from SWA and replaced by the SWA Police in 1981, which recruited personnel from inside SWA (Tonchi, et al., 2012). Nonetheless a SWA paramilitary COIN unit, which had been established by the SAP in the late 1970s, continued to operate within SWA until 1989. This unit was officially titled Operation K, but it became more widely known as 'Koevoet' (crowbar), a crude analogy for its principal *modus operandi*, aptly described by Louis le Grange, the South African Minister of Law and Order as being to "prise terrorists out of the *bushveld* like nails from rotten wood" (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998). It primarily targeted SWAPO insurgents and was deployed in the northern regions of SWA close to the Angolan border. It was mainly comprised of black SWA Police personnel and retired special forces operators from Rhodesia. SAP retained a close relationship with Koevoet throughout most of its existence, with a number of SAP officers serving within this unit until its disbandment (Dale, 1993, O'Brien, 2001).

Koevoet sought to instil fear and used violence in an attempt to prevent the establishment of SWAPO liberated zones with SWA, and to make the areas in which it operated more compliant to control of the South African administration (Brown, 1995, Herbstein and Evenson, 1989). Koevoet platoons closely resembled and operated like the colonial commandos, albeit in a more orderly fashion. That is, they were small, well-armed and highly mobile units. As with the colonial commandos, Koevoet units often worked closely with the military (Hooper, 2012, Stapleton, 2014).

In the vast borderland areas they hunted and killed SWAPO insurgents and supporters with complete impunity. At times Koevoet operatives perpetrated violent acts whilst dressed in clothing similar to SWAPO fighters and then attacked communities that they perceived to be sympathetic to SWAPO in an attempt to undermine support for the liberation movement (Stiff, 2004). Human rights violations perpetrated by Koevoet members were effectively encouraged due to a bounty arrangement where financial bonuses were linked to the killing of SWAPO insurgents. In June 1984 Louis le Grange, the Minister of Law and Order reported that Koevoet had been “involved in more than 720 skirmishes with SWAPO terrorists” and that “more than 1,600 insurgents had been killed” as a result (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1984a).

The key insight for SAP from the SWA COIN operations was that such violent forms of policing could be effective in combatting liberation movements and refashioning those zones in which such liberation movements and their allies sought to operate into areas more amenable to government control. This COIN experience was to be adapted and partially duplicated within South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s as the low intensity conflict between the SAP and the ANC/PAC intensified.

6.1.3 Mozambique: the impact of the Nkomati Accord

In 1984 the governments of Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord. The crux of this non-aggression pact was that the two governments would commit themselves to refrain from supporting armed non-state groups within their territories, particularly the ANC and Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance Movement)¹³ that had launched attacks against the South African and Mozambican governments respectively (Metz, 1986). The Mozambican government signed the agreement as its economy was suffering from the ravages of war. For South Africa, the Nkomati Accord was a means to further secure its borders, and project itself as a dominant state in the Southern African region (Davies, 1985).

The SAP was not intimately involved in brokering this agreement, but the police directly benefited from the outcome. That is, shortly after the Nkomati Accord had been concluded ANC operatives were harassed by the Mozambican authorities and were compelled to leave the country (Davies, 1985), thereby weakening the threat offered by the ANC to the borderline policing function of the SAP and sabotage attacks on government facilities. This development also severely curtailed the ANC's arms smuggling routes into South Africa that had been uncovered by the SAP a few years earlier (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1980). However, the South African security forces, particularly the SADF, did not honour the agreement and continued to clandestinely provide arms and other support to Renamo (Minter, 1989).

¹³ The creation of Renamo had been facilitated and funded by the Rhodesian intelligence services in the mid-1970s to destabilise Mozambique as it was being used as a military training ground by Zimbabwean liberation organisations. The South African military and intelligence service took over benefaction of Renamo in the early 1980s.

6.2 SAP and the enforcement of internal apartheid boundaries

6.2.1 The police and 'petty' apartheid

A central feature of apartheid was the methodical criminalisation of the movement of black people who were required to reside in specific (principally rural) areas, and could only be present in urban and 'Europeans (whites) only' areas if they had an official permit (passbook). As was the case during the post-unification period (see Chapter 5), SAP members were active in upholding such legislated racial segregation, and arrested those black people who failed to produce such a permit on demand. In fact, considerably more time was taken up with the enforcement of 'petty' apartheid criminal codes than was devoted to the prevention and combating of more serious forms of crime (Prior, 1989). SAP members also harassed and imprisoned numerous leaders of anti-government organisations. The SAP also became intricately involved in the heavy lifting of the forced removals of black populations from land that had been designated for exclusive use by whites (Brewer, 1994), or from areas that had been earmarked to be buffer zones between white and black residential areas (Glaser, 2005).

Paradoxically, on average, close to half of all the SAP members were black, the majority of which occupied lower ranks of the policing organisation. This was a continuation of the colonial tradition in which certain, typically loyal indigenous populations were drafted or recruited into performing policing duties. This was largely due to cost considerations, as black police personnel were paid lower wages than whites (Prior, 1989, Weitzer, 1993).¹⁴

The SAP responded in a forceful manner in circumstances when groups of black people challenged or disregarded regulations pertaining to racially segregated public spaces. This was clearly evident during the 1952 Defiance Campaign when leaders of the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations orchestrated a series of acts of civil disobedience against petty apartheid laws. Black people used 'Europeans only' areas in train stations and post offices; and activists refused to carry passbooks and adhere to curfews. Thousands of activists were arrested and/or fined by the SAP. Courts sentenced some of the younger activists to be lashed. A number of prominent leaders of this protest action were charged and found guilty under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) (Hirson, 1988).

Another prominent example took place in August 1989 when numerous black families held a picnic at the whites-only Bloubergstrand beach in Cape Town. This picnic had reportedly been organised by a civil society organisation, the Black Sash, in deliberate defiance of apartheid policies and laws. Heavily armed police forcibly ejected the black picnic-goers from the beach. A news report at the time described the course of events as follows:

Some hundreds of people were charged, some beaten, including women and children by no more than 35 policemen and women, heavily armed...A helicopter swooped low over

¹⁴ Black South Africans enrolled in the SAP largely due to limited stable employment opportunities, and the relatively better salaries offered by the SAP compared to other government institutions.

the crowd and hovered overhead blowing sand into the gathering (South African Press Association, 1989c).

6.2.2 Day-to-day policing in black townships

There was a distinct difference with respect to the manner in which the SAP policed 'ordinary' crime in white residential areas as compared to black townships, with patrolling and responses to calls for assistance being significantly more subdued in the latter. The SAP, which displayed distinct othering towards black populations, surmised that a minimalist approach to policing 'ordinary' crime in black townships was appropriate as the SAP's enforcement of petty apartheid laws would mostly keep crime contained within townships (Cawthra, 1993, Shaw, 2001). Furthermore, large settlements, such as Soweto, were viewed to be too dangerous for the SAP to engage in regular patrolling (Glaser, 2005). The SAP nonetheless responded more judiciously to those categories of crime that could potentially result in community mobilisation and protest against the police, such as armed robbery. For instance, in some crime hot spots the police were more visibly present on pay-days in an effort to diminish the likelihood of theft and robberies (Brewer, 1994).

From the 1980s the SAP also made use of 'special constables' or *kitskonstables* (instant constables), who were inexperienced, poorly paid black recruits often drawn from communities with strong support for loyalist vigilante groups, such as Inkatha. They were enrolled in a six-week crash course in basic policing and were then armed with shotguns, batons and *sjamboks* (a type of whip). These special constables were largely unsupervised and often operated with impunity. They were also notorious for their brutality, ineptitude, partiality and for abusing their mandate and service firearms to settle personal disputes (Brewer, 1994, Fine, 1989, Kentridge, 1990).

The special constables were an experiment in 'black-on-black policing' (Brogden and Shearing, 1993), a customised version of the British colonial model of ethnic policing in which certain ethnic groups, considered to be martially oriented, are recruited to enforce law and order within indigenous communities throughout the colony, as well as deter and repress opposition to government (Deflem, 1994). This form of ethnic policing in apartheid South Africa was aptly described by Andrew Wilson, the presiding judge of the Trust Feed Massacre¹⁵ trial, in which he stated that special constables "were taken from the community and placed back in the community to act as a wedge against the comrades [anti-apartheid opposition groups]" (Independent Board of Inquiry, 1992a:15). In effect the special constables allowed the SAP to police numerous black communities at a distance, with the SAP only being required to deploy regular personnel into black communities during times of unrest and/or crime waves.

A further SAP strategy in relation to policing black communities was to provide financial and material support to loyalist groups that were predisposed to undermining or attacking organisations within their communities that were

¹⁵ This massacre took place in the Trust Feed community in the Natal Midlands in which some police personnel and Inkatha supporters killed 11 and injured two people.

opposed to government (Glaser, 2005). This in effect was a form of indirect policing, in which partisan groups were deputised to undertake aspects of geo-racial boundary enforcement. In Natal, for example, during the 1980s the SAP reportedly escorted and permitted Inkatha *impis* (armed vigilante groups) to perpetrate violent acts against communities aligned to the United Democratic Front (UDF)¹⁶ and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In addition, the SAP even thwarted efforts to prosecute Inkatha members, particularly warlords, who had allegedly been responsible for multiple acts of violence (Jeffery, 1997, Kentridge, 1990).

When necessary, the austere and indirect policing in townships by the SAP was supplemented with mass crackdowns and curfews by both the police and the military in an attempt to clear-out the more deviant and undesirable elements from these communities through sudden and concentrated enforcements of laws and the mass arrests of suspects (Brewer, 1994, Glaser, 2005). For example, in Soweto in December 1965 the SAP searched the homes of some 200,000 people and made 2,000 arrests. The following year the SAP conducted 33 'special operations' in and around Johannesburg and made some 8,000 arrests in this regard (Glaser, 2005). In October 1984 a combined force of approximately 7,000 police and soldiers cordoned off and conducted pre-dawn raids in the Transvaal townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong, with 354 people being arrested in Sebokeng alone (South African Press Association, 1984).

The SAP also facilitated the establishment of semi-autonomous police units within a number of the self-governing, ethnically based 'bantustans' or 'homelands' for black Africans. These were grand apartheid constructs in rural areas established as a mechanism of 'divide-and-rule', as well as a means to contain and severely restrict the movement of black people (Frankel, 1980). The police in the 'bantustans' were generally repressive, and were characterised by "nepotism, corruption and selective patronage" (Cawthra, 1993:63).

By 1990 violence and criminality had escalated in numerous townships, and threatened to overflow into the relatively serene white residential and commercial enclaves, as well as to fundamentally destabilise the efforts of the apartheid government to maintain order. Such townships had also become substantially more dangerous for the police, conditions that were exacerbated by the wider availability of firearms. This resulted in larger and more intense police/military crackdowns in an attempt to contain and diminish violence and crime in such areas. These operations by the security forces will be discussed in greater detail in later sections of this chapter.

6.2.3 Public disorder policing

The manner in which SAP responded to incidents of public disorder, particularly protest action by black South Africans, displayed distinct boundary enforcement components. That is, when SAP personnel encountered agitated crowds of black

¹⁶ The UDF was an anti-apartheid movement that drew together hundreds of civil society organisations and religious organisations from across South Africa. It was closely aligned to the ANC.

people, particularly in townships, police consistently resorted to the use of force (or the threat thereof) in order to disperse and quell such disturbances. This was motivated by concerns that localised protest action could rapidly escalate into more widespread collective disorder in other black communities, which in turn could spill over geo-racial urban boundaries and then threaten the apartheid status quo.

SAP typically policed protests in townships at an arm's-length with an arsenal of military-style vehicles and incapacitants (such as tear gas). If required, SAP members would engage in a baton charge and use *sjamboks* on protestors. Lethal force was applied (including live ammunition) in the occasions where protestors breached the SAP notion of a buffer zone, or if the crowd did not adhere to instructions from the police (Rauch and Storey, 1998). However, as this section will show, on a number of occasions, the SAP was unprepared for the intensity of public protests and organised defiance, which resulted in the police injudiciously using excessive lethal force in an effort to repel and disperse the protestors. Such episodes often prompted organisational and tactical reforms for the SAP.

6.2.3.1 Sharpeville massacre (1960)

In March 1960 in the township of Sharpeville (near Vereeniging) some 300 police opened fire on a crowd of thousands of PAC supporters who were protesting against the pass system, killing 69 and injuring approximately 180 people.¹⁷ First-hand accounts from the time of the massacre suggest that the policemen on the scene, feeling overwhelmed and fearful, had opened fire on the protestors in a state of agitation (Lodge, 2011, Nicholson, 1986). This incident was a wake-up call for government, realising that black communities had become less compliant to apartheid regulations and policing techniques, and that more organised anti-apartheid opposition had developed in a number of townships (Parker and Mokhesi-Parker, 1998). During the parliamentary debates in the immediate aftermath of the massacre, De Villiers Graaff, the leader of the political opposition at the time, expressed concern that within townships where there had been unrest that “agitators were receiving more support from natives who were usually law abiding” (South African Home Service, 1960).

By 1961, as a result of the Sharpeville massacre, there had been significant organisational changes within the SAP. The number of white policemen within the force was increased substantially at an annual cost of R1 million, and a Reserve Police Force (part-time citizen force) was created (Frankel, 1980). Additional funds were allocated to the SAP to endow them with the “most modern equipment in order to crush any threat to internal security successfully” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1961:19). There was also a reconfiguration of the SAP territorial policing boundaries, with the SAP's administrative geographical divisions being reconfigured to allow for more effective collaboration with the South African Defence Force (SADF).

¹⁷ The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that the SAP's shooting of protestors constituted gross human rights violations.

A government committee was subsequently established to reform police training in order “to ensure that police constables in the future will be better equipped for their task both physically and mentally and will have better knowledge of their exacting duties” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1961:19). Subsequently, further resources were invested in more forceful public order police units within the SAP. That is, riot squads were established in the early 1970s with support reportedly being provided by the Israeli government (Cawthra, 1993, Frankel, 1980).

6.2.3.2 Soweto uprising (1976)

Combined the above developments led to the SAP becoming increasingly more belligerent in its crowd control techniques, which was exceedingly evident during the June 1976 Soweto uprising. In this incident approximately 10,000 school learners and adults took to the streets of Soweto to protest against the government’s requirement that Afrikaans be used as a mandatory medium of instruction in schools. Confrontations between the riot police and the protestors rapidly escalated and culminated in the police fatally shooting hundreds of demonstrators and injuring approximately 2,000. Shortly thereafter violent protests erupted in some townships on the East Rand and in Cape Town, which the SAP, with the support of the SADF, forcefully subdued (Marks and Fleming, 2004). In total, the SAP discharged in the region of 50,000 rounds of ammunition against the protestors in all areas (Mafeje, 1978).

In providing feedback to Parliament on the Soweto violence, Jimmy Kruger, the cabinet minister responsible for the police, stated that policemen had opened fire in “self-defence”, as they felt that they were “overwhelmed” and that “their lives were in grave danger” (Johannesburg International Service, 1976). The minister, in further defending the shootings, maintained that some of the protestors were barbaric and disobedient “communists” who had been specifically trained to perpetrate acts of arson (Pohlandt-McCormick, 2005). The emphasis on danger was reiterated by the findings of the Cillié Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the Soweto uprising. The Commission’s report stated that the lethal actions of the SAP members were justified, given that the policemen on the scene were significantly outnumbered by the protestors, who had thrown stones at the police, and had surrounded the police after less lethal attempts to disperse the protestors had failed (Cillié, 1980). Further to this the report emphasised that: the protest was “illegal” as no written permission from the relevant government authority had been requested; a number of the protestors were “street urchins” and “lawless idlers”; and the SAP members were duty bound to disperse the crowd and “restore peace” (Cillié, 1980:114).

The element of danger was emphasised in the Cillié Commission report by extensive references to the written statement by Sergeant M J Hattingh, one of the policeman who fired on the protestors. It was likely that the statement had been embellished as it over-emphasised the menacing nature of the protestors and valour of the police response (Pohlandt-McCormick, 2005). It does however provide a glimpse, albeit biased, into how the policemen who perpetrated the

shooting viewed and responded to the protestors. According to the Commission report:

He [Sergeant Hattingh] saw that other members of the squad had been injured, some seriously, and it was clear to him that the crowd was going to overpower them. He was hit on the leg by a stone and fell down on the ground...he heard others firing...He got up and drew his firearm. A black man charged at him with a brick in his left hand and a *kierie* [stick] in his right hand. To beat off the attack, he fired straight at the man. The attacker fell down dead...he fired five more shots at the legs of the charging crowd (Cillié, 1980:118).

The report further recounts that Hattingh was able to retreat to his police vehicle, but was subsequently surrounded by a group of protestors:

They [the protestors] tried to drag him out of the vehicle, grabbed his cap and ripped the badges from his uniform. His hand was injured by a sharp object and an attempt was made to take his firearm from him. Col Kleingeld [the commanding officer on the scene] drove the attackers off with bursts from the automatic rifle, and the sergeant and his vehicle were removed from the danger area (Cillié, 1980:119).

Critically, the Commission concluded that the hazardous situation in which the police found themselves was also largely the result of the SAP personnel on the scene being ill prepared and not sufficiently competent to effectively disperse a large group of protestors. Therefore, the SAP public order policing capability was significantly improved at the station level in the immediate years thereafter, and the riot control function of the police was centralised into the Riot Control Unit (Brewer, 1994). Furthermore, the SADF were tasked to support the SAP in crowd control incidents based on the view that a display of overwhelming force would prompt protesting crowds to disperse without violent confrontation (Cawthra, 1993). In addition, protest action was further discouraged through the provisions in the Internal Security Act (1982) that outlawed public protests (see section 6.2.4 below for further details). Prominent leaders of anti-government organisations were also 'banned' by the SAP to specific areas with restrictions on their movement and ability to associate with others, which the police termed as a "stabilising" strategy (Johannesburg International Service, 1977).

6.2.4 The intensification of SAP militarisation

Following the Soweto uprising there were definitive attempts to reform the SAP, with the military model being regularly venerated in various SAP annual reports as the pathway towards such 'modernisation'. The SAP subsequently embraced a military staff/officer ranking system, and military-style training was introduced. The SAP also acquired automatic firearms for use by some of its frontline units (Brewer, 1994). Close strategic and operational ties were forged with the SADF,¹⁸ and the operational elements of the SAP were frequently teamed-up with SADF units to patrol high priority border areas, as well as subdue and contain unrest and violent protest action in black townships. In addition, the police were granted extensive search-and-seizure powers. Such developments were also informed by an escalation in acts of sabotage by the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). In 1981, for example, there were reportedly more

¹⁸ The Union Defence Force was renamed the South African Defence Force in 1957.

than 90 sabotage acts orchestrated by MK against police stations, railway lines, electricity stations, and military facilities. This was close to a nine-fold annual increase in attacks compared to the period 1977-1980 (African National Congress, 1997).

Police militarisation was further entrenched with the South African government's adoption of a security-centred form of statecraft widely referred to as 'Total Strategy'. This strategy was informed by an ideology that a 'total [communist] onslaught' was directed against the apartheid state from both inside and outside of the country. Total Strategy entailed the de facto centralisation of high-level decision-making on domestic and foreign policy within the State Security Council (SSC)¹⁹, which was dominated by the security services, particularly the military. A key foreign policy strategy was to use the security forces to destabilise states in Southern African that were perceived to be hostile towards the South African government and/or harboured ANC and PAC insurgents (Cawthra, 1986, Davies and O'Meara, 1985, Grundy, 1987).

Public accountability procedures and mechanisms to hold the police in check were diluted with the promulgation of the Internal Security Act (1982) (Prior, 1989). This Act was also a key legislative othering instrument, amongst a variety of repressive legislation, which classified most collective dissent by black people as illegal. It further legitimised the state's repressive armoury and aggressive police responses to protest action. That is, the Act sanctioned widespread banning of anti-government organisations, activists and public gatherings. It also permitted the SAP to detain people for extensive periods of time without the requirement of a judicial order and/or trial, allegedly for the purposes of interrogation, 'preventive' reasons, or the belief that a person may be a material witness in a security incident (Foster and Davis, 1987).

6.2.4.1 Policing under a state of emergency

Despite these containment measures, many black townships became even more ominous and hostile spaces for the SAP by the mid 1980s, with there being an unparalleled upsurge in the levels of protest violence against apartheid rule. This was linked to the ANC's call for mass mobilisation to 'make townships ungovernable', which entailed the destruction of government buildings and attacks on local government officials, suspected police informers and even policemen. The ANC also called on its cadres to ambush police patrols and seize their firearms "for future use" (African National Congress, 1984). This increase in township violence was acknowledged by the police in the 1984/85 SAP annual report, which referred to the violence as "large-scale" of "serious proportions", and had "made heavy demands on the available manpower" (South African Police, 1985:1).

Publicly government engaged in selective othering with regards to the perpetration of such violence in an attempt to portray the unrest as orchestrated attempts by radical factions determined to undermine 'the peace' in townships

¹⁹ The State Security Council had been established in 1972 by an act of Parliament, but only to have an advisory role to the South African Cabinet.

and destabilise South Africa. The National SAP Commissioner, Johan Coetzee, attributed the acts of unrest to “relatively small groups of rioters [that] spread their acts of violence over a wide geographical area, then disperse quickly to regroup and strike elsewhere” (Johannesburg International Service, 1984). The Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange referred to anti-government opposition as “enemies of our way of life [that seek] to drive a wedge between the police and the community” (South African Press Association, 1985g).

The operational response by the SAP to incidents of public disorder was considerably less discerning in terms of who was targeted. Joint SAP-SADF crackdown operations were launched, such as Operation Palmiet (1984) in townships in the PWV area with the objective of “restoring normality” (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1984b). However, according to Cawthra (1993:104): “Much of the police action [Operation Palmiet] resembled unjustified provocation or revenge rather than crowd control; it was punitive rather than preventative”. In some respects, excessive violence by the SAP was counterproductive as it “tended to aggravate and provoke unrest rather than dampen it”, in that repressive police action tended to mobilise black communities to engage in larger and more severe forms of protest action (Cawthra, 1993:102).

The SAP also imported more sophisticated riot control equipment, including helicopters and armoured vehicles fitted with water cannons (South African Press Association, 1985a). Additionally, in July 1985 government imposed emergency measures that specifically related to unrest hot spots in 36 magisterial districts, such as Alexandra, Soweto and a number of townships in Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Fort Beaufort. These emergency provisions included the use of security force crackdowns in targeted townships, the mass arrest of protestors, a ban on school boycotts, as well as the implementation of curfews and the regulation of the possession of petrol (in a effort to mitigate the use of petrol bombs by protestors) (South African Press Association, 1985c).

The SAP, despite its augmented riot control capability, was unable to contain and extinguish this widespread violence and destruction of state property in many townships. Louis le Grange, the Minister of Law and Order declared: “as far as we are concerned it is war, plain and simple” (Nathan, 1989:68). Philip Powell, an infamous SAP Security Branch operative, conceded in his Masters dissertation in 1991 that a number of townships became “contested zones in which the state’s control was extremely tenuous to say the least” (Powell, 1991:68). Consequently, from the mid 1980s, the SAP was “compelled to rely on the support of the South African Defence Force” (South African Police, 1986:4), and in excess of 30,000 SADF troops were deployed to assist the SAP in combatting this collective violence (Nathan, 1989).

The warlike context combined with the SAP’s close collaboration with the SADF had the effect of sharpening the policing boundaries fashioned around those townships that the SAP regarded as dangerous. Similarly it intensified the process of othering amongst SAP operational personnel towards black protestors in these areas, who were already perceived to be part of a

“revolutionary onslaught” against South Africa (Marks, 2005) instigated by “terrorists” (South African Police, 1987:22). These pejorative sentiments, combined with an exceedingly low threshold beyond which police could employ lethal violence in controlling crowds (South African Police, 1989); and inadequate command-and-control during operations (Brewer, 1994) (Thornton, 1990) often resulted in the excessive use of force against black people in violence hot spots (Haysom, 1991).

By 1985 there were regular reports of the SAP using live ammunition to disperse crowds of protestors, and “defend” themselves against protestors that were throwing stones and petrol bombs at the police (South African Press Association, 1985d). In Parliament in 1986 Louis Le Grange declared that individual police would use their own discretion with regards to discharging their firearms in operational contexts: “No person will be allowed to attack policemen with firearms or petrol bombs. If they do so they will be shot” (South African Press Association, 1986a).

The police also became even more belligerent in pre-emptively dealing with youth who policemen perceived to be predisposed to perpetrating acts of unrest and boycotting class by forcefully ensuring that such youths attended school, and arresting non-compliant learners. According to a learner in KwaThemba (East Rand) in August 1985: “They [security forces] arrived at my house at 7.45am, asked me why I was not going to school, *sjamboked* me and escorted me to the school premises” (South African Press Association, 1985b). In the same month in Soweto, the most senior SAP official in the area declared: “We are cracking down. We will not allow 5,000 stupid students to disregard law and order...” (South African Press Association, 1985e). The police subsequently arrested 800 learners in Soweto for boycotting school attendance (South African Press Association, 1985f).

The partial state of emergency was upgraded to a nation-wide state of emergency in 1986, which mostly remained in place until 1990. The choice of such a repressive strategy was motivated by P.W. Botha, the State President, due to an “alarming” escalation in “black-on-black” violence and the destruction of property by “ruthless and unscrupulous people [the ANC and affiliated organisations]” who use “callous and gruesome methods of terror and extreme violence to intimidate people in order to gain control of the various black population groups” (South African Press Association, 1986b). This was further motivated by the head of the SAP Security Branch, Johan van der Merwe who reported that there had been a substantial increase in “terrorism” incidents, from 60 for the period 1 April 1984 to 31 March 1985 to 193 for the following 12 months (Johannesburg Television Service, 1986a). Such a state of emergency would allow the police to arrest and detain (without standing trial) suspected agitators, and in so doing would physically remove threats from unrest areas, as well as potentially weaken the ability of anti-government organisations to organise and mobilise protest and defiance activities. Between June 1986 and June 1987 the police detained an estimated 29,000 people (Price, 1991).

Furthermore, in 1986 P.W. Botha announced that the personnel strength of the SAP would be increased by 16% from just over 48,000 to 55,500 (South African Press Association, 1986b). The Railways Police, which had been historically separate from the SAP, were incorporated into the SAP. Dramatically, the SAP was also withdrawn from its national border protection responsibilities and was replaced by SADF soldiers, which according to the National SAP Commissioner, P.J. Coetzee, was to address “widespread violence within South Africa” (Johannesburg Television Service, 1986b). This was an indication that for the police the threats from within South Africa were perceived to be significantly greater than threats beyond South Africa’s territorial borderline. The size of the SAP was to undergo further increases during the latter part of the 1980s, with both the personnel size and budget of SAP doubling between 1985 and 1990 (O’Brien, 2001).

For the period from September 1984 to May 1990 the SAP reported that they had responded to in excess of 51,000 unrest incidents in which 4,529 people had died and 12,449 had been injured (South African Press Association, 1990a). Critically, much of this violence, both unrest and lethal violence perpetrated by the police, had taken place from the mid 1980s, with the number of South Africans dying as a result of police shootings increasing from 284 in 1984 to 716 in 1986 (Cricher and Waddington, 1996). Some of this police violence were in fact massacres, which were more prevalent in 1985 and 1986 (see Table 6.1 below), than in previous years.

Table 6.1: Massacres allegedly perpetrated by SAP, 1984-1989

Year	Location of public gathering	Number of casualties
1984	Vaal Triangle	26
1985	Crossroads, Cape Town	18
1985	Langa, Uitenhage	20
1985	Springs, East Rand	10
1985	Duncan Village, East London	23
1985	Queenstown	14
1985	Mamelodi, Pretoria	12
1986	Gugulethu, Cape Town	27
1986	Winterveld, Bophuthatswana	26
1986	Alexandra, Johannesburg	9
1986	Vlaklaagte, KwaNdebele	12
1986	White City, Soweto	24
1988	Natal	11
1989	Cape Town	29

Source: South African History Online (2012)

In 1988 the SAP leadership frequently argued that stringent security measures, particularly the police’s brandishing of extensive emergency powers, had led to reductions in violence and crime in targeted areas. For example, the SAP National Commissioner, Hennie De Witt claimed that: “in spite of the attempts by the ANC and the South African Communist Party to promote the revolutionary onslaught, the police had succeeded in forcing back the onslaught to its initial phase”. He substantiated this statement by reporting that the incidents of unrest had declined from approximately 8,000 in 1986 to around 2,000 in 1987 (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1988). The following year, a senior police

official in Natal suggested that the crackdown operations had resulted in reductions in murders and “other crimes” in the province (South African Press Association, 1989b). These sentiments were repeated by Adriaan Vlok, the Minister of Law and Order in October 1990 in relation to crime combating operations in Soweto, which he claimed had contributed to a 62% and 65% reduction in reported murders and rapes respectively (South African Press Association, 1990d).

In addition, the emergency regulations had seemingly given the police the upper hand over the anti-apartheid organisations in numerous townships (Price, 1991). That is, the SAP argued that they had thwarted efforts by the ANC to consolidate control in these areas. Hence, in 1989 the SAP publicly denounced calls by the ANC and allied organisations for the state of emergency to be lifted. For instance, the SAP National Commissioner, Johan van der Merwe stated that the ANC had “lost ground due to SAP action and desperately wanted to regain it”, and that should the state of emergency be lifted then there would be a risk of violence in which “the [SAP-community] bonds of trust that had slowly been forged in the past year would be lost” (South African Press Association, 1989a).

6.2.4.2 The policing of unrest during the political transition (1990-1994)

Towards the end of 1990 regular boastful statements by the senior SAP leadership about the effectiveness of their policing strategies had been replaced by distinctively unnerved public comments. The SAP National Commissioner, Johan van der Merwe suggested that crime in South Africa was had reached “alarming proportions” (Jansen and van Heerden, 1990). There was also a clear indication that the police felt they had lost a significant degree of control with the lifting of the state of emergency by President F.W. de Klerk in June 1990. That is, the SAP could no longer readily employ the raft of more forceful policing techniques that were permitted by emergency regulations, particularly detaining suspects for lengthy periods without a trial. The SAP also perceived various townships to have become increasingly more dangerous for day-to-day police patrols (Kopel and Friedman, 1997).

In response to an escalating crime rate and incidents of violence government announced that it would increase the personnel size of the SAP by 10,000 and provide better remuneration for all police. Johan van der Merwe also announced that given the dangers of operational policing, there would be more widespread use of bulletproof vests by police in operational areas (Jansen and van Heerden, 1990). Government also started making public statements about the need for the more rigorous regulation of private ownership of dangerous weapons, including firearms (Grange and Wilkinson, 1991, Johannesburg Television Service, 1990a).

In September 1990 the police initiated a major militarised crackdown operation with the SADF aptly titled ‘Iron Fist’. The main operational zone was the high violence areas in the PWV, including Tokoza, Vosloorus, Katlehong, Soweto, Meadowlands, Diepkloof and Dobsonville (South African Press Association, 1990c). Curfews were declared. Razor wire was reportedly used to cordon-off hostels and informal settlements that were considered to be hot spots for crime

and violence (South African Press Association, 1990b). In the case of the Masiza Hostel in Sebokeng, for example, it was reported that 1,500 police and 500 soldiers stormed and searched the housing complex and uncovered a makeshift weapons “factory” within the hostel (Duncan, 1990).

According to the senior SAP officer Major-General Gerrit Erasmus, who was responsible for Operation Iron Fist, armoured police vehicles were fitted with light machine guns in order “to curb attacks against police vehicles...[as] they attack us with AK-47s and other weapons. Shotguns against an AK are no good” (South African Press Association, 1990b). This was reiterated by Leon Mellet, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Law and Order in a television interview aired by the South African Broadcasting Corporation in which Mellet described the targeted townships as “a warlike situation” with some residents being “heavily armed” in which “snipers” shot at the police. Mellet argued that:

The troublemakers have become totally ruthless. They have become totally bloodthirsty...If one had to deal with these people you must expect from them ruthlessness, and you can only deal with them in a similar manner. We are therefore determined to curb the violence, to at least contain it [sic] (Johannesburg Television Service, 1990b).

The following year the SAP launched another large crackdown operation pugnaciously branded ‘Operation Thunderbolt’ in which more than 30,000 police and soldiers were deployed to violence hot spots throughout the country. Some 9,700 suspects were arrested and 77 illegal firearms were seized (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1991). Raids were carried out in hostels where factional fighting had taken place in Alexandra and Soweto (South African Press Association, 1991a). ‘Operation Peace’, which was also a SAP/SADF joint operation, was initiated in 1992 in the volatile Natal midlands. It was an attempt, according to the SAP, to “stabilise” and “reduce conflict between supports of the IFP and ANC” (South African Press Association, 1992).

The stabilisation objective was further emphasised by Hernus Kriel, the Minister of Law and Order in relation to similar joint operations in the PWV area in 1992. According to Kriel these operations were “nothing less than a peace offensive...to create conditions in which other government departments can work towards not only restoring essential services, but wherever possible to upgrade infrastructure and living standards” (Johannesburg Radio, 1992). The ANC, however, objected to some of the operations claiming that they were “tantamount to intimidation” in relation to a planned national strike (Johannesburg Radio, 1992).

6.3 The rise of counterinsurgency approaches within the SAP

Intertwined with the SAP’s more profound militarisation and the multiple threats presented by armed struggles by various liberation movements in South Africa and elsewhere, was a concerted shift within the police to develop more extensive intelligence-gathering and COIN capabilities. This was based on a notion within the SAP leadership that in order to defend the apartheid state and white privilege against increasingly organised threats from elements of the black

population, more clandestine ways of policing would have to be pursued. This, in essence, entailed shifting the frontier of some aspects of offensive police work into the shadows, a theatre of policing that was largely hidden from public scrutiny in which more unsavoury and deadly tactics can be pursued with relative impunity in order to contain growing threats and alter those spaces that are conducive to cultivating and supporting such threats.

6.3.1 The SAP Security Branch

The dynamo for COIN policing within South Africa was the SAP Security Branch (SB) (also referred to as the Security Police), which had been established 1939.²⁰ The SB was initially born out of a need for a dedicated unit “to investigate and prevent subversive political activities”, particularly by right wing Afrikaners. (South African Police, 1986:34). With the demise of the Ossewabrandwag (see Chapter 5) the SB shifted its focus to the ANC and PAC (Shear, 2012). The SB was a relatively small and undervalued component within the SAP until the early 1960s, but grew in size, stature, influence and ferocity following the launch of the armed struggle by ANC and PAC, as well as insurgencies in Rhodesia and SWA (Brewer, 1994, Frankel, 1980).

The SB sought to disrupt the activities of anti-apartheid groups and liberation movements by capturing or neutralising their leaders and operatives. In order to achieve this the SB required actionable intelligence, which was generated by means of: a large network of informers; infiltration of anti-apartheid movements; as well as extensive use of detention of suspected anti-government activists in which harsh interrogation techniques were employed, including torture (Shear, 2012). An additional inhuman technique used by the SB, which they implemented from the early 1960s, was to use interrogation and torture in order to ‘turn’ captured insurgents into informers (known as *askaris*) that could infiltrate liberation movements (O'Brien, 2001). In 1990, Basie Smit, the head of SB at the time, indicated that the SB had “given attention” to 314,000 individuals and 9,500 organisations since the SB’s inception, with the TRC estimating that 80,000 individuals had been detained without trial by the SB (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

The twilight terrain in which the SB operated, combined with anti-apartheid leaders and organisations being seen as ‘terrorists’, ultimately resulted in routine use of excessive violence by SB members. That is, SB members were responsible for perpetrating extra-judicial killings both inside and outside of South Africa, and engaging in acts of sabotage and arson (Frankel, 1980). For example, of the 256 individuals who applied for amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for committing human rights abuses, 90% had served in the SB at the time of the violations (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998). Moreover, between 1 January 1976 and 30 April 1990 the SAP reported that it had arrested and killed 780 and 224 “ANC terrorists” respectively (South African Press Association, 1990a). The SB had most likely been responsible for such fatalities and injuries.

²⁰ The original name of the Security Branch was the Special Staff in 1939, and was then renamed the Security Branch in 1947.

6.3.2 Lethal shadow policing and fighting dirty

From the late 1970s the SAP began to earnestly pursue clandestine forms of COIN policing within South Africa. This was motivated by a perceived acceleration in the infiltration by ANC and PAC insurgents into the country; an increase in sabotage attacks; and the mobilisation of popular support for the anti-apartheid struggle. These developments, combined with the SAP's intimate COIN experiences in Rhodesia and SWA, resulted in the SAP leadership concluding that more unconventional policing methods were required to augment the traditional forms of policing (Cawthra, 1993).

The SAP COIN strategies sought to alter the political conditions within black townships, specifically to make such communities less supportive of, or less receptive to, the mobilisation efforts of liberation movements and their allies. This form of COIN policing had four core elements: the assassination of key opposition activists; the provision of support to, or the creation of, criminal/vigilante groups; the clandestine supply of arms and paramilitary training to such criminal/vigilante groups; and the orchestration and/or participation in violent attacks on passengers in trains and minibus-taxis. These strategies will be analysed in more detail below.

The most notorious COIN element within SAP was known as Section C1 or Vlakplaas,²¹ which emerged from within the SB. Its core activity was the assassination of ANC and PAC guerrillas and prominent anti-apartheid activists. It ostensibly pursued this strategy in order to eliminate and disrupt threats posed by the liberation movements to the apartheid state, and instil fear among black communities in order to undermine mobilisation efforts by these liberation movements (Boraine, 1989b, Pauw, 1997). In addition, Vlakplaas operatives engaged in sabotage (bombing) activities against anti-apartheid targets (Dlamini, 2014).

The ANC's strategy of making the townships 'ungovernable' led to acute concerns within the SB, namely that such a state of affairs would ultimately lead to the creation of liberated zones and military bases. That is, it would give "the insurgent an area in which he can move freely, rely on regular and reliable intelligence and recruit cadres whilst carrying out the political mobilisation of the people". This in turn would ultimately result in the emergence of a serious military threat for the South African government (Powell, 1991:67,71). COIN strategies were therefore devised to counter such guerrilla warfare methods and regain control of such areas. A common SB approach, which had the endorsement of the State Security Council, was to arrest and/or execute key 'instigators' and activists in ANC strongholds.

The assassination of the 'Cradock Four'²² in the Eastern Cape in 1985 by members of the SB was an apt example of this COIN policing strategy. At least two members of the group (Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata) had been

²¹ Named after the farm where the COIN unit was based.

²² This was the collective name given to the following four ANC activists who were murdered by the SB in Cradock: Mathew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli.

influential activists that had created MK cells in in and around Cradock, and had been highly effective in mobilising black communities in the area to actively support the UDF, and had directly contributed to making the Lingelihle township 'ungovernable'. According to Powell (1991), international journalists subsequently portrayed these developments as a leading example of grassroots defiance against apartheid rule. Amnesty applications to the TRC by seven former SB members specified that they regarded the 'Cradock Four' as central to the violent protests in the Eastern Cape at a time, and consequently had kidnapped and assassinated them in an attempt to end the unrest in the area (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

From the mid 1980s elements within the SAP also pursued a clandestine divide-and-rule strategy in relation to a number of black communities that were perceived to be strong supporters for the ANC, UDF and COSATU. This entailed the formation and support of vigilante/gangster groups (which included the supply of firearms and ammunition) that then sought to unsettle ANC/UDF/COSATU mobilisation efforts in targeted communities. These groups also terrorised and attacked those individuals and communities that were supportive of the ANC/UDF/COSATU. The key objective of such a strategy was to prevent the formation of, or undermine, significant anti-government opposition in these areas. Examples included: the Witdoeke in New Crossroads; the Anti-Comrades and the Three Million Gang in a number of towns in the former Orange Free State; the Toaster Gang in Tembisa; the A-Team in Natal; the Black Cats in Ermelo; and the Khetisi Gang in Sebokeng (Independent Board of Inquiry, 1992b, Pigou, 2001, Woods, 1993).²³

Similarly, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SB, Vlakplaas and other elements within the SAP were successful in intensifying violent incidents in many rural areas and townships in Natal. At this time, Inkatha was pursuing a violent power struggle against the UDF and COSATU. Securocrats in government, not wanting the UDF and COSATU to expand their influence in the province, arranged for the delivery of large quantities of firearms to vigilante and militia groups that were closely associated with Inkatha, as well as provided paramilitary training (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998, Welsh, 1993). Ironically, Vlakplaas was officially redeployed in 1991 to focus on the illegal firearm trade, but this appeared to be just a ruse (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

The TRC implicated SAP members in the clandestine support of and/or complicity in attacks by Inkatha-affiliated hostel dwellers against ANC-aligned communities, which resulted in mass killings in the early 1990s. Massacres were perpetrated in the Transvaal province in areas such as in Sebokeng (1990), Swanieville (1991) and Boipatong (1992). The TRC also reported that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that SAP personnel had sabotaged many of the subsequent investigations into these massacres, which included the tampering with video and ballistics evidence. In addition, the SAP often confiscated firearms

²³ The SADF, intelligence services and the KwaZulu Police Force also engaged in similar covert destabilisation activities during the 1980s, with a strong focus on the Natal Midlands.

from Inkatha hostel-dwellers after these incidents of mass violence in such a cavalier fashion that the arms could not be later linked to the individual perpetrators of violence (Ellis, 1998, Marinovich and Silva, 2000, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

Furthermore, in an attempt to provoke further conflict between the ANC and Inkatha, some security force personnel, particularly those from Vlakplaas, illicitly orchestrated violent attacks on trains in and around Johannesburg and Soweto, and provided firearms to the alleged culprits. In this regard, the TRC found that there were over 600 incidents of train violence between 1990 and 1993 in which 572 people lost their lives (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998, Waddington, 1992). The police were also implicated in the backing of taxi violence, particularly in ANC strongholds, such as in Khayelitsha (near Cape Town). Certain members of the SAP firearm units were also allegedly involved in arms smuggling into South Africa from Mozambique (Dugard, 2001, Ellis, 1998).

Some SAP personnel even planned and directly perpetuated mass killings, as was the case with the 1988 Trust Feed Massacre in the Natal Midlands where UDF aligned anti-eviction activists were assassinated in a SAP orchestrated hit (Charney, 1991) (Meer, 1994). Another notorious incident was the 'Seven Day War' that took place in March 1990 in the Lower Vulindlela and Edendale valleys near Pietermaritzburg. Residents were attacked by thousands of armed Inkatha followers. More than 100 people lost their lives, and between 20,000 and 30,000 people fled their homes. The TRC implicated the SAP Riot Unit and special constables in providing ammunition and logistical support to the Inkatha assailants (Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, 1993, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

6.3.3 Aspiring to win hearts and minds

A nonviolent COIN strategy was also pursued by the South African government (with the support of the SAP) titled 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM) as a further attempt to sustain geo-racial boundaries. WHAM was effectively cut-and-pasted from colonial COIN doctrine (see Chapter 2). That is, the aim of WHAM was to foster and leverage support and legitimacy for government in target communities. This was to be achieved by means of devoting resources and pursuing infrastructure projects in an attempt to address some of the fundamental drivers of political opposition and insurrection, and thereby dissolve the "revolutionary climate" (Katagiri, 2011). Major-General Bert Wandrag, the COIN chief within SAP, summed-up WHAM as follows:

Drastic action must be taken to eliminate the underlying social and economic factors, which have caused unhappiness in the population. The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip revolution in the bud by ensuring there is no fertile soil in which the seeds of revolution can germinate (Jochelson, 1990).

The apartheid government through the Joint Management Centres of the National Security Management System began to invest in 'orderly' infrastructural upgrading and housing projects in 34 'oil spots' or 'strategic bases' and

approximately 200 townships (Jochelson, 1990) through local government structures called Mini-Joint Management Centres. However, security tended to trump welfare considerations in the selection of the upgrade sites. According to Borraine (1989b:57) there was:

[n]o real effort to solve the urban crisis, [but] merely to contain it through a policy of divide and rule...[that sought to] create fissures and cracks, making political alliances within townships, and between different townships and even regions, more difficult.

This policy was not about wooing disenfranchised black communities into endorsing their continued subjugation, but rather about population control. In Mamelodi in the mid to late 1980s, for example, government funded the tarring of roads, the installation of traffic lights; as well as the construction of better water drainage systems, post offices, schools and a mobile police station. Major housing projects were also implemented, and there were allegedly plans to build a cableway in the area (Borraine, 1989b:57,62).

In Alexandra, similar upgrading was pursued in the wake of violent protests in 1986, such as the building of a clinic and sewerage works; improved schooling and public recreation facilities; and the installation of high mast lighting (Borraine, 1989b:62). Other communities that were targeted for WHAM infrastructure upgrading included: Bonteheuwel and Crossroads (Western Cape); New Brighton and Kwazakele (Eastern Cape) and Soweto, and certain townships near Durban and Pietermaritzburg (Borraine, 1989a, Mayekiso, 1996).

6.4 Reforming under fire: The restructuring of SAP

In 1988 the De Witt Commission was established to draw up proposals for the restructuring of the police, but the key recommendations were only effectively initiated during the early 1990s. In this regard, the SAP was reconfigured into five divisions, namely: Crime Combatting and Investigation (CCI), Visible Policing, Internal Stability, Human Resource Management and Support Services (Rauch, 1991b, South African Police, 1994). The CCI and the Internal Stability divisions were particularly relevant in the policing of boundaries.

The restructuring process subsequently became framed by the National Peace Accord (NPA), which was signed by government and the principal political groupings in 1991. This document had a major police component, including a Code of Conduct for SAP members, specifically calling for effective, non-partisan, racially inclusive and more legitimate, community-focused and accountable policing. In addition, SAP members were obliged to “disarm those persons illegally bearing dangerous weapons in any gathering or procession” (National Peace Accord, 1991:7). Some analysts have argued that the NPA ultimately laid the foundation for democratic policing and community-oriented policing in post-apartheid South Africa (Camay and Gordon, 2002). Nonetheless, persistent violent unrest and the operational leverage that the police had lost due to the lifting of the state of emergency was to result in the perpetuation of militarised approaches to policing of protest and unrest.

The CCI Division was predominantly comprised of personnel from the former Crime Investigative (Detective) Branch and the SB (which was disbanded). Structurally it included entities such as the: Criminal Records Centre; Commercial Crime Unit; Diamond and Gold Branch; South African Narcotics Bureau; Stock Theft Unit; Inspectorate for Explosives; Unit for the Protection of Endangered Species; as well as the various murder and robbery, child protection and vehicle theft units. This division also contained covert units such as Vlakplaas (Cawthra, 2003, South African Police, 1992).

The Internal Stability Division (ISD) was effectively the culmination of the restructuring of the Riot Unit, and was initially comprised of 17,500 personnel. It was established to be a specialised, paramilitary, public order policing entity with ISD personnel being clothed in military-style camouflage uniforms, armed with military-type weapons and conveyed in military vehicles (Marks and Fleming, 2004, Rauch, 1991b). Operational units were to be established in violence hot spots. In justifying the creation of the ISD, Hernus Kriel, the Minister of Law and Order argued that: “A man in a blue uniform must control political unrest as well as crime, and it doesn’t work. That is why we believe there has to be a parting of ways”. Furthermore Kriel stated that: “This force may never be crippled to the point where the SAP is scared to act against unrest” (South African Press Association, 1991b).

Hence, the thinking behind the establishment of the ISD at the time was that there needed to be a clear separation of public order policing for volatile areas and commonplace policing, so that “ordinary station-level police officers could get on with the job of building relations with the citizenry and fighting crime” (Shaw, 2001:26). However, the ISD often engaged in operations and apprehended individuals without prior notification of the police station commanders in the affected areas. In addition, the ISD was notorious for its heavy-handed tactics. These actions further undermined the relations between the ordinary police members and the affected communities (Network of Independent Monitors, et al., 1995).

6.5 Racialised firearm control and firearm crime


6.5.1 Firearm licensing

The Arms and Ammunition Act (1969) governed the policing of firearms during most of the apartheid period. This piece of legislation perpetuated the colonial legacy of largely prohibiting black South Africans from acquiring firearms, as firearms would give black people the necessary lethal technology to effectively challenge the white minority government. The Act permitted mainly white persons 16 years or older to obtain firearm licences. In fact, it was commonplace for a person to acquire a legal firearm shortly after applying for a licence. Partial background checks were undertaken, mainly to determine if the applicant had a criminal history. Relatively few licence applications were rejected. For example, according to SAP annual reports, in the early to mid 1990s, on average the SAP rejected only seven per cent of firearm licence applications.

Chart 6.1 below indicates that, according to SAP annual reports between 1984 (the earliest date at which data is provided) and 1990, on average 180,000 new firearm licences were granted annually. There were licensing spikes in 1986 and 1990, most likely linked to: major escalations in acts of violent defiance and sabotage by liberation movements and the declaration of a state of emergency by the apartheid government the year before; and the unbanning of the ANC and PAC respectively.

Under apartheid, the racialised firearm control traditions of the preceding two centuries were perpetuated. That is, a minority of ‘fit and proper’ (loyal) black South Africans were permitted to possess licensed firearms, such as conservative traditional leaders. Within the self-governing ‘homelands’ government authorities had the mandate to issue firearm licences. In Natal, some *Izindunas* (traditional amaZulu leaders) and community leaders aligned with Inkatha were permitted to possess firearms, with licence applications being facilitated by the KwaZulu Police (KZP) (Ellis, 1998, Gould, et al., 2004). There is evidence to suggest that these licensing mechanisms were abused by some Inkatha ‘warlords’ during the late 1980s in that they acquired numerous legal firearms in order to arm their personal *impis* (militias) (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

Chart 6.1: Firearm licence approvals: 1984-1990



Source: SAP annual reports

6.5.2 Firearm crime and violence under apartheid

Only sketchy data on firearm crime under apartheid is publicly available, particularly for the 1940s and 1950s. From the early 1960s the SAP annual reports intermittently referenced armed robberies (with a firearm) and the loss and theft of firearms. For example, in 1960 it was reported that policemen were killed during riots in Cato Manor (Natal) and had their service firearms stolen in the process (which were not subsequently recovered). In 1964 bank robberies involving the use of firearms received their first mention in the SAP annual reports, with this type of crime being emphasised in the immediate years thereafter. From this point onwards firearm crime statistics were regularly included in the SAP annual reports in varying degrees of detail. A key emphasis in these reports from the mid 1980s was on the discovery and seizure of suspected ‘terrorist’ arms caches by the security forces within South Africa.

Data is available on the loss and theft of licensed firearms from the mid 1960s, and indicates a striking acceleration of firearm loss/theft from the mid 1980s, and further increases during the early 1990s (see Chart 6.2 below). Similarly, from the late 1980s, there were substantial increases in interpersonal firearm crime. For instance, between 1989 and 1992, the armed robbery rate ratcheted up by 40% (see Chart 6.3 below), and the reported firearm homicide rate, which had averaged four homicides per 100,000 for much of the 1980s, increased by 150% in 1991. In addition, the number of firearm homicides as a percentage of total homicides increased from an average of 9% throughout most of the 1980s to 35% in 1992 (see Chart 6.4 below).


In Natal, for example, there was more than a 300% increase in firearm homicides between 1989 and 1992, with mortuary records reflecting a upsurge in deaths due to gunshot wounds from 354 in 1989 to 1,109 in 1992 (Schönteich and Louw, 1999). It was black Africans that suffered the most, with 85% of all firearm homicide victims (mainly men) between 1983 and 1990 being from this population group (Shaw, 2001). In the PWV area on average more than 1,000 conflict-related deaths were recorded annually between 1990 and 1994, many of which were due to firearm injuries (Network of Independent Monitors, et al., 1995).

Hence, in the context of weakened social and political control in many areas (Louw, 1997) (Minnaar, et al., 1998), the more pervasive availability of firearms had become a key driver of violence transforming many townships and conflict hot spot areas into considerably more dangerous places for its residents, but also members of the SAP. That is, firearms became the most commonly used weapons to kill or injure police officials from the late 1980s (Kynoch, 2005), with there being more than a 100% escalation in police deaths between 1989 and 1993 (353 and 726 police deaths respectively).

In 1991, for example, firearm violence accounted for 79% of off-duty police and 54% of on-duty police casualties respectively (Plani, et al., 2003). In most cases the service firearms of the slain police personnel were stolen. The SAP fingered the ANC's self-defence units (SDUs) as the main culprits, which had acquired firearms via smuggling networks (South African Police, 1994). However, it is entirely possible that the perpetrators of police murders had acquired the murder weapons as a result of the increased proliferation of firearms in high violence areas brought about by the SAP COIN strategy of arming militias, vigilantes and criminal gangs.

Government responded to the escalation in armed violence by promulgating the Criminal Law Second Amendment Act (1992) to further regulate the illegal possession of dangerous weapons, including firearms. This law made provision for minimum sentences of five years imprisonment (with a maximum of 25 years) for the commission of crime with such dangerous weapons. Amnesty was offered to those in possession of illegal firearms in which firearm owners could either surrender the firearms to the police (cash incentives were offered), or apply for a firearm licence if the owner and the firearms complied with the provisions of the AAA.


Chart 6.2: Reported loss and theft of licensed firearms



Source: SAP annual reports


Note: No data available for 1981, 1986 and 1990.

Chart 6.3: Armed robbery rates per 100,000 (1987-1992)



Source: SAP annual reports

Chart 6.4: Firearm homicide rates per 100,000 (1983-1992)



Source: Hansson (1998)

Note: No data available for 1990.

6.5.3 Types of firearms used in crime


6.5.3.1 Overview of firearm crime

Available data on the types of firearms used in interpersonal violence in South Africa during the apartheid era is exceedingly limited and problematic. In the case of murder, only a very small number of police publications yielded accurate

disaggregated information about firearms involved in crime, particularly the licensed status of the firearms. The 1992 SAP annual report, which provides a rare glimpse into the manner in which SAP recorded firearm crime, indicated that licensed firearms were used to commit 446 and 505 murders in 1991 and 1992 respectively (South African Police, 1993). Nevertheless no information is provided on the numbers of illegal firearms used to commit murder.

Where convictions for serious firearm crime were secured, which was a very small, unrepresentative proportion of reported firearm crime, handguns featured increasingly prominently between 1988 and 1994 (see Chart 6.5 below). It is critical to note that very few of the numerous political murders and massacres perpetrated during the political transition resulted in convictions. Anecdotal reports during this period pointed to automatic weapons as the principal weapons of choice in this regard (Jeffery, 1997, Minnaar, 1994).

Chart 6.5: Percentages of types of firearms used to commit murder and attempted murder where a conviction was secured



Source: Hansson (1998)


An assessment of the available evidence, which is imprecise in nature, suggests that the majority of the firearms used to commit serious violent crime during the political transition were illegal, and were derived from four principal sources. Firstly, the upward trend in the loss and theft of firearms accelerated throughout the political transition with handguns being the most commonly lost/stolen firearm (see Chart 6.6 below). It is highly likely that a significant number of these firearms were used to commit criminal acts. Secondly, as indicated in the sections above, clandestine elements in the SAP showered Inkatha warlords, *impis* and SPUs with firearms to fight the ANC, UDF and COSATU, particularly in Natal and the Transvaal. Criminal gangs and vigilantes were also armed. It is entirely possible that many of these weapons were subsequently used in non-political violence. Thirdly, as also indicated above, the ANC armed its SDUs in conflict hot spots, with it being entirely feasible that many of these firearms were also employed to commit crime. Fourthly, the SAP reported that arms smuggling into South Africa from Mozambique and Angola was a major source of illegal firearms, with the police claiming that undocumented migrants brought weapons in South Africa as “passports for survival” (South African Police, 1994).

6.5.3.2 SAP response to firearm crime

There is very limited publicly available information about how SAP responded to ordinary firearm crime before the mid 1980s. Prior to the 1960s reporting on firearm crime is conspicuously absent. The most plausible reason for this state of affairs was because the vast majority of black South Africans were prohibited from possessing firearms. When interpersonal and collective violence perpetrated by black people against other black people was reported it was almost exclusively stones, sticks, axes and assegais that were used. One of the only remarks in the SAP annual reports during the 1950s about the use of firearms by black people was in 1954 in relation to gang violence in Newclare, Johannesburg where it was reported that: “in isolated cases firearms were used by Natives” (South African Police, 1955).

Critically the annual SAP annual reports from the 1950s emphasised the advantage that firearms gave the police in maintaining dominion over black communities, and the strategic use of such weapons for containing violence within black townships and hostels. In this regard, as stated in the SAP annual reports, SAP personnel frequently used their service firearms to disrupt and subdue “native unrest”, “tribal fights” and “faction fights”, or to shoot their way out of situations where they found themselves hemmed in by agitated mobs in order to prevent themselves from being “overwhelmed”. SAP also appeared to have devoted considerable energy to ensuring that a large percentage of cases where black people were implicated in the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition were heard in the courts (see Chart 6.6 below).

Chart 6.6: Illegal possession of firearms by non-whites and SAP response



Source: SAP annual reports

Note: No data available for trial cases (illegal firearm possession by non-whites) for 1970, 1971 and 1972)

6.5.3.3 SAP Firearm Unit

The SAP Firearm Unit was established in the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre (1960). It sought to “recover stolen firearms lest they get into black hands, and to check for smuggling of arms over the borders” (Brewer, 1994:264). Internationally the establishment of focused police units is usually an indication that certain crimes “cannot be dealt with by routine policing responses and require specialised expertise” (Casey, 2010:111). The creation of

such a unit was most probably an indication that the SAP had become perturbed about the lenient state of firearm control for white South Africans, especially as the PAC and ANC had established armed wings in 1960 and 1961 respectively. The police were likely concerned that the easy availability of firearms had the potential to facilitate violent attacks by these armed groups.

The early achievements of this Unit were first disclosed in the 1961 SAP annual report indicating that 50 revolvers and 1,212 rounds of ammunition had been recovered. Later reports provided concise annotations of the numbers of firearms and rounds of ammunition confiscated by the Firearm Unit, which prioritised the Natal and Transkei regions. Table 6.2 (below) provides details of the firearms and ammunition seized by this Unit. No description or assessment of the inner workings of this Unit was ever provided in the SAP annual reports. Moreover the SAP annual reports create an impression of two contrasting aspects of the policing of firearms: namely the mundane, which entailed the licensing of firearms and enforcement thereof carried out by the Central Firearm Register (CFR) and the Firearm Unit respectively; and the more prized and exhilarating operations executed by the SB and the Riot Unit.

Table 6.2: Firearm Units' firearm and ammunition seizures

Year	Firearms	Handmade/homemade firearms	Ammunition
1971	508	46	251
1973	702	146	433
1972	n/a	n/a	n/a
1974	713	246	455
1975	407	89	170
1976	505	86	562
1977	288	110	1351
1978	291	166	682
1979	308	262	632
1980	352	138	300
1981	357	282	390
1982	n/a	n/a	n/a
1983	n/a	n/a	n/a
1984	n/a	n/a	n/a
1985	598	264	1527

Source: SAP Annual Reports

In 1993 a 'central coordinating' firearm control body was established within the SAP Head Office in Pretoria and a National Firearm Plan was devised. The aim of the Plan was to expand the number of firearm investigation units throughout the country, as well as boost the investigation capacity for firearm crimes. By October 1993 35 such units were in existence (South African Police, 1994).

6.5.4 Emergence of firearm focused police operations

The increase in violence, particularly firearm violence, forced the police to re-think its approach to combating such crimes in volatile areas, particularly black townships. Given that the SAP lacked legitimacy within such places, it ultimately resorted to large-scale joint search-and-seizure operations with the SADF (which also involved the mass arrest of alleged criminals) that focused on high crime

areas, and in locations where ANC weapons caches were supposedly being stored (Cawthra, 1993). These areas were predominantly in Natal and the PWV. Examples of such operations, as listed in the SAP annual reports, included: 'Sentinel', 'Alpo', 'Diver' and 'Stabilize'. The following numbers of military personnel were deployed to support the police in such operations between 1989 and 1992: 2,814 (1989); 5,628 (1990); 1991; 7 821 (1991); and 6,968 (1992) (South African Police, 1993).

The ISD often assisted other specialised units, such as the Firearms Unit, to conduct raids into communities that were either volatile or hostile towards the SAP (Network of Independent Monitors, et al., 1995). For example, in 1992 the ISD undertook a series of operations, which according to the SAP annual report for that year entailed: 22,106 roadblocks (in which 178,082 vehicles and 894,216 persons were searched); 7,509 cordon-and search procedures (in which 155,320 vehicles and 536,041 persons were searched); and the confiscation of 2,354 firearms and 14,231 rounds of ammunition (South African Police, 1993). In 1993 the ISD confiscated 2,599 firearms (South African Police, 1994).

SAP was widely criticised for allegedly being more thorough in their disarmament ministrations of ANC supporters as compared to their apparent *laissez faire* treatment of armed IFP loyalists, particularly hostel dwellers (Africa Watch, 1991, Zulu, 1993). Nonetheless, the SAP did raid a number of IFP-aligned hostels and confiscate weapons, including firearms, but were allegedly inhibited by the hazardous nature of such spaces, which were effectively governed by 'warlords'. On some occasions the police were fired upon by hostel residents and had to retaliate with automatic weapons fire (Independent Board of Inquiry, 1992b).

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that boundaries, both the national borderline of South Africa and the various internal social boundaries of racial segregation, fundamentally influenced the police and official policing during the apartheid era. That is, throughout this period the SAP was primarily required to uphold and reinforce these boundaries. Nonetheless the SAP's boundary work varied in intensity over time and tended to prioritise some boundaries over others. For example, SAP personnel were deployed in the mid 1960s to bolster and defend the South African-Rhodesia borderlands, but were subsequently withdrawn in the mid 1970s. Furthermore, in the mid 1980s the SAP entirely relinquished its borderline protection responsibilities to the SADF in order to focus its efforts on defending internal social boundaries. Within South Africa, the police consistently devoted more resources and attention to the maintenance and fortification of certain boundaries over others, especially those related to the more volatile townships in the PWV region, and in conflict-prone urban and rural communities in Natal. However, even the potency of the enforcement measures in terms of these prioritised boundaries were not consistent over time.

Therefore, as this chapter has shown, it was not the manifestation of boundaries that singularly shaped the police and policing during the apartheid period, but

rather the circumstances on the other side of the boundaries. The police habitually directed and concentrated their resources towards the frontiers of such boundaries, and even penetrated such boundaries when individuals and groups beyond the boundaries were regarded as exceedingly threatening to government and elites in society. In fact, it was these threatening characteristics, such as violent protests and organised defiance that often re-activated relatively dormant boundaries for the police. The othering of populations that resided on the other side of prioritised boundaries (for the SAP) tended to acutely inform the SAP's boundary protection and enforcement work. This othering manifested as the criminalisation of, and severe racial prejudice towards, such populations. Certain groups were branded as being exceptionally dangerous, and some were even regarded as terrorists.

The combination of these dynamics often resulted in the SAP using forceful and belligerent methods at the frontiers of their boundary work, with the level of coercion applied by the police having been frequently informed by the severity of the perceived threat. In circumstances where threats were regarded as less severe the police tended to use minimal overt force to neutralise the threats and ensure that the threats were contained beyond the boundary. This was clearly evident with the passbook system and ethnic policing approaches. In situations where the police were confronted by organised protest action and civil disobedience the police, as was the case in numerous townships in the 1980s, would temporarily penetrate the boundaries in large numbers to overwhelm and extinguish such threats. Where the threats were more impervious to conventional policing methods, unconventional and unsavoury approaches were adopted in an attempt to convert the targeted areas into less threatening places. These policing tactics included the use of death squads and loyalist militias to eliminate key opposition figures and instil fear in the targeted communities; as well as attempts to incentivise acquiesce to government control through the introduction of infrastructure and development projects. In those circumstances where the South African government's control and governance of certain areas was not guaranteed and was contested by opposition groups, such as the ANC and UDF, large contingents of police and soldiers were deployed to re-conquer the area. This was particularly distinguishable in a number of PWV townships in during the early 1990s.

The nature of the police's boundary enforcement efforts also had discernible impacts on the SAP as an organisation. Escalations in organised protest and defiance in townships, combined with increases in armed attacks by liberation movements, consistently resulted in an increase in the personnel size and budget of the SAP, as well as the acquisition and adoption of more modern policing equipment and techniques respectively. The SAP's close relationship with the SADF, which was an effort to more effectively maintain and reinforce social boundaries, directly contributed to the further militarisation of the police, which was reflected in the manner in which the SAP was managed, organised and trained.

Furthermore, as was shown in Chapter 5, firearm control continued to be an insightful lens through which to examine the relationship between the police and

boundaries in South Africa. That is, the SAP's efforts to prevent black people from acquiring firearms, and subsequently using them to disrupt the established social order and defy the government, were central to preserving apartheid. This included: racially discriminatory firearm licensing; prioritising cases where black people had unlawfully obtained firearms; and undertaking search-and-seizure firearm operations in townships.

Chapter 7: The policing of boundaries in post-apartheid South Africa

This chapter provides an analysis of circumstances surrounding the establishment of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and an assessment of policing strategies and approaches in relation to crime and violence after 1994. It considers the attempts by the post-apartheid government led by the African National Congress (ANC) to reform the police on the basis of the principles of inclusive policing, as well as the implementation challenges in this regard. In particular it will reflect on how the characteristics and dynamics of the changeover from apartheid rule to democracy influenced the boundary work of the police, as the promulgation of a new Constitution ultimately required the dissolution of the lingering official racially discriminatory social boundaries.

A prominent feature of the post-apartheid period was high levels of violent crime, with South Africa experiencing one of the highest recorded murder rates in the world between the mid 1990s until 2012 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). Such crime was not evenly distributed across the country and tended to be concentrated in a relatively small number of areas. Firearms were a central feature of such criminality, and thus the SAPS prioritised interventions to diminish the availability of firearms, especially illegal firearms, as a means to reduce firearm injuries and deaths. Hence, as this chapter will show, firearms and the risks that they presented, fundamentally moulded the perpetuation and reconfiguration of the boundary work of the SAPS.

7.1 The emergence of the SAPS and the reconfiguration of boundary policing

7.1.1 A new police for a new South Africa

South Africa's Interim Constitution (1993), which was negotiated during the political transition in the early 1990s, required the government to create the SAPS by means of an act of Parliament. Such a police organisation was subsequently established out of the integration of various apartheid-era police bodies, including the Bantustan police forces, as well as the inclusion of some individuals from the armed wings of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) into the South African Police (SAP) structures (Rauch, 2000, Shaw, 2001).

The SAPS was initially legally compelled to: prevent and investigate crime; uphold law and order; and maintain "internal security" (Republic of South Africa, 1994). However, in an effort to transcend what was tantamount to a rebranding exercise, the final Constitution (1996) reframed the police's "internal security" obligation as follows: "maintain public order" and "protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property" (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The subsequent SAPS Act (Act no. 68 of 1995) sought to re-engineer the police, and how they related to government structures and how they acted within society. The SAPS were thus required to: "ensure the safety and security" and "uphold and safeguard" the fundamental Constitutional rights of "all persons" in South Africa; "reflect respect for victims of crime and an understanding of their

needs”; cooperate with “the communities it serves” to reduce crime; and submit to civilian oversight (Republic of South Africa, 1995).

In essence, the architects of the Constitution and the SAPS Act had envisaged a new police for South Africa that would disregard the internal geo-racial apartheid policing boundaries and police all people with professionalism, compassion and respect, particularly those population groups that had previously been treated with suspicion and fear. Flowing from this the new political leaders from the ANC and their civilian policing advisors set about drafting the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). The strategy was an attempt to “reorganise government” in order to reduce and prevent crime, but emphasised the need for the SAPS to be more efficient and effective (Department of Safety and Security, 1996). This approach was informed by development-centred crime reduction efforts in other countries (Newham, 2005). The NCPS was an idealistic attempt to fundamentally address the various social and economic determinants of crime and violence in South Africa by means of an extensive, integrated, multi-layered, intergovernmental and public-private partnership enterprise. Many of the principles of the NCPS strategy were also re-emphasised in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security.

Such a crime prevention strategy ultimately required the SAPS to work more intimately and collaboratively with a range of other government departments that the police had traditionally not interacted with, such as the Department of Welfare and the Department of Education, to address the risks associated with crime perpetration and victimisation (Department of Safety and Security, 1996). At the time there seemed to have been little consideration within government that the SAPS, like most police organisations, was an inherently aloof institution that was not predisposed to actively cooperating with other government departments, especially those with very different institutional cultures. In addition, high levels of crime persisted. Combined, these two dynamics ultimately undermined the comprehensive rollout of this more holistic approach to preventing crime.

7.1.2 SAPS resistance to the requirements of policy change

The SAPS, as was the case with its predecessor (the SAP) in 1910, was fashioned amidst considerable political and socio-economic volatility. Intense political violence persisted in many peri-urban and rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal after the 1994 general elections.²⁴ In addition, criminal violence escalated in most policing areas in South Africa throughout the remainder of the 1990s, with high concentrations of such violence being experienced in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The SAPS’ traditional monopoly over the lethal means of force had also frayed considerably. Cabinet consequently impressed upon the SAPS the necessity to control and combat crime within South Africa as a matter of priority.

²⁴ This violence only tapered off after a peace agreement was brokered between the main protagonists, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1999.

During the latter part of the 1990s the ethos and orientation of the SAPS had remained relatively unchanged from the apartheid era (Rauch, 2004). In addition, the SAPS generally lacked popular legitimacy, particularly in townships. Furthermore, a comprehensive crime prevention strategy was not entirely in the bureaucratic interests of SAPS as it would require “a redirection of resources” to deal with crime (Department of Safety and Security, 1996). Consequently, the SAPS responded to the radical policy shift that was recommended within the NCPS in a relatively superficial and perfunctory manner.²⁵ The police leadership narrowly interpreted the notion of crime prevention to conform to its tried-and-tested policing approaches, with the SAPS Annual Plan (1996/97) providing clear evidence of this.

The SAPS 1996/97 Annual Plan stated that the NCPS was: “A medium to long term supportive strategy which seeks to desegregate the various crime combating endeavours and to support operational endeavours by creating a favourable environment for the combating of crime” (South African Police Service, 1996b:7). Likewise, according to a media statement by George Fivaz, the National SAPS Commissioner, the SAPS Annual Plan represented “a no-nonsense back-to-basics” approach to policing “aimed at crushing crime, specifically criminals” (Burger, 2007a:105).

The SAPS 1996/97 Annual Plan also indicated that future policing efforts would be directed towards those provinces with the greatest intensities of violent crime, namely KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, and that “all provinces would thus benefit” from this approach (South African Police Service, 1996b:10). By 1999 the SAPS determined that their policing endeavours should focus on high crime areas in all nine provinces, but there needed to be a continued emphasis in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, as well as in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape. In operational terms the key principle was “maximum support [resources and actions]...to enable results in the shortest possible time” (South African Police Service, 2001a:11).

As the democratic South African state gradually matured it became evident that the SAPS was increasingly viewing crime prevention as an overarching normative and legitimising aspiration, while the actual policing of priority crime was to be forceful and militarised. Following the 1999 general elections the security cluster of Cabinet Ministers, led by Steve Tshwete (Minister of Safety and Security), which had initially supported the social crime prevention orientation of the NCPS, began to endorse a ‘get tough on crime’ approach. Escalating levels of violent criminality and widespread perceptions that the police were underperforming when it came to containing and combatting crime informed such backpedalling by the Minister. In addition, various government structures were struggling to prioritise and adapt to the multiple demands of a preventive strategy (Burger, 2007a, Frank, 2003, Rauch, 2002).

Within a short space of time the NCPS had become marginalised, and the Safety

²⁵ The SAP had experimented with the notion of crime prevention in the 1980s, but was narrowly interpreted as a community liaison function and appeared to be part of a ‘winning-hearts-and-minds’ counterinsurgency strategy.

and Security Secretariat, the NCPS champion within government, was downgraded to relative insignificance (Thulare, 2002). The NCPS was subsequently supplanted by the SAPS' own National Crime Combatting Strategy (NCCS)²⁶, which did not emphasise the need for active collaboration with non-security government departments. The NCCS was launched in 2000 with the tacit endorsement of Cabinet (Burger, 2015a). According to the 2001/02 SAPS annual report:

Crime prevention is the core policing function and provides for the activities of police stations nationally...Operations at police stations are informed and directed largely by the National Crime Combating Strategy. This multidisciplinary approach focuses on the geographical areas with the most severe crime problems (South African Police Service, 2002:13).

The principal emphasis of the NCCS was serious and violent crime, as well as organised crime, with the aim being to substantially reduce the incidents of such crime over the next 15 years. It also focused on policing service delivery in order to provide more visible and immediate accomplishments (Burger and Boshoff, 2008). Paradoxically, in an interview with Johan Burger, a former Assistant National Commissioner within SAPS, the NCCS was never finalised into a formal document (Burger, 2015a), and hence the SAPS' definitive operational blueprint for crime fighting was effectively a virtual strategy.

The NCCS framed the strategic orientation of SAPS squarely within a militarised crime-fighting paradigm, where serious and violent crime was to be eliminated through aggressive policing, and by apprehending and imprisoning criminals, particularly in high crime areas. 'War rooms' were later established with a view to deliver a more effective, integrated and coordinated crime-fighting response (Mthethwa, 2010g). Furthermore, it emphasised the need for intelligence-driven, high-density, hot spots policing in which high crime areas, or 'flashpoints' would be clustered into 'crime-combating zones' (Omar, 2010, Rauch, 2002). In effect, many of the high crime areas in the mid 1990s were the same ones that had been regarded as being threatening and dangerous by the police during the apartheid period. Hence boundary policing became profoundly re-affirmed and reinvigorated as an underlying police ethos during the post-apartheid period.

The NCCS also became the foundation on which the police's political leadership has perpetuated a 'war on crime' discourse over the past 15 years, frequently referring to criminals as the "enemy". In the 2011/12 SAPS Annual Performance Plan, for instance, the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa asserted that "military expertise" amongst criminals has "drastically changed the nature of crime in our country" (South African Police Service, 2011a). Similarly police have been encouraged to: "shoot to kill"; "fight fire with fire"; "show no mercy" towards dangerous offenders; and "squeeze crime to zero" (Faull and Rose, 2012) (Samara, 2010). Although not consistently stated, such war talk and sabre-rattling has predominantly been directed towards high crime areas.

²⁶ The initial name was the 'SAPS Crime Combatting Strategy'.

As suggested by Altbeker (2009), the conceptualisation of crime and the formulation of crime fighting remedies that were envisaged within the NCCS was most likely a nostalgic response by the SAPS to policing during the apartheid period when threats were easily identifiable, as in the post-apartheid period criminal offending became complex and confusing to the police where those that undermine the maintenance of law and order were not clearly identifiable. In addition, Altbeker (2009:277) further iterated that “tightly organised hierarchical organisations” such as the SAPS, “seldom produce leaders that are innovators”.

7.2 High crime zones and the SAPS’ operational approach to policing

7.2.1 Crime mapping and its impact

From the late 1990s the SAPS operational and day-to-day decision-making began to increasingly be informed by crime mapping, crime pattern and threat analysis, as well as hot spot assessments (Breetzke, 2006, Krause, 2007). Added to this, the Orkin Commission of Inquiry (1997-1998) into the SAPS crime statistics recommended the use of a geographical information systems (GIS) to map crime (De Kock, 2007). Thereafter a GIS crime analysis approach was piloted in Johannesburg by the SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre (Cooper, et al., 1999, Stylianides, 2000).

By the early 2000s a sophisticated, web-based GIS crime mapping and information system had been developed for the SAPS with backdated crime, population and socio-economic data. High crime stations were the first to acquire this technology, with it being implemented in the remainder of the SAPS stations shortly thereafter (Smit and Schnetler, 2004). The system also allowed for real-time, multi-variant crime assessment at the SAPS’ smallest unit of analysis, the Crime Administration System (CAS) block (Breetzke, 2006). It also equipped the SAPS with the necessary information to make informed decisions regarding the planning of operations and other policing actions (Ellis, 2004). Additionally, new station-level maps with up-to-date information were distributed to the priority police stations (Boshoff, 2001).

Electronic forms of crime mapping have crisply demarcated the spatial intensities of reported disorder and criminal offending in South Africa. They have revealed that violent crime has been intensely concentrated, in a relatively small number of places. This consequently contributed to the prioritisation of crime reduction responses in high crime spaces (Vigneswaran, 2014). Such a vivid graphical representation of the territorial intensities of crime, however, has tended to limit and distort interpretations of crime as being specifically bound to clearly definable “problematic” hot spots (Manning, 2008), rather than taking into consideration the interconnectedness of the criminal economy and external variables such as entrenched inequities and structural violence (Gillespie, 2014).

7.2.2 Prioritisation of high crime areas for police interventions

By 2001 the SAPS had resolved that between 140 and 148 police station precincts with ‘high contact crimes’ would be prioritised in terms of receiving

additional policing resources and police operations. The number of earmarked high contact crime police stations was subsequently increased to 169, which was underscored in the SAPS 2005-2010 Strategic Plan (South African Police Service, 2005) (Table 7.1 below provides a list of these 169 priority stations). In recent years the number of focal high crime station areas has not remained entirely static as the SAPS has established additional police stations where there was dire need, such as in Khayelitsha, KwaMashu, Katlehong and Mamelodi; and has prioritised interventions in additional station areas with rising crime levels, such as Philippi East, Westonaria, Bhekithemba and Sundumbili.

Table 7.1: SAPS 169 High Crime Priority Station Areas

Eastern Cape	Kwazakele*; New Brighton; Umtata* (Mthatha); Kwanobuhle; Motherwell; Mdantsane; Bethelsdorp; Duncan Village; Gelvandale; East London; Grahamstown; Queenstown; Kamesh; Walmer; Cambridge; Humewood; Buffalo Flats; King Williams Town; Lusikisiki; Cradock; Butterworth; Inyibiba; Engcobo; Ngqeleni; Ngangelizwe; Vulindlela; Zwelitsha; Mqanduli; Mount Frere; Libode
Free State	Batho; Thabong; Park Road; Sasolburg; Bloemspruit; Bethlehem; Botshabelo; Boithuso; Kagisanong; Welkom; Odendaalsrus; Maokeng; Selosessa
Gauteng	Hillbrow*; Sophia Town; Yeoville; Johannesburg Central*; Booyens; Alexandra*; Jeppe*; Mamelodi*; Pretoria Central; Rietgat; Atteridgeville; Sunnyside; Tembisa*; Daveyton; Ivory Park*; Benoni; Katlehong*; Roodepoort; Randfontein; Krugersdorp; Evaton*; Orange Farm; Sebokeng; Vanderbijlpark; Meadowlands; Dobsonville; Lenasia; Moroka*; Kliptown
KwaZulu-Natal	Durban Central; KwaMashu*; Umlazi*; Inanda*; Empangeni; Plessislaer*; Phoenix; Point; Eshikawini*; Kwadabeka; Mount Rise; Chatsworth; Ladysmith; Madadeni; Pietermaritzburg; Mariannhill; Pinetown; Bhekithemba; Eshowe; Kwadukuza; Kwamsane; Cato Manor; Richards Bay; Osizweni; Verulam; Nongoma; Hillcrest
Limpopo	Thohoyandou; Polokwane; Mokopane; Seshego; Giyani; Tzaneen; Mankweng; Bolobedu; Maake; Lebowakgomo; Calcutta; Bushbuckridge; Letsitele; Makhado; Malamulele; Bele Bele; Tubatse
Mpumalanga	Vosman; Kanyamazane; Tonga; Nelspruit; Siyabuswa; Kwamhlanga; Embalenhle; Kabokweni; Witbank; Ermelo; Kwaggafontein; Masoyi; Piet Retief; Mhluzi
Northern Cape	Galeshewe; Kimberley; Rosedale; Upington; Roodepan; Kakamas; Groblershoop; Pabablello
North-West	Temba; Ikageng; Rustenburg; Loate; Jouberton; Phokeng; Garankuwa; Mabopane; Mmabatho; Vryburg; Brits; Klerksdorp; Potchefstroom; Tlhabane
Western Cape	Khayelitsha; Nyanga*; Kuils River*; Mitchells Plain*; Worcester; Gugulethu*; Delft; Kraaifontein*; Elsies River; Cape Town Central; Bishop Lavis; Langa; Paarl; Oudtshoorn; Manenberg; Paarl East; Knysna

Source: SAPS annual reports

* The 2002/03 SAPS report stated that 20% of all reported murders in that reporting year took place in these 23 station precincts.

7.2.3 Nature of high crime spaces

Most of the high crime areas were densely populated, infrastructurally marginalised and characterised by elevated levels of poverty, such as large urban townships and informal settlements. Within these high crime areas there were micro hot spots where criminal offending was even more magnified, such as hostels, *shebeens* and taxi ranks. For the SAPS leadership one of the reasons for this state of affairs was that the distorted and discriminatory approach to policing that the SAP had pursued under apartheid had left many poorer areas

“virtually unpoliced”, which had generated “enormous opportunities for criminals to get a foot-hold in society” (South African Police Service, 1996b:1).

Many of these high crime areas were urban and peri-urban shadowlands, where the authority of the state was not absolute. At times some of these spaces closely resembled warzones, as was the case with KwaZulu-Natal towns of Richmond, KwaMashu and Inanda in the mid to late 1990s; and the Cape Flats communities of Manenberg and Mitchells Plain, which have been intermittently wracked by fierce gang conflicts. Furthermore, day-to-day police service delivery has often been negated by the overwhelming extent of reported crime and calls for service, combined with incidents of excessive use of force by SAPS members (Bruce, 2002, Hornberger, 2013).

Jonny Steinberg has postulated that many of these communities have yet to give their “consent to being policed” by the SAPS; and the police “have never found sufficient moral authority to rise above the logic of this terrain, nor to refashion it...” (Steinberg, 2008:22-23). That is, under apartheid, many of these high crime communities had constructed indigenous systems and methods of policing and protection, which often resulted in more immediate forms of justice and punishment. Much of this non-state policing endured after 1994 (Buur, 2006, Schärf, 2001, Super, 2015, Tshehla, 2002), with additional forms of both benign and predatory community policing emerging (Baker, 2002b, Marks and Wood, 2010).

In such spaces, the state has “porous, constructed borders” (Cooper-Knock, 2014), where the police have often been required to perform subtle and intricate manoeuvres and negotiations (Steinberg, 2008) with community members in order to pursue their day-to-day duties. These conditions have fundamentally challenged the traditional notions of official policing prescribed by South Africa’s democratic constitution. Police stations exist within or on the outskirts of such dangerous places, but have often resembled fortresses with high fences and solid walls, a vivid architectural demonstration of the SAPS’ unease with working in such areas, and have had clear similarities in functional design to the police outposts that were constructed along the colonial territorial frontiers. This has tended to reinforce notions of othering between SAPS personnel and residents.

High crime places have also potentially been perilous for those SAPS members that are required to work within them. That is, these spaces have been seen as forbidding and difficult to navigate due to a lack of streets, systematic dwelling numbering systems and lighting. Police have been frequently at risk of being attacked by armed criminals (Bruce, et al., 2007, Minnaar, 2003b), particularly at night (Rauch, 1998). Steinberg (2014b) reflecting on the testimony of SAPS officials to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry (2014), and his own ethnographic research, has suggested that it was not inconceivable that SAPS members have been “afraid” to work within many such high crime areas.


Such fear was a prominent theme in the interview-based research on SAPS members by Steinberg (2008), Bruce (2001), Marks (2005) and Faull (2010a), with police members responding to their deployment in high crime areas either

with dread or bravado. Both responses have had the potential to lead to aggressive behaviour towards suspected offenders, particularly from paramilitary policing formations, such as the Public Order Policing Units. For example, Monique Marks reflecting on a ride-along with Public Order Policing members in KwaMashu (one of the most unsafe policing areas in KwaZulu-Natal) during the time of an intense national high density operation, recounted the following apt example from her field notes:

Sergeant Marais (SAPS member): It is fucking quiet out here tonight. Monique, it looks like you jinxed us. There is nothing exciting taking place. *Monique*: What do you hope to take place? *Sergeant Marais*: A bit of shooting at least. That is what we live for... [Later that night] [w]hile patrolling the road, the police spotted four guys on the pavement. They pulled the van to a stop and jumped out... They searched the four guys and found nine Mandrax pills. They hit the four young men and asked them where they had got the pills (Marks, 2005:100).

Elevated murder levels of policemen and policewomen, mostly in high crime areas, have also informed such fear, with firearm injuries being the main cause of death. The incidents of police murders were in excess of 200 per year in the mid to late 1990s, and have subsequently declined significantly since then, decreasing from 263 in 1994/95 to 77 in 2013/14, which was more than a 300% decline over that period of 20 years. Nonetheless, the murder of police personnel has remained an area of grave concern to both the police and its political leadership. For example, in June 2013, in a speech at the funeral of a senior police official, the Minister of Police at the time, Nathi Mthethwa eulogised that the SAPS “are in the midst of a war; a war that has been declared by heartless criminals on our men and women in blue...[and that] we shall ensure that those who kill police officers pay the price accordingly” (Mthethwa, 2013).

Chart 7.1: Murder of SAPS personnel 1994/95-2014/15



Source: (SAPS)

Over the past 20 years senior political leaders and police officials have repeatedly articulated that high crime areas are dangerous spaces of contested governance, which should be repossessed by the security forces and thereafter the authority of the state should be reasserted. For example, according to the former Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, high-density police operations were the means by which “we want to take back the streets from the

gangs. We want to create a safe environment where children can grow up in peaceful, stable conditions” (van Dyk, 2003). In 2015, Jeff Radebe, the Minister in the Presidency, declared that in the context of Operation *Fiela*-Reclaim, large-scale police operations could result in the “reclaiming [of] our communities so that our people can live in peace and harmony” (SABC, 2015), and to “help create a level of systemic normality” (Poplak, 2015b).

7.3 Boundaries and policing adaptation

Despite the perpetuation of a militaristic policing ethos, the SAPS nonetheless initiated a series of organisational changes, which were motivated by both legislative imperatives (for the introduction of more democratic policing approaches) and operational considerations. Nonetheless as this section will show, these adaptations were ultimately fashioned to support the enforcement of post-apartheid policing boundaries, especially the prioritisation and combatting of crime in high crime areas. This was evident with: the introduction of sector policing; in the changes that were made to the SAPS’ approach to the policing of public disorder; as well as with the closure of specialised investigative police units.

7.3.1 Dabbling in community policing

The SAPS did embrace some policing approaches that were in-line with more progressive thinking on crime prevention. A key example was that of community-oriented policing. In principal it is an approach that seeks to make the police and community members “co-producers of public safety” (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988:iii). It was seen by the new generation of South African policy makers in the 1990s to be a potential miracle treatment that would instil democratic policing values throughout SAPS, as well as generate legitimacy and grassroots accountability for the police (African National Congress, 1993, Pelser, 1999).

In this regard, the SAPS Act (No. 68 of 1995) has required the police to establish Community Policing Forums (CPFs) in all policing areas. CPFs were envisaged to be committees of community members that would be mandated to: promote communication and cooperation between communities and SAPS; engage in joint problem-solving between civilians and the police; facilitate transparency and accountability of the police; and improve the delivery of police services. Nonetheless, the SAPS modified the notion of community-oriented policing to suit the dominant policing ethos and the objectives of the NCCS, especially in support of the policing of boundaries in relation to high crime areas. That is, community-oriented policing was chiefly used as a means to mobilise and co-opt civilians as auxiliary resources for the business of state policing (Marks, et al., 2009).²⁷

²⁷ Such a strategy had in fact been pursued during the 18th and 19th centuries where members of frontier communities were deputised (in the form of commandos) to perform some of the policing functions of the colonial authorities. This also occurred under apartheid where community members and community structures were enlisted to defend and maintain white minority rule.

The SAPS even developed their own brand of community-oriented policing in 2001, which has been referred to as sector policing, with the National SAPS Commissioner issuing a Final Draft National Instruction on Sector Policing in 2003. It was a hybrid model that fused together elements of both community policing and problem-oriented policing, and was influenced by the limited British and North American experience in this area (Burger, 2014, Rauch and Dixon, 2004). The SAPS version was envisioned to be a “practical manifestation” of community policing, that divided policing precincts “into smaller manageable parts”, which would be actively patrolled by the same cohort of police in order to: deliver more community-specific, partnership policing; increase response times; and strengthen CPFs (South African Police Service, 2003a, South African Police Service, 2013b). Within the SAPS, according to an interview with Johan Burger, sector policing was often referred to as “soft policing” (Burger, 2015a).

Sector policing was to be phased in over the next decade, starting initially with 145 priority police stations in high crime areas (Government Communication and Information System, 2005). By March 2012 sector policing had reportedly been implemented in 1,056 police station areas (Government Communication and Information System, 2013). However, by this point in time, the problem-solving aspects had been de-emphasised with sector policing having been re-interpreted as an ‘operational’ form of visible policing (Burger, 2014). Since 2000 there have been a handful of studies of sector policing. Published studies that have focused on the West Rand (Steinberg, 2004a) and Hillbrow (Quest Research Services, 2013) has indicated that there had been some successes in building legitimacy and improving service delivery, but other studies have indicated that the effectiveness of sector policing was undermined by scant community involvement and inadequate resources (Buthelezi, 2014, Montesh, 2007).

7.3.2 Reforming public order policing

Efforts were also made to reform the SAPS approach to the policing of public disorder in an attempt to align this form of policing with the principals of policing in a multiracial democracy. In this regard the SAPS Public Order Policing Unit was established in 1995, which was the merger of the personnel from the former Riot Units and Internal Stability Units from the SAP and the various Bantustan police forces. It was envisaged that the Public Order Policing Unit would pursue a “more soft approach than previous historical methods” to the policing of gatherings, marches and protests, which included the showing of restraint and using force as a last resort (South African Police Service, 1997b:50). Public Order Policing personnel were “re-selected” (Omar, 2006) and underwent training based on international standards of crowd management by Belgian police instructors, which included negotiation skills (Tait and Marks, 2011).

The 1997 SAPS strategy on the policing of gatherings, protests and crowds called for the establishment of uniform procedures in this regard that were: aligned to the Constitution; community orientated; and efficient and effective. Public Order

Policing units were also required to devote a significant amount of their time to supporting crime prevention and crime combatting operations. This strategy was encapsulated within SAPS Standing Order No. 262 (2002), which outlined how the police should act in circumstances where force was required to control collective disorder (Ministry of Police, 2013, Omar, 2006). The Public Order Policing component was envisaged to be a slimmed down version of the apartheid behemoth, but was still a significant structure within SAPS, totalling 42 units and 7,610 members (South African Police Service, 1997b).

The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security clearly indicated that the public order component of the police would entail boundary policing, with the public order units being earmarked as the lead SAPS agency when it came to high-density operations. Such operations were defined as “the saturation of areas experiencing high levels of crime with patrolling police officers...to stabilise high crime areas so that normal policing can resume” (Department of Safety and Security, 1998:20).

During the 2000s the public order component was rebranded, reoriented and its members re-trained on two occasions. In 2001, following a reported decrease in incidents of public violence, these units were renamed Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). Informed by the principles of sector policing the ACCUs were regionalised and were assigned an adjusted mandate, namely to focus on serious and violence crimes (Omar, 2006). Five years later the ACCUs were further rationalised into Crime Combatting Units (CCUs), which were heavily armed, sported military-style uniforms, and made use of military organisational terms such as “company” and “platoon” (Omar, 2007) (Dixon, 2015).

From the early 2000s the SAPS established specialised paramilitary policing bodies that could be swiftly deployed to react to incidents of public disorder, serious and violent crimes, terrorism and natural disasters “where normal policing was not adequate”. Examples included the Rapid Deployment Stability Force, the National Intervention Unit and the Special Task Force. Air supported reaction groups were also created in order to respond rapidly to crimes, such as bank robberies, vehicle hijackings and farm attacks (Government Communication and Information System, 2003, Republic of South Africa, 2005).

7.3.3 Investigation of violent crime: Specialisation and de-specialisation

By the late 1990s numerous specialised units were in existence within the SAPS Detective Service, such as: murder and robbery units; firearm investigation units; gang units; gold and diamond theft units; child protection units; vehicle hijacking units; stock theft units and taxi violence units (South African Police Service, 2002). In an effort to provide a more coordinated investigation of crime, the majority of these units were clustered together into new “priority specialised units”, namely: Serious and Violent Crime (where the firearm investigation units were housed); Organised Crime; and Commercial Crime (Government Communication and Information System, 2006).

These organisational changes were reportedly driven by the concerns of senior SAPS decision-makers that many of the specialised units were underperforming in terms of: securing satisfactory conviction rates; were too expensive to maintain; and were largely isolated from community policing endeavours (Redpath, 2002). Officially the SAPS claimed that this restructuring was to: better coordinate criminal investigations; promote collaboration and the sharing of information across SAPS; make better use of existing resources; and build investigative capacity at the local level (South African Police Service, 2002).

There was more austere future restructuring of the specialised units in 2005 and 2006. This resulted in most of these units being made redundant with many of their members being redeployed within the SAPS structures. For example, the Serious and Violent Crime component was decentralised and its members deployed to police stations in high crime areas. The SAPS management envisaged that such a rationalisation process would provide officials at the station-level with more autonomy and hence hoped that such a strategy would boost morale within the SAPS (South African Police Service, 2006b).

7.4 Border protection and responding to organised crime

One of the benefits of South Africa's transition to democracy was that government found itself in a considerably less hostile environment within the Southern African region compared to the 1980s. South Africa no longer faced threats from liberation movements in neighbouring countries, and consequently the military was replaced by the police as the lead borderline protection entity. However, for the police, the danger of armed insurgents had been substituted by that of transnational organised criminal organisations, which facilitated cross-border smuggling of illegal goods, such as stolen vehicles, drugs, precious metals and minerals, as well as illicit firearms (Shaw, 1998). The SAPS leadership therefore resolved that augmented border policing approaches were required to defend South Africa's borders from the new trans-national threats posed by organised criminal groups (Gastrow, 1998).

An early innovation within the SAPS in this regard was the creation of specialised units, such as Organised Crime Investigation Units and the Border Police. These units were to engage in a range of joint operations with other SAPS entities in order to combat organised crime (South African Police Service, 1997b). The Border Police, for example, had members stationed at border posts, harbours and airports in order to net smugglers and contraband (Minnaar, 2003a). By 2002 the Border Police had a presence at 53 land border posts, ten airport border posts and nine sea border posts (South African Police Service, 2002). The 2007/08 SAPS annual report indicated that the Border Police were responsible for 3,186 operations and 18,094 roadblocks; and had searched more than 23 million persons and close to four million vehicles (South African Police Service, 2008).

However, despite these organisational changes the SAPS lacked the necessary capacity to effectively monitor and patrol South Africa's land borders. Therefore, in 1998, the SANDF was compelled to once again become the vanguard of border

protection and crime fighting in the regions along South Africa's national borderline (Hennop, 2001b). The Border Police continued to function nonetheless. Cabinet resolved in 2003 that the SAPS should be reallocated the border protection mandate, and that the SANDF presence in the frontier territories should be gradually phased out. However, due to capacity constraints and poor performance, the SAPS were unable to fully assume the mantle of safeguarding South Africa's borders, and hence responsibility was once again officially handed back to the SANDF in 2009 (Boshoff, 2009, Helfrich, 2014).

7.5 The centrality of firearms in violent crime

The widespread availability of firearms in the mid 1990s in South Africa was one of the leading contributors to violent crime. Of the eight National Crime Priorities identified by the SAPS in its 1996/97 annual report, firearms featured prominently in five, namely: vehicle hijacking; minibus-taxi-related violence; possession and trafficking of illegal weapons; political massacres; and bank robberies (South African Police Service, 1997b). Firearm-related crime was also identified as a key priority area in both the NCPS and the NCCS. Firearm crime and firearm control were to remain top priorities for the SAPS for the following two decades, as consistently illustrated in most SAPS strategic and policy documents. For example, the 2015/16 SAPS Annual Performance Plan reiterated that firearm loss and theft was a "key concern" and a major "contributor to crime" (South African Police Service, 2015a:vi). The elevated levels of firearm possession, especially in high crime areas, was to significantly influence the manner in which the SAPS policed these areas, as such weapons increased the risk for police personnel being injured and killed.

7.5.1 Firearm availability and crime: 1994-2013

7.5.1.1 Licensed firearms

In 1998 the CFR reported that there were a total of 4,544,705 licensed firearms in South Africa of which: civilians owned 3,554,336; 487,401 were in the possession of government departments; firearm dealers and manufacturers were holding 397,146 and 10,100 respectively; and 95,722 were in the hands of private companies. At this time more than 60% of these firearms were handguns; 28% were commercial rifles and 10% were shotguns. In terms of licensed civilian firearms, the greatest concentration of licensed civilian firearm ownership was in Gauteng, followed by the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Eastern Cape (Chetty, 2000). However, as there are some problems with the reliability and accuracy of the SAPS electronic firearm registry (Gould, et al., 2004) database it is possible that these figures were not entirely accurate.

In March 2015, following an audit of all state-held firearms and the re-licensing process for civilians, the National SAPS Commissioner announced at the National Firearm Summit that between 2004 and 2015 some 3,189,861 firearm applications (new applications and renewals) had been submitted to the CFR of which 3,106,438 had been 'finalised'. She further noted that at this time that there were: 1,749,034 individual firearm owners, who possessed 3,081,173 firearms; 425 official institutions with 1,270,405 firearms under their control;

and 8,937 non-official institutions, owning 136,259 firearms (Phiyega, 2015). The majority of individual licences were issued for self-protection, hunting and sports shooting (Department of Community Safety, 2015).

7.5.1.2 Illegal firearms

A 1999 report by the SAPS Joint Investigation Team suggested that there were approximately 500,000 illegal firearms in South Africa. This figure was formulated by adding an estimated 200,000 missing government firearms, 150,000 stolen from or lost by private owners, some 30,000 homemade firearms, and anticipated unreported losses from all sectors (Ministry of Safety and Security, 1999). SAPS and independent researchers identified the principal sources of illegal firearms at this time being: firearms lost by, or stolen from licensed civilians, government departments (such as SAPS, the SANDF and the former Bantustan security forces) and private security companies; homemade firearms; and firearms illegally trafficked into South Africa, particularly from Mozambique (Altbeker, et al., 2000, South African Police Service, 2000a).

Police seizures of illegal firearms during the 1990s provided limited insights into the scope of the proliferation of the different sources of illegal firearms at the time. For example, in 1994 AK-47s accounted for 11% of all SAPS firearm seizures for that year, while handguns and homemade firearms accounted for 53% and 21% respectively. By 1998 AK-47 and homemade firearm seizures had shrunk significantly to 2.5% and 15% of all SAPS firearm seizures respectively, while handgun confiscations had increased to 72% (Chetty, 2000). Such trends suggested that cross-border weapons smuggling (particularly from Mozambique) had diminished considerably, as it was predominantly AK-47s and other automatic weapons that had previously been trafficked into South Africa. In addition, the 19% increase in the handgun proportion of total firearm seizures over this five-year period implied that civilian licence holders (including private security companies) and SAPS stocks had possibly been the main sources of illegal firearms.

At this time key internal markets for illegal firearms, particularly handguns, were located in high crime townships and informal settlements where some residents, particularly business owners, sought to acquire illegal firearms for self-protection. The reason being that the official licensing route had been largely opaque and unresponsive to many black South Africans in these areas (Burger, 2015b, IRIN, 2006, Jacobs, 2004, Wines, 2005). Individuals with criminal intentions also sought to acquire illegal firearms.

According to interviews with existing and retired senior SAPS firearm crime investigators, namely Stan Joubert, Alice Pienaar-Marais and a former senior CFR official (name withheld), most serious firearm crimes in South Africa, such as murder, attempted murder, and robbery with aggravating circumstances, have been committed with illegal firearms (Anonymous, 2015, Joubert, 2015, Pienaar-Marais, 2015). Case study and ethnographic research in South Africa suggests that those persons who perpetrate violent crime with an illegal firearm either acquire it directly from those legally in possession of such weapons by means of

theft/robbery, or indirectly via black market entrepreneurial intermediaries. Those individuals that steal firearms for their personal use are predominantly part of small criminal groupings that engage in street, house and business robberies where firearms were stolen in addition to other valuable items (Altbeker, 1999, Thaler, 2011, Zinn, 2010).

The illegal firearm intermediaries have often been linked to organised criminal groups (including street gangs) (Kinnes, 2000, Shaw, 1998, Standing, 2006) that steal or buy stolen/misplaced licensed or government-held firearms, or bribe corrupt government officials which have access to firearms. In addition, some drug dealers, hostel residents, minibus taxi drivers, shebeen owners, corrupt police officials (see the section on the Central Firearm Registry below) and business owners have been implicated in trading in illegal firearms (Anonymous, 2015, Keegan, 2005). Similar dynamics have been identified by researchers in a wide range of countries, such as the USA (Wachtel, 1998), the UK (Hales, et al., 2006), Australia (Baker and McPhedran, 2007), Colombia (Cragin and Hoffman, 2003) and Brazil (Lessing, 2005).

The exact dimensions of the current pool of illegal firearms in South Africa are unknown. Nonetheless the SAPS recently released data on the loss and theft of firearms for the period 1999 to June 2015, which provided partial insights into how the illegal firearm sector has been fuelled. That is, it appears that the main sources of lost and stolen firearms in South Africa have been civilians (139,765 firearms); private security companies (18,739 firearms); government departments (18,697 firearms); and the SAPS (15,357 firearms) (Phiyega, 2015).


Hence, it is highly likely that the majority of firearms used in the commission of crime in South Africa were originally licensed civilian firearms, both namely firearms licensed to individuals and private security companies, as together they accounted for 77% of all lost and stolen firearms between 1999 and June 2015. This is a view that has been shared by the SAPS, with the Minister of Police noting in 2012 that licensed civilian firearm owners will “continue to become arsenals for criminals” (South African Police Service, 2012a:25).

This view is somewhat supported by firearm seizure figures from the Border Police, which indicates a general decreasing trend in firearm confiscations at points of entry into South Africa from 2002/03. That is in 2002/03 reporting year 433 firearms were confiscated by the Border Police, while in 2014/15 81 firearms were seized (see Chart 7.2 below). The SAPS reported in 2005 that this trend could be attributed to the “tightening up of border controls” and “improving other security measures at most of the major points of entry and exit” in line with the SAPS Firearm Strategy (South African Police Service, 2005b:78). In addition, it was likely the arms destruction efforts by the SAPS and the Mozambican police that were part of Operation Rachel had contributed to a reduction in such firearm confiscations (see below).

These sentiments have been reiterated intermittently in subsequent SAPS annual reports. In addition, the official Southern African Development Community statement to the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the

Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2010 did not identify cross-border smuggling of firearms in Southern Africa as a major area of concern (Bule, 2010).

Chart 7.2: Border Police firearm seizures, 1997/1998 to 2014/2015



Source: SAPS annual reports

7.6 SAPS and firearm control

Given that the widespread availability of firearms in South Africa was a key driver of the high levels of violent crime, particularly in high crime zones, the SAPS prioritised the collection and seizure of illegal firearms in such areas. Furthermore, as a large proportion of illegal firearms in South Africa had originally been legally held by civilians and members of the security forces, government initiated a process of reforming South Africa's national firearm controls as a means of restricting the flow of licensed firearms into the illegal economy and hence further destabilising high crime areas.

In addition, the SAPS' internal assessments in the mid 1990s found that: the overall management of firearm control by the SAPS was inadequate; the information technology systems and software used for firearm control and criminal investigation was problematic; communication between provincial structures and the Central Firearms Registry (CFR) in Pretoria was poor; and that the Illegal Firearm Investigation Units (IFIUs) were under-resourced (Naudé, 1996, South African Police Service, 1996a). Consequently improvements to the SAPS firearm control and investigation architecture and infrastructure was initiated.

7.6.1 Operation Rachel

One of the first major post-apartheid operational interventions in relation to firearms entailed the destruction of firearms caches within Mozambican territory that had accumulated during the civil war in that country. The reason for this operation was that in the mid 1990s SAPS crime intelligence was reporting that a substantial number of such firearms, particularly automatic weapons, were being smuggled into South Africa and were then being used in

criminal activities in Gauteng and in the internecine conflict between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal (Chachiua, 1999).

Unlike during the apartheid period when the SAP would often illegally cross national borders to eliminate insurgent threats, the SAPS were compelled to broker an official agreement with the Mozambican police that resulted in a joint operation between the two police organisations. This bilateral policing intervention, which was titled Operation Rachel, was launched in 1995, with there having being at least 28 iterations of this type of operations between 1995 and 2008. The Mozambican government was supportive of such an operation as they did not have the resources to fund such an undertaking itself, and the firearms in question could potentially be a destabilising domestic factor in the future (Chachiua, 1999, Hennop, 2001a).

This operation permitted significant numbers of SAPS personnel to legitimately cross over into Mozambican territory to work with the Mozambican police to identify and then destroy caches of firearms, ammunition and explosives in mainly rural and underdeveloped areas. The operations were intelligence-driven, and informants were provided with financial rewards for successfully identifying arms caches. In an attempt to encourage more Mozambicans to identify weapons caches no punitive measures were pursued against those found in possession of arms (Hennop, 2001a). Due to the nature of the terrain GIS techniques were piloted to map the location of the arms caches (Chachiua, 1999). In total the police destroyed more than 51,000 firearms and in excess of 31 million rounds of ammunition of various calibres (Littlejohn and Millard, 2009).

Table 7.2: Operation Rachel 1995-2008

Year	Firearms	Ammunition
1995	1127	23153
1996	488	136639
1997	5683	3000000
1998	4693	155314
1999	12036	3315106
2000	2415	83276
2001	3930	486000
2002	4930	11004018
2003	1637	2200001
2004	2453	2100038
2005	3189	1666808
2006	3170	300000
2008	6124	7000000
Total	51875	31470353

Source: Littlejohn and Millard (2009)

7.6.2 Emergence of a national firearm strategy

In 1997 a National Firearm Plan (NFP) (1997) was drafted with the overall goal being to “combat the illegal importing/use/distribution/trade and possession of weapons, explosive devices and equipment and to determine their origin in order to ensure safer, crime free communities”. The main objectives of the Plan were to: restructure existing IFIUs and establish new units; gather intelligence on firearm proliferation; undertake joint “proactive” policing operations in order

to remove and destroy illegal firearms; “upgrade” firearm control legislation; develop cooperative agreements with other Southern African governments in relation to firearm operations; and improve controls over legal firearms held by government, civilians, firearm dealers and private security companies (South African Police Service, 1997a).

Interviews with two senior SAPS personnel that were responsible for devising the SAPS’ firearm control policies revealed that the NFP was never officially published. According to Alice Pienaar-Marais, the NFP was assimilated into the SAPS Firearm Strategy and accompanying implementation plan, which had a similar overall objective, namely to “eradicate the proliferation of firearms for use in crime and violence in South Africa” (Pienaar-Marais, 2015). Col Johan A P Burger, the former programme manager for the SAPS Firearm Control Strategy, claimed that in effect, the finalised Firearm Strategy (2002) was the outcome of a retrofitting exercise that fused together existing SAPS firearm control thinking and activities into a relatively coherent plan (Burger, 2015b).²⁸ This document, which had more of a firearm violence prevention orientation compared to the NFP, was comprised of the following key components or “pillars”:

- The establishment of policies, procedures and operational mechanisms that would enable the Firearms Control Act implementation, particularly the Regulations for the Act;
- The creation of administrative means (such as Firearm Registration Centres, an information technology based licensing system, and licensing standards), the acquisition of the necessary equipment (such as for the destruction of firearms), and the appointment of SAPS Designated Firearm Officers at the station-level;
- The reduction and eradication of the illegal pool and the criminal use of firearms through an evaluation of firearm control weaknesses, investigations into the main sources of illegal firearms, the linking of cases to criminality, procedural and focused organised crime interventions, cross-border operations, and the destruction of redundant and obsolete firearms; and
- Awareness-raising and the development of social crime prevention partnerships, including firearm-free zones (Gould, et al., 2004, South African Police Service, 2003b).

In a presentation to Parliament in 2000 the main objectives of this Strategy were more plainly stated as follows:

To cut down on the number of firearms in the country...[;] protect South African citizens from crimes associated with both illegal and legal firearms...[;] encourage a culture of responsible gun ownership...[;] have stricter monitoring of all firearms in the country...[;] and give the Police appropriate powers to investigate, confiscate and arrest with a view to successful prosecution (South African Police Service, 2000a).

²⁸ The Firearms Strategy was compiled in a relatively unstable organisational environment as the responsibility for formulating the document was shunted between various SAPS structures, before it was eventually located within the Visible Policing component.

A key method by which the SAPS sought to drive the Firearm Strategy was to use concrete performance targets. For example, the 2005/06 SAPS official planning document stipulated that the police sought to recover 80% of all stolen and lost firearms each year (South African Police Service, 2005a), which was increased to close to 85% in the 2006/07 planning document (South African Police Service, 2006a). However, in an interview with Col Johan A P Burger he indicated that the formulation of performance targets in such a limited manner did not allow for firearm crime to be addressed in a systematic manner. That is, the targets only related to the recovery of firearms, and not, for example: the types²⁹ of firearms; the tracing of illegal firearms to intermediaries as well as the legal owners; and successful convictions of those responsible for firearm crime (Burger, 2015c).

7.6.3 Overhaul of firearm control legislation

In response to both the SAPS and public concerns about firearm crime, and the problematic nature of firearm control in South Africa, Parliament, with the support of the Safety and Security Secretariat and the SAPS, initiated an overhaul of firearm legislation in the late 1990s. The Firearms Control Act (FCA) (No. 60 of 2000) was subsequently formulated by means of lengthy parliamentary deliberations and public consultations with relevant stakeholders. This Act eventually became fully operational in 2004 with the promulgation of its requisite regulations. The FCA was amended in 2006, principally to address technical deficiencies and administrative oversights.

The FCA included the introduction of more rigorous firearm licencing requirements, such as: extensive background checks of applicants; an increase in the legal minimum age to possess a firearm to 21 years; a reduction in the maximum number of licensed firearms and rounds of ammunition that an individual may possess; and the requirement that firearms be stored in secure safes. Penalties for licensing infringements and firearm misuse also became more stringent. In addition, all licence applicants were required to successfully complete a written test relating to firearm legislation, as well as undergo prescribed training and pass a practical test on the safe handling of a firearm with an accredited service provider. Licence holders were also required to renew their firearm licences every five years (Republic of South Africa, 2001).

As with previous firearm legislation in South Africa, the FCA also stipulated that the police would only consider applications for firearm licences from “fit and proper” persons. In terms of the Act, such a person is required to meet the following criteria (amongst others): To be of a stable mental condition; not dependent on any substance which has an intoxicating or narcotic effect; not have any convictions relating to the negligent handling of a firearm and firearm-related crime; not have any convictions relating to violence or sexual abuse; not having any convictions relating to alcohol and drug abuse; and not have been declared unfit to possess a firearm (Republic of South Africa, 2001). The reforms also required that all existing firearms licensed under the previous Act be re-

²⁹ Fully automatic firearms, for example, can cause considerably greater levels of harm than a pistol for example.

licensed, and that excess firearms be surrendered to the SAPS (South African Police Service, 2000b).

The racial discrimination that was a feature of both colonial and apartheid firearm control legislation was abandoned. However, many aspirant black firearm owners with lower incomes found the licensing requirements prohibitive in terms of licensing costs, and many did not meet the firearm safety requirements of the FCA, and hence, according to the Black Gunowners Association of South Africa, numerous black applicants had their licence applications rejected (eNCA, 2015, Molosankwe, 2015). For example, those that lived in informal settlements could not have the necessary firearm safe easily installed. However, such claims by the Black Gunowners Association are yet to be objectively verified.

Likewise, the FCA introduced more rigorous controls in relation to those firearms held by official government institutions, such as the SAPS, the Metropolitan Police, the SANDF, the Department of Correctional Services, and the Department of Justice. A key provision was that government personnel could only carry an official state firearm if they were also “fit and proper”, and in possession of an official permit, which would only be granted if the government official had successfully completed firearm competency training and testing. In addition, firearm controls were tightened in relation to firearm manufacturers, dealers, gunsmiths, and private security companies. In this regard the Act empowered the SAPS to conduct inspections of the premises of these entities without prior notification (Republic of South Africa, 2001).

Furthermore, Chapter 14 of the FCA authorised the SAPS to enter any premises “on reasonable grounds” and search for, and seize, firearms and ammunition from persons that they perceived to be “incapable of having proper control” of those firearms or ammunition, or who “presents a danger of harm to himself or herself or to any other person”. During the course of police operations the SAPS were also permitted to search premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft and seize firearms where there was “reasonable suspicion” that the firearms and ammunition were being held in contravention of the FCA; or to ascertain if the possession of the firearms and ammunition were in compliance with the Act (Republic of South Africa, 2001).

7.6.4 Illegal Firearm Investigation Units

In an interview with Stan Joubert, the former National IFIU Commander, he indicated that the National IFIU was established in 1993 “to address the increasing number of illegal firearms in circulation” (Joubert, 2015). More than thirty IFIUs were subsequently established at the provincial level. These units were mainly staffed by personnel from the former Security Branch (Burger, 2015c, Rauch, 2004), but also drew personnel from the former Riot and the Murder and Robbery components (Joubert, 2015). These units were located within the Serious and Violent Crime component of the Detective Services and reported via the SAPS provincial commissioners.

The objectives of the IFIUs were to effectively prevent and investigate firearm related crimes; as well as ensure the successful implementation of firearm related legislation (South African Police Service, NDb). Members of the Unit also provided training to other SAPS components, the intelligence services, SANDF and police personnel from other Southern African countries in the handling, identification, storage and tracing of firearms (Joubert, 2001).

These firearm units pursued operations that primarily entailed the “cordonning off of flash point areas [high crime zones] and the searching thereof”, as well as “sweep and clean-up operations”, such as Operation Cifat (South African Police Service, 1997b:25-26). According to Stan Joubert, operations were based on intelligence generated by the IFIU’s own informer networks (Joubert, ND) that were separate from SAPS Crime Intelligence. Firearm tracing and case monitoring systems were also introduced to determine the origin of recovered illegal firearms, as well as link illegal firearm cases to actual illegal firearms and maximise the conviction rate (Joubert, 2001, South African Police Service, NDb). However, intelligence on firearm smuggling was not always forthcoming from SAPS officials at border posts, often due to a lack of capacity (Joubert, 2003, Joubert, 2015).

At times the IFIU operations entailed a high degree of risk for the SAPS personnel involved, and encounters with small groups of armed men often had lethal outcomes. For example, a journalist described one such operation in KwaMashu in August 1995 as follows:

Shots were fired at the units from all directions...The policemen returned fire, killing eight men in a house where illegal weapons were later found. A policeman, wounded in a thigh and hand, underwent an operation in a local hospital on Thursday morning (South African Press Association, 1995).

During the interview with Stan Joubert he disclosed that towards the end of each year all IFIU members would be incorporated into Operation Leopard, a national operation that targeted illegal weapons hot spots, such as mine compounds and hostels in order to predominantly apprehend migrants in possession of illegal firearms that were returning to their family homes for the festive season. In KwaZulu-Natal IFIU members would undertake “camps” in which they would be deployed in rural parts of the province in order to confiscate illegal firearms (Joubert, 2015).

The IFIUs also conducted inspections, and supported the SAPS firearm control systems and activities, such as checking firearms and searching for illegal firearms at ports of entry. In 2003, for example, the Unit also undertook an investigation at OR Tambo (Johannesburg) International Airport and reported at the time that: “the procedures and handling of firearms is not secure, there are no transit permits for firearms in transit, and the storage of firearms is not secure enough” (Joubert, 2003).

The IFIUs, however, were reportedly undermined by the provincial SAPS management, with the personnel of these units often being directed to attend to non-firearm crime (Naudé, 1996, South African Police Service, 1996a). In an

interview with Martin Naudé, the former head of both the national IFIU, as well as the SAPS Serious and Violent Crime division, he indicated that the IFIUs were exceedingly vulnerable within the SAPS bureaucracy at this time, as the restructuring process had left them without a strong institutional mandate and a dedicated budget. For Naudé they were “like bats hanging from the ceiling” (Naudé, 2015).

Table 7.3: IFIU location and personnel numbers

Location	No of SAPS personnel	Location	No of SAPS personnel
KwaZulu-Natal	162	Mpumalanga	16
Pinetown	50	Middleburg	8
Ladysmith	7	Ermelo	2
Tugela Ferry	16	Nelspruit	6
Richards Bay	16	Northern province	8
Vryheid	41	Pietersburg	8
Port Shepstone	10	Western Cape	10
Pietermaritzburg	16	Parow-East	10
Jozini	6	Gauteng	105
Free State	26	Soweto	25
Bloemfontein	5	Gen. Johan Coetzee	15
Welkom	7	Pretoria	23
Bethlehem	7	East Rand	15
Qwa-Qwa	7	Vaal Triangle	27
Northern Cape	8	North West	21
Kimberley	8	Potchefstroom	4
Eastern Cape	35	Klerksdorp	9
Port Elizabeth	16	Lichtenburg	3
East London	19	Phokeng	5

Source: Naudé (1996)

The 1997 SAPS NFP therefore recommended:

The immediate evaluation and restructuring of existing units as well as the formation of new units in order to effectively address the problem of illegal firearms...extending existing and establishing new abilities to gather information and improve investigation...[and] improving liaison and coordination (South African Police Service, 1997a: 3-4).

In addition, a “new or improved computer/network/database” was to be established (South African Police Service, 1997a:11). However, in an interview with Martin Naudé, he stated that this proposed expansion did not take place (Naudé, 2015). In January 2000, there were 34 FIUs in existence, but by early 2006 all of these units had been formally disbanded and the personnel largely incorporated into reconfigured SAPS structures as part of the larger SAPS restructuring exercise (Burger, 2013) that was mentioned earlier in this chapter.

7.6.5 Central Firearms Registry

The SAPS Central Firearms Registry (CFR) is located within the Firearm, Liquor and Second Hand Goods Control component of SAPS, which is part of the larger Visible Policing Division. The CFR has been responsible for administering and facilitating decision-making in relation to civilian firearm licensing (both

individuals and businesses), as well as overseeing and advising on the control of state owned firearms. The CFR is also required by the FCA to maintain databases for: licensed civilian firearm owners; manufacturers; dealers; gunsmiths; official government institutions; the import and export of firearms; as well as firearms recovered and destroyed by the police. The CFR, according to statements in an interview with Col Johan A P Burger, also became the lead entity within the SAPS responsible for coordinating firearms-related operations (Burger, 2015b).

The CFR was restructured and increased in size from the late 1990s due to a high level of reported dysfunctionality, and in order for the CFR to more effectively take on the additional roles and duties that had been assigned to it by the FCA (South African Police Service, 2000b). Prior to this restructuring the CFR had 245 employees with 105 vacant posts. Furthermore, it was reported that an investigation into the reliability of the CFR's database indicated that the CFR database was "less than 30% accurate" in terms of licence holders' personal data. In addition, the findings of this investigation emphasised that the CFR's electronic systems were antiquated and difficult to use, and many CFR personnel were inadequately trained to input and access the firearm data (Hansmann and Hennop, 1999).

The new CFR management team made considerable progress in reforming the Firearm Registry and implementing many of the new measures required by the FCA and the SAPS Firearm Strategy, such as the introduction of Designated Firearm Officers at the station-level, and the establishment of Firearm Registration Centres. However, the more rigorous civilian licensing process was highly labour-intensive, particularly the background checks. Furthermore, holders of firearm licences issued under the AAA were required to renew these licences with the CFR, with the number of such licences running into the millions (Gould, et al., 2004, Mthembu-Salter and Lamb, 2008). These dynamics placed considerable administrative strain on the staff of the CFR, and as a result licensing decisions often took an inordinate amount of time to finalise. This was compounded by the lack of a fully functional electronic Enhanced Firearm Registry System that was meant to cover the full gamut of firearm control (Mabule, 2013).


The net effect of the administrative delays combined with more thorough vetting of licence applicants for the period 2000 to 2010 was that considerably higher numbers of firearm licence applications were rejected by the CFR (especially for handguns) compared to the pre-2000 period (Potgieter, 2011). Between 1994 and 1999 an annual average of 194,000 licence applications were approved by the CFR. For the years 2000 and 2001, the annual average of approvals decreased by 24 per cent to 146,500, with an annual average of 107,203 licences being approved by the CFR for the period 2000/2001 to 2003/2004. By 2003 the number of total licensed firearms recorded on the SAPS Firearms Registry had dropped to 3.7 million as compared to 4.5 million in 1999 (Mthembu-Salter and Lamb, 2008). For the period 2004/2005 to 2009/2010 the annual average of firearm licences approved by the CFR had drastically shrunk to 9,886 (Department of Community Safety, 2015).

7.6.6 Firearm amnesties and firearm recoveries

In an attempt to reduce the number of civilian-held firearms that could potentially enter the illegal market the Minister responsible for SAPS declared two national firearm amnesties, namely in 2005 and 2010. The aim of these amnesties was to encourage civilian firearm owners to surrender those firearms to the SAPS that they either no longer wished to possess, or were in their possession unlawfully³⁰, without fear of prosecution³¹. Together these two amnesties resulted in the surrender of close to 105,000 firearms and 1.7 million rounds of ammunition (Kirsten, 2007).

SAPS also prioritised the recovery and seizure of stolen and illegal firearms. The early successes of the IFIU operations are depicted in Chart 7.3 below. Firearm recoveries were also prioritised during high-density operations (which will be assessed in Chapter 8 of this thesis) and day-to-day policing. According to the SAPS annual reports, from 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2014 the SAPS destroyed a total of 1,189,884 firearms.

Chart 7.3: Firearms recovered by the IFIUs: 1994-1996



Source: South African Police Service (1997b)

7.6.7 Firearm control: Institutional weaknesses

7.6.7.1 SAPS as a source of illegal firearms


Despite the SAPS' efforts to improve national firearm control and reduce the flow of licensed firearms into the illegal economy, the police's internal firearm control processes were defective. In 1999 the Ministry of Safety and Security reported that between 1990 and 1999 some 14,636 police firearms had been lost or stolen, which was an average of 1,626 per year (South African Police Service, 2010a). One of the most embarrassing incidents for the SAPS was in 1998 when corrupt SAPS officials assisted members of the notorious Hard Livings gang to steal assault rifles and shotguns from a police armoury in Faure in the Western Cape (Gould, et al., 2004).

³⁰ These firearms typically included those that had not been relicensed either as a result of being inherited or could not be licensed due to the more rigorous restrictions of the FCA.

³¹ All surrendered firearms would undergo ballistics testing. Amnesty from prosecution would not be granted in cases where firearms had been used to commit crime.

Chart 7.4 below provides a depiction of available annual data on the SAPS reported firearm losses/thefts.³² The data for the period 2005/2006 to 2010/2011, which is disaggregated to the provincial level, was derived from the SAPS official response to the access to information request by the South African History Archive (SAHA). Compared to previous years, the significant increases in reported SAPS firearm losses and thefts between 2005/2006 and 2009/2010 were not necessarily an indication that SAPS members had become more negligent or more vulnerable to having their firearms stolen, but due to a nationwide audit of SAPS armouries and holdings that revealed previously unreported losses and thefts. On average, 1,885 SAPS firearms were lost or stolen each year between 2001/02 and 2014/15.

Chart 7.4: SAPS Firearm loss and theft: 2001/2002 to 2014/2015



Source: SAPS annual reports

An examination of the SAPS data provided to SAHA revealed a troubling trend, namely that the losses/thefts of SAPS service firearms were more prolific in policing precincts with exceedingly high rates of violent crime. In addition, the SAPS had prioritised many of these areas to receive additional resources and enhanced policing interventions through the Priority and Presidential³³ police station improvement programmes. A listing of some of the police station areas with high crime rates combined with high levels of SAPS firearm loss and thefts are provided in Table 7.4 below.

Table 7.4: Loss/theft of SAPS firearms from high violent crime SAPS station areas: 2005/2006-2010/2011

Police station area	Firearms lost/stolen	Police station area	Firearms lost/stolen
Soweto	710	Grahamstown	74
Mthatha	528	Thohoyandou (Presidential)	68
Johannesburg Central (Priority)	518	Mariannhill	64

³² Detailed reporting by SAPS on their firearm losses and thefts since 2000 has been haphazard with data on such losses occasionally being included in SAPS annual reports. Annual figures were not always entirely accurate as a 2001 report by the Auditor-General stated that in a number of cases firearm losses had only been reported six years after the actual loss.

³³ Previously underdeveloped police stations that were prioritised by the South African President to receive additional resources in order to fast track improved policing capacity and service delivery.

Pretoria Central (Priority)	329	Booyens (Priority)	63
Moroka (Priority)	283	Nongoma	60
Kwamhlanga	274	Rustenburg (Priority)	59
Durban Central (Priority)	197	Kliptown	57
Nelspruit (Priority)	192	Pietermaritzburg (Priority)	55
Polokwane (Priority)	188	Sebokeng	55
Alexandra (Presidential)	187	Vanderbijlpark (Priority)	54
Phokeng	105	Delft	54
King William's Town	132	Queenstown	53
Hillbrow	104	Engcobo	53
Katlehong (Presidential & Priority)	90	Park Road (Priority)	52
Mamelodi (Priority)	86	East London (Priority)	47
Jeppe (Priority)	85	Pinetown (Priority)	47
Lebowakgomo	83	Daveyton	46
Inanda (Presidential)	80	Umlazi	42
Kanyamazane (Priority)	80	Witbank (Priority)	41
Krugersdorp (Priority)	79	Nyanga	34
Tzaneen	76	Mdantsane (Presidential)	32

Source: South African Police Service (2011e)

Additionally, the SAPS has been faced with a number of challenges with regards to its Section 13 stores, which are meant to be highly secure places within police stations where confiscated and surrendered firearms are kept. As of January 2011 there were 188,848 firearms in SAPS Section 13 stores (Auditor-General, 2001), which was equivalent to 70% of the number of official SAPS firearms at the time. The security, management and administration of these Section 13 stores has reportedly been inconsistent across police stations (Mawson, 2004, South African Police Service, 2011b), and consequently some firearms from these stockpiles have been stolen, and/or sold onto criminals by corrupt SAPS officials. However, the response from the Minister of Police to a parliamentary question about missing firearms from police custody in 2011 was a cause for concern, indicating serious information management and monitoring problems in this regard. According to the Minister:

This information is not available on a central electronic database. In order to provide the requested information every police station will have to manually check its SAPS 13 stores registers. This information will also have to be verified for correctness and completeness. This process represents a significant administrative burden that may impact on SAPS service delivery. When firearms have been reported as lost or stolen from the SAPS 13 stores, a criminal case is opened and investigated. However, the information captured on the Crime Administration System (CAS) will only reflect 'theft of firearm...There is no specific crime code on the CAS that indicates theft from the SAPS 13 Stores (Mthethwa, 2011, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2011).

Hence, most publicly available information on firearm thefts from SAPS Section 13 stores has only been available in media reports, SAPS statements and audit reports. The only exceptions were small qualitative studies commissioned by Gun Free South Africa that indicated that some SAPS Section 13 stores were vulnerable to theft (Keegan, 2005, Ndlela, et al., 2003). Three high profile examples, which are based on media reports, are highlighted below in order to provide some insight into the more acute forms of weak Section 13 store control.

Firstly, in 2010 it was reported that an exhibit clerk at the Inanda police station in KwaZulu-Natal was instrumental in stealing 98 firearms from the Section 13 store. He subsequently received a 20 year jail sentence (Mnisi, 2010). A site inspection by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police in June 2010 suggested that poor management and administrative practices at the Inanda station, and a lack of effective oversight by the KwaZulu-Natal firearm control structures, had contributed to conditions that were conducive to firearm theft (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police, 2011). Similar incidents have reportedly taken place at police stations in Nelspruit (South African Press Association, 2013), Sandton (Mashego, 2014) and Alice (Eastern Cape High Court, 2013).


Secondly, in 2014, a police raid on the home of an alleged leader of an organised criminal group in Norwood, Johannesburg led to the discovery of more than 300 unlicensed firearms, as well as ammunition and explosives. During the ensuing legal proceedings it was revealed that some of these firearms were police service firearms, while others had previously been surrendered to the SAPS for destruction as part of a national firearm amnesty (South African Press Association, 2014) at the Linden Police Station (Hosken, 2014).

Thirdly, a SAPS official responsible for securing confiscated firearms in the Vereeniging police station (Gauteng), Colonel Christaan Prinsloo, was arrested in January 2015. He was accused of supplying some 2,000 firearms to members of the 28s and Mongrels gangs from 2007 onwards (Mashego, 2014). Prinsloo had allegedly sourced the firearms from a stockpile in the SAPS custody that had been earmarked for destruction (Baadjies, 2015). Gang members then allegedly used these firearms in at least three murder cases. Prinsloo was also charged with corruption, racketeering, murder, attempted murder, and money laundering (Serrao, 2015).

The SAPS have had some limited successes in recovering lost and stolen SAPS firearms. They have also reportedly implemented measures aimed at minimising loss and theft of service firearms, such as regular firearm inspections and stocktaking; as well as the issuing of safes and pistol retention cords³⁴ to SAPS personnel to prevent snatching and loss during active duty (Eggington, 2015). The Minister of Police (Nathi Mthethwa) also previously threatened to ensure that those SAPS members that lost their firearms would be “relieved of their duties” (South African Police Service, 2014a). These developments appear to have possibly contributed to narrowing the gap between lost/stolen firearms and recovered firearms since 2010 (see Chart 7.5 below). On average, between 2004/05 and 2014/15 the SAPS’s annual firearm recovery rate of stolen/lost firearms was 22.5%.

³⁴ Such a measure was introduced in order to prevent snatching of firearms and loss during active duty.

Chart 7.5: Loss/theft of SAPS firearms vs recoveries of SAPS firearms: 2004/05-2014/15



Source: SAPS annual reports

7.6.7.2 Weaknesses of the CFR

The pressure of incessant legal action by firearm interest groups, combined with concerns voiced publicly by firearms enthusiasts resulted in the Minister of Police instructing the Civilian Secretariat for Police to establish a task team in 2010 to scrutinise the working methods of the CFR and the legislative provisions that related to the firearm licensing process, and make recommendations to remedy these alleged shortcomings. The task team was mainly comprised of officials from the Civilian Secretariat for Police and pro-firearm interest groups (Jaynes, 2013). Published summaries of the task team's report asserted that there had been considerable inefficiencies, irregularities and poor communication in the manner in which the CFR had administered the licensing processes. The abridged version of the task team report also made unspecified allegations of bribery and corruption against some CFR personnel (Mthethwa, 2010a).

A key recommendation of the task team report was for the CFR senior management team to be re-deployed, which was endorsed by the Minister of Police (Nathi Mthethwa) at the time. The Minister subsequently instructed the SAPS to deploy an 'Intervention Team' to take charge of the CFR and implement a 'turnaround strategy' to tackle the licence applications and renewals backlog, and put in place an effective IT licensing system (Mthethwa, 2010a).

Following the management changes within the CFR brought about as a result of the task team's report existing administrative challenges and dysfunctions within the CFR appeared to intensify (Bopape, 2014). In addition, the licensing body became embroiled in a series of scandals in which CFR officials flouted control measures (see below) (Foster, 2013). In response the South African Gunowners Association requested the Public Protector to intervene (Hood, 2012), and Gun Free South Africa called for a moratorium on the issuing of licences, as well as forensic audit of the licensing processes (Osborn, 2014). A internal SAPS inquiry into the CFR was subsequently established (Department of Community Safety, 2015).

One of the most prominent public scandals in relation to the CFR took place in 2013 when the newly appointed head of the CFR, Brigadier Mathapelo Mangwani, was implicated in accepting bribes from the management of Dave Sheer Guns, a large firearm dealer in Johannesburg, in order to facilitate the fast tracking of licence applications from this gun dealership (Serrao, 2013). Mangwani and 20 other SAPS employees were subsequently suspended, with Mangwani being found guilty of corrupt practices and dismissed by the SAPS the following year (Serrao, 2014). In 2014 some CFR officials were alleged to have issued fraudulent firearm licences to the leaders of the notorious 28s gang in the Western Cape who then used the firearms in the commission of crime in some of the most violent communities in the province (September, 2014).

In 2015 the SAPS National Commissioner, General Riah Phiyega announced that a further reform strategy for the CFR had been put in place to “clean the mess in that unit”. She further indicated that “new standards” to “streamline” the issuing of firearm licences would be established, and that the CFR would strive to finalise such licences within 90 working days (Phiyega, 2015, South African Police Service, 2015b). It was unclear at the time if the CFR would be able to judiciously fulfil all the necessary background checks as required by the FCA within that period, especially given the exceedingly high number of licence applications and renewals.

7.6.7.3 SAPS operational environment for firearms

In an interview with Stan Joubert, the former National IFIU Commander in 2015, he claimed that the closure of the IFIUs had adverse implications for the comprehensive implementation of the SAPS Firearms Strategy, particularly in relation to the reduction and eradication of the illegal firearms and their criminal use, and the maintenance of effective firearm control systems. That is, the SAPS no longer had a dedicated team of individuals at its disposal with the necessary experience in tracing the chain of possession and origins of illegal firearms that had been seized and recovered (South African Police Service, 2015b). Hence, weaknesses in the firearm control systems, especially in terms of government stocks, could not be consistently detected. Furthermore, reliable information about the nature of the illegal firearms economy was in short supply (Joubert, 2015).

According to Col Johan A P Burger, the former programme manager for the SAPS Firearm Control Strategy, the inadvertent drawback of allocating the leadership role of the Firearms Control Strategy to the CFR was that the leadership of the Firearm Registry prioritised those aspects of the Firearms Strategy that were closely aligned with their mandate and expertise, namely FCA compliance, especially firearm licensing, and the auditing of government and private sector firearm stockpiles. Dedicated firearm operations were allegedly deprioritised with operational leadership and expertise effectively “diminishing and disappearing” (Burger, 2015b). At the station-level the focus of the Firearm Strategy was on firearm licensing by Designated Firearms Officers (DFOs), with the tracing of illegal firearms and analyses of the illegal firearm economy, and

the linkages between illegal firearms and organised criminal groups, not being prioritised (Burger, 2015b).

However, in late 2015, following internal consultations, the SAPS Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) initiated a process of re-establishing an illegal firearm investigation entity within the ranks of the DPCI, referred to as the National Bureau for Illegal Firearm Control and Priority Violent Crime. The principal objective was reportedly to trace firearms used to commit violent crime back to their legal origins through conventional investigation and systematic analysis and forensic assessments (including ballistics, fingerprints and DNA). This would be undertaken with a view to: countering firearm violence (including police murders) and organised crime; and identifying dysfunctions and vulnerabilities within government's firearm control systems (Burger, 2015c, Nhleko, 2016c).

7.7 High-density policing

The 1996/97 SAPS Plan (mentioned earlier in this chapter) was to be boldly implemented by means of a large-scale national operation with the martial title of 'Sword and Shield'. During this operation the SAPS reported that it would "take the offensive in hunting down criminals while concurrently trying to prevent crime by systematically reclaiming the streets and rural areas from criminals..." (South African Police Service, 1997b:5). This operation was an overwhelming demonstration of the continuation of the highly aggressive forms of boundary policing carried over from the apartheid period. Between 1 April 1996 and 31 March 1997 some 157,432 sub-operations in conjunction with the SANDF were launched. More than 300,000 individuals were arrested, and more than 100 civilians and 63 SAPS personnel died in the context of this operation (South African Police Service, 1997b).

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Sword and Shield (see Chapter 8 for details of this operation), the SAPS stated in its annual report that such operations had "proved their worth in crime prevention" (South African Police Service, 1997b:4). High-density policing was subsequently to become embedded within the NCCS (South African Police Service, 2002:6), and thereafter rapidly became the flagship policing approach for major crime hot spots, eclipsing alternative crime prevention models such as sector policing.

Such operations were planned by Crime Combatting Task Groups after which targeted high crime areas would be saturated with police and military personnel that would make use of a range of tactics, including roadblocks and cordon-and-search methods. Operation Crackdown was to be the initial implementation vehicle of the NCCS with the objective being to stabilise 145 policing precincts that were experiencing high levels of reported priority crimes (South African Police Service, 2002). Thereafter a multitude of national and provincial operations were launched in an attempt to combat and contain criminality in high crime areas. Chapters 8 and 9 provide a more detailed analysis and impact assessment of these large-scale SAPS operations.

7.8 Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, notwithstanding the formal dissolution of the apartheid requirements for the police to enforce geo-racial restrictions and some democratic policing reforms, boundaries remained central to the SAPS' crime reduction strategies in post-apartheid South Africa. Such boundary police work was driven by: persistently elevated levels of reported crime and fear of crime; a relatively untransformed hawkish institutional police culture; and an endorsement from high political office that it was appropriate for the SAPS to use traditional militaristic strategies, especially in relation to areas with high levels of criminal offending.

The SAPS adopted novel crime-fighting technology, such as the use of crime mapping techniques, to identify crime hot spots, and regularly named and made pronouncements about the most troublesome policing spaces. The SAPS frequently stated that these communities were the principal procreation sites for serious and violent crime in South Africa with such areas being viewed as amongst the most treacherous places in which the police operated. In terms of policing such areas the SAPS chiefly sought to contain and combat the criminality therein through the dedicated and focused concentration of physical police strength. The perceived dangers of these high crime places also bolstered and perpetuated militarised and aggressive forms of policing by the SAPS.

The widespread availability of firearms in such areas directly contributed to this sense of danger. Hence the SAPS established entities, such as IFIUs, and initiated new types of operations to seize and destroy firearms within high crime areas. Furthermore, as firearms were permeating into these danger zones from other parts of South Africa, the SAPS prioritised the overhaul of the national firearm controls in order to mitigate the transfer of licensed firearms into the illegal sector. The SAPS also successfully negotiated with the Mozambican government to allow South African police personnel to cross the common territorial border with Mozambique in order to destroy firearms and ammunition caches, as such weapons stocks were allegedly fuelling violent crime in South Africa. The SAP had pursued similar penetrative boundary policing during the apartheid period, some of which were covert and illegal, in an attempt to neutralise threats on the other side of the boundary. As was the case with such interventions under apartheid, the Mozambican operations necessitated more innovative policing tactics and technology, such as the use of GIS.

This re-emphasis of policing of boundaries was further sustained through the initial requirement that SAPS take the lead responsibility for South Africa's land borders given that military-type threats had dissipated and were replaced by new threats to which the SAPS were supposedly more attuned. Police units were subsequently created, such as the SAPS Border Police, to counter these transnational threats. However, as was the state of affairs under apartheid, the intensity of police work within South Africa in terms of containing and combating crime led to the SANDF taking over the SAPS' borderline control responsibilities.

Chapter 8: SAPS high-density policing operations 1994-2015

From the mid 1990s the South African Police Service (SAPS) embarked on a series of large-scale, high-density operations in an attempt to diminish the excessively high levels of violent crime, which was decidedly concentrated in a relatively small number of areas (as described in Chapter 7). The principal motivation behind the adoption of this approach was that by concentrating police resources on such crime hot spots government “hoped that the national level of serious crime w[ould] be reduced” (Tshwete, 2000:28).

Over the past two decades high-density operations have become the preferred crime-fighting weapon of choice for the SAPS and its political overseers with respect to law enforcement and order maintenance in high crime areas. Such operations have constituted forceful attempts by the police to eradicate the threats presented to the South African state and society by high crime places and the felonious occupants therein. In this regard, this chapter will consider and analyse in detail the purposes, context and the substance of the most prominent national and provincial high-density SAPS operations. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that high-density policing operations, drawing from apartheid policing traditions, have been central to reifying the key role of boundaries in the police work of the SAPS.

8.1 Tactical police approaches to high crime areas

8.1.1 High density policing

As indicated in Chapter 7, militarised forms of law enforcement in post-apartheid South Africa have been perpetuated in relation to high crime areas, which are places that have generally been viewed as grave threats to the established social order. This state of affairs is not uncommon, as a number of scholars have shown that there are clear connections between the manifestation of militarised policing and threats to the status quo, especially in North America and Western Europe (Brodeur, 2010, Jefferson, 1990, Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). Huggins (1998), for example, has associated the framing of domestic political opposition as a threat to socio-economic stability by governments to the emergence of militarised forms of policing in a variety of Latin American settings.

The most definitive aspect of militarised policing approaches in South Africa have been high-density operations, which the SAPS has defined as the noticeable and concentrated “saturation of high crime areas with patrolling police members, performing pro-active patrols...[that are] intent on law enforcement” (South African Police Service, 1998:41). These operations have typically targeted the foremost offending hot spots in high crime policing areas, such as *shebeens*, taxi ranks and hostels, as well as the main transport access points. Such policing actions have typically lasted a few hours, but in some cases, particularly where there has been excessive violence, have been in place for several days. In an interview with Gen Gary Kruzer, a high-level member of the SAPS, he claimed

that at times the police “locked down” and “squeezed” the targeted areas so that offenders would be “at increased risk of making a blunder” (Kruzer, 2016).

As indicated in Chapter 3, such operations have been based on a perceived pragmatism that criminal offending will feasibly drop in circumstances where the likelihood of being detained for criminal acts by the police is significantly elevated and/or where known offenders are targeted and arrested (Braga, et al., 1999, Chermak, et al., 2001, Cohen and Ludwig, 2003). Such operations are also expedient mechanisms to alleviate public criticism and blood baying about crime levels, as they “offer the promise of firm, immediate action and quick, decisive results” (Scott, 2004).

Dating back to World War I militaries have pursued a tradition of assigning evocative codenames to specific military operations, often as a means to overtly communicate fortitude against an enemy and bolster troop morale; or to deceive one’s opponents. In some instances this naming practice had the effect of delineating the aims, foci and preferred outcomes of the military action; as well as simplifying “the complexities of operational sequencing and synchronization by naming each operation something that the staff could remember” (Sieminski, 1995). The South African Defence Force adopted this custom with enthusiasm during the ‘bush war’ in Angola and South West Africa, as well as in terms of counterinsurgency operations (Seegers, 1996). The South African Police embraced a similar tradition when it began to make use of high-density operations in the 1980s (see Chapter 5). The SAPS has maintained this tradition, and has generally christened their high-density operations with codenames that have ostensibly sought to demonstrate fierce and forceful intent. Some examples include Sword and Shield, Crackdown and Iron Fist.

Within such operations SAPS members have frequently been heavily armed and deployed in battle-ready formations supported by armoured personnel carriers while at times helicopters have hovered overhead. Similar to the militarised township policing of the 1980s and early 1990s, the SAPS has entered and temporarily occupied many high crime areas like an invading army, usually in conjunction with contingents of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers. Security personnel have thereafter vigilantly patrolled the streets, and roadblocks have been erected.

Residents, vehicles and premises have been searched, and at times doors to homes have been rammed open. Illegal firearms and ammunition, drugs, alcohol and stolen goods, including vehicles, have been seized. Those in possession of such goods have been arrested and hauled off to police cells, along those individuals ‘wanted’ by the SAPS for serious crimes, as well as prostitutes, pimps and undocumented immigrants. Resistance or antagonism towards the military and the police has usually been met with a hyper-aggressive response (Poplak, 2015a, Samara, 2003, Steinberg, 2014a). Table 8.1 (below) provides a listing of the most significant national and provincial high-density operations that the SAPS have pursued since 1996.

Table 8.1: Major SAPS Operations Timeline: 1996-2015

Year	Operation name	Areas
1996-1997	Sword and Shield	National
1998	Pax	Richmond (KwaZulu-Natal)
1999	Ventilation	KwaMashu and Inanda (KwaZulu-Natal)
1999	Monozite	National
1997-1999	Recoil	Western Cape
1998	Saladin	Western Cape
1999-2000	Good Hope	Western Cape
2000/01-2002/03	Crackdown	National
2001	Lancer	Western Cape (urban terrorism)
2001	Slasher	Western Cape (gang areas)
2001	Tshwane	Gauteng (Pretoria and surrounds)
2002	Tsipa	National
2003/04	Sethunya	National
2006/07	Iron Fist	Gauteng
2006/07	Trio	Gauteng
2007/08	Duty Calls	National
2008/09	Duty Calls	National
2009/10	Duty Calls	National
2010/11	Duty Calls	National
2011	Big Wave	Gauteng (Pretoria and surrounds)
2011/12	Duty Calls	National
2012/13-	Combat	Western Cape (gang areas)
2012/13	Duty Calls	National
2013/14	Duty Calls	National
2014/15	Duty Calls	National
2015/16	Fiela-Reclaim	National

Source: SAPS annual reports

In essence, these high-density dragnets have been grandiose meldings of a multitude of police entities. That is, rank-and-file police personnel that were generally responsible for day-to-day order maintenance, as well as detectives, have been deployed alongside specialised, paramilitary police groupings, such as the Public Order Policing Units, Dog Units and the Special Task Force in the context of a martially branded operation. In an interview with a former senior SAPS official the analogy of a rugby team was used to illustrate ideal operational strategy for high-density operations. That is, various police entities would have different but complementary roles (or field positions) related to their areas of expertise; and that they would all work together as a team to achieve a common goal (Naudé, 2015).

The pursuance of high-density operations has also been shaped by the intricacies of the socio-political terrain of high crime spaces, where reliable crime intelligence has been difficult to acquire, and residents have not always been predisposed to being policed by the state. In this regard, the presence and efforts of small posses of uniformed police have typically not been able to induce groups of residents that are engaging in collective acts of disorder, such as drinking in an illegal shebeen, to cease participating in such activities. Hence the SAPS, in order to temporarily reclaim its authority in relation to law enforcement and order maintenance in such places, has often resorted to using overwhelming numbers or the excessive use of force (Steinberg, 2014b). Brigadier Zithulele Dladla, the Station Commander of Khayelitsha (Site B) police station fittingly described this

state of affairs in his testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into police inefficiency as follows:

On a Saturday night if you go...to close a shebeen that is operating that has 60-100 people, you can't do it with a vehicle and two members, you have to have enough people to close that [illegal] shebeen...[as] they're going to walk all over you...So it's better to have numbers so that you can prevent injuries to people. People, when they realise that there's few police officials, they say, we can take a chance here, and we end up using live ammunition, which is not necessary... (Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha, 2014:226).

8.1.2 'Iron fist inside the velvet glove'?

The SAPS has taken a juxtaposing, but complementary, approach to the policing of high crime areas. That is, it has adopted community-oriented policing approaches within its high-density policing operations. The customary motivation behind such dual approach is what scholars in the US have cynically referred to as 'the iron fist inside the velvet glove', in which community policing projects are implemented in parallel with militarised policing tactics in an attempt to obscure and divert attention away from heavy-handed police actions (Crime and Social Justice Associates, 1983, Kraska and Paulsen, 1997).

In South Africa, however, the inclusion of community-oriented policing within high-density operations appears not to have been about subterfuge, but have been perceived by the SAPS to be a legitimate ancillary strategy for reducing criminality through militaristic means. That is, the SAPS have regularly incorporated members of Community Policing Forum (CPF) structures and neighbourhood watch organisations into the implementation of many of its large-scale operations, with the SAPS at times regarding this arrangement as a type of community policing. For example, Monique Marks, reflecting on ethnographic research undertaken in relation to SAPS roadblocks in Umlazi (KwaZulu-Natal) in the context of high-density operations, suggested that the police manning the roadblocks saw such actions as a clear indication that a policing *service* was being delivered to this high crime community. Roadblocks were seen as a form of crime prevention and were "reassuring" for community members (Marks, 2013).

It does appear that the SAPS has sincerely sought to build more constructive relations with residents in these communities through the allocation of additional policing resources and the pursuance of community-oriented policing approaches. However, over the past two decades this has been an unsteady, uneven and an under-resourced process, given the frequent disjuncture between the day-to-day services that residents have expected from the SAPS, and the actual capability of the police to respond to calls for assistance, reduce criminal offending and facilitate adequate justice for victims (Gastrow and Shaw, 2001) (Bradford, et al., 2014, Bruce, et al., 2007). Added to this, the establishment of new police stations in violent areas has rarely been accompanied by substantial and sustained improvements in service delivery by the police (Redpath and Nagla-Luddy, 2015). Therefore, there have often been strong motivations for the SAPS to become overly reliant on high-density operations as a means of self-

legitimation in such areas, and to create the impression that it is taking crime seriously.

Khayelitsha (Western Cape) presents an archetypal example of this dual policing approach in a high crime area. Since the mid 1990s Khayelitsha has frequently been a site of militarised policing activities, as well as the recipient of two additional police stations (Dugmore, 2003). However, the operational environment has been exceedingly complex (Freeman and McDonald, 2015). CPFs are largely ineffective, and station-level police members have protested that there have been insufficient police for this sprawling settlement, which they have viewed as being “rough and at times impenetrable” (van der Spuy and Armstrong, 2014:388). The report of the Commission of Inquiry into policing by the SAPS in Khayelitsha (2014), which is an unrivalled scrutiny of policing in a high crime area in post-apartheid South Africa, found that despite considerable infrastructural police resources being allocated to Khayelitsha, more than 50% of Khayelitsha residents were highly dissatisfied with the service offered by the SAPS, as well the police’s work ethic and level of professionalism (Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha, 2014). Hence, the SAPS have continued to pursue aggressive policing practices of in this mega-township (Koyana, 2016).

8.1.3 Criminal threat framing and othering

SAPS high-density operations have taken place in the context of intense official criminal threat framing and othering at senior government levels, which has been characterised by an explicit antipathy towards perceived criminality and criminals. This has contributed to the validation of militarised approaches to high-density policing, especially in neighbourhoods where excessive levels of deviance and violent law breaking have been concentrated. Some examples of this belligerent othering, as espoused by cabinet ministers responsible for policing since the late 1990s, are selectively replicated below.

In 1999 at a public rally in Soweto (Gauteng), Steve Tshwete, the Minister of Safety and Security declared:

We will deal with criminals with the ferocity of a cornered bull and with the agility of a cat. We will deal with them the way a bulldog deals with a bone...We are going to give them hell because they have been giving our people hell... [W]hen we visit criminals we will not treat them with kid gloves. We are going to make them feel like cowboys should not cry. Those who raise dust must not complain that they cannot see. We will unleash the police force on them (Steinberg, 1999).

In April 2008, Susan Shabangu, the Deputy Minister of Safety and Security controversially proclaimed at a community meeting on crime in Pretoria West:

Criminals are hell-bent on undermining the law and they must now be dealt with. If criminals dare to threaten the police or the livelihood or lives of innocent men, women and children, they must be killed. End of story (sic). There are to be no negotiations with criminals (Hosken, 2008).

In July the following year, Fikile Mbalula, Shabangu's successor, announced during the SAPS budget vote in Parliament that there would be a launch of a policing operation in the coming months titled Operation *Wanya Tsotsi*, which he claimed was a "radical African expression and display of strength and zealousness against one's enemy", that would be geared towards the "strategic isolation of criminals" and those that protected them (Mbalula, 2009). According to Mbalula, this operation was to be:

A weapon to instil fear and respect to one's strategic opponent...an expression of readiness of one's forces of war. It is a strength exhibition! It is a war cry!...[And] the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah awaits them [criminals] (Mbalula, 2009).

Between 2008 and 2014, Nathi Mthethwa, the Minister of Police, with the support of other cabinet ministers and senior SAPS officials, frequently stated that "those who commit crime have automatically declared themselves as our enemies" (Mthethwa, 2012), and reiterated that "collectively, we shall defeat this scourge" (Murugan and SAnews, 2012) by "closing the escape routes for criminals" (South African Police Service, NDa). Mthethwa had previously referred to criminals as "scoundrels, who are nothing but beasts in human face (*izinswelaboya*)" (Mthethwa, 2009b).

The current political leadership of the police has perpetuated this othering in recent years. For example, at the memorial of murdered SAPS officials in Gauteng in August 2015, Maggie Sotyu, the Deputy Minister of Police, asserted that:

Our [SAPS] strategic implementation plan must always intend to treat heinous criminals as outcasts, who must neither have place in the society nor peace in their cells. They must be treated as cockroaches (Sotyu, 2015).³⁵

Government has however repeatedly emphasised that police actions and operations would be tempered by considerations for the human rights of law-abiding citizens. For example, in his State of the Nation Address in 1996, former President Nelson Mandela declared:

The time has come for our nation to choose whether we want to become a law-governed and peaceful society or hapless hostages of lawlessness...The government will use all lawful means to ensure that they [criminals] do not succeed in undermining our social fabric. Law-abiding citizens can rest assured that there are effective mechanisms in place to prevent and punish any rapacious invasion of their lives (Mandela, 1996).

This narrative of discerning criminal othering has been preserved and promoted over the past 20 years, with the SAPS political leadership regularly stating that the police need to take a "tough stance against criminals" (Mthethwa, 2010d) and "uproot the cancer of crime from our communities" (Mbalula, 2009), but this should be "balanced...with the need to ensure our police embrace our human rights culture" (Mthethwa, 2010d). However, it is important to note that the

³⁵ A Democratic Alliance Member of Parliament submitted a written question to the Minister of Police requesting clarity on these controversial comments made by the Deputy Minister. The response from the Minister in September 2015 was that the speech in question "did not entail the alleged remarks as alluded". The text of the relevant speech that appeared on the SAPS website however did include the statements in question.

various SAPS Strategic Plans for the period 2005-2013 do not include the term “human rights”.

In practice the SAPS have sought to portray high-density operations as a type of police surgical strike that would not result in significant collateral damage to law-abiding individuals. For example, at the launch of a high-density operation in 2011, the SAPS Provincial Commissioner for Limpopo, Simon Mpembe claimed:

We will not falter in our endeavours to pluck criminals out of their holes where they plan their criminal acts and place them behind bars for the rest of their lives. During this period we will not rest in our endeavours to make the province a safer place for all vulnerable communities, especially the elderly and our women and children (South African Police Service, 2012b).

More recently, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Police claimed that in relation to Operation Fiela-Reclaim:

Law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear from our operations, which are targeted at crime and criminals...We will ensure that peace loving and law-abiding South Africans can go about their lives without fear (Williams, 2015b).

In an attempt to foster further legitimacy for these high-density operations, the police’s political leadership, particularly during the tenure of Nathi Mthethwa, presented these operations as a form of righteous “crusade” (Mthethwa, 2009a, Mthethwa, 2010b) in which the police have sought to “push back the frontiers of evil” (Mthethwa, 2010c). Similar stances were also adopted at a few SAPS stations. For example, Oswald Reddy, the SAPS commander of Hillbrow precinct, and an influential SAPS official in Johannesburg, unilaterally launched Operation Divine Intervention in this notorious crime-ridden inner-city slum to focus on the “spiritual dimension of crime”. According to Reddy:

Because in Ephesians 6:12 God says our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers...authorities...the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms...We asked the Holy Spirit to unleash His light in the area (Lombard, 2012).

8.1.4 Influence of counterinsurgency doctrine

Given that criminals had recurrently been labelled as ‘enemies’ of the South African state and citizens, and it had been resolved that militaristic policing approaches were required to eliminate such foes, it was almost inevitable that the approach and content of high-density operations would draw heavily from counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, tactics and terminology. In an interview with Johan Burger, a retired SAPS Assistant National Commissioner, a catalyst for the use of COIN approaches was that the architect and emphatic champion of the National Crime Combatting Strategy (NCCS) (see Chapter 7), André Pruis, the Deputy National SAPS Commissioner at the time, had previously served in the SADF where he had been schooled in COIN strategies (Burger, 2015a). In addition, the SAPS had institutional experience in pursuing COIN strategies in the former Rhodesia and South West Africa (see Chapter 6). The use of COIN

philosophy in the design and implementation of post-apartheid high-density operations has been evident in at least four respects.

Firstly, national operations have been centrally planned and directed, predominantly by the SAPS National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), which has been responsible for coordinating all security and law enforcement operations throughout South Africa. Table 8.2 below provides a listing of the 2015 composition of the NATJOINTS. The National Joint Operational Centre (NATJOC) has been responsible for driving the implementation of the operational strategies and the instructions determined by the NATJOINTS. Provincial structures, PROVJOINTs and PROVJOCs, were also established to drive and coordinate operations at the provincial level.

Table 8.2: Composition of the NATJOINTS

Core members	Co-opted departments/agencies
Department of Correctional Services Department of Defence Department of Home Affairs Department of Justice and Constitutional Development National Intelligence Coordinating Committee SAPS State Security Agency South Africa Revenue Services Government Communications Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) Civilian Secretariat for Police Financial Intelligence Centre Department of International Relations and Cooperation National Prosecuting Authority National Treasury Department of Social Development Stats SA	Department of Transport Department of Basic Education Department of Higher Education and Training Department of Co-operative Governance/Disaster Management Civil Aviation Authority Airport Company of South Africa Eskom Telkom Metro Police Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture Border Management Agency Department of Labour Small Business Development Department of Trade and Industry Department of Health

Source: Ministry of Police (2015)

Secondly, cordon-and-search tactics have been a mainstay method of SAPS high-density operations, and have entailed the sealing-off of targeted areas in which dwellings and premises have been searched in order to capture ‘wanted’ persons and seize illegal weapons and other contraband. Cordon-and-search was originally pursued by colonial armed forces in order to pacify recalcitrant communities and capture suspected insurgents in Africa, South-East Asia and Northern Ireland (French, 2012, Kilcullen, 2006, Toft and Zhukov, 2012). The South African Police also frequently employed such tactics under apartheid (Cawthra, 1993).

Thirdly, the COIN concept of ‘flood-and-flush’ (Byman, 2006, Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, 2008) also found resonance amongst high-density policing strategists in South Africa. That is, targeted areas have been ‘flooded’ with a vast security force presence in order to ‘flush out’ the perpetrators of various crimes (Burger, 2007a, South African Police Service, 1997b), in an effort to “restore law and order” (Williams, 2015a).

Fourthly, the SAPS have at times referred to its high-density operational approach as an 'oil stain strategy' (South African Police Service, 1998). This is a French COIN pacification approach initially developed in Vietnam in the 19th century. It posits that in order for a government to overcome an enemy COIN efforts should be concentrated on securing and developing strategic areas and thereafter expand the locus of control outwards like an oil stain on cloth (Grinter, 1975, Porch, 1986).

8.2 SAPS high-density operations: 1996-1999

Between 1996 and 1999 the SAPS implemented two major national operations, namely Sword and Shield and Monozite, as well as a number of specialised provincial operations, most of which were in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. These operations were umbrella operational policing trademarks under which a series of smaller high-density policing actions were pursued in a variety of high crime areas. These operations were often undertaken in cooperation with other governmental bodies, particularly the SANDF. In the context of a crime wave, these operations included familiar (apartheid era) forceful policing techniques, combined with a 'broken windows' or 'zero tolerance' policing philosophy. These actions were primarily attempts to stabilise those areas that were experiencing exceedingly high levels of crime and/or political violence.

8.2.1 National operations

8.2.1.1 Operation Sword and Shield (1996-1997)

As indicated in Chapter 7 Operation Sword and Shield was intended to be the central implementation mechanism of the SAPS 1996/97 Plan. The name was purposefully symbolic, with the 'Sword' representing the police's aggressive and targeted approach towards criminals, while the 'Shield' was illustrative of the protection that the SAPS sought to provide to those who adhered to the law (Burger, 2007a).

This national operation was comprised of a variety of individually named sub-operations, such as Urban Strike, Omega and Gladiators (South African Police Service, 1997b), which focused on areas where priority crimes were concentrated, and on the apprehension of 10,000 of the 'most wanted criminals'. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, a sub-operation titled Operation Jambo was launched within the context of Sword and Shield in an attempt to contain party-political murders in various areas in the run-up to the local government elections. These sub-operations were implemented in conjunction with the deployment of approximately 47,000 SANDF personnel (South African Police Service, 1997b). In a number of such volatile areas in KwaZulu-Natal, such as Umlazi and KwaMashu, the SAPS had to patrol in armoured personnel carriers (SABC 3 Television Network, 1996).

Between 13 June 1996 and 31 March 1997 the police had undertaken a total of 157,432 sub-operations and 27,382 roadblocks. Some 13,893 illegal firearms were seized, and the police made a total of 333,470 arrests for all manner of

crimes, of which 27,101 were ‘wanted persons’ (1,476 were wanted for murder and 1,164 for serious robbery). As the Table 8.3 below indicates Operation Sword and Shield appears to have been more concentrated in the North West Province, Gauteng, Northern (Limpopo) Province, and the Eastern Cape (South African Police Service, 1997b).

8.3: Operation Sword and Shield – arrests (‘wanted persons’)

Province	Number of arrests (‘wanted persons’)	% of total
Eastern Cape	4694	17.3
Free State	1381	5.1
Gauteng	5351	19.7
KwaZulu-Natal	1091	4.0
Mpumalanga	418	1.5
Northern Cape	3038	11.2
Northern Province	5291	19.5
North West	5589	20.6
Western Cape	248	0.9
Total	27101	100

Source: South African Police Service (1997b)

8.2.1.2 Operation Monozite (June – July 1999)

Operation Monozite was envisaged to be a super-sized and more effectively choreographed version of Sword and Shield, which targeted those policing areas in South Africa where more than 50% of total reported serious and violent crime was concentrated, such as murder, carjacking and armed robbery. In this regard, the police sought to apprehend the ‘most wanted’ criminal suspects and those in violation of bail conditions. The operation also focused on illegal drug dealing, illegal drug possession and illegal immigrants (Dlamini, 1999).

As with Sword and Shield, Monozite made extensive use of flood-and-flush policing tactics (Burger, 2007a). Its chief objective was “to stabilise the affected areas, and to ensure a greater feeling of safety and security amongst the communities” (Government Communication and Information System, 2006:35). According to the SAPS Divisional Commissioner at the time, André Prais: “Law enforcers would try to stabilise such areas, creating a suitable environment for government departments like education, health and welfare to address the causes of crime” (South African Press Association, 1999). However, meaningful crime prevention interventions in such areas from these departments were not forthcoming.

SAPS reported that between 28 June and 26 July 1999 it undertook 5,446 high-density sub-operations, and conducted 4,375 roadblocks and 1,971 cordon-and-search actions in targeted areas throughout South Africa. In addition, a total of 183,496 vehicles and 21,644 premises were searched. In the first two months of the operation 58,413 suspected criminals were arrested and 2,482 illegal firearms were recovered (Zuma, 2000). In the same year, the Premier of Mpumalanga province claimed that the work of Operation Monozite in his province had resulted in approximately 12,000 arrests (which included in excess of 1,000 murder and robbery suspects), and the seizure over 400 firearms (Mahlangu, 2000).

8.2.1.3 Provincial operations

Three prominent high-density, intelligence-driven SAPS operations were implemented in the Western Cape between October 1997 and March 2000 in cooperation with the SANDF. These province-specific interventions were essentially due to this province not being a major focus of Operation Sword and Shield. In addition, there had been an intensification of gang violence; conflict between gangs and a prominent vigilante movement, the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD); and acts of urban terrorism perpetrated by individuals aligned with PAGAD. The three operations in question were: Operation Recoil (October 1997 – January 1999); Operation Saladin (January 1998 – January 1999); and Operation Good Hope (January 1999 – March 2000).

As a consequence of these Western Cape operations the SAPS reported that between October 1997 and January 1998 there were 3,769 arrests for serious crime, of which: 175 were for murder; 269 for robbery; and 181 for illegal possession of firearms. Operation Good Hope resulted in 4,014 arrests and the recovery of 489 firearms and 5,803 rounds of ammunition (Boshoff, 2001). There were numerous complaints by members of the public about the alleged excessive use of force by SAPS, which was possibly reflected in the annual statistics published by the SAPS watchdog, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), with complaints relating to police misconduct (and minor crimes) in the Western Cape increasing by almost 100% from 257 in 1998/99 to 496 in 1999/2000. The SAPS responded publicly by saying:

We know that some of the criminals and the community are not happy. We will continue to do our job, but we know that the people who are complaining are also the suspects (Samara, 2011:118).

In KwaZulu-Natal many peri-urban and rural areas in this province continued to be affected by low-intensity armed conflict, mainly between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters, which included the perpetration of mass shootings and assassinations. In some areas the instigators of political violence transitioned into becoming perpetrators of violent criminality, particularly in the minibus taxi industry (Kaarsholm, 2005). The key flashpoints in the mid to late 1990s were, amongst others, Richmond, KwaMashu, Inanda and Nongoma, where station-level policing was also widely viewed as inadequate and biased towards IFP interests³⁶ (Taylor, 2002).

The SAPS and the SANDF subsequently launched a series of intelligence-driven, high-density operations in these areas, such as Operation Pax (1998) in Richmond; and Operation Ventilation (1999) in KwaMashu and Inanda (Nebandla, 2005a, Nebandla, 2005b). In terms of Operation Ventilation, a SAPS spokesperson at the time stated that the main objective of the operation was “to arrest wanted criminals and bring normality to the area” (Green, 1999). Furthermore, the National Minister of Safety and Security appointed a new Station Commissioner in KwaMashu (from outside of the area) due to

³⁶ Many of these stations had formerly been under the authority of the KwaZulu Police, with many of the personnel retaining their posts after the creation of SAPS.

accusations of bias and incompetence directed towards SAPS in the region (Nebandla, 2005b).


8.3 Operation Crackdown (2000-2003)

8.3.1 Operation overview

Operation Crackdown was officially launched on 1 April 2000 and became the primary implementation mechanism for the NCCS. It was a three-year nationwide operation that sought to stabilise what was perceived to be rampant criminality in South Africa, as well as improve public confidence in the police (Pelser, 2000, Schönreich, 2002, South African Police Service, 2001a). Jackie Selebi, the National SAPS Commissioner, hailed Operation Crackdown as “a new and unprecedented method of policing” (South African Police Service, 2001b).

This operation was an immense, intelligence-driven endeavour that targeted 145 ‘flashpoint’ (high crime) police station areas, which was subsequently increased to 169 (see Chapter 7), as well as police station areas adjacent to them. Policing and intelligence resources were to be shared between policing agencies in an integrated manner (South African Police Service, 2001b). At the provincial level police authorities were instructed to implement sub-operations in crime hot spot areas (South African Police Service, 2005c). In addition, in an interview with Alice Pienaar-Marais, who had been a key SAPS official in the implementation of high-density operations from the early 2000s, the ‘broken windows’ approach to crime was to be a dominant feature of this national operation (Pienaar-Marais, 2015).

Chart 8.1: Number of police station areas targeted by Operation Crackdown per province



Source: South African Police Service (2001b)

Generally Operation Crackdown focused on the 169 high crime areas, but the SAPS and the SANDF did undertake sub-operations in additional police precincts, such as Alberton, Brakpan, Boksburg, Springs, Primrose, Germiston, Atlantis, Strand, Philippi East, Somerset West and Woodstock (to name but a few). The length and intensity of station-level policing actions varied between areas, and were informed by crime intelligence and the crime profiles of the target zones.

8.3.2 Operational logistics

For operational purposes these station areas were grouped into 76 Crime Combatting Zones, with each Zone having its own dedicated Crime Combatting Task Group (CCTG) led by a SAPS commander (South African Police Service, 2000a, South African Police Service, 2002). Each CCTG was comprised of officials from the SAPS, the SANDF and the Metro Police. From within the SAPS a variety of units and departments participated in CCTGs, such as Visible Policing, the Detective Service, Illegal Firearms Investigation Units, Public Order Policing, the Air Wing, and the Special Task Force.

Cooperation between these SAPS components and the sharing of intelligence was encouraged, and CPFs were incorporated into sub-operations where appropriate. Organised Crime Task Teams were also established to tackle criminal syndicates. According to SAPS reports, personnel from a range of other government departments, such as the Department of Health, Department of Home Affairs, the South African Revenue Service, the Department of Justice and the Department of Correctional Services were incorporated into sub-operations (South African Police Service, 2000c).

8.3.3 Operational outcomes

For the first 12 months (1 April 2000 to 31 March 2001) of Operation Crackdown 485,551 arrests were made by the police, of which 176,235 were related to serious crimes. In addition, 20,580 firearms were collected (Government Communication and Information System, 2002). The high number of arrests continued throughout the remainder of 2001 and into the first quarter of 2002, with 524,419 arrests being made by the SAPS between January 2001 and May 2002, of which 216,322 were related to serious crimes. Some 17,294 firearms were also confiscated during this period (Government Communication and Information System, 2003).

The Operation Crackdown intervention in Hillbrow in 2000, for example, as outlined in a report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), was in place for a week, and entailed the deployment of 884 SAPS and 240 SANDF personnel. It included 114 roadblocks; and the searching of 22,568 vehicles, 293 buildings and 205,324 persons (Pelser, 2000). SAPS arrested 14 people wanted for serious crimes, such as murder, rape and robbery, with a further 512 individuals being arrested for less serious crimes. Some 97 illegal firearms, 52 firearm magazines, 1,606 loose rounds of ammunition and more than 70kg of illegal drugs were seized (Pelser, 2000).

A sub-operation of Operation Crackdown was initiated in August 2000 in Khayelitsha following intense violence in the public transport sector in this township. The SAPS and the SANDF blockaded Khayelitsha for 24 hours, and prevented buses and minibus taxis from entering the township. Scores of armed security force personnel undertook patrols with the support of armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. At the time, Col. Piet Paxton, a SANDF spokesperson, stated that this sub-operation sought “to clean up the Western

Cape which is buckling beneath a scourge of crime, urban terror and bloody gang warfare”. Similarly, Ryan Coetzee, adviser to MEC for Community Safety in the Western Cape stated that: “We [Western Cape Provincial Government] are prepared to do anything and everything to win the war against criminals” (News24, 2000).

In a number of high crime informal settlements in close proximity to the platinum mines in the Rustenburg (Phokeng) area (North-West Province), the SAPS undertook large-scale patrols and cordon-and-search interventions. These policing actions were reportedly to demonstrate to residents that “no go zones” for the police did not exist in these areas (Bruce, 2001). However, ethnographic research by Bruce (2001) with SAPS members suggested that they were fearful of informal settlements, especially after dark, and would mostly only enter these spaces in large numbers and/or with armoured personnel carriers.

Operation Crackdown was not without its controversies. For example, in July 2000 an ANC Member of Parliament, Bheki Mkhize was fatally shot by police in Mahlabathini (KwaZulu-Natal) during an alleged Operation Crackdown sub-operation. Three members of the SAPS’ Ulundi Public Order Policing Unit were arrested and charged with Mkhize’s murder (South African Press Association, 2000a). A subsequent investigation by the ICD found that the SAPS personnel in question did not have a search warrant to enter the premises and had sought to plant firearms on the scene after the shooting in an attempt to justify the raid and their lethal use of force (Independent Complaints Directorate, 2001, South African Press Association, 2000b). One of the accused, Sergeant SP Buthelezi, was found guilty of Mkhize’s murder by the Pietermaritzburg High Court in September 2001 (South African Press Association, 2001).

By early 2002 SAPS strategists feared that Operation Crackdown was losing momentum and therefore rebranded it as Operation Tsipa (Sesotho word meaning ‘to pinch’) (Burger, 2015a). Tsipa was in place from early January until mid March 2002, and sought to provide additional operational interventions in close to 50 police station areas (that were part of the focal stations for Operation Crackdown), which were yet to experience a stabilisation of crime levels. This operation resulted in 29,416 arrests, and the confiscation of 994 firearms (Republic of South Africa, 2005).

8.3.4 Parallel operations

Ancillary, individually named operations were also established, namely Slasher, Lancer and Tshwane. Operation Slasher was launched in March 2001 and focused specifically on gangs, and gang-related crime in the Western Cape. These operations predominantly targeted the residential areas of Mitchells Plain, Hanover Park, Manenberg, Bishop Lavis and Elsies River. After three months 1,238 arrests had been made, and 85 firearms and 1,157 rounds of ammunition had been seized. Operation Lancer, which was also implemented in the Western Cape, was devoted to combatting urban terrorism, mainly by individuals aligned to PAGAD (South African Police Service, 2001a).

In the larger Pretoria area Operation Tshwane was pursued in the first half of 2001 with a focus on those individuals wanted by the police for housebreaking, carjacking and motor vehicle theft. Between 1 February 2001 and 7 May 2001 7,387 suspects were arrested for serious crimes, and 715 firearms were seized (Government Communication and Information System, 2002).

8.3.5 Self-evaluation of Operation Crackdown by government

There was disagreement between the political and operational leadership of the police on how to evaluate the successes of Operation Crackdown. National Commissioner Selebi reportedly appraised its successes in terms of the numbers of policing actions, such as roadblocks, search-and-seizure interventions and arrests. In an interview with Johan Burger he suggested that a number of senior SAPS operational officers, conversely advocated for an assessment that reflected the impact that policing actions had had on crime levels (Burger, 2015a). Nonetheless, public comments about Operation Crackdown by government representatives made reference to both policing actions and their short-term crime reduction impact.

For example, in his Budget Speech to Parliament in June 2000, Jacob Zuma, the Deputy President of South Africa proudly declared Operation Crackdown “a major success in our fight against crime, resulting in the arrest of a considerable number of suspects for serious crimes and the recovery of a significant amount of stolen property, drugs and illegal firearms”. Zuma further indicated that this operation had been “a major improvement in the operational efficiency of our integrated and coordinated approach [compared to Monozite]”...[and] we have improved both in our tactics and in the number of arrests and property recovered” (Zuma, 2000). In the North West province, the SAPS stated that a 48% reduction in crime had been achieved in Mafikeng (South African Press Association, 2000c). In 2002, the SAPS reported that criminal offending had stabilised in two-thirds of the target station areas (Leggett, et al., 2003).

To date, Operation Crackdown has not been independently assessed. In response to a Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000) request by the South African History Archive at the University of the Witwatersrand for documentation on Operation Crackdown, the SAPS indicated that the documentation could not be located (Allan, 2009). It is entirely conceivable that no such reports were actually placed within the general SAPS filing system as the operational leadership kept tight control over the data that was used to determine the successes of Operation Crackdown. In an interview with Johan Burger he suggested that there were also suspicions at the time that the outcomes of day-to-day policing were incorporated into the Operation Crackdown data, thereby distorting the reported effect of this mega-operation (Burger, 2015b).

8.4 Operation Sethunya (2003-2004)

Operation Sethunya (amaZulu term for gun) was launched on 1 April 2003, and was initially in place for six months, and was to be pursued throughout South Africa. It was developed separately from the previous, more general high-density

operations like Sword and Shield, Monozite and Crackdown. The explicit objective of Sethunya was to “trace illegal firearms and to check legal firearm owners’ compliance with the legislation” (Meek and Stott, 2004b:27), particularly high risk individuals that had lost or had had their firearms stolen on numerous occasions, as well as those in possession of more than five licensed firearms. Sethunya’s operational techniques were nonetheless similar to previous operations, such as the use of roadblocks and cordon-and-search actions, with a focus on high crime areas. A ‘normalisation phase’ was implemented from 1 October 2003 to 30 March 2004 in which station commissioners were encouraged to pursue firearm-specific operations as part of everyday policing (South African Police Service, 2003c, South African Police Service, 2004). Operation Sethunya also sought to destroy obsolete, redundant, illegal and confiscated firearms.

Operation Sethunya was pursued as a shoo in for the official rollout of the Firearms Control Act (FCA) (No. 60 of 2000). That is, the police sought to gather and seize as many unlicensed³⁷ and illegal firearms as possible, as well as demonstrate to the public that the SAPS was firmly committed to strictly enforcing the provisions of the new firearm control legislation (Meek and Stott, 2004b). According to an interview with a former senior SAPS firearm control official (name withheld), he disclosed that it was during the planning phase of Operation Sethunya that it was resolved that in order for the FCA to be effective the police had to generate a “fear factor” in order to demonstrate to those in possession of unlicensed and illegal firearms that the SAPS “meant business”, and would take firm action against transgressors (Anonymous, 2015).

Operation Sethunya also judiciously probed the internal SAPS firearm control measures, especially: the management³⁸ and proper disposal of Section 13 stores at station-level; the processing of declarations of unfitness to possess a firearm; and the sharing of information within the SAPS regarding lost and stolen firearms. Firearm dealers, manufacturers and private security companies were to be scrutinised by the SAPS to ensure compliance with the relevant legislation (Gould, et al., 2004, South African Police Service, 2004). To accommodate these various activities, and facilitate more accurate reporting, an electronic Operational Planning and Monitoring (OPAM) system was developed. In interviews with Alice Pienaar-Marais and Col Johan A P Burger they both indicated that OPAM was subsequently used as the principal electronic management system for all major SAPS operations (Burger, 2015b, Pienaar-Marais, 2015).

Under the Operation Sethunya station-level sub-operations varied in length, with sub-operations in some high crime areas being almost a daily occurrence. Shebeens were a focal point, with shebeen owners often being compelled by SAPS officials to surrender those firearms (many of which were illegal) that

³⁷ A key consideration was firearms from deceased estates where families had inherited firearms, but had failed to apply for licences, as well as firearms held by those who had been declared to be unfit to possess a firearm.

³⁸ This included the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) testing of and dot-peen marking these firearms.

intoxicated patrons had entrusted to them for safekeeping. In an interview with Alice Pienaar-Marais she indicated that often firearms would remain behind in such containers after the shebeen had closed for the night (Pienaar-Marais, 2015). In the Sebokeng/Orange Farm area, for example, Pienaar-Marais stated that shebeen owners often required patrons to deposit their firearms into a container, such as a box or chest freezer, as a precondition for entering their premises. At one point the SAPS was confiscating between 100 and 150 such discarded firearms every weekend in this area (Pienaar-Marais, 2015).

According to Pienaar-Marais, the roadblocks under the auspices of Operation Sethunya were often mobile in that the operational teams varied the roadblock locations to create a greater sense of visibility throughout the focal areas, and “box-in” the targeted areas (Pienaar-Marais, 2015). Minibus taxis were prime targets during these roadblocks, and when minibus taxis were stopped at roadblocks and the occupants were informed by the SAPS officials that they were searching for firearms the police members on the scene would at times hear a quick succession of thudding sounds. After the occupants had alighted the vehicle police would then often find firearms on the floor of the taxi. On such occasions the SAPS did not have the necessary technology and fingerprint information to link the discarded firearms to the various occupants, and hence no charges were laid. The police nonetheless seized the abandoned firearms (Pienaar-Marais, 2015).

Furthermore, the SAPS devised custom built sub-operations that focused on specific persons of interest. That is, such policing actions were based on information provided by SAPS Crime Intelligence concerning individuals or entities in possession of large quantities of potentially illegal firearms, as well as data gleaned from the Central Firearms Registry database concerning persons who had either lost or had had their firearms stolen on multiple occasions (Hlongwa, 2004, Pienaar-Marais, 2015). For example, one case in 2004 entailed alleged gun-running between Lesotho and South Africa, with the individuals involved claiming their firearm collection constituted a private “small arms museum” (Mokoena, 2004).

Between the beginning of April and early December 2003 police actions under the Operation Sethunya banner in the Eastern Cape (mainly in Umtata and East London) led to more than 3,880 illegal firearms being seized and 4,161 people being arrested in connection to these firearms (News24, 2003). An added feature was that the SAPS, for the first time, retained confiscated firearms, which were then ballistics tested and subsequently sent for destruction (instead of returning the firearms to their original legal owners).

For the SAPS, Operation Sethunya exposed serious inadequacies in the administration of the civilian firearm licensing, and a high level of negligence amongst firearms owners in terms of reporting firearm loss/theft, as well as re-licensing firearms from deceased estates. According to a Gauteng SAPS spokesperson, Dennis Adriaao:

We have noticed that when we have managed to trace the [legitimate] owners of guns used in a crime, many of them had not reported the theft or loss of their firearms...Even more alarming is the fact that intelligence from Operation Sethunya has shown there are 14,000 guns belonging to people who are dead and which have either not been handed to the police or re-registered under new owners' names" (Hosken, 2003).

The SAPS publicly claimed that Operation Sethunya had led to significant reductions in a number of violent crime categories (Pretorius, 2003, South African Press Association, 2003a). For example, according to Charles Nqakula, the Minister of Safety and Security, Operation Sethunya resulted in the decrease in reported murder and attempted murder of 8.3% and 17.9% respectively (where firearms were used) between 1 April 2003 and 31 March 2004 (Nqakula, 2004).

Table 8.4: Operation Sethunya reported successes

	1 Apr – 30 Sept 2003 (Operation Sethunya)	1 Oct 2003 – 31 Mar 2004 (Normalisation phase)	Total
Firearms seized	13,859	12,116	25,975
Ammunition seized	1,562,873	117,067	1,679,940
Arrests (illegal possession of firearms & ammunition)	3,082	2,908	5,990

Source: South African Police Service (2004)

8.5 Targeting repeat offenders and 'wanted' persons

In July 2006 an operational strategy was developed to respond to violent crime, which focused on arresting repeat offenders, and those wanted for serious violent crimes, such as murder, attempted murder, rape, robbery with aggravating circumstances and vehicle hijacking. Dedicated police teams were established to trace and apprehend such 'wanted' persons. This operational strategy became a key feature of high-density operations from that point onwards. For example, during 2008/09, tracing teams arrested some 39,697 suspects that had been linked to 55,963 criminal cases (Government Communication and Information System, 2010).

The systematic targeting of repeat offenders and 'wanted' persons by the SAPS had taken place before, but in a more ad hoc manner. For example, Operation 101 Dalmatians was established in the 2000/01 reporting year with the aim of arresting approximately 1,500 of the most 'wanted' persons for serious and violence crime. Thereafter the focal list of 'wanted' persons for this operation was to have been expanded (South African Police Service, 2001b).

This strategy has continued to be pursued by SAPS to this day through specific operations. For instance, in 2014 the SAPS established Operation Tornado as a national intelligence-driven operation to be in place until the end of March 2016. The intention of this operation was reportedly to coordinate policing efforts through 'Provincial War Rooms' in order to track down 'wanted' persons, as well as gather the necessary evidence and link the relevant criminal cases to these individuals (South African Police Service, 2015d). Two of the focal crimes have been robberies in shopping malls and the murder of police officials.

'Disruptive/takedown' policing action was pursued in crime hot spots as part of Operation Tornado, and in August 2015 the SAPS reported that as result of this operation there had been 1,850 arrests and that 295 firearms had been confiscated (South African Police Service, 2015d).

8.6 Provincial operations: 2006 and beyond

Between 2006 and 2015 numerous high-density operations were implemented at the provincial level, with Gauteng and the Western Cape receiving the most attention. The focus of these operations was high profile violent crimes, such as robbery with aggravating circumstances, Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) bombings and gang-related crime. Four of these operations are briefly discussed below, namely: Iron Fist, Trio, Combat and Big Wave.

8.6.1 Gauteng: Operation Iron Fist, Operation Trio and Operation Big Wave

Operation Iron Fist³⁹ was a sixth month operation that was in place from 1 July until 31 December 2006 that focused on numerous high crime station areas in Gauteng. It was extended in February 2007 as Operation Iron Fist II. A unique development was the key involvement of the Gauteng Provincial Government's Department of Community Safety, which was publicly presented as the principal driver of the operation. Approximately 3,000 police officers were dispatched to the focal police stations with CPFs being drawn in to assist where appropriate (Cachalia, 2007).

The following police actions took place during Operation Iron Fist: 93,757 vehicle patrols; 698,555 vehicle searches; 1,705,235 person searches; 10,727 roadblocks; and 4,416 suspect raids. This operation resulted in 218,572 arrests for all offences (of which 80,729 were for serious crimes) and the recovery of 8,324 firearms (Cachalia, 2007). In addition, it was reported by the Gauteng Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Community Safety, Firoz Cachalia, that there had been "notable reductions in certain crime categories, such as burglary, vehicle theft and cash-in-transit heists while hijackings had stabilised" (Cachalia, 2008).

Operation Trio, which was implemented in parallel with Operation Iron Fist II, focused on 'trio crimes' (carjacking, house robberies and business robberies) in 21 policing clusters where levels of these crimes had escalated, and was also led by the Gauteng Provincial Government's Department Community Safety. After four months 133 suspects had been arrested (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2009, Mvoko, 2007). Between July to December 2007 the following policing actions were undertaken: 7,055 roadblocks; 5,315 cordon-and-search actions; 3,352 suspect raids; 623,019 vehicle searches; and 1,247,313 person searches. Further to this, 5,873 firearms were recovered; and 232,212 arrests were made

³⁹ Sixteen years earlier the apartheid security forces, in response to political violence in a number of townships, established a similar operation with the same name, but with more draconian measures (such as dusk-to-dawn curfews). It was a national operation, with Gauteng being a major focus. See Chapter 6 for more details.

for all crimes (of which 34,036 arrests were made for all violent contact crimes) (Cachalia, 2008).

Operation Big Wave was established in 2011 with a distinctive focus on trio crimes, cash-in-transit robberies and ATM bombings in the greater Pretoria area. The SAPS 2011/12 annual report indicated that this operation had resulted in 127 arrests for a range of crimes, including attempted murder, corruption, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition, possession of stolen goods, drug possession and being in South Africa illegally. This police action resulted in the seizure of 420 firearms and 104,682 rounds of ammunition, as well as significant quantities of drugs (South African Police Service, 2012a).

8.6.2 Operation Combat

Operation Combat was initiated in the Western Cape in 2012 with a focus on between 15 to 17 criminal gangs in a select number of areas, such as (but not limited to) Mitchells Plain, Bishop Lavis, Philippi, Atlantis, Lavender Hill and Manenberg. Some of its foremost objectives were to: “dislodge and terminally weaken” the ability of gangs to operate in high crime communities and prisons; “disorganise and fundamentally disable” the gang-related economy, through the targeting of senior members of organised criminal networks and large consignments of contraband; and “mobilise and organise communities” against gangs and gangsterism (South African Police Service Western Cape, 2015) (Petersen, 2015). In addition, this operation sought to “gain back the space in the streets that have been occupied by gangs” (SABC, 2014b) .

Operation Combat has been intelligence-driven, drawing on information provided by informants (Sylvester, 2014), and has had a strong military ethos and doctrine. According to Gen Jeremy Vearey, the head of the Operation Combat, this gang-focused policing intervention sought to “target the enemy, neutralise the enemy in the target environment, cut and disrupt the movement of the enemy and disrupt the supply lines of firearms and drugs” (eNCA, 2013). The core strategy in this regard has been to use dedicated investigation teams and paramilitary SAPS bodies, such as the Tactical Response Teams, that are supported by station-level personnel, to disrupt gang operations. This has been pursued through assertive visible policing, as well as arresting gang leaders (eNCA, 2013, Loggenberg, 2014). More surreptitious methods have also been employed, such as the use of unmarked police vehicles to conduct stop-and searches (SABC, 2014a).

In 2013 the SAPS claimed that this operation has resulted in between 50 and 100 firearms being confiscated each month (eNCA, 2013). The SAPS have also celebrated the securing of severe prison sentences for a number of gang leaders, including from the Fancy Boys, Junior Cisco Yakkies and the 28s gangs. A key innovation has been to use of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (1998), which specifically targets “criminal gangs”, and makes provision for a range of lengthy sentences for gang-related economic activities, such as racketeering and money laundering (Fisher, 2015, Norman, 2014).

In March 2016, the SAPS established a very similar intervention to Operation Combat in the Eastern Cape, which has been referred to as Operation Lockdown. This operation primarily focused on gang hot spots in Port Elizabeth, namely Gelvandale and Bethelsdorp, with the objectives of “stabilizing these areas” and “build[ing] the community’s confidence in the SAPS” (South African Police Service, 2016). Between March 2016 and September 2016 the SAPS reported that they had arrested 600 suspects and seized 85 firearms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition. However, the effectiveness of Operation Lockdown has reportedly been slated by community activists in the affected areas (van Aardt, 2016).

8.7 National Festive Season operations and the 2010 FIFA World Cup

8.7.1 Festive Season operations

From 2007 onwards, national SAPS high-density operations became an annual fixture in and around the summer holiday period, typically implemented between October and January the following year. These operations were often undertaken in cooperation with the SANDF, the Metro Police and a range of other government departments (such as the Department of Correctional Services and the South African Revenue Service), as well as parastatals (such as Telkom and Eskom). They were branded either as Operation Festive Season or Operation Duty Calls, with the principal motivation being that criminality, both serious offences and misdemeanours, tended to spike during this period.

A ‘zero tolerance’ approach to most forms of criminality, including firearm-, alcohol-, and drug-related crime, as well as road offences has been adopted. This has been enforced through roadblocks, cordon-and-search actions, and inspections of firearm dealers and liquor outlets, such as taverns and shebeens. The tracing and apprehension of ‘wanted’ persons has also been a priority (Kanyane, 2015, South African Police Service, 2011c). These operations have also been accompanied by belligerent othering by the senior police political leadership towards offenders in these areas. For instance at the launch of the 2010/11 Festive Season operations in Mfuleni (Western Cape), Nathi Mthethwa, the Minister of Police declared:

Our operations during this festive season will not just be focused in the cities or suburbs. We will be everywhere. In essence, we will aggressively increase the number of police on patrol at malls, taxi ranks, and recreational areas, as well as identified key ‘hot spots’. The only people who must have a jolly season are law-abiding citizens. Criminals must burn in prison. Theirs should be an unpleasant period of pain, fear and suffering (Mthethwa, 2010f).

The Ministry of Police has claimed that these operations have resulted in crime reduction successes. For instance, the Police Minister stated that robbery with aggravating circumstances and motor vehicle theft noticeably declined during the 2009/10 Festive Season compared to the previous Festive Season period, which “can in all probability be attributed to higher police visibility” (Mthethwa, 2010e).

Furthermore, these annual operations have resulted in the confiscation of thousands of firearms and numerous arrests of individuals found to be in

possession of illegal firearms and/or ammunition. For example, during the 2012/13 Festive Season operation the SAPS confiscated 721 illegal firearms and 7,638 rounds of ammunition (South African Police Service, 2013a). In late November 2015 SAPS personnel in KwaZulu-Natal confiscated 28 unlicensed firearms and 101 rounds of ammunition, with 31 suspects being arrested in this regard (South African Police Service, 2015f).

The police undertook close to six million searches (of vehicles, people and premises) during the 2015/16 iteration of Operation Duty Calls. Some 362,795 people were arrested for a wide variety of offences, but were predominantly apprehended for order maintenance related crime, such as: drug-related offences (17%); 'riotous behaviour' and 'pedestrian source of danger' (12%); and drinking/being drunk in a public space (11%). Some 3,579 'wanted' persons and 3,841 murder suspects were arrested. Furthermore 2,652 and 961 suspects were arrested for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and robbery with a firearm respectively. The SAPS also reported that 5,310 firearms and 112,339 rounds of ammunition were confiscated (85% were handguns). The SAPS concluded, on the basis of a initial analysis, that this operation had resulted in a reduction in serious crime in five provinces during December 2015 compared to December 2014 when an earlier version of Operation Duty Calls was underway (Nhleko, 2016a).

8.7.2 High-density policing for the 2010 FIFA World Cup

The SAPS began to make policing preparations for the 2010 *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) World Cup from 2006 (which South Africa hosted in 2010). A particular focus was the establishment of tracing teams to track down suspects for which arrest warrants had already been issued (Burger, 2007b). No major operations were however undertaken, with the SAPS rather pursuing "extremely high levels of police visibility" between April and June 2009, due to a number of prominent, nationwide mega-events such as the general elections, international cricket matches (such as the Indian Premier League) and the Confederation Cup Football tournament (South African Police Service, 2010b).

Thereafter, according to comments by Alice Pienaar-Marais, this amplified level of visible policing was maintained for more than a year in the run-up to, and in the immediate aftermath of, the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Pienaar-Marais, 2015). During this time there were elevated levels of security in place (Cornelissen, 2011), and there was a strong operational focus in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, as according to SAPS these provinces were experiencing the lion's share of criminal offending (South African Police Service, 2011d).

8.8 Operation Fiela-Reclaim (2015)

Operation Fiela ('sweep clean')-Reclaim, envisaged to be in place for a two year period, was launched in April 2015 in response to large-scale outbreaks of xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng (Minister of Police, 2015a). However, this national operation had more grandiose plans than containing such xenophobic violence. According to the Cabinet-level Inter-Ministerial Committee

on Migration, the intention of this operation was to target the places “which are known to be frequented by criminals” (Radebe, 2015). This was pursued, according to Cabinet, in order “to rid our country of illegal weapons, drug dens, prostitution rings and other illegal activities” (Evans, 2015). State Security Minister, David Mahlobo has also suggested that the South Africans were highly supportive government’s intention to “clean out those criminal services” throughout the country (Njamela, 2015).

The NATJOINTS penned the operational blueprint for Operation Fiela-Reclaim, which was branded as the ‘Multi-Disciplinary Integrated National Action Plan to Reassert the Authority of the State’. This document revealed a deep sense of disquiet within government’s security cluster, namely the perception that the authority of the state had been extensively eroded in high crime communities. According to this plan, the security forces would “dominate and stabilise” focal areas by pursuing high visibility policing actions; arresting ‘wanted’ persons; fast tracking criminal investigations; and adopting a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to lesser forms of criminality, such as traffic offences, operating illegal businesses, selling counterfeit goods, illegal mining, drinking in public, and being in South Africa illegally (NATJOINTS, 2015).

In terms of this operation the SAPS has sought to implement weekly sub-operations throughout the country, which entailed numerous roadblocks, cordon-and-search actions and directed patrols. By 19 June 2015 some 343 sub-operations had been conducted in these areas, which are outlined in Table 8.5 below (Minister of Police, 2015b). The SAPS expanded its operational focus to further high crime areas in the second half of 2015, including, but not limited to: Point, Pinetown, Grahamstown, Parow, Nyanga, Summer Greens, Pudimoe, Morokweng, Kwanobuhle, Masiphumelele, Margate, Port Shepstone, Dundee, Greytown, Port St Johns and Kwadukuza.

Table 8.5: SAPS focal stations for Operation Fiela-Reclaim (as at 19 June 2015)

Province	SAPS focal stations
Eastern Cape	East London, Humansdorp, King Williams Town, Mthatha, Port St John’s, Uitenhage, Matatiele, Mount Road, Mdantsane, Motherwell
Free State	Ladybrand, Mangaung, Phuthaditjaba, Welkom, Bethlehem, Bloemfontein, Bultfontein, Henneman, Park Road, Thabong, Selosesha, Zamdela
Gauteng	Alexandra, Benoni, Brakpan, Carletonville, Katlehong, Boksburg, Ga-Rankuwa, Johannesburg, Krugersdorp, Mamelodi, Springs, Tembisa, Vereeniging, Alrode, Diepsloot, Johannesburg Central, Hillbrow, Moroka, Orlando, Pretoria Central, Pretoria West, Sunnyside, Temba
KwaZulu-Natal	Inanda, Newcastle, Pietermaritzburg, Kokstad, Ladysmith, Port Shepstone, Umkomaas, Umlazi, Brighton Beach, Chatsworth, Durban Central, Jozini, Mountain Rise, Mtuzuma
Limpopo	Bela- Bela, Giyani, Lephalale, Modimolle, Musina, Phalaborwa, Polokwane, Seshego, Thabazimbi, Thohoyandou, Tzaneen, Vaalwater, Lebowakgomo, Lulekani, Mahwelereng, Makhado, Masemola, Mphephu, Tubatse, Vuwani, Westerburch
Mpumalanga	Acornhoek, Elukwatini, Ermelo, Kwamhlanga, Middelburg, Nelspruit, Piet Retief, Secunda, Standerton, Witbank, Bushbuckridge, Pienaar, Tonga
North West	Brits, Klerksdorp, Rustenburg, Taung, Vryburg, Wolmaranstad, Zeerust, Haartebeespoort, Lichtenburg, Marikana, Mogwase, Potchefstroom, Stilfontein, Tlhabane, Atamelang, Boitekong, Ikageng, Mahikeng, Mmakau, Phokeng

Northern Cape	Alexandra Bay, Calvinia, De Aar, Kimberley, Kuruman, Port Nolloth, Postmasburg, Windsorton, Griekwastad, Hartswater, Jan Kempdorp, Keimoes, Springbok, Victoria West, Barkly West, Kagiso, Kakamas, Roodepan, Wilbosten, Galeshewe
Western Cape	Cape Town, George, Hermanus, Khayelitsha, Kraaifontein, Kuilsriver, Milnerton, Mitchells Plain, Nyanga, Vredenburg, Worcester, Bellville, Parow, Oudtshoorn, Dunoon, Wynberg, Grassy Park, Conville, Manenberg, Bishop Lavis

Source: NATJOINTS (2015)


Within high crime areas roadblocks mostly took place at night, with the security forces also honing in on the traditional micro-spaces of disorder and law breaking, such as hostels, abandoned inner city buildings, taverns, shebeens, and taxi ranks. For example, in April 2015 security force personnel stormed the Madala Hostel in Alexandra and the Wolhuter Road Hostel in Jeppestown (both in Gauteng). Similarly, in October 2015, the notorious Glebelands hostel in Umlazi (KwaZulu-Natal) was saturated with security force personnel that subsequently arrested 60 individuals on various criminal charges. In Manenberg, during an intense gang turf-war (May 2015), approximately 300 security force members were deployed into the area, which then raided suspected drug houses and gangster hideouts. Numerous arrests were made for illegal possession of firearms and drugs (Koyana, 2015).

On 30 and 31 July policing sub-operations were undertaken, which resulted in 2,908 arrests across the country, of which 39% were undocumented migrants and 20% were in possession of drugs. Ten people were arrested for murder, and 31 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Twenty-eight firearms and 175 rounds of ammunition were confiscated (Government Communication and Information System, 2015). In late October 2015 the SAPS reported that throughout that month 1,626 people had been arrested for various crimes as a result of Operation Fiela-Reclaim, and 12 firearms and 78 rounds of ammunition had been confiscated (South African Police Service, 2015c).

As with most of the previous high-density operations, the SANDF actively participated in Operation Fiela-Reclaim, but only in the formative stages, namely between April and June 2015 (Wilhelm, 2015). The military were extricated in June 2015 following public concerns about the adverse repercussions that their long-term internal deployment would have on the state of democratic governance in South Africa (African News Agency, 2015, RDM News Wire, 2015). In addition, there was intensive civil society advocacy concerning the arrest and the apparent disproportionate targeting of undocumented migrants by the security forces under the auspices of this operation (De Wet, 2015, Jordaan, 2015).

Between April and July 2015 the vast majority of arrests made by the SAPS were related to undocumented migrants; traffic offences; and possession of drugs. Some 144 persons were arrested for illegal possession of firearms/ammunition; 29 for murder; and 18 for armed robbery. Some 159 illegal firearms were also seized (NATJOINTS, 2015). More recently Operation Fiela-Reclaim was co-branded with the annual Operation Duty Calls in an attempt to reduce criminal offending over the 2015/16 Festive Season (South African Police Service, 2015e).

Chart 8.2: Operation Fiela-Reclaim: 1 April – 21 July 2015



Source: NATJOINTS (2015)

8.9 Conquering high crime places

At times high-density operations have been presented as having, and being linked to, a type of conquest imperative, namely that government has publicly expressed concerns that criminal elements have seized complete control of certain high crime public spaces and neighbourhoods. This has been the case with Operation Fiela-Reclaim (2015), where government has declared that the principal operational objective has been to “take back the communities from criminals and to re-assert the authority of the state” (Radebe, 2015). In addition, the SANDF was deployed alongside the SAPS in conspicuous numbers during Operation Fiela-Reclaim, particularly in areas prone to gang violence, and large hostels.

In some cases government has, together with high-density police operations, attempted to re-establish its formal authority in high crime spaces through infrastructure and development projects. These interventions have also been an attempt to mitigate the environmental conditions and determinants of criminal offending in the target areas. In this regard, these projects have predominantly focused on the building and refurbishment of community facilities and the upgrading of housing. Some of these interventions are nonetheless reminiscent of the ‘winning-hearts-and-minds’ COIN strategy that was pursued by government under apartheid (see Chapter 6).

For example, in Manenberg, which is a community plagued by deeply ingrained gang violence, the Western Cape Provincial Government and the City of Cape Town launched a major upgrading project in the wake of Fiela-Reclaim interventions. A central component of this project has been the development of a ‘youth lifestyle campus’ in Manenberg which has been publicised as including the following: increased support for early childhood development facilities and schools; implementation of ‘community cohesion’ programmes; upgrading of public parks and other amenities; the construction of new sports facilities;

improved lighting in public spaces; and deployment of additional personnel; and the funding of specific projects with the brief of improving community safety (Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town, 2015). A new hospital and an emergency services 'hub', which will include a satellite fire station, have also been earmarked for the area (De Lille and Zille, 2015).


Within some of the areas with the highest levels of violent crime, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, there are large hostels that were built during the apartheid period in order to accommodate and control black male migrant labourers from rural areas and other Southern African countries. These hostels have typically been places with intense concentrations of violent criminality where possession of illegal firearms has been commonplace. These densely populated, and often dilapidated residential compounds were estimated to have housed five per cent of South Africa's population in 1994 (Department of Housing, 1994). They are also places typically governed by informal pro-violence patriarchal systems where formal government bodies have exercised very limited authority, and are amongst the most dangerous places for the police to operate (Pienaar and Cloete, 2003). Since the mid 1990s government policy has intimated that hostels should be transformed, upgraded and better integrated into the surrounding communities. However, over the past 20 years progress has been ad hoc and sluggish.

Following the launch of Operation Fiela-Reclaim, the Minister of Human Settlements, Lindiwe Sisulu, stated in her 2015/16 budget vote speech that there was going to be a policy shift on hostels, namely that government was now seeking to "gradually abolish hostels", and provide hostel-dwellers with access to a special housing subsidy scheme (Sisulu, 2015). This is arguably a strategy to eliminate such crime hot spots and regain control of such spaces. For example, the eThekweni Municipality reportedly assigned approximately R72 million in late 2015 to upgrade the physical security, recreational facilities and gardens in and around the Glebelands and KwaMashu hostels (KwaZulu-Natal). This will reportedly include the upgrading of the Glebe Stadium, the refurbishment of a swimming pool and other recreational amenities, as well as the introduction of closed circuit television and access control systems (Rondganger, 2015). Hostel upgrading has also been reportedly initiated in Orlando West (Soweto) (Frankson, 2015).

8.10 High-density operations and imprisonment

The South African prison population increased in size significantly from 1997 with the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act, which introduced minimum sentencing for serious and violent crime (Giffard and Muntingh, 2006, Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers, 2005). From 1999 there was a dramatic increase in the size of the prison population following the launch of the National Crime Combatting Strategy and Operation Crackdown (Department of Correctional Services, et al., 2004). Successive police operations during the first half of the 2000s continued to contribute to increases in the prison population through pursuing a policy of mass arrests (see Chart 8.3 below).

Chart 8.3: South Africa: Average annual prison population: 1995-2013/14




Source: Department of Correctional Services annual reports

The most violent offenders, such as murderers, armed robbers and those in possession of illegal firearms and ammunition, were frequently handed-down long prison sentences. That is, between 2000 and 2005, the number of life sentences and sentences exceeding 20 years increased by approximately 500% and 150% respectively (Giffard and Muntingh, 2006). Between the early 2000s and 2010, particularly after the promulgation of the Firearms Control Act (FCA), those individuals arrested for illegally possessing firearms and ammunition were typically not granted bail by magistrates, and were often sentenced to between eight to twelve years if found guilty. In an interview with a former senior SAPS firearm control official (name withheld), the Central Firearm Registry frequently worked with magistrates to ensure more stringent sentencing for such offences (Anonymous, 2015).

Those arrested for lesser crimes were either held in police cells and then freed after a few days, or were transferred to the awaiting trial section of Correctional Services facilities, with most being released shortly after their first appearance in court (Leggett, et al., 2003). For example, in 2001 54% of the 782,013 cases brought to the courts, many of which were the direct consequence of Operation Crackdown, were withdrawn (Schönteich, 2002). Further to this, it has been estimated that un-sentenced awaiting trial prisoners spent on average 136 days in prison prior to being released (Schönteich, 2002).

Chart 8.4: Criminal cases brought before the courts: 1996/97 - 2012/12



Source: National Prosecuting Authority annual reports

8.11 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the SAPS' attempts to leverage control over violent crime in South Africa through the use of large-scale high-density police operations. Similar to apartheid-era policing of the 1980s and early 1990s, such operations have been militarised, with the police (often in partnership with the military) doggedly honing-in and targeting their efforts and resources towards those relatively disorderly zones where crime has been intensely concentrated. The SAPS leadership and their political overseers have demarcated and classified such places as being disproportionately dangerous for both the police and the law-abiding public, as such spaces have contained cohorts of threatening and criminal others, especially 'wanted' persons, who have been viewed as enemies that are an affront to the South African state and society. Hence, the SAPS' key imperative has been to contain or even neutralise such threats, as well as stabilise the focal areas in order for law-abiding citizens to live in relative peace.

Consequently, the SAPS has pursued overt and forceful crime control approaches with the aim of (temporarily) imposing order and disrupting the dynamics of criminality within high crime areas as a means to reduce the predisposition towards law breaking. These approaches have typically entailed the deployment of large numbers of security force personnel to engage in visible policing activities, such as patrols, roadblocks and cordon-and-search interventions. The police have also sought to remove the most problematic catalysts for violent crime from the target areas, namely illegal firearms and ammunition. In addition, the SAPS arrested numerous 'wanted' persons for a range of crimes, including murder and being in possession of illegal firearms and ammunition. Therefore significant numbers of high-risk perpetrators and potential perpetrators of violent crime, as well as the instruments of such violence, have been repeatedly extricated from many of these high crime areas.

Furthermore, through a zero tolerance approach to a wide range of misdemeanours, such as traffic, drugs, alcohol and prostitution transgressions, and the mass arrest of offenders in this regard, the SAPS has specifically sought to sanitise such areas and compel residents to become more law-abiding. This was crudely depicted with the naming and objectives of the most recent national high-density police operation, Operation *Fiela* (clean sweep)-Reclaim. In some instances the government has sought to diminish the criminogenic nature and elements of the most problematic places in high crime areas, such as hostels, through infrastructure and development interventions.

Chapter 9: Impact of SAPS high-density operations

As indicated in Chapter 8, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has consistently stated that one of the key objectives of high-density operations has been to decrease violent crime in the targeted policing areas. In addition, in the aftermath of many of the more prominent operations, senior SAPS officials, and even cabinet ministers, have praised such police interventions, and have publicly declared that these flagship forms of the policing of boundaries have had substantial crime reduction effects. Crime data indicating a short-term declining trend in certain crime categories has typically been offered as evidence in this regard.

The plausibility of such claims is supported by academic research from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), which indicates that place-based policing can have a durable reduction effect on criminal offending in the focal areas; and possibly even in the surrounding areas with no significant displacement effects (Braga, 2001, Caeti, 1999, Cordner, 1996) (see Chapter 2). Further to this, evidence suggests that high-density operations should be “sufficiently long and strong” in order to have a more meaningful impact on crime levels (Scott, 2004). However, the research also implies that if the police are overly aggressive and do not actively communicate their intentions during high-density operations then police credibility with regards to targeted communities and the general public could be undermined (Eck and Maguire, 2000, Maher and Dixon, 1999, Sherman, 1997a).

Many crime researchers and commentators focusing on South Africa have nonetheless been dismissive of the crime reduction capability of such operations, suggesting that reported decreases in crime in targeted areas are only likely to be temporary as the socio-economic determinants of criminality have not been directly addressed by such high-density operations; and that such operations may result in the displacement of crime to other areas (Altbeker, 2009, Samara, 2010, Shaw, 2001). However, no thorough and detailed studies have been presented to substantiate such views.

Hence, this chapter will seek to objectively assess the impact that high-density police operations may have had on recorded violent crime levels, specifically murder in high crime areas in post-apartheid South Africa. Such an assessment has been pursued by means of a retrospective case-series study of a sample of 132 high crime SAPS station areas for the period 1994/95 to 2014/15. This assessment has not entailed an advanced statistical analysis of SAPS crime data. Rather it was based on a visual inspection of the trajectory patterns displayed by murder and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA) incident data within line charts over the 21-year period. In this regard, IPFA data was used as a proxy variable for SAPS high-density operations. However, prior to presenting the methodology and findings of such a study, this chapter reviews the characteristics and reliability of the relevant SAPS crime data and its applicability for such a study.

9.1 SAPS crime data: the good, the bad and the ugly

9.1.1 About SAPS crime data

Since 1994 the SAPS have published annual crime data and statistics for a wide range of crime categories, with data on total cases at the national, provincial and station level being released every year in September or October. This data has typically been accompanied by national and provincial rates and ratios for most crime categories. Annual data has consistently covered the period 1 April to 31 March of the following year, and has therefore been reported in the combination year format, such as 2014/15.

At the station (precinct) level the SAPS has provided data for all crime categories annually, but only raw figures for total cases, not rates or ratios. The key reason for this is that in the vast majority of cases the demarcated SAPS station areas do not correspond to the boundaries of distinct municipal areas or census enumeration areas for which there is established population data. Consequently the SAPS station-level crime data cannot be reliably and accurately connected to population data, especially over multiple years.

Researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) have recently attempted to painstakingly calculate crime ratios for a select number of precincts using only the 2011 census (small area) data and the 2014/15 SAPS crime data by means of overlaying both data sets spatially and then estimating the population and number of households for the selected precincts. The ISS researchers readily admit that there are some significant limitations to such an approach as: census data is not entirely accurate at the small area level, especially in informal settlements; the estimation of number of households per precinct will likely result in the misallocation of some households; and the technique cannot adequately account for population growth and mobility as census data is only released every 10 years (Lancaster and Kamman, 2016).

The SAPS crime analysis component has nonetheless been dismissive of devising rates and ratios for station areas stating that it is “neither sensible nor recommended”, as many stations areas, particularly in large metropolitan areas, tend to have dynamic populations that are comprised of both residents and non-residents that occupy and depart from the space on a daily basis (South African Police Service, 2008:1-2). In addition, given the high level of diversity among station areas, small increases in reported criminal incidents between years in low crime areas will likely result in a high year-on-year ratio, while large increases in criminal cases in high crime areas will likely not yield a high year-on-year ratio (South African Police Service, 2008:2).

Most crime data is initially recorded at the station level on the SAPS' Crime Administration System (CAS). This information is then accessed by the SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC), which analyses and then finalises the annual data for analysis and publication. The convention has been to publish the preceding nine years of data alongside the most recent annual data release in order to allow for comparison and trend analyses. Where appropriate, the CIAC

has made adjustments to historical data and statistics based on more up-to-date information.

To date, the Statistician-General has not designated the SAPS crime data to be 'official statistics' in terms of the provisions of the Statistics Act. In essence this means that Statistics South Africa has not been afforded the opportunity by the SAPS to vet and assure the quality of this crime data (Lukhwareni, 2015).⁴⁰ At the time of writing the SAPS had initiated a process with Statistics South Africa to improve the quality and integrity of the SAPS crime data in order for it to be brought in line with the requirements of the Act.

9.1.2 Much ado about crime counting and interpretation

For more than two decades scholars have had a love/hate relationship with the SAPS crime data, and the manner in which the police have interpreted it. On the one hand it has been viewed as the paramount dataset on criminality in South Africa (Burger, et al., 2010:10), and as a result has been widely used by scholars to formulate crime analyses and commentary. However, on the other hand, the SAPS crime data has been subject to severe criticism, even by those researchers who have published articles that have made use of this data. Much of this disparagement relates to the accuracy and reliability of the SAPS data, primarily due to manner in which it is collected, collated and presented. Concerns have also been voiced about the method that the SAPS crime analysts have used to infer proportionality (Berg and Schärf, 2004, Leggett, 2005, Palmary, et al., 2003).

In 2015 the Centre of Criminology at the University of Cape Town released 'A Citizen's Guide' to the SAPS crime data, which was not peer reviewed. This document made the following pronouncement: "all [SAPS] stats [sic] prior to about 2003 should be treated with utmost caution, and thought of as only a very broad indication of what might have been the reality" (De Kock, et al., 2015:5). It is not clear if this contentious and imprecise statement was directed towards crime rates, and/or ratios and/or data on reported incidents. It was seemingly informed by reports produced by the CIAC⁴¹ in the mid to late 1990s, as well as possibly by one of the authors' first-hand experience of working within the CIAC (although no references are provided in this regard).

The actual SAPS crime statistics reports in question indicate, based on a SAPS survey conducted in collaboration with the Human Sciences Research Council, that under-reporting of crime had been so extensive that it may have contributed to "perceived increases or decreases in crime" (Crime Information Management Centre, 1997b:2). Further to this, the reports highlighted the weaknesses of, and gaps within, the SAPS crime administration system as a result of the incorporation of the various policing bodies into SAPS in the mid 1990s, and a backlog in processing crime data as a result (Crime Information Management

⁴⁰ At the time of writing the SAPS had initiated the process with Statistics South Africa to improve the quality and integrity of the crime data with a view to SAPS crime data being classified as "official statistics".

⁴¹ At the time the CIAC was referred to as the Crime Information Management Centre.

Centre, 1997a). However, the 1997 Crime Information Management Centre's year-end report indicated that the backlog had been reduced to acceptable levels (Crime Information Management Centre, 1998). Critically, these reports did not dismiss the SAPS crime data in its entirety, but rather suggested that crime ratios at the time were problematic.

In July 2000, the Minister of Safety and Security declared a moratorium on SAPS crime data, which was in place until May 2001. The aim of the moratorium was purportedly to improve the manner in which this data was recorded, processed and analysed (Burton, et al., 2004).⁴² This development, however, further fuelled the debate around the reliability of this data (Shaw, 2001). Some scholars argued that this decision was a "politically convenient" move by government at the height of a crime wave, and the launch of Operation Crackdown, to more carefully craft the manner in which this data was organised and presented to the public (Newham, 2013). With the termination of the moratorium the Ministry of Safety and Security stated that the period of the data freeze had given the SAPS the opportunity to roll-out computer equipment, as well as geographic information systems, to various police stations, and to train personnel in more accurate data capturing. This would, according to the Ministry, "enhance their day-to-day planning of crime prevention operations" (News24, 2001).

Since 2001 there have been numerous allegations of substantial and persistent under-reporting for certain crime categories by researchers and analysts, especially various forms of robbery and assault (Bruce, 2010), as well as sexual crimes (Jewkes and Abrahams, 2002, Statistics South Africa, 2015). Perception surveys have suggested that this under-reporting has been due to a combination of factors, such as: a lack of trust in the police; the inaccessibility of police stations (particularly in rural areas); adverse notions of the utility of reporting criminal incidents to the SAPS; concerns about being stigmatised by family and/or community members; and fears about being further victimised by the perpetrator of the original crime (especially in the case of domestic violence and rape) (Lancaster, 2013, Masuku, 2002, Statistics South Africa, 2015).

The introduction of a station-level personnel performance appraisal systems (SAPS Performance Chart) that links reductions (quotas) in most crime categories to financial bonuses and career advancement have inadvertently undermined the credibility of the SAPS data collection process in a number of stations. That is, some officials in some stations have fraudulently misreported⁴³ and under-reported certain crime categories⁴⁴ in order to reflect crime reductions that exceed, or are in line with, specific performance targets (Bruce, 2010, Faull, 2010b).

⁴² This decision was informed by the findings of the Orkin Committee of Enquiry into the Collection, Processing and Publication of Crime Statistics.

⁴³ In essence this entails the purposeful recording of a certain crime under a similar, but incorrect crime category, such as recording a case of "attempted murder" as "common assault".

⁴⁴ This has typically taken the form of front office SAPS personnel responsible for taking statements and opening dockets actively discouraging or thwarting attempts by individuals to report crime. This usually takes place with the knowledge of the station commander.

More recently the integrity of the SAPS crime data has also been questioned due to the modus operandi used to determine crime ratios at the national and provincial levels and decode the relevance of such ratios. The core critique relates to the use of “out-dated population figures” to compare the change in crime ratios, especially between 2011/12 and 2012/13 (Institute for Security Studies, 2013, Wilkinson, 2013). Curiously, the SAPS did not include ratios or rates in the 2014/15 crime data, which was possibly the result of this public furore.

Despite the various criticisms of the SAPS crime data, some of its aspects and categories are sufficiently reliable and accurate for robust analyses to be constructed. Nonetheless, the data needs to be carefully navigated to moderate the risk of one’s research findings being discredited due to the abovementioned hazards. Fortunately the two crime categories that are most pertinent to this study are among the most statistically reliable, namely murder and IPFA. A further examination of the reliability of these two crime categories takes place in the sections below.

9.1.3 Murder: As good as it gets

9.1.3.1 Reliability of murder data

Globally murder (or homicide) is widely regarded as one of the most statistically reliable crime categories (Marshall and Block, 2004) (Neapolitan, 1997) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). The reason for this is that the occurrence of this intentional form of killing is most often linked to a corpse, with such a corpse typically being examined by a medical official who is required to declare the apparent manner of death. This information is then logged in the death registry and a death certificate is issued (Krug, et al., 2002). This process has been methodically followed in South Africa. As Gillespie (2014:207) irreverently notes: “murder is a relatively reliable statistical measure that the state is obliged to manage, because of the presence of killed bodies”. However, murder data is not always entirely accurate as in a small number of cases accidental killings and suicide may be recorded as murder, and vice versa.

South African crime and public health researchers concur that murder is the most reliable SAPS crime category statistically (Altbeker, 2005, Masuku, 2002) (Abrahams, et al., 2009, De Kock, et al., 2015, Seedat, et al., 2009). The robustness of the murder data has been further enhanced by the inclusion of ‘culpable homicide’ category in the SAPS crime data, which refers to the negligent killing of a person by another. Furthermore, the National Victims of Crime Surveys (NVCS) have consistently found that the SAPS murder data is one of the few SAPS crime categories that most people would report to the police. Table 9.1 below lists the percentages of the population that seemingly would report murder to the SAPS for the five NVCS that have been published by Statistics South Africa to date, with the year column representing the year in which the report was published.

Table 9.1: NVCS – Reporting incidents of murder to the SAPS

	1998	2011	2012	2013/14	2014/15
Percentage of household sample that would report murders to SAPS	83%	93.2	98.2	88.7	95.7

Source: Statistics South Africa (1998); Statistics South Africa (2012a); Statistics South Africa (2012b); Statistics South Africa (2015)

Other violent crime categories are significantly less reliable than murder due to lower reporting levels and increased possibility of misreporting. For example, attempted murder, which entails the commission of a crime with the intention of killing another person, but the actions of the perpetrator does not result in the death of the victim, requires SAPS officials to subjectively determine if perpetrator of a violent act intended to kill the victim(s) (South African Police Service, NDc). Hence there is a risk that actual acts of attempted murder may be recorded as assault or robbery (with aggravated circumstances), and vice versa.

Therefore, murder is the most reliable measure to use in determining the impact of high-density SAPS operation on the level of violent crime. Furthermore, most of these operations have sought to have a reduction effect on incidents of murder.

9.1.3.2 Murder victims and perpetrators

The modest research on homicide (including murder) in South Africa indicates that over the past 20 years both the victims and perpetrators of all forms of homicide in South Africa have mostly been young black African and coloured men between the ages of 15 and 39. Such men are predominantly unmarried, unemployed, and live in relatively impoverished areas (Ratele, et al., 2010) (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008). Such men have typically witnessed and/or experienced violence as a child, and possibly possessed an illegal firearm (Abrahams and Jewkes, 2005). Women accounted for between 10% and 15% of homicide victims, with even fewer women having perpetrated homicide (Matzopoulos, et al., 2013, Matzopoulos, et al., 2015). These dynamics correspond with studies on homicide in other countries, which demonstrate that young men in lower socio-economic situations are the most at risk of being both the agents and targets of such violence (Krug, et al., 2002, Mouzos, 2000, Wilson and Daly, 1985).

Homicides in South Africa have often been the outcome of aggressive verbal disagreements in the context of alcohol consumption (Kramer and Ratele, 2012, Matzopoulos, 2005), or during the perpetration of another crime, such as robbery. In some areas, gang rivalries may result in killings (Steinberg, 2004b, Ward, 2007a). An analysis of an unspecified number of murder dockets by the SAPS that was presented within the SAPS 2002/03 annual report indicated that 56% of murder cases reviewed had reportedly “started as an argument which degenerated into a fight and then a [fatal] assault”. In addition, 28% of the perpetrators in the assessed murder cases were family members, or were in an intimate relationship with the victim, while 22% and 19% were friends and acquaintances of the victims respectively (South African Police Service, 2003a).

Similarly, a SAPS docket analysis of 9,623 murder dockets during the 2004/05 reporting year found that 61.9% of perpetrators of murder were relatives, friends or acquaintances of the victims (South African Police Service, 2005b). Further to this, an analysis by the SAPS of 1,348 murder dockets from the 2007/08 reporting period indicated that the main motives and circumstances associated with murder during that period had been: misunderstandings or arguments (50.4% of dockets); consequences of other crimes (15.9% of dockets); “domestic-related” (7.3% of dockets); and “jealousy/love-triangle” (5.5% of all dockets). This study also found that alcohol abuse was a key contributing factor in murder cases (South African Police Service, 2009).

Comparable findings have been reported in subsequent SAPS annual reports, especially the 2010/11 report, which stated that the Crime Research and Statistics component within the SAPS Crime Intelligence had estimated that over the previous ten year period that the victims and perpetrators had been acquainted with one another in at least 70% of murder cases (South African Police Service, 2011d).

Homicide has typically transpired on the streets or in the homes of victims, and was more frequent on weekend nights (Kramer and Ratele, 2012). Studies have found that the availability of firearms significantly increased the risk of the lethality of violence in such contexts in South Africa (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008, Matzopoulos, et al., 2013, Swart, et al., 2015).

The literature on masculinity and violence in South Africa suggests that the perpetration of homicide has been closely tied to notions of manhood that reveres dominant men that are “always ready for a fight, never show fear, ignore pain, and play it cool.” Such a type of masculinity encourages bravado, weapon-carrying, excessive drinking of alcohol and dramatically increases the risk of violent confrontations between men and groups of men in public spaces (Ratele, 2009:20-21). The link between this form of masculinity and homicide has been amplified when men at risk of perpetrating violence live in communities where there are high levels of interpersonal violence; and where firearms are easily obtainable (Lazarus, et al., 2009, Redpath, et al., 2008).

9.1.3.3 Homicide/murder: Trends: 1994/95-2013/14

Between 1995/96 and 2011/12 the murder⁴⁵ rate (per 100,000 people) in South Africa plummeted by more than 50 per cent according to the SAPS data, falling from 67.9 to 30.9 respectively. For much of this period firearm injuries were one of the leading causes of violence-related deaths (Matzopoulos, et al., 2002, National Injury Mortality Surveillance System, 2000). In total it is estimated that 143,548⁴⁶ people were murdered with a firearm between 1 January 1994 and 31

⁴⁵ Murder, according to the SAPS entails the unlawful and intentional killing of a human being. International organisations, such as UNODC and the World Bank make use of the term ‘intentional homicide’, instead of murder for the purposes of comparing data between countries.


⁴⁶ This figure is calculated by combining the SAPS data published by the Western Cape Department of Community Safety and the National Crime Prevention Centre.

March 2014, which is equivalent to 35% of all murders for that period (Chetty, 2000, Department of Community Safety, 2015).

Between 1994 and 1998 South Africa's firearm homicide⁴⁷ rate remained relatively constant, with an annual average of close to 28 per 100,000 people, with the proportion of homicides involving firearms rising from 41.5% to 49.4% respectively (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). At this time firearm homicide was not evenly spread throughout South Africa, but was rather concentrated in small number of urban areas. Close to half of all firearm homicides in 1998 took place in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng (Chetty, 2000).


From 1998 South Africa's firearm homicide rate steadily declined to 17 per 100,000 in 2007 (a 40% reduction), with the total number of firearm homicides in South Africa shrinking from 12,413 to 8,319 over the same period (a 33% reduction) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Official disaggregated SAPS data on the firearm homicide rate for the period after 2008 has not been made publicly available. A study of 2009 mortuary data nonetheless indicated that there continued to be noticeable variations in firearm homicide across provinces, with such homicides continuing to be more pronounced in KwaZulu-Natal (42.3%), Gauteng (39.7%), Mpumalanga (33.2%) and the Western Cape (21.8%) compared to other provinces (Matzopoulos, et al., 2013).

Chart 9.1: Total firearm homicides in South Africa, 1994-2007



Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011)

Chart 9.2: Homicide rate in South Africa (per 100,000), 1994-2007




Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011); SAPS annual reports

⁴⁷ Homicide includes both intentional and unintentional or accidental killing of human beings.

By 2008 sharp force injuries had become the leading cause of non-natural death (including homicide) in South Africa (13.6% of total non-natural deaths), followed by firearms (10.8% of total non-natural deaths). Blunt force injuries accounted for 6.9% of such deaths. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town experienced the most noticeable reductions in firearm homicides, with such reductions evident for all age groups (National Injury Mortality Surveillance System, 2009). This trend was maintained in 2009, with sharp force injuries (41.8% of all homicides) continuing to be the leading cause of homicide⁴⁸ followed by firearms (29% of all homicides) (Matzopoulos, et al., 2013). A more recent study on injury-related mortality estimated that for all metropolitan areas firearm homicides constituted 44% of all homicides in 2005, which subsequently decreased to 38.5% in 2009 (Matzopoulos, et al., 2015).

Chart 9.3: Non-natural deaths in South Africa by instrument (Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria), 1999-2008



Source: National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (2009)

9.1.3.4 Current explanations for murder/homicide trends

Only a handful of studies have sought to determine the causes of the reduction in the homicide rate in South Africa. All of these studies have concluded that such a decrease was primarily attributable to the introduction of more rigorous firearm controls that were ushered in with the introduction of the Firearms Control Act (FCA) (Act 60 of 2000) (Abrahams, et al., 2012, Matzopoulos, et al., 2014). At first glance this common explanation across studies appears to be plausible given the underlying logic of the FCA. That is (as described in Chapter 7), this Act has chiefly sought to use more restrictive firearm licensing procedures to limit individual access to firearms as a means to lower the risk of firearm injuries and deaths. In addition, there are approximate parallels between the initial point at which the firearm homicide rate began to decline and the finalisation of the FCA text.

However, there are two fundamental shortcomings with this reasoning. Firstly, despite the text of the FCA having been approved by Parliament in 2000, this Act only entered into South African law in late 2004 after the promulgation of the regulations for this Act, which by then was well into the firearm homicide downturn. Secondly, most of these studies provide no detailed analysis of how the wide varieties of FCA-related controls were implemented and their specific

⁴⁸ Homicides accounted for 36.2% of all non-natural deaths in 2009 according to mortuary data.

relationship to the reduction in firearm homicides. This is a key shortcoming in the literature given the South African government's mediocre track record in implementing the array of other legislation that has violence prevention aspirations as shown by Seedat, et al. (2009) and Jewkes, et al. (2002).

As discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis, the SAPS have been at the front and centre of the execution and enforcement of firearm controls in post-apartheid South Africa. It has principally been due to the actions of the police that the provisions of firearm control legislation have been applied or disregarded. In other words, the effectiveness of firearm controls in South Africa has ultimately been determined by the capacity and resourcefulness of the police, not by the legislation itself.

Matzopoulos, et al. (2014), who have undertaken the most prominent study on firearm homicide in South Africa to date, suggested, in general terms, that firearm collections, confiscations and destruction by the police and military, combined with the stricter application of the firearm licensing provisions of the previous legislation, may have contributed to the decline in firearm homicides between 2001 and 2005. However, no substantial analysis of the nature of the policing of firearms and firearms controls was provided in this study.

9.1.4 Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA)

9.1.4.1 Reliability of IPFA data

The charge of illegal or unlawful⁴⁹ possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA)⁵⁰ entails the possession of firearms and ammunition for which one does not have an official license issued by the SAPS. The reporting of such a crime is specifically categorised by SAPS as a crime that is 'heavily dependent on police action for detection'⁵¹, as the illegal possession of a firearm is entirely dependent on the police to verify and investigate. That is, if the SAPS encounter a person in possession of firearms and ammunition, usually at a roadblock or during a search, they are authorised to undertake a series of actions to determine if that person is legally entitled to possess the firearm(s) and ammunition in question. This entails instructing such person(s) to produce a firearm licence; scrutinising the license (if available); and, thereafter verifying its authenticity. Where it is found that the firearm(s) and ammunition are illegal then the SAPS open an IPFA case.

If the inspection/verification of the firearm and firearm license reveals that it is an unlicensed firearm or the firearm license is fraudulent then the SAPS are

⁴⁹ The term "illegal" was replaced by the term "unlawful" in the 2012/13 SAPS annual report crime statistics table for the first time in order to bring reporting in line with the FCA. A person would be guilty of this offence if they were "unlawfully in possession of" firearms and ammunition, and were "not the holder of a licence, permit or authorisation to possess" firearms and ammunition. In 2014/15 the term "illegal" was reinstated replacing "unlawful".

⁵⁰ In 2013/14 SAPS renamed this category "unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition", but reverted to using IPFA in 2014/15.

⁵¹ Other crime categories that have also been classified as such include drug-related crime and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.


required to confiscate the firearm (and ammunition) and place it within the SAPS Section 13 stores (see Chapter 7). In this regard the SAPS are required to administer a series of tests, such as ballistics testing and at times, etching⁵², as well as create official records about such firearms and ammunition. This process allows for verifications and audits to take place thereby mitigating the possibility of false and duplicate reporting and underreporting. Added to this, IPFA targets are typically not overly prioritised in the SAPS performance charts at the station-level, and hence the incentive to intentionally misreport such crimes is minimised.

It is important to note that IPFA cases relate specifically to persons whom the SAPS determine to have been unlawfully/illegally in possession of firearms and ammunition. It does not relate to the amount of firearms and ammunition that have been confiscated by the police. That is, a single IPFA case can range from a low-level gangster in possession of handful of bullets to a businessman who owns a warehouse crammed with automatic weapons.

9.1.4.2 Overview of IPFA trends and IPFA as an indicator of SAPS operations

A review of aggregated national data on reported cases of IPFA reveals that there was a general upward trend between 1994/95 and 1999/2000, with there having been a 25% increase between these two reporting years. This was followed by a slight decline (2%) the following year, which was subsequently followed by an 11% increase between 2000/01 and 2003/04. Thereafter the level of reported IPFA cases declined significantly (20%) during the subsequent two years, which was then followed by a gradual upswing, with some minor variations over the next nine years (see Chart 9.4 below). The distinctive peaks in 1999/2000 and 2003/04 correspond with the periods in which Operation Monozite, Operation Crackdown, and Operation Sethunya were implemented respectively.

Chart 9.4: IPFA total (national), 1994/95-2014/15



Source: SAPS annual reports

⁵² Etching is a process by which an acid-type liquid or gel is applied to the surface of a firearm in an attempt to recover serial numbers and/or markings on firearms that have been damaged, modified or erased.

The study below, which includes a visual inspection of the trajectory patterns of IPFA data at the SAPS station level in 132 precincts for the period 1994/95-2014/15, reveals that significant annual increases and/or peaks in such reported crime closely corresponds to major police operations that were reportedly relevant to these precincts. This was particularly the case the between 1998/99 and 2001/02 (Monozite/Crackdown/Tsipi back-to-to-back operations) and in 2003/04 (Operation Sethunya). In addition, there were also noticeable increases/peaks in the IPF trajectory patterns in many of the sample station areas during large province-specific operations, such as Operation Iron Fist (Gauteng) and Operation Combat (Western Cape).

Hence, given such checks, verifications and dynamics IPFA appears to be a relatively robust data category. Furthermore, IPFA data is one of the strongest indicators of, or proxy for, the occurrence and intensity of high-density police operations in high crime police areas as the seizure of illegal firearms and ammunition has been a major focus of such operations irrespective of the size of the operation (as previously discussed in Chapters 7 and 8).

9.2 The potential crime reduction effect of SAPS high-density operations: A study of SAPS station-level data, 1994/95 – 2014/15

9.2.1 Study objective

The study below makes use of a sample of 132 high crime SAPS station areas (or precincts) for the period from 1994/95 to 2014/15. The objective is to ascertain to if SAPS high-density operations (using the annual number of reported IPFA cases as a proxy indicator) can account for reductions in the number of annual murder cases in such areas.

9.2.2 Research method

This study adopts a case series approach that examines and retrospectively compares trends in the number of annual cases of murder with respect to trends in number of annual IPFA cases for 132 SAPS stations areas over a 21-year period (the SAPS reporting years: 1994/95 to 2014/15). The SAPS had previously identified all of these 132 station areas to be the target of high-density operations over much of the study period. The data for both murder and IPFA were then displayed in the form of line charts. The use of such incident data, rather than crime rates, is in keeping with a significant number of studies that have focused on place-based criminality and place-based policing (Braga, 2001, Braga, et al., 2015, Groff, et al., 2010, Koper, 1995, Sherman, 1990, Weisburd, et al., 2004).

Using crime incident data rather than crime rates has an obvious drawback in that incident data does not reflect population growth/decline within the focal areas over the 21-year period. However, as indicated above, historical crime ratio data for the SAPS station areas is not publicly available; and estimating the population size per precinct per annum for crime analysis purposes is exceedingly challenging given that numerous non-residents may be present in some areas for significant periods of time (such as for employment of

entertainment purposes). Furthermore, in majority of areas, the annual level of murder fluctuated considerably over relatively short periods of time (less than five years), which is unlikely to have been a consequence of population dynamics.

A trajectory pattern analysis of the 132 line charts was undertaken by means of visual inspection in order to assess trends and the relationships between annual murder and IPFA cases over the period of more than two decades. Trajectory pattern analysis was originally used to study criminal careers by Nagin and Land (1993), which used this technique to categorise groups of individual criminal offenders with similar life course pathways in order to study patterns of change in criminality over a period of more than ten years. This approach was also used by Nagin and Tremblay (1999) in their study on the developmental trajectory of male juvenile delinquency. Since then a number of US criminologists have used trajectory analysis to examine temporal crime trends within crime hot spots over time in order to determine if such criminogenic spaces display unique crime patterns relative to other areas (Groff, et al., 2010, Ratcliffe, 2004, Stults, 2010, Weisburd, et al., 2004, Weisburd, et al., 2009). Moreover Griffith and Chavez (2004) have used trajectory analysis to analyse homicide trends in 831 census tracts in Chicago between 1980 and 1995; and McCall, et al. (2011) have used a similar approach with regards to 176 large US cities from 1976 to 2005.

Researchers that have used trajectory pattern analysis have typically grouped the multitude of trajectory observations into a small number of common patterns in order to more easily facilitate the interpretation of the research findings. A study by Weisburd, et al. (2004), for example, identified 18 distinctive trajectories of criminal offending for crime hot spots from an analysis of criminal incidents in close to 30,000 street segments in the US city of Seattle over a 14-year period. Thereafter three common trajectory patterns of criminality were discerned in order to frame the discussion of the study findings. Similarly, the crime hot spot study by Groff, et al. (2010), which was also of street segments (n = 24,023) in Seattle, categorised the various trajectory findings into eight common patterns.

Such studies have typically used statistical modelling techniques, but there has been some studies that have used visual inspection, along with other methodological techniques, to determine common patterns (Allard, et al., 2013, Braga, et al., 2010, Payne and Gallagher, 2016). Visual inspection or visual analysis is a sub-category of visual research methods that has most commonly been employed within anthropology and sociology (Pauwels, 2010), and is gaining currency within other social science disciplines (Hamilton, 2006, Wiles, et al., 2012). The reason being is that it can potentially provide a “deeper and more subtle exploration of social contexts and relationships” that are less possible with more established social science research methods (Spencer, 2011:1). It has primarily been used to scrutinise visual data, such as photographs, video footage, and graphics (usually in the form of charts and maps). Moreover it is a technique that has been used to: identify patterns of societal phenomena; the relationship between such patterns; and the relative strengths and weaknesses of these patterns and pattern relationships (Grady,

2008). It has also been used to determine the effectiveness of certain treatment interventions in psychology (Bulté and Onghena, 2012), with statisticians underscoring the need to scrutinise graphical representations of data prior to embarking on more sophisticated statistical analysis (Wilkinson and Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999).

In criminology some researchers have increasingly suggested that graphical representations of criminal justice data can “provide insights that would not have been possible using standard statistical methods”, especially in terms of “complex, non-linear relationships” and “dynamic interactions” between variables (Maltz, 2010:28). In the area of crime mapping, visual inspection has been a commonly used method of research and analysis (Bowers, et al., 2004, Buerger, et al., 1995, Hiropoulos and Porter, 2014). Visual inspection has also been used as one of a number of methods to study transnational trafficking in illicit goods (Barberet, 2014), organised criminal networks (Malm, et al., 2010), as well as the trajectories of criminal careers (Greenberg, 2016).

An attempt was made to construct a representative control group in order to minimise bias and develop a benchmark that would reflect movements in murder levels in station levels where high-density police operations were not pursued. However, due to the nature of the SAPS data, such a control group could not be identified (see below for further details).

A lack of available and reliable population, socio-economic and disaggregated case data (such as seasonal or monthly variations in reported crime) at the station level precluded a more sophisticated trend analysis. Small-scale civil society and/or local government violence prevention interventions have been initiated in some of the station areas, such as in Nyanga and Inanda. However, no reliable data on the impact of such interventions was available for analysis, and the scale of such projects meant that they were unlikely to have had a noticeable impact on murder trends throughout the entire precinct. Furthermore, international and South African evidence suggests that the availability of alcohol and excessive alcohol consumption have directly contributed to violence (Livingston, 2008, Matzopoulos, 2005), but similarly no such comprehensive data on alcohol availability and use at the station area level existed at the time of this study.

A review essay by Cassidy, et al. (2014) indicated that globally a small number of studies on urban upgrading have shown that such interventions have the potential to contribute to reductions in violence and criminal offending, but at that time, no studies had been undertaken in middle- and low-income countries. More recently published research findings of a handful of neighbourhood level township upgrading projects in Cape Town have presented mixed results, with some of the upgrading interventions yielding modest violence reduction impacts, but only in the specific physical locations where they were implemented.

For example, in a study of the impact of urban upgrading programmes in Freedom Park (Mitchells Plain), Sheffield Road (Philippi) and Monwabisi Park, (Khayelitsha), Brown-Luthango, et al. (2016:1-2) found that: “In a context

marked by high unemployment, poor education and limited opportunities to break the cycle of poverty, the long-term impact and sustainability of upgrading interventions is limited in the absence of targeted programmes aimed at addressing the structural factors which drive and sustain high levels of violence and crime". Furthermore, preliminary (unpublished) study findings by researchers closely associated with Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) have indicated that robberies declined significantly within the VPUU business development upgrade site in Harare (Khayelitsha) after the implementation of the upgrade and other crime prevention interventions in this small area (Krause and Shay, 2016). However, ethnographic research in Khayelitsha undertaken by Barolsky (2016), suggests that township upgrading projects by VPUU may have undermined community social cohesion.

9.2.3 Sample design

9.2.3.1 *'Treatment' sample*

In order to assess the impact of high-density police operations on annual reported cases of murder in South Africa a criterion purposeful sampling strategy was adopted, the logic of such a strategy was to "review and study all cases that [met] some predetermined criterion of importance" (Patton, 2002:238). This entailed the selection of "the most productive sample to answer the research question" (Marshall, 1996:523). In terms of this study such a strategy involved the selection of a sample of station areas that were drawn from those high crime precincts that the SAPS prioritised for high-density operations.

As indicated in the previous chapter, from the mid to late 1990s the SAPS senior leadership earmarked 169 such precincts for regular high-density police operations. The SAPS continued to prioritise the majority of these station areas well into the 2010s. A full listing of these station areas, which was drawn from all nine provinces, was provided in Chapter 7. This grouping of station areas represent a wide degree of diversity in terms of demographics, socioeconomic conditions, geographical locations, and SAPS operational interventions over the 21-year period.

Consequently, given this state of affairs, it was essential that the largest possible sample be constructed from these 169 station areas in order for valid inferences to be established about the possible effects of SAPS operations in these station areas. Such an approach mitigated the possibility of selection bias, which has been common to retrospective studies, as well as improved the significance, accuracy and representivity of the findings (Marshall, 1996). A large sample also greatly increased the prospects that outliers would be identified, and the likelihood that the external validity or generalisability of the results would be enhanced.

Ideally, all 169 stations should have been included in the sample. However there are four considerations about the reliability and accuracy of the SAPS station-level data that were taken into account in order to finalise (and reduce) the sample size.

Firstly, over the past two decades the SAPS has constructed additional police stations and demarcated new station areas, many of which have been within existing high crime precincts. This has ostensibly been an attempt to improve policing effectiveness and public reporting on crime. The subdividing of station areas has significant implications for historical analyses of crime statistics as crime reporting becomes split between the original station area and the new area(s). In addition, the construction of new police stations has the potential to change the relationship between residents and SAPS personnel, which in turn can affect crime-reporting patterns during the focal period. Hence, such station areas were not included in the sample. Secondly, for similar reasons, station areas that were re-zoned between provinces during the focal period were omitted. Thirdly, station areas with consistently low levels of murder were excluded from the study, as murder levels were unlikely to have been notably influenced by the implementation of police operations. Fourthly, station areas where the credibility of the crime data had been called into question were not included in the sample.

Nonetheless, some exceptions were made due to the importance of certain station areas. The Lentegeur police station area was established within the boundaries of the Mitchells Plain precinct in 2013/14. Despite this development Mitchells Plain was included in the sample, as this precinct has consistently had one of the highest annual levels of reported murder and IPFA cases. In addition, the timing of the establishment of SAPS Lentegeur only had an impact on crime reporting in the last two focal years. Similarly within the Katlehong, Mankweng and Tembisa precincts, new policing areas, namely Katlehong North, Sebayeng and Tembisa South police stations were founded in 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 respectively. These developments arguably only had a marginal impact on the trend analysis (South African Government News Agency, 2013, South African Police Service, 2014b).

Concerns have been raised about the integrity of crime data (particularly under reporting and intentional misclassification) at the Bishop Lavis, Knysna, Oudtshoorn and Paarl East stations. However, these data problems reportedly did not relate to murder or IPFA cases (Bruce, 2010), and hence these four station areas were retained in the sample.

As a result of taking these considerations into account 37 station areas were excluded from the final sample, the details of which are provided in Table 9.2 below. Hence the final sample includes 132 station areas, from all nine provinces: Western Cape (13); Gauteng (24); KwaZulu-Natal (24); Eastern Cape (29); Free State (11); North-West (8); Limpopo (9); Mpumalanga (11); and Northern Cape (3). The full listing of station areas is provided in Table 9.3 below.

Table 9.2: High crime station areas excluded from sample

Reason for exclusion	Station areas
Additional SAPS station areas established in original area	Khayelitsha; KwaMashu; Lenasia; Mamelodi; Upington; Kuilsriver; Paarl; Queenstown, Witbank; Sasolburg; Potchefstroom, Pinetown and Klerksdorp
Low levels of reported murder (relative to	Humewood; Makhado; Malamulele; Makopane;

other high crime areas in the province)	Sophia Town; Pretoria Central; Sunnyside; Pabablello; Rosedale; Roodepan; Kakamas; Letsitele; Bele Bele; Tzaneen; Cape Town Central; and Batho
Station areas rezoned for other provinces	Calcutta; Bushbuckridge; Mabopane; Ga-Rankuwa; Loate; and Temba
Data credibility concerns	Ngangelizwe; Tzaneen and Mountain Rise ⁵³

Table 9.3: Treatment sample - 132 high crime SAPS station areas

Code	SAPS station area	Code	SAPS station area	Code	SAPS station area	Code	SAPS station area
	Western Cape	Se	Sebokeng	Dv	Duncan Village	We	Welkom
Bl	Bishop Lavis	Te	Tembisa	El	East London		North West
De	Delft	Ye	Yeoville	Nc	Ngcobo (Engcobo)	Br	Brits
Er	Elsies River	Va	Vanderbijlpark	Ge	Gelvandale	Ik	Ikageng
Gu	Gugulethu		KwaZulu-Natal	Gr	Grahamstown	Jo	Jouberton
Kn	Knysna	Bh	Bhekithemba	Id	Idutywa	Mm	Mmabatho
Kr	Kraaifontein	Cm	Cato Manor	Iy	Inyibiba	Pk	Phokeng
La	Langa	Ch	Chatsworth	Kh	Kamesh	Ru	Rustenburg
Ma	Manenberg	Dc	Durban Central	Kt	King Williams' Town	Tl	Tlhabane
Mp	Mitchells Plain	Em	Empangeni	Kb	Kwanobuhle	Vr	Vryburg
Ny	Nyanga	Es	Eshikawini/ Esikaleni	Kk	Kwazakele		Limpopo
Ou	Oudtshoorn	Eh	Eshowe	Lu	Lusikisiki	Bg	Bolobedu
Pe	Paarl East	Hc	Hillcrest	Li	Libode	Gi	Giyani
Wo	Worcester	In	Inanda	Mn	Mdantsane	Le	Lebowakgomo
	Gauteng	Kw	Kwadabeka	Mw	Motherwell	Mr	Maake
Al	Alexandra	Kz	Kwadukuza	Mf	Mount Frere	Mx	Mankweng
At	Atteridgeville	Km	Kwamsane	Mq	Mqanduli	Pw	Polokwane
Be	Benoni	Ls	Ladysmith	Mt	Mthatha	Ss	Seshego
Bo	Booyens	Md	Madadeni	Nb	New Brighton	Ty	Thohoyandou
Da	Daveyton	Mh	Mariannhill	Nq	Nggeleni	Tu	Tubatse
Do	Dobsonville	Ng	Nongoma	Ps	Port St Johns		Mpumalanga
Ev	Evaton	Os	Osizweni	Vu	Vulindlela	Eb	Embalenhle
Hi	Hillbrow	Ph	Phoenix	Wa	Walmer	Eo	Ermelo
Ip	Ivory Park	Pb	Pietermaritzburg	Zw	Zwelitsha	Ke	Kabokweni
Je	Jeppe	Pl	Plessislaer		Free State	Ky	Kanyamazane
Jc	Johannesburg Central	Po	Point	Bt	Bethlehem	Kf	Kwaggafontein
Ka	Katlehong	Rb	Richards Bay	Bs	Bloemspruit	Kx	Kwamhlanga
Kl	Kliptown	Um	Umlazi	Bi	Boithuso	Ms	Masoyi
Kd	Krugersdorp	Ve	Verulam	Bb	Botshabelo	Nl	Nelspruit
Me	Meadowlands		Eastern Cape	Kg	Kagisanong	Pi	Piet Retief
Mo	Moroka	Bd	Bethelsdorp	Mk	Maokeng	Sy	Siyabuswa
Of	Orange Farm	Bf	Buffalo Flats	Od	Odendaalsrus	To	Tonga
Ra	Randfontein	Bu	Butterworth	Pr	Park Road		Northern Cape
Ri	Rietgat	Ca	Cambridge	Sl	Selosesha	Gw	Galeshewe
Ro	Roodepoort	Cr	Cradock	Th	Thabong	Gh	Groblersthoop
						Ki	Kimberley

9.2.3.2 Absence of a control group

Ideally a cohort research design should have been employed for this study, which would have entailed the construction of equal sized and representative 'treatment' and control groups. Conventional scientific wisdom suggests that

⁵³ The data for Ngangelizwe appears to be problematic, especially as between 2012/13 and 2013/14 there was a dramatic and inexplicable change in various categories of crime. Mountain Rise was excluded due to reporting fraud in that the station commander had submitted falsified crime data in order for it appear that this station was excelling in terms of the SAPS performance criteria.

such a research design significantly enhances the internal validity and veracity of the findings of a study (Mann, 2003, Schulz and Grimes, 2002, Wittes, 2002). However, as with all retrospective studies, one is at the mercy of historical decisions that were made regarding ‘treatment’; and the type of data, the manner in which the data was recorded, and the level of detail of the data that has been made publicly available (Dekkers, et al., 2012, Hess, 2004). Hence, many retrospective studies have been undertaken without a control group.⁵⁴

In this regard, with very few exceptions, all SAPS station areas with moderate to high levels of violent crime (particularly murder) appeared to have been subjected to markedly elevated levels of annual IPFA cases on at least one occasion between 1994/95 and 2014/15. Only a miniscule number of precincts with moderate levels of violent crime reported consistently low levels of annual IPFA data over the 21-year period. The majority of these station areas were rural towns in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces where firearms were infrequently used to commit murder. Key examples included: De Doorns, Elliot, Graaff Reinet, Humansdorp, Joubertina and Villiersdorp.

9.3 Results

The section below describes the findings derived from the trajectory pattern analysis based on a visual inspection of the annual reported murder and IPFA case data for all of the 132 station areas displayed in the form of line charts for the period 1994/95 to 2014/15. All of the 132 line charts, along with line charts for total cases in all nine provinces, are included in Appendix 3.

9.3.1 Trends in annual reported cases of murder

As previously indicated, aggregated national SAPS data showed a sustained decline in the total annual reported murder cases for the entire country between the mid 1990s and the 2011/12 reporting year. This was also observable at the provincial level, with the exception of the Western Cape where reported cases of murder only significantly decreased after 2002/03. In Gauteng, the total annual reported murders declined from the late 1990s.

However, the charting of station level data between 1994/95 and 2014/15 revealed a more complex state of affairs. Annual reported cases of murder, even in places deemed to be high crime areas by the SAPS, were disproportionately distributed. In the 132-sample station areas the mean of the annual average number of reported murders over these 21 years was 60, but the annual average over this period varied substantially between stations, from 14 in Vryburg to 256 in Nyanga. See Appendix 1 for a complete depiction of distribution of the averages of reported murder for the 132 sample police station areas.

⁵⁴ It is predominantly only in prospective cohort studies, such as the random-controlled trials conducted by scholars interested in hot spots policing, where the cooperation of the police has been secured, can representative and equal sized control groups be established prior to conducting the experiment (see Chapter 3 for more details).

Densely populated and underdeveloped policing areas on the outskirts of major cities (in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng), which generally included large informal settlements, tended to have regularly experienced amongst the highest levels of reported murder. Other than Nyanga, key examples included: Inanda (219 annual average); Umlazi (201 annual average); Plessislaer (174 annual average); Gugulethu (152 annual average); Kwadukuza (147 annual average); Tembisa (143 annual average); Katilehong (142 annual average); and Alexandra (130 annual average) (Marx and Charlton, 2003, Noble, et al., 2014, Statistics South Africa, 2016).

Station areas that were located in rural areas in more sparsely populated provinces tended to experience lower levels of murder, as is the case with Vryburg. Other examples included: Groblershoop (15 annual average); Tubatse (15 annual average); Selosesha (20 annual average); Lebowakgomo (21 annual average); Kwaggafontein (22 annual average); and Bolobedu (23 annual average).

In many of the high crime areas in this sample there was considerable fluctuation in the trends in reported murder cases over time. That is, the overall murder trend was in a downward direction, but there were significant peaks and troughs at the station level, with some station areas showing an aggregate upward trend in reported murders from the late 1990s, such as: Bethelsdorp; Delft; Ngcobo; Roodepoort; Botshabelo; Kagisanong; Rustenburg; and Thohoyandou. In high crime areas in more rural areas, or areas close to small- to medium-sized towns, the variability in the annual level of reported murder was pronounced, as in the case of: Ladysmith; Osizweni; Brits; Engcobo; Grahamstown; Idutywa; Libode; Lusikisiki; Polokwane; Mankweng; Kwamhlanga; and Tonga.

In a number of large townships close to major cities murder cases continued to increase after the late 1990s and only peaked in early 2000s before significantly declining until 2010/11 or thereabouts, such as: Atteridgeville; Gugulethu; Ivory Park; Inanda; Kwadabeka; Langa; Motherwell; and Nyanga. From 2010/11 there was a marked and sustained increase in the annual number of reported murders in many of these large townships. The trend in Umlazi, one of the most dangerous policing areas in South Africa (Marks, 2005), was somewhat different. That is, there was a gradual decline in the annual incidents of murder after the substantial decrease in political violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the mid to late 1990s, with an ensuing 54% increase in cases of reported murder between 2004/05 and 2008/09. Thereafter there was a 50% decrease in murder between 2008/09 and 2012/13, which was then followed by an upswing.

There was considerable variation in reported murder in policing areas typically affected by gang violence. In some places, such as Elsie's River, Manenberg and Mitchells Plain there were significant declines in reported murder cases from the late 1990s and early 2000s, with an escalation in reported murders from 2009/10. In other such areas, as in the case of Delft, Kraaifontein, Chatsworth, Phoenix and Verulam, the murder trend vacillated considerably between 1994/95 and 2014/15. Similar, but less severe, trends were observable in inner

city slum-like policing areas in more recent years, such as: Durban Central; Jeppe, Booysens; Johannesburg Central; Point and Yeoville. Hillbrow appears to be an exception in this regard, with the SAPS having reported more than a 400% decline in reported murder cases between 1996/97 and 2010/11.

9.3.2 Trends in annual reported cases of IPFA

At the station level the mean average of the 132 sample station areas over the period of 21 years was 41, but there was considerable variation across station areas throughout that period (see Appendix 2). There were some similarities with the manner in which average annual murder cases were distributed, particularly in those policing areas that included major townships with sizeable informal settlements, which consistently reported high levels of IPFA cases. Relevant examples included: Nyanga (140 annual average); Tembisa (126 annual average); Inanda (125 annual average); Katlehong (110 annual average); and Gugulethu (102 annual average). Similarly, station areas in most rural areas (with low murder levels) typically reported significantly lower than average annual cases of IPFA, such as: Groblershoop (2 annual average); Tubatse (9 annual average); Selosesha (8 annual average); Vryburg (7 annual average) and Zwelitsha (7 annual average).

Areas regularly affected by gang violence reported the uppermost averages for IPFA cases, such as Mitchells Plain (176 annual average), which reported the highest annual average in the sample, which was more than four times the mean. Comparable areas included: Bishop Lavis (117 annual average); Manenberg (92 annual average); and Delft (79 annual average) (Pinnock, 2016). Hillbrow, which has been consistently notorious for having amplified levels of firearm crime and violence (Quest Research Services, 2013), also recorded amongst the highest IPFA levels (147 annual average). Other policing areas that included major inner city slums also experienced elevated levels of IPFA, such as Johannesburg Central (97 annual average) and Durban Central (75 annual average) (Marx and Charlton, 2003).

During the period in which the back-to-back Operation Monozite and Operation Crackdown were implemented (1998/99-2002/03) there was a clear surge in annual reported, or a sustained elevation in IPFA cases, in at least 112 of the 132 sample station areas (85%). The outcome of Operation Sethunya (2003/04), which was almost exclusively focused on illegal firearms and ammunition, was clearly discernible within at least 85 station areas (64.4%), with the annual number of IPFA cases peaking in these areas in 2003/04. In most of the station areas affected by these three operations there was a clear and sustained increase in the annual number of reported cases of IPFA between 1998/99 and 2003/04. This was followed by a distinctive decline in the number of such crimes between 2004/05 and 2006/07, which corresponded with an absence of major national SAPS firearm operations during this period.

It was not possible to reliably determine if the impact of Operation Sword and Shield (1996/97) was reflected in this data series, as available crime data for most high crime station areas prior to 1994/95 has been widely regarded as

being inaccurate and unreliable (De Kock, et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the above charts revealed that in at least 45 station areas (34.1%) there were significant increases in annual IPFA cases during the period Sword and Shield was implemented.

As indicated in the previous chapters, Operation Duty Calls / Festive Season was an annual national operation that was pursued during the extended festive season period from 2007/08 onwards. There was some variation in the focal station areas for this operation from 2007/08, with the IPFA being one of many priorities. Nevertheless, in at least 87 of the sample police station areas (65.9%) the effect of Operation Duty Calls / Festive Season was clearly perceptible by means of at least one significant upswing in reported annual cases of IPFA. It was not possible to determine if Operation Fiela-Reclaim had had an effect on IPFA levels as this operation took place during the 2015/16 reporting period.

In the Western Cape significant peaks in annual IPFA cases in areas with high levels of gang violence closely corresponded with the implementation of dedicated anti-gang SAPS operations in this province, such as Recoil (1997-99), Saladin (1998), Slasher (2001) and Combat (2011/12 – 2014/15). The key precincts in this regard were: Bishop Lavis; Elsie's River; Manenberg, Mitchells Plain; Kraaifontein; and Delft. A similar effect was observable in Gauteng in relation to Operation Iron Fist (2006/07), especially in Hillbrow and Johannesburg Central. In Inanda (KwaZulu-Natal) there is a noticeable spike in IPFA cases at the time of Operation Ventilation (1999).

Table 9.4: Elevated IPFA levels and national SAPS high-density operations

High density operation	Station areas (codes)	No. of station areas	% of total
Sword & Shield	Er; Gu; At; Be; Do; Ev; Hi; Je; Jc; Ka; Me; Of; Ri; Se; Bh; Ch; Dc; Es; Kz; Ph; Pb; Po; Ve; Bd; Bw; El; Kt; Mw; Mq; Nq; Ps; Wa; Bt; Bb; Kg; Mk; Od; Pr; Mm; Le; Ss; Ty; Eo; Kf; Pi	45	34.1
Monozone/Crack-down/Tsipha	Er; Gu; Kr; La; Ma; Mp; Ny; Pe; Wo; Al; At; Be; Bo; Da; Do; Ev; Hi; Ip; Je; Jc; Ka; Kl; Kd; Me; Mo; Of; Ra; Ri; Ro; Se; Te; Va; Bh; Cm; Ch; Dc; Em; Es; Eh; Hc; In; Kw; Kz; Km; Ls; Md; Mh; Ng; Os; Ph; Pb; Pl; Po; Rb; Um; Ve; Bd; Bf; Bw; Ca; Dv; El; Nc; Ge; Gr; Id; Iy; Kt; Kb; Kk; Li; Lu; Mn; Ml; Mf; Mq; Mt; Nb; Nq; Ps; Vu; Wa; Bt; Kg; Mk; Pr; Sl; Th; We; Ik; Mm; Pk; Ru; Bg; Gi; Le; Mr; Mw; Pw; Ss; Ty; Tu; Eb; Ke; Ky; Kf; Kx; Ms; Nl; Pi; Sy; To; Mx	113	85.6
Sethunya	Bl; Kn; Ny; Pe; Wo; Al; At; Be; Bo; Do; Ev; Hi; Ip; Je; Jc; Ka; Me; Mo; Of; Ra; Ri; Ro; Se; Te; Va; Bh; Cm; Ch; Dc; Em; Es; Eh; Hc; In; Kw; Kz; Km; Ls; Md; Ng; Os; Ph; Pb; Pl; Po; Rb; Ve; Bd; Bf; Bw; Ca; Dv; El; Gr; Id; Iy; Kk; Mn; Ml; Mf; Mq; Mt; Nb; Nq; Ps; Wa; Bb; Kg; Th; Br; Ik; Jo; Mm; Ru; Tl; Pw; Ss; Ty; Tu; Ke; Ky; Ms; Pi; Sy; Mw	85	64.4
Duty Calls & other post-2004/05 operations	Bl; De; Er; Gu; Kr; La; Ma; Mp; Ny; Wo; Al; At; Be; Bo; Da; Do; Hi; Ip; Je; Jc; Ka; Kl; Kd; Me; Of; Ra; Ri; Ro; Te; Va; Bh; Cm; Ch; Dc; Em; Es; Eh; Hc; In; Kw; Kz; Km; Ls; Mh; Ng; Os; Ph; Pb; Po; Rb; Um; Ve; Bd; Bw; Ca; El; Nc; Ge; Id; Kb; Li; Lu; Ml; Mq; Nb; Nq; Ps; Wa;	87	65.9

	Bs; Bb; Kg; Pr; Br; Mm; Pk; Mr; Tu; Eb; Eo; Ke; Kx; Ms; Nl; Pi; Sy; To; Mx		
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9.3.3 Trajectory pattern types

Each of the line charts from the 132 SAPS station areas presented a unique trajectory pattern of annual murder and annual IPFA data for the period 1994/95 – 2014/15 (see Appendix 3). By means of visual inspection six general trajectory patterns that related to the level and direction of the sequential changes in the two crime categories over time were identified from these 132 trajectory patterns. As indicated above, such a categorisation exercise allowed for a more structured analysis of the relationship between the trajectories of the two crime types. These six general patterns are described and discussed below with Chart 9.5 (below) providing a graphical representation of the patterns.

9.3.3.1 Converging crossover

This pattern entails an elevated level of murder during the mid to late 1990s, while IPFA levels are relatively low at this time. Thereafter the murder trend line declines until 2010/11 (or thereabouts). From that point onwards the murder trajectory displays minor variations or may plateau. The IPFA trend line increases from 1994/95 until around 1999/00 with it being noticeably elevated at the times of relevant SAPS major high-density operations thereafter, particularly between 2000/01 and in 2004/05. The trajectory of the IPFA trend line subsequently converges with the IPFA line in a general downward direction (with some variability), and crosses over the murder trend line at least at one point in time.

This pattern was particularly prevalent in some of the most densely populated townships and inner city slum-like areas in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (with the exception of the Johannesburg Central precinct), with the greatest number station areas (41 out of 132 or 31%) displaying this general type of pattern. Some 25 station areas (out of the 41 station areas) were from Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, with Alexandra, Hillbrow, Inanda, Rietgat and Nongoma being amongst the most representative of such a pattern. Similar patterns were also displayed in precincts that included large towns with sizeable townships, such as Paarl East, Worcester, Nelspruit, Butterworth and Ikageng.

9.3.3.2 Converging connection

This pattern is similar to the converging crossover pattern in that murder levels are at their highest during the mid 1990s, while at the same time IPFA levels are relatively low. Thereafter the murder trend line generally declines until around 2010/11. From that point onwards the murder trend line displays minor variations or plateaus. The IPFA trend line increases from 1994/95 to around 1999/00 with it being noticeably elevated at the times of relevant SAPS major high-density operations, particularly between 1999/00 and in 2004/05. The two trend lines do not cross, but converge closely after 2003/04, both in a general downward direction. A total of 18 precincts displayed this general pattern (13.6%).

The majority of policing areas that displayed this pattern were in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape (13 out of 18). The areas in question ranged from sizeable townships, such as Bhekithemba, Plessislaer, Motherwell and Mdantsane; to small cities and large towns such as Mthatha, King William's Town and Grahamstown; to mining communities such as Odendaalsrus and Embalenhle.

9.3.3.3 Variable convergence

In this pattern the murder and IPFA trajectory pathways vary considerably with the murder trend line mostly being above the IPFA trend line. The IPFA trend line displays noticeable peaks or is at an elevated level at the times of relevant major SAPS high-density operations for these areas, particularly between 1998/99 and 2001/02, and in 2003/04. In many such cases the murder and IPFA trend lines converge at a number of points, with there being some minor crossovers at some points in time, and then typically converge towards the end of the focal period. This general pattern was exhibited in 30 station areas (22.7%), with it mainly being applicable to large towns in a variety of provinces (such as Oudtshoorn, Ermelo, Brits, Rustenburg and Knysna), as well as to some densely populated townships (such as Gugulethu, Langa and Duncan Village).

9.3.3.4 Variable crossover

In this pattern both the murder and IPFA trend lines vary considerably throughout the focal period, with murder levels being mostly higher than IPFA levels, although both trend lines prominently intersect on at least one occasion. The IPFA trend line is markedly elevated at the times of relevant SAPS major high-density operations, particularly between 2000/01 and in 2004/05. This pattern array is exhibited in 21 station areas (15.9%), with it being mainly prevalent in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, and includes areas that have typically been affected by gang violence, such as Bethelsdorp, Chatsworth and Verulam (Desai and Vahed, 2013, van Aardt, 2016).

9.3.3.5 Variable inverted

In this pattern both the murder and IPFA levels are significantly elevated in 1994/95, with the IPFA trend line remaining above the murder line for most of the focal period. The IPFA trend line peaks during the key SAPS high-density operations that were relevant to these areas. Murder levels vary throughout the 21 year period, but generally decline from the late 1990s, and then mostly escalate after 2010/11. Such a trajectory pattern was observable in 9 station areas (6.8%) and was most common in precincts in the Western Cape that have regularly been affected by gang violence, such as Mitchells Plain, Elsies River and Manenberg (Pinnock, 2016). Gelvandale (Eastern Cape), which has also been renowned for gang violence (van Aardt, 2016), also displayed such a pattern. The coastal town of Port St Johns appeared to be one of the exceptions in this regard.

9.3.3.6 Variable separation


With respect to this pattern the murder trend line remains well above the IPFA trend line over the 21-year period. Both lines may vary over time, and the trajectory lines do not cross one other but may converge in later years. The IPFA trend line does not consistently reflect increases during the years of major high-density operations. Thirteen precincts (9.9%) displayed such a pattern, which included some of the most violent police areas in South Africa, such as Nyanga and Umlazi (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008). However, some small- and medium-sized towns also exhibited this pattern, such as Cradock, Groblershoop and Welkom.

Chart 9.5: General trajectory pattern types - Murder and IPFA


Key

— Murder — Unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition


Converging crossover




Converging connection




Variable convergence



Variable crossover



Variable inverted



Variable separation




Table 9.5: Trajectory pattern type by SAPS station area

Pattern type	Relevant precincts	No. of station areas	% of total stations
Converging crossover	Pe; Wo; Al; Bo; Da; Ev; Hi; Je; Ka; Kl; Kd; Me; Of; Ri; Ra; Se; Te; Ng; Nq; Bt; Pr; Le; Ky; Nl; Sy; To; Dc; Em; Hc; In; Km; Pb; Mq; Ik; Pi; Eh; Ph; Bu; Gi; Mo; Po	41	31.1
Converging	Bh; Pl; Gr; Iy; Kh; Kt; Kk; Mn; Os; Od; Pk; Mx; Eb;	18	13.6

connection	Mh; Md; Mt; Th; Mw		
Variable convergence	Kr; La; Kn; Ou; Gu; Dv; El; Id; Bf; Nc; Li; Mf; Nb; Kg; Jo; Wa; Br; Ru; Tl; Mr; Ty; Ss; Tu; Eo; Ki; Kw; Va; Bb; Ny; Um	30	22.7
Variable crossover	At; Ip; Ro; Cm; Ch; Ls; Rb; Ve; Bd; Lu; Be; Mm; Vr; Pw; Kx; Ke; Es; Kf; Ms; Jc; Do	21	15.9
Variable inverted	Bl; Er; Ma; Mp; De; Ge; Kz; Ps; Ye	9	6.8
Variable separation	Cr; Ca; Kb; Vu; Zw; Mk; Bi; We; Bg; Gh; Gw; Sl; Bs	13	9.9
Total		132	100

9.3.4 Analysis: Association between murder and IPFA

9.3.4.1 IPFA-murder: interdependent inverse association

An analysis of the six general trajectory patterns described above reveals that for a noteworthy number of SAPS station areas a striking trajectory pattern characteristic was displayed. That is, there appeared to be a significant inverse association between the murder and IPFA trajectories. More specifically, in a significant number of precincts over at least two consecutive years an increase in the annual number of IPFA cases corresponded with a decline in the annual number of reported murders during the same two (or more) years. Moreover, during the period of at least two consecutive years where there was a decrease in the number of reported IPFA cases there was a corresponding increase in the number of murder cases over the same period.

This seemingly symbiotic association was visibly observable in at least 34 of the 132 SAPS station areas (26%). In addition, within at least 15 of these 34 precincts the apparent symbiotic association was observable on at least two occasions between 1994/95 and 2014/15. This possible symbiotic relationship was not consistently demonstrated in terms of all six general patterns, with it being more prevalent in station areas that presented: the converging crossover pattern (18 stations); the variable crossover pattern (7 stations); and the variable convergence pattern (6 stations). Of the precincts where the variable inverted pattern was visible, only two precincts displayed such a dynamic, while it did not occur in any of the station areas with the variable separation pattern.

Appendix 4 provides details of 107 apparent inverse associations between murder and IPFA levels from these 34 stations and the time periods in which the inverse increases/decreases took place. In addition, the related percentage increases/decreases in the levels of murder and IPFA are included. Of these 107 inverse relationships, 57 were related to an IPFA-increase/murder-decrease association; and 50 were related to an IPFA-decrease/murder-increase association. In terms of the former, 25 out of the 57 inverse associations related to the period of Operation Crackdown (44%); 12 were during the period of Operation Sword and Shield (21%); 11 took place possibly during a specific provincial operation or Operation Duty Calls; six were during a period of overlapping operations (11%); and three occurred at the time of Operation Sethunya (5%).

For 86% of IPFA-increase/murder-decrease associations the relative percentage increase in IPFA cases was higher than the percentage decrease in murder. In 58% of IPFA-decrease/murder-increase associations the relative percentage decrease in IPFA cases was higher than the percentage increase in murder. In general a significant percentage increase in IPFA cases corresponded with a significant decrease in the percentage of murder cases, but this was not consistent across station areas. For example, in Ngcobo, a 500% increase in IPFA cases between 1995/96 and 1997/98 yielded a 30% decrease in murder over this period, while in Atteridgeville, a 26% increase in IPFA cases between 2001/02 and 2003/04 resulted in a 45% reduction in murder. Similarly a sizeable decline in the percentage of IPFA cases was directly associated with a considerable increase in murder, but this was also not a consistent dynamic. For example, in Ngqeleni a 52% decrease in the IPFA cases between 2004/05 and 2005/06 is associated with a 67% increase in murder, while in Alexandra a 57% decrease in IPFA cases corresponded to a 12% increase in murder.

9.4.3.2 IPFA-murder: delayed inverse association

In at least 17 other station areas across three pattern types (converging crossover; converging connection; and variable crossover) there appeared to have been a delayed inverse association between IPFA and murder trajectories. That is, murder levels did not decline significantly in the same year as a noticeable increase in the number of IPFA cases, and only decreased the following year. In the case of Ivory Park, for example, there was a 91% increase in annual IPFA cases between 2002/03 and 2003/04 (during the period of Operation Sethunya), but a perceptible decrease in the number of murder cases was only recorded the following year (2004/05).

This was also the case with Everton where there was a 224% increase in IPFA cases between 1995/96 and 1996/97 (during the period of Operation Sword and Shield), while the number of murder cases only decreased from 1997/98 (by 29%). Similar trajectory displays were observable in the case of Rietgat (immediately after Operation Sword and Shield), as well as in Jeppe (shortly after Operation Crackdown). Other station areas where this was distinctively observable included: Giyani; Grahamstown; Ikageng; Mankweng; Mariannhill; Mmabatho; Paarl East; Phoenix; Richards Bay; Roodepoort and Tlhabane.

In some townships, such as Nyanga and Motherwell, there was a series of consecutive elevations in the IPFA levels before there was a noteworthy decline in murder levels. In Nyanga, for example, the murder level increased from 177 murder cases in 1999/00 to 458 in 2002/03 (292%). During this time the SAPS clearly prioritised the policing of IPFA in this area and appeared to implement a series of high-density operations each year between 2000/01 and 2004/04, with the average IPFA annual cases during this period being 207. This equated to an average of 74% increase over these five years compared to 1999/00. The murder level declined significantly between 2002/03 and 2004/05, from 485 to 263 (43% decrease). Likewise in Motherwell, murder levels only consistently declined from 2003/04 following consecutive years of elevated IPFA levels (during the Operation Crackdown and Operations Sethunya periods).

9.4.3.3: Elevated IPFA levels, reduced murder levels

In addition to the station areas discussed above at least another ten precincts displayed elevated IPFA levels that corresponded with consistent declines in annual murder cases over a period of several years (60% of which displayed converging crossover patterns). Minor troughs in the IPFA trend lines did not result in significant increases in murder, but did appear to equate with a slackening-off in the declining trajectory of murder cases, or negligible increases. This was specifically the case for Daveyton (1998/99–2002/03); Durban Central (2006/07–2012/13); Hillcrest (2008/09–2011/12); Meadowlands (1996/97–2003/04); Mitchells Plain (1998/99–2006/07); Nelspruit (2010/2011–2014/15); Plessislaer (1997/98–2003/04); Point (2003/04–2009/10); Randfontein (1998/99–2000/01); and Yeoville (2002/03–2005/06).

9.4.3.4 IPFA-murder: no inverse association

In at least 15 station areas there appeared to be no consistent inverse association between the trajectories of the two data categories, with there being no corresponding decrease in murder levels relative to increases in IPFA cases, and vice versa. In Gugulethu, for instance, there were dramatic increases and elevations in the IPFA cases between 1998/99 and 2002/03, yet murder levels, remained relatively constant during this period. Similar trajectories were also observable in Vanderbijlpark during the same period. Other station areas with similar characteristics included: Bloemspruit; Brits; Eshikawini; Galeshewe; Jouberton; Knysna; Kwadukuza; Kwanobuhle; Maake; Odendaalsrus; Oudtshoorn; Selosesha; and Tubatse. These station areas were representative of all pattern types, with the exception of the converging crossover pattern.

Moreover, in at least a further three station areas it was not possible to discern any clear relationship between the IPFA and murder trajectories, as there are no significant variations in the IPFA trend line. This was especially the case with the variable separation pattern, which included mostly police areas with relatively low IPFA levels (an annual average of 10 IPFA cases) in rural areas, such as Groblershoop and Boithuso.

In addition, in at least six more precincts some degree of inverse association between the IPFA and murder trajectories was observable for most of the focal period, but during some consecutive years, particularly after 2009/10, increases in IPFA were matched with increases in murder. This was notably prevalent in areas that exhibited the variable inverted pattern such as Delft, Elsies River, Manenberg and Mitchells Plain. These areas have traditionally been prone to gang violence. Bethelsdorp and Kraaifontein, which are similarly known to be gang violence hot spots (Pinnock, 2016, van Aardt, 2016), also displayed such a trajectory array.

9.4 Discussion

9.4.1 Potential crime reduction effect of SAPS high density operations

Existing theory and evidence can potentially account for the apparent inverse association between the IPFA (as a proxy for SAPS high-density operations) and murder trajectories that were observable between 1994/95 and 2014/15 in more than half of the 132 SAPS station areas included in this study. This was especially the case in those areas where there was a seemingly immediate interdependent inverse association between the two trajectory lines. Hence, in the section below, theory and evidence concerning to the following will be discussed in relation to the apparent inverse association between murder and IPFA trajectories: place-focused policing tactics; firearm control and disarmament; and mass arrests.

9.4.1.1 *Place-focused policing tactics*

As previously indicated, since 1995 the SAPS have consistently combined elements of place-based policing and 'broken windows' (or 'zero tolerance') policing into their high-density operational methodology. As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, there is a wealth of research findings that demonstrate that place-based policing can result in place-specific reductions in violent crime, including murder (Braga, et al., 2015, Sherman, 1992). The same applies to studies on 'broken windows' policing, which suggests that violent crime can be reduced through geographically-concentrated disruption and penalisation of routine misdemeanour offending, as such criminality, and the norms and environmental conditions associated with it, if left unchecked, has tended to contribute to more serious criminal acts (Keizer, et al., 2008, Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

9.4.1.2 *Disarmament and firearm control*

SAPS high-density operations have consistently prioritised the seizure of large quantities of illegal firearms and ammunition. As discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of international research on firearm violence suggests that high levels of firearm prevalence contributes to elevated homicide levels (Hepburn and Hemenway, 2004, Monuteaux, et al., 2015, Siegel, et al., 2013). Rigorous studies have also indicated that a reduction in the availability of firearms can lead to significant decreases in the homicide rate (Chapman, et al., 2015, Loftin, et al., 1991, Villaveces, et al., 2000).

In addition, as discussed in Chapter 7, there was a dramatic reduction in the issuing of new firearm licences from the early 2000s due to more discerning and discriminatory unofficial licensing criteria applied by the Central Firearms Registry (CFR); and the implementation of a more restrictive firearm possession measures of the Firearms Control Act (FCA), such as an increase in the minimum licensing age and the introduction of limits on the maximum number of firearms and rounds of ammunition that a person may legally possess. In addition, firearm amnesties resulted in the surrender of more than 100,000 firearms (Kirsten, 2007). Furthermore, civilian firearm loss and theft (the principal contributor to

the illegal firearm pool) dropped by 25% between 1998/99 and 2002/03, with the SAPS recovery of such firearms increasing by 61% during the same period. Hence, the net effect of all these measures was that those persons that were at risk of perpetrating firearm violence found it considerably more difficult to acquire firearms and ammunition (both illegal and legal).

As previously indicated, studies undertaken by the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System have shown that there were substantial reductions in non-natural deaths due to firearm injuries between 2000 and 2008 in five of South Africa's largest cities, while deaths due to sharp-force and blunt-force injuries remained relatively constant (National Injury Mortality Surveillance System, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that the arms control and disarmament measures implemented by the SAPS may have contributed to the reduction in firearm murders in the relevant station areas discussed above.

9.4.1.3 Mass arrests

As earlier discussed, a further key component of the SAPS high-density operations was the arrest of large numbers of offenders and suspected offenders. There is considerable North American research that indicates that the imprisonment of violent offenders can have crime reduction effects (Marvell and Moody, 1998, McDowall, et al., 1992, Spelman, 2000, Zimring and Hawkins, 1995) (Groff, et al., 2015). Hence, it is possible that murder levels may have declined in high crime areas in the aftermath of high-density operations due to the incarceration of some of the most dangerous individuals as well as those responsible for lesser crimes. The reason being is that such arrests may have had the effect of altering the criminogenic dynamics of these spaces in two respects. Firstly, a substantial number of violent residents from these areas could no longer perpetrate, and/or directly mobilise peers to perpetrate violent crime (more commonly known as the 'incapacitation effect') (Altbeker, 2007, Leggett, et al., 2003, South African Police Service, 2010b). Secondly, large numbers of persons responsible for misdemeanours were prevented from possibly contributing towards more serious law breaking.

9.4.2 Absence of an inverse association

The trajectory patterns in at least 15 station areas, chiefly those that displayed the variable separation and variable inverted patterns, revealed that significant increases in IPFA cases did not consistently correspond with a subsequent downturn in the murder trajectory. In some instances murder and IPFA levels increased simultaneously over successive years. This was particularly the case for station areas with the variable inverted pattern. In a notable number of stations areas that conformed to the variable separation pattern, the murder trend line varied over the 21-year period, whilst the IPFA trend line was at a low level and remained relatively constant. In addition, in a small number of precincts where the variable convergence and variable crossover patterns were observable there was no distinct inverse association between the IPFA and murder trend lines. In the sub-sections below possible reasons for this state of affairs are discussed.

9.4.2.1 Role of other risk factors

Murder in South Africa, as previously mentioned, has typically been the outcome of the interplay of a variety of socio-ecological factors. Hence, it is possible that in those precincts where there was no consistent inverse association between the IPFA and murder trajectories, that the key determinants of murder were impervious to the crime reduction pressures of the high-density operations. There are five such key determinants that appear to have been specifically relevant to some of the areas in question, which are as follows: excessive alcohol consumption; violence in the minibus taxi industry; political violence; harmful cultural practices and beliefs, namely unsafe circumcision procedures and witchcraft; and police violence.

Public health researchers have regularly found that the excessive consumption of alcohol has contributed considerably to all forms of injuries, with Schneider, et al. (2007) estimating that alcohol was attributed to 40% of all intentional injuries in South Africa in 2000. In addition, studies have also shown that more than half of homicide victims in South Africa have exhibited high levels of blood alcohol concentrations at the time of death (Peltzer and Ramlagan, 2009).

Alcohol is considered a common catalyst for homicide as it often results in aggressive behaviour, particularly amongst young men (Parry and Dewing, 2006). Such aggression frequently translates into interpersonal violence, and even fatalities. Alcohol has also been identified as a risk factor in relation to gender-based violence (Seedat, et al., 2009), including in rural areas (Jewkes, et al., 2006). An unpublished study by Lamb (2016) of SAPS murder dockets in SAPS precincts in rural KwaZulu-Natal from 2008 and 2009 indicated that murder was often the outcome of disagreements between individuals who were intoxicated at the time. Such dynamics may possibly also apply to other rural areas. In most publications on the relationship between alcohol and violence, shebeens have frequently been identified as an epicentre for alcohol related murders in high crime communities (Faull, 2013, Redpath, et al., 2008) .

Recent ethnographic research on shebeens in Sweet Home Farm, an informal settlement near Philippi (Cape Town), has however suggested that shebeens “are not simple unidirectional drivers of crime and criminality. They are instead complex social spaces that form part of the constellation of risk factors for violence” (Herrick and Charman, 2013:31). That is, some shebeen owners have introduced design features, entertainment resources, social controls and selective entry criteria in order to reduce the potential risk for interpersonal violence. Moreover, shebeen owners in the Sweet Home Farm became adept at keeping their businesses open despite regular raids by the police. Some shebeen owners had paid bribes to the police to prevent police raids of their premises (Charman, et al., 2014, Herrick and Charman, 2013). It is likely that these characteristics apply to shebeens in many other parts of South Africa.

Therefore, where the contextual violence reduction measures are not in place within shebeens, violence between patrons is more likely. Available research does suggest that such shebeens are more likely to operate in larger townships,

such as Nyanga (Faull, 2013) and Khayelitsha (Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha, 2014).

Violent feuds between clans and villages have existed in many rural areas for decades, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Towns such as Idutywa, Ngcobobo and Lusikisiki have been named as hot spots for these types of murders (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999, Mathis, 2013). Similarly, the minibus taxi industry has been prone to persistently fierce rivalries in urban townships and rural towns throughout South Africa with countless passengers, drivers and taxi owners losing their lives as a result. The report of the Ntsebeza Inquiry into the minibus taxi industry in Cape Town revealed that 'warlords' dominated many taxi associations, both in the Eastern and Western Cape, and that *imbovane* (hit men) were used to intimidate and eliminate rivals. The report pointed to the taxi associations operating in the townships of Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga as being particularly prone to using assassins as a business strategy (Ntsebeza, 2005).

Strong beliefs in witchcraft have also been at the core of numerous murders in the rural hinterland of South Africa for decades (Ashforth, 2005). For example, in Lusikisiki, Libode, Mount Frere and Ngcobobo, witchcraft or 'muti' has been attributed in SAPS and media reports to numerous murders and violent attacks between May 2009 and September 2016 (Fuzile, 2016). Witchcraft related murders have also been prevalent in Limpopo province, particularly in Polokwane (Mahopo, 2016); and have been reported on a number of occasions in Ermelo (The Bulletin, 2016).

In rural communities within Eastern Cape botched circumcision procedures during initiation ceremonies has led to the death of hundreds of young men, which the SAPS have often recorded as murder. According to the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, between June 2006 and June 2013 some 453 initiates died in the Eastern Cape (Douglas and Hongoro, 2016), with Libode (Koyana, 2016), Lusikisiki (Nchabeleng, et al., 2012) and Duncan Village (South African Press Association, 2003b) having been regarded as hot spots for such deaths.

Numerous parts of South African have a long history of 'political' violence, namely that inter- and intra-party rivalries are resolved through the use of violence. This has been especially prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal (Taylor, 2002) (Bruce, 2009) (Madlala, 2016, Schuld, 2013). Eshikawini, for example, has regularly experienced party political violence dating back to the 1990s, including assassinations and massacres (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998). Eshikawini has continued to be affected by political violence, combined with ordinary criminal violence and under-performance by SAPS members in the area (Maseko, 2010). Other areas reportedly affected by such political violence have included Nongoma, Ladysmith, Osizweni, Pietermaritzburg and Umlazi (De Haas, 2016, Sello, 2016).

Furthermore, in some areas, the SAPS have been a prominent contributor to high levels of murder. In Cato Manor, for instance, a SAPS organised crime unit

operating in the area was reportedly responsible for lethally shooting an excessive number of suspects between 2008 and 2011, with 45 individuals dying as a result of police action in this station area (Bruce, 2015, Hofstatter, et al., 2011). Reports by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate have also shown that SAPS members have perpetrated murders in Daveyton, Giyani, Groblershoop, Hillbrow, Mankweng, New Brighton, Orange Farm and Rietgat (to name but a few) (Independent Police Investigative Directorate, 2013, Independent Police Investigative Directorate, 2016).

9.4.2.2 Role of other weapons

The predominant use of weapons other than firearms in murder cases may have accounted for a lack of an inverse relationship between IPFA and murder in some areas. This is partially supported by published analyses of non-natural deaths in 2009 by the Medical Research Council, which found that firearms only accounted for 29% of all homicides, and the percentage was even less in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free State and the North West Province (Matzopoulos, et al., 2013).

This use of other weapons, such as knives, to commit murder has been particularly the case in policing areas that are mostly comprised of small rural towns, such as Groblershoop, Boithuso and Odendaalsrus, where there has not been widespread availability of firearms. In the Northern Cape Province, for example, which is mostly comprised of small towns, knives have consistently been the leading cause of homicide (Leggett, 2004).

9.4.2.3 Mass arrests: the counter-arguments

The crime reduction effect of imprisonment has been contested by a range of criminologists and penologists arguing that incarceration has: a negligible impact on crime (DeFina and Arvanites, 2002); diminishing marginal crime prevention returns (Levitt, 2004); and causes long-term societal damage (Rose and Clear, 1998) (Tonry, 2004). The link between imprisonment and crime levels in South Africa has not been subjected to rigorous studies. Publications on this topic have tended to be normative and speculative, arguing that South Africa's punitive approach to imprisonment has not had any meaningful downward impact on violent crime (Muntingh, 2008, Redpath and O'Donovan, 2007, Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers, 2005).

Nonetheless, there is consensus in some of the criminological literature that a significant risk of recidivism exists for prisoners released from prisons in countries that pursue punitive incarceration approaches (Chen and Shapiro, 2007, Durlauf and Nagin, 2011). South African prisoners are no exception (Gaum, et al., 2006, Law and Padayachee, 2012), with South African prisons often being referred to as the 'universities of crime' (Burchell, 2005). That is, South Africans that have been to prison for minor crimes may go on to perpetrate more serious crimes, including murder, after their release from prison.

9.4.2.4 Criminal gang dynamics and the proliferation of firearms

Firearm possession and firearm violence are defining features of many street gangs in South Africa. Gangs frequently use firearms against members of opposing gangs, and the nature of 'career pathing' in many gang hierarchies encourages violent offending in order to acquire prison credentials within the Numbers (prison) gangs (Pinnock, 2016, Steinberg, 2004b). Such gangs typically have established methods and networks of securing firearms, which are likely to be more difficult for police operations to disrupt and dismantle. Additionally, given the centrality of firearms for gangs, gang members tend to be acutely motivated to acquire replacement firearms should the police confiscate their existing firearms. Such a state of affairs may contribute to the absence of a consistent inverse association between IPFA and murder trajectories in areas that are frequently affected by gang violence. Furthermore, plans by gang leaders to expand the territories under their control and access to illicit markets may result in such gang leaders acquiring a large arsenal of firearms as a means to achieve such an objective.

During the period 2010/11 to 2014/15 some gang areas in the Western Cape, such as Bishop Lavis, Elsies River, Manenberg and Mitchells Plain showed substantial upward movement in annual IPFA cases, which corresponded with a sustained upsurge in murder cases. The possible reason for this state of affairs was that these areas were subjected to a dramatic intensification of violent confrontations between gangs, following the release of certain gang leaders from prison (Swingler, 2014, Zille and de Lille, 2013), and large injections of illegal firearms as a result of the corrupt SAPS firearm control officials (Thamm, 2016) (see Chapter 7). This suggests that under such war-like conditions where perpetrators of violence have easy access to illegal firearms, high-density operations may not have a reduction effect on murder levels in the short-term.

Inconsistent associations between murder and IPFA trajectories were also observable in other areas that have been notorious for gang violence, namely Bethelsdorp (De Swart, 2014), Jouberton (Somniso-Abraham, 2015) and Chatsworth (Goldstone, 2007).

9.5 Conclusion

The results of the study presented in this chapter reveal that the levels of murder in high crime areas between 1994/95 and 2014/15 were distinctly variable, with the annual number of murder cases zigzagging in a general downward direction in the majority of the sample station areas during this period. The findings also demonstrate that in a significant number of precincts an apparent inverse interrelationship between annual trends in reported cases murder and IPFA (as a proxy for the annual intensity of SAPS high-density operations) was observable.

In effect, these results imply that SAPS' high-density operations may have conceivably contributed to reductions in murder levels in some high crime station areas. However, the possible murder reduction impact of many of these

police actions appear to have been ephemeral, in that murder levels increased in the aftermath of major operations in a noteworthy number of station areas. Hence, it is possible that regular high-density police operations may have accounted for the overall downward trajectory of annual murder levels in many such policing areas over the 21 year period.

The SAPS themselves have publicly emphasised on numerous occasions that high-density operations are a stopgap to 'stabilise' high crime communities in order to allow other government departments and civil society organisations to intercede in addressing the key determinants of criminality and violence. However, such multi-sectoral interventions have typically not been forthcoming. Therefore SAPS have found themselves locked into a cycle of relentlessly bombarding such areas with high-density operations in a concerted attempt to constrain and suppress criminal offending. Indeed, in some areas, high-density operations appears to have had little or no effect on murder levels, which possibly denotes the potency of a range of pervasive risk factors for murder in such areas. These factors are diverse, and range from excessive alcohol consumption, to political violence, to organised crime, to harmful cultural practices.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The principal aim of this thesis has been to determine how boundaries have influenced the operational approaches of the police in South Africa, and what impact these approaches have had on violent crime. In order to pursue this objective, four propositions were developed, all of which proposed that boundaries have been a fundamental component of police work, and may even have profoundly shaped the nature of the strategies and tactics that the police have historically employed. Moreover, it was proposed that the policing of boundaries, specifically in the form of high-density operations, has possibly contributed to reductions in violent crime. In this regard, this concluding chapter condenses and draws together the key empirical and analytical strands from the preceding chapters. In addition, this chapter proposes a new concept of 'police frontierism' that may potentially inform future analyses of the relationship between the boundaries, the police and police work.

10.1 Boundaries, othering and crime control in South Africa

Social and territorial boundaries have been fundamental to the approaches and practices of policing bodies in South Africa for centuries, from the mounted colonial paramilitary forces of the 1800s to the 21st century professional police. Boundaries have not only been a central mechanism that the police have consistently used to control and regulate the general population, but have also been catalysts for change in terms of operational policing strategies and tactics. This has particularly been the case when a threat has been ascribed to the bounded area and/or to population groups that reside on the other side of the boundary. Such threat-designated boundaries have tended to focus police attention and action towards such boundaries, with the frontier areas in close proximity to the boundaries being the sites for intense counter-threat activities by the police. The police have typically adjusted or even reformed their strategies and tactics in situations where their existing policing approaches have been shown, or are perceived to have been, inadequate in terms of diminishing or eliminating the threat.

During the 1700s and 1800s the police were at the forefront of expanding the boundaries of the European colonies into the interior of the Southern African region. Indigenous populations that resided on the other side of the colonial boundaries, or in the borderlands, were widely regarded as the principal threat to the security of the colonies, especially where such groups forcefully resisted such territorial expansion by the settlers. The colonial authorities characteristically responded to such threats by teaming up policing entities with the military in order to defeat, assimilate or eradicate such indigenous groups and thereafter extend the territorial boundaries of the colonies. As a result militarism became ingrained within the organisation and practice of policing bodies. Furthermore, considerable efforts were undertaken to disarm indigenous people, as well as prevent them from acquiring firearms.

Following the creation of the Union of South African in 1910 boundaries continued to shape the work of the police. That is for much of the 20th century

the police were the bulwark of enforcing the social and territorial boundaries of racial segregation, particularly with regards to the movement of black South Africans. Furthermore, the South African Police regularly collaborated with the South African Defence Force to quell internal riots and insurrection by groups that threatened to destabilise the country and the established systems of governance. Furthermore, the police were required to defend the national borderline of South Africa, and at times even conducted operations within neighbouring countries in an effort to counter the threats presented by liberation movements.

From the mid 1970s there was a dramatic escalation in violent protests in many townships where black people lived. In response the government deployed the police and military in large numbers to cordon-off such hot spots and quash the protests and uprisings. During this time the personnel size of the police increased markedly, and its operational approaches were further militarised. In addition, the apartheid government actively sought to prevent black people from acquiring firearms, as firearms would have given the subjugated population groups the significant lethal means to threaten the maintenance of the geo-racial boundaries.

In post-apartheid South Africa, the policing of boundaries has mostly taken the form of large-scale coordinated aggressive policing actions that have had an explicit geographical focus. That is, they have been firmly oriented towards distinct zones beyond a boundary where populations of dangerous people and/or criminals were perceived to reside. These police actions have typically sought to lessen or eradicate the threats posed by such people and places. This policing approach has been acutely influenced by the boundary, as well as the considerable othering of these populations beyond the boundaries. The pejorative views of the police, senior political leadership and the general public towards such groups have contributed to such othering, which has resulted in the emergence of beliefs that such targeted groups are undesirable, and a menace to society, and are therefore deserving of severe treatment and harsh punishment.

10.2 High-density operations and the reduction in violent crime in post-apartheid South Africa

The relationship between high-density police interventions, which have been regularly pursued by the South African Police Service (SAPS) since the mid 1990s, and violent crime was assessed by means of a retrospective case-series study of 132 high crime SAPS station areas. Trajectories in annual reported murder incident data over a 21-year period were compared to trajectories in annual reported incident data on illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA) (which was used as a proxy variable for SAPS high-density operations). The results demonstrated that within a significant number of police precincts an apparent inverse interrelationship was discernible in terms of the trajectories in reported cases murder relative to the trajectories in reported IPFA cases.

The results of the retrospective case-series study have suggested that SAPS high-density operations may have possibly contributed to reductions in annual murder levels in a noteworthy number of high crime SAPS station areas, although causation was not established. Nonetheless, the possible murder reduction effect of many of these high-density policing interventions appears to have been short-lived, in that annual murder levels rose in the years shortly after major high-density operations in a considerable number of SAPS station areas. Hence, it seems that in many such high crime areas a general downward trajectory of annual murder levels may arguably have been attributable to frequent high-density police operations over time in these areas.

10.3 Police frontierism

By means of an exclusive historical focus on South Africa this thesis has presented an under-developed approach to studying the operational work of the police; and has shown that dynamic interactions exist between boundaries and policing in South Africa. Given that such an approach has been informed by some academic disciplines that are typically not regularly used to study the police, particularly geography, the formulation of a new concept is warranted. This concept – police frontierism – is one that illuminates the nature of the relationship between the police, boundaries, and policing, and could potentially be used in other case studies.

The term ‘frontierism’, which in essence is the influence that a frontier has on human behaviour, and its subsequent bearing on future political culture, has largely been a preoccupation of a coterie of North American historians devoted to the work of Frederick Jackson Turner.⁵⁵ Research and academic deliberation about frontierism have chiefly taken place within historiography. The main focus has been on the pioneers, namely those individuals from colonising groups that inhabited frontier zones and were often the impetus for the expansion of the frontier; and how the settlers’ experience of a frontier zone shaped their outlook, and even that of future generations and state institutions. This has particularly been the case with the ‘Great West’ American frontier.

Turner wistfully argued that the unique environment (especially the wilderness) and the primacy of individualism, inventiveness, liberty and idealism amongst settler communities on the US western frontiers shaped the fundamental values and ‘spirit’ underpinning US political culture and democratic institutions (Turner, 1921). The essence of Turner’s hypothesis is that the frontier experience, particularly the domestication of the wild, was an evolutionary catalyst that effectively created the modern American nation. This was further elaborated by Coleman (1966:22) as follows:

The frontier had made the famed melting pot boil and produced from widely disparate incoming peoples a new people...It was a nationalizing force, compelling American traders and manufacturers to look less to Europe and more to the needs of the unusual

⁵⁵ Turner, a US historian, formulated the ‘frontier thesis’, which held that the frontier experience was the principal driving force for the emergence of democracy and democratic institutions in the US.

civilization arising in their western hinterland. Turner's frontier dissolved older forms of society and generated from their ruins new institutions more appropriate to those liberty-loving individuals called Americans.

There has been extensive and vigorous debate about Turner's frontier hypothesis among scholars of US history, as well as between other historians regarding its applicability to non-US contexts (Jones and Wills, 2009) (Pierson, 1994). The general consensus is that the influence of the US frontier experience was somewhat exceptional, but that frontiers have, to varying degrees, influenced the nature and dynamics of modern states and societies in countries such as Canada, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Germany and South Africa (Bassin, 1993, Careless, 1954, Coleman, 1958, Fifer, 1982, Gerhard, 1959). There, however, has been almost no consideration of the manner in which frontiers may have shaped behaviour, culture, traditions and practices of law enforcement entities and their personnel, other than analyses and accounts of the nature and actions of colonial frontier forces (see Chapter 2).

The concept of police frontierism posits that the control and governance of spaces and places by dominant groups in society fundamentally frames the manner in which such spaces and places are policed. Furthermore, it expressly postulates that the boundaries between safe and unsafe spaces have a significant influence on the strategies and tactics of the police as well as on the behaviour of police personnel.

10.3.1 Defining police frontierism

Police frontierism is an alternative way of conceptualising policing, one in which police work is fundamentally framed by societal and territorial boundaries, which delineates perceived safe or 'civilised' spaces from dangerous or 'uncivilised' ones. The police concentrate their resources in the frontier zone immediately adjacent to the boundary in order to preserve or extend the boundary of safety and 'civilisation', and restrict, subdue or eliminate those individuals, groups or circumstances from the 'uncivilised' spaces that a government authority or elites have deemed to be a threat to order and peace.

An essential dynamic of this policing approach is that the boundary and the adjoining frontier zone strongly influence police practices and behaviour in this context. In particular, territorial delineations amplify and distort existing police prejudices towards those communities on the other side of the boundary. The police often engage in 'othering', where the communities of interest are viewed negatively, and almost alien, and are predominantly seen as 'objects' of disorder and law breaking. This othering may lead to an intensification of aggressive police behaviour towards the targeted communities.

Police frontierism often has a technological aspect, namely the use of more advanced policing equipment and techniques (relative to the policing of the day) that are typically not employed during regular policing. It is also accepting of policing reforms and new policing techniques, particularly if they are applicable to the control and strengthening of boundaries.

10.3.2 Varieties of police frontierism

There are essentially four general varieties of police frontierism that can be derived from the South African case study, as well as from published research relating to other countries. These four varieties are containment, confrontation, conversion and conquest. Each type has an explicit objective and is comprised of different magnitudes of police coercive resources that are directed towards the boundary and the 'othered' populations that reside on the other side of the boundary. All types of police frontierism are influenced by the perceived or actual behaviour of the othered populations, as well as by internal and external pressures on the police to act against such populations. Figure 10.1 (below) provides a graphical depiction of these four varieties of police frontierism.

10.3.2.1 Containment

Containment entails police action that is specifically geared towards the maintenance (and even the fortification) of boundaries between areas of perceived or actual danger and safety, with the aim of restricting the diffusion of crime and violence from the former into the latter. The othered population or community tends to be poor, marginalised and socially disorganised. They often inhabit densely populated ghettos, inner city slums or informal settlements. The police will typically pursue a containment approach in circumstances where this population does not collectively offer any major threat to the dominant group communities, or hostile defiance to the police's corralling undertakings.

Police action in this regard is largely driven by the prejudiced concerns of elites and even the police (Jackson, 1989, Jacobs, 1979). In such circumstances the police may provide basic policing services to the othered community, but their priority remains boundary maintenance. This is characteristically achieved through intensive patrolling of the frontier zones and harassment of perceived members of the othered community, particularly young men who are perceived to be disproportionately prone to criminal offending. The techniques of containment typically entail vehicular and pedestrian stops by police patrols, as well as stop-and-frisking, interrogation and arbitrary arrests (Chambliss, 1994, Della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, Fagan and Davies, 2000, Smith, 1986, Smith, et al., 1984, Weitzer, 1999).

10.3.2.2 Confrontation

Confrontation is commonly a reactive response by the police to protests and/or collective violence by othered populations on the other side of a boundary, with such violence transcending, or threatening to transcend, the boundary. This violence can take the form of civil disobedience, riots, mob violence, strikes and looting (Earl, et al., 2003). Confrontation can also be used as a pre-emptive strategy to pacify types of social movement mobilisation and protest action that the police and/or elites feel may threaten the stability and even the sustainability of the boundary.

With this type of frontierism police resources and public order policing are deployed to bolster the boundary, with there being significant, but temporary,

penetrations of the boundary by large groups of police personnel in an attempt to repel or suppress the outbreak of collective disorder. The additional police resources are generally withdrawn from the othered space once the disorder has been contained, or the perceived threat subdued. Riot control policing techniques are the mainstay of confrontational police frontierism, and can entail the use of both non-aggressive crowd management and forceful (and at times militarised) crowd dispersal techniques.⁵⁶ The military may be deployed to support the police in more intense and widespread cases of public violence. In some cases, however, excessive use of force by the police may spark a riot, which in turn begets an escalation in heavy-handed responses from the police.

Other than the evidence and analysis from South Africa presented in the earlier chapters, the literature on policing from other countries abounds with an array of examples of confrontational police frontierism. Some of these examples include police forcefully quelling violent uprisings in: African American neighbourhoods in Los Angeles in 1992 (Gooding-Williams, 1993); Parisian localities where there were concentrations of immigrant men (mainly from Africa) during mass protests⁵⁷ in 1961 and riots in 2005 (Schneider, 2008); and Cairo's Tahrir Square during the 2011 'Arab Spring' pro-democracy protests (El-Ghobashy, 2011). Less belligerent strategies of confrontation have also been pursued where active dialogue with protesters was prioritised such as in Canada (De Lint and Hall, 2009), the UK (Waddington, 1987, Winterton and Winterton, 1989) and Denmark (Björk, 2005).

10.3.2.3 Conversion

The objective of conversion is to transform areas beyond a boundary that are designated to be disorderly or unsafe into safer, more orderly and acquiescent (to the interests of the state) spaces through the deployment of resources and processes, principally by the police. In such spaces the authority of the police is either not widely contested, or the populations in question lack the necessary coercive capabilities to repel police intrusions. These police interventions, at times in partnership with other government agencies, tend to be limited in timeframe, and range from small-scale visible policing interventions, to large-scale crime reduction operations with police personnel saturating the targeted areas.

Conversion techniques can include crackdowns focusing on known criminal offenders and/or criminal activities, such the possession of illegal drugs and firearms; 'zero tolerance' or 'broken windows' policing; hot spots policing; curfews and truancy enforcement; as well as community policing where willing residents of the targeted areas are allocated policing responsibilities. With many of these conversion approaches the police may temporarily occupy these

⁵⁶ Examples can include the use of water cannons, tear gas, non-lethal ammunition (such as 'rubber bullets' and buckshot), 'baton-charges', and even lethal ammunition.

⁵⁷ These protests took place in the context of the Algerian civil war and were initiated by Parisian residents of Algerian descent who were opposed to the imposition of a curfew against them by the police as part of an anti-terrorism strategy. It is estimated that the police killed approximately 200 protestors at the time.

targeted areas and conduct large-scale search-and-seizure operations, and pursue a strategy of mass arrests.

The murkier side of conversion police frontierism involves the use of counterinsurgency techniques and extrajudicial killing by the police, often in collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies. Death squads and proxy forces have been employed to eliminate suspected insurgents, activists and undesirables in an attempt to make the targeted space more compliant to the social control efforts of the state. This has not only taken place in South Africa, but in a variety of other countries too, such as Guatemala (Morrison and May, 1994), Colombia (Bagley, 1988), India (Gossman, 2002) and Turkey (van Bruinessen, 1996). In Spain, for example, the Interior Ministry unleashed a proxy assassination force, the *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* against the Basque separatist movement, *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA), during the 1980s (Whitfield, 2014).

10.3.2.4 Conquest

This extreme form of police frontierism entails an extensive, potent and medium- to long-term intervention by the police beyond the boundary in an effort to appropriate spaces that are under the control of well-resourced non-state groups. It ultimately seeks to establish state authority over the targeted areas, and subjugate the population therein to the rules and norms of the state by means of forceful policing. Excessive forms of othering take place where the targeted population have been dehumanised in the eyes of the police and have been regarded as enemies. This police action may result in the reconfiguration of the boundary, or even its dissolution.

The conquest type of police frontierism generally involves the deployment of large numbers of heavily armed police, often alongside soldiers. Clashes, or even battles, with the non-state groups and their supporters may ensue. After the police have captured the coveted spaces a strategy of highly visible and overbearing policing is then typically pursued. This can include the establishment of police posts and checkpoints, intensive police patrols, the aggressive imposition of widespread curfews, and at times mass arrests. In South Africa this form of policing was typically pursued during the colonial era, as well as during the apartheid period. In addition, conquest police frontierism was attempted on various occasions since 1994 through high-density police operations, with the most apt example being Operation *Fiela*-Reclaim.

There have been numerous occurrences of conquest police frontierism in other countries. One of the more recent examples was the 2010 joint police-military incursion into the 'garrison communities'⁵⁸ of Tivoli Gardens and Denham Town in the Jamaican capital of Kingston. This resulted in the capture of the notorious crime lord, Christopher (Dudus) Coke, and the imposition of state authority over these previously out-of-bounds neighbourhoods (Jaffe, 2012, Schwartz, 2011).


⁵⁸ These are urban neighbourhoods in Jamaica that entirely are controlled by criminal groups headed by a 'don' (crime boss). Access points into these neighbourhoods are fortified against government intervention, particularly police action.

Other cases include: the deployment of the Israeli Police into the occupied Palestinian territories during the 1970s and 1980s (Milton - Edwards, 1998); the occupation of East Timor between the late 1970s and late 1990s by the Indonesian police and military (Jardine, 1996); and the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (along with the military) policing of working class Catholic neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s (Weitzer, 1995).

One of the most widely published contemporary examples of this form of police frontierism have been the occupation and 'pacification' of certain *favelas* (slums/shanty towns) in Rio de Janeiro's by the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) and its *Unidades the Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP) (or Pacification Police Units). This type of police action, which has been undertaken in collaboration with military personnel, was initiated in 2008 in order to impose state control in these marginalised communities that had traditionally been viewed as 'enemy territory' by the state, as they were mainly governed by criminal groups (Penglase, 2009, Stahlberg, 2011, Veloso, 2010).

The *modus operandi* has entailed the pre-announced, large-scale, militarised incursion (often with air support) into *favelas* in an effort to forcibly oust the criminal groups or arrest their members. Thereafter permanent police posts have been established, the Brazilian flag was ceremoniously hoisted, and highly visible armed policing was pursued in an attempt to prevent the criminal gangs from regaining control over these spaces (Freeman, 2012, Mendes, 2014). These operations have been combined with a veneer of 'winning-hearts-and-minds' counterinsurgency policing where the police have pursued a handful of infrastructure projects in an attempt to build legitimacy with *favela* residents (Arsenault, 2012, Watts, 2013). This has resulted in the UPP interventions being generously described by some writers as a new form of community policing (Saborio, 2013) and the vanguard of enlightened urban transformation (Tierney, 2012).

Figure 10.1: Varieties of police frontierism



10.4 Looking forward: The policing of boundaries in a future South Africa

In January 2016 the Minister of Police, Nkosinathi Nhleko held a media briefing in Parliament in order to announce the new 'Back-to-Basics' approach of the

South African Police Service (SAPS). The 'new' policing approach, which was in line with the SAPS Strategic Plan 2014-19, contained nothing new with respect to how the SAPS intended to police South Africa into the future. Instead it appeared to be an attempt at rebuilding trust with Parliament and the general public by means of a re-commitment from high political office that the SAPS would seek to reinvigorate its efforts to systematically contain and reduce crime through improved discipline, dedication and visibility. This would, according to the Minister of Police, entail "every police officer doing the basics of policing...properly and consistently" so that "all people in South Africa are and feel safe" (Nhleko, 2016b). The slogan for this new strategy was "#CrimeMustFall"⁵⁹, where "the fight against crime must become a reality that permeates every sector of South African society, led by the men and women in blue and supported by involved and informed communities" (Nhleko, 2016b).

A fundamental component of this 'Back-to-Basics' strategy is the use of force, which has been combined with notions of problem-oriented policing, and will prominently entail "the targeted, informed deployment of operational resources to ensure the optimal utilisation of the limited resources that the Police have at their disposal, ensuring that they are applied for maximum effect" (Nhleko, 2016b). The framing of the 'Back-to-Basics' strategy has sharp philological and linguistic parallels with the National Crime Combatting Strategy (NCCS) that was developed by SAPS in the late 1990s (see Chapter 7). That is, 'Back-to-Basics' has distinct counterinsurgency influences and is firmly grounded in the assumption that acts of criminality can be mitigated by strong-arm policing methods, particularly high-density operations. It was no coincidence that at the same briefing the Minister of Police provided detailed feedback from the 2015/16 Operation Festive Season in which he lauded the: approximately five million patrol activities; six million searches of vehicles, persons and premises; and the close to 200,000 arrests of suspects (Nhleko, 2016b).

In essence, the 'Back-to-Basics' strategy is a perpetuation of a militarised form of boundary policing that the police in South Africa have pursued for decades. The SAPS appears to be convinced that police frontierism approaches yield crime reduction results, which is a supposition that has typically been dismissed by many crime analysts in South Africa. This thesis has however shown that certain forms of boundary policing, namely through high-density operations in high crime areas, may have possibly contributed to the reduction in murder levels in post-apartheid South Africa.

This forceful and militaristic approach to crime prevention is nevertheless a double-edged sword. That is, while such an approach has plausibly enabled the post-apartheid government to wrestle down murder levels, it has come at the cost of substantial long-term trade-offs. In addition, violent crime in South Africa remains alarmingly high, with murder levels having increased in recent years. Comparatively, very small amounts of government resources have been devoted

⁵⁹ This name was opportunistically appropriated from the leftist university student protest movements against university fee increases in South Africa in 2015, which were united under the slogan of #feesmustfall. The SAPS was widely accused of using heavy-handed methods to contain and subdue these protests.

to addressing the key determinants of violent crime in South Africa, particularly those risk factors in homes and communities that greatly facilitate vulnerabilities to violent crime and the perpetration thereof. The macro environment that predisposes South Africans to high levels of poverty, unemployment and income inequality has also remained largely unchanged since 1994.

Further to this, SAPS, which encompasses close to 50% of all funded government posts, has consistently received one of the largest allocations of total government spending compared to other departments. This financial allotment has increased considerably every year since 1995/96. In the 2014/15 financial year, for example, the SAPS spent R72.5 billion, which was in excess of 11% of government spending for that year. For 2015/16 the SAPS was allocated R76.4 billion, which was more than the combined financial resources that had been apportioned to: Health; Basic Education; Trade and Industry; Economic Development; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Sport and Recreation; and Women (National Treasury, 2015). Sound international research has shown that significant government investment in education, health and employment creation is more likely to result in meaningful and sustainable long-term violence prevention outcomes than policing.

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
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Appendixes

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
Appendix 2: Average annual reported cases of IPFA: 1994/95 – 2014/15 for the 133 sample of high crime station areas




Appendix 3: Line charts - Annual cases of murder & IPFA (132 station areas)

Western Cape


Province total




Gugulethu




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
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
Delft




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
Elsies River




Langa




Manenberg




Paarl East



Mitchells Plain





Worcester




Gauteng

Province total


Nyanga




Oudtshoorn




Alexandra




Atteridgeville




Dobsonville




Benoni




Evaton




Booyse




Hillbrow




Daveyton




Ivory Park




Jeppe




Krugersdorp




Johannesburg Central




Meadowlands




Katlehong




Moroka




Kliptown




Orange Farm




Randfontein




Tembisa




Rietgat




Yeoville



Roodepoort




Vanderbijlpark




KwaZulu-Natal


Sebokeng




Province total




Bhekithemba




Empangeni




Cato Manor




Eshikawini/Esikaleni




Chatsworth




Eshowe




Durban Central




Hillcrest




Inanda




Ladysmith




Kwadabeka




Madadeni




Kwadukuza




Mariannhill




Kwamsane




Nongoma




Osizweni




Point




Phoenix




Richards Bay




Pietermaritzburg




Umlazi




Plessislaer



Verulam




Butterworth




Eastern Cape


Provincial total




Cambridge




Bethelsdorp




Cradock




Buffalo Flats




Duncan Village




East London




Idutywa




Ngcobo (Engcobo)




Inyibiba




Gelvandale




Kamesh




Grahamstown




King Williams' Town




Kwanobuhle




Mdantsane




Kwazakele




Motherwell




Libode




Mount Frere




Lusikisiki




Mqanduli




Mthatha




Vulindlela




New Brighton




Walmer



Ngqeleni




Zwelitsha




Free State


Port St Johns




Provincial total




Bethlehem




Kagisanong




Bloemspruit




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
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
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
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
Park Road




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
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
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
Ikageng



Welkom




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


North West

Provincial total





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
Limpopo

Provincial total


Phokeng




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
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
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
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
Vryburg




Lebowaqgomo




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
Thohoyandou



Mankweng




Tubatse




Mpumalanga


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
Provincial total




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
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
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
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
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Masoyi




Kanyamazane




Nelspruit




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
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
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
Groblershoop



Tonga




Kimberley




Northern Cape

Provincial total



Galeshewe



Appendix 4: Listing of 34 police areas where apparent immediate inverse relationships between IPFA and murder were observable

Station area	Trajectory pattern	Period	IPFA % increase	Murder % decrease	Period	IPFA % decrease	Murder % increase
Alexandra	Converging crossover	1997/98-2000/01	67	30	2006/07-2007/08	57	12
		2007/08-2009/10	174	17	2011/12-2013/14	7	35
Atteridgeville	Variable crossover	1995/96-1996/97	96	37	1996/97-1997/98	21	27
		2001/02-2003/04	26	45	2003/04-2005/06	35	54
Benoni	Variable crossover	1997/98-1999/00	42	12	1999/00-2000/01	33	35
Bethlehem	Converging crossover	1995/96-1996/97	40	28	1998/99-2000/01	59	29
		2000/01-2001/02	244	20	2008/09-2013/14	67	64
Bhekithemba	Converging connection	1994/95-1996/97	28	27	1996/97-1998/99	57	18
		1998/99-2004/05	178	34	2004/05-2005/06	30	17
Booyens	Converging crossover	2002/03-2003/04	50	19	2003/04-2005/06	47	8
		2008/09-2011/12	182	27	2012/13-2014/15	12	19
Botshabelo	Variable convergence	1995/96-1996/97	31	24	1996/97-1997/98	33	9
		2003/04-2004/05	43	44	2004/05-2006/07	45	45
Butterworth	Converging crossover	2000/01-2002/03	172	26	2002/03-2003/04	43	24
		2008/09-2009/10	123	15	2009/10-2010/11	24	43
Cato Manor	Variable crossover	1996/97-1997/98	133	23	1997/98-1998/99	14	5
		1998/99-1999/00	19	33	n/a	n/a	n/a
Dobsonville	Variable crossover	1997/98-1999/00	44	47	1999/00-2000/01	49	19
		2000/01-2002/03	79	22	2002/03-2006/07	41	54
Elsies River	Variable inverted	1994/95-1995/96	50	24	1995/96-1996/97	12	27
		1996/97-1997/98	8	19	n/a	n/a	n/a
Evaton	Converging crossover	1996/97-1998/99	11	34	2002/03-2003/04	58	30
Hillbrow	Converging crossover	1997/98-1999/00	67	19	n/a	n/a	n/a
		2000/01-2003/04	79	22	2003/04-2004/05	34	10
Inanda	Converging crossover	1999/00-2001/02	37	16	2011/12-2014/15	57	14
Ivory Park	Variable crossover	2001/02-2003/04	138	5	2012/13-2013/14	46	78
Johannesburg Central	Variable crossover	1994/95-1996/97	72	9	1997/98-1998/99	12	39
		2004/05-2008/09	258	27	2010/11-2014/15	35	115
Kagisanong	Variable convergence	1999/00-2001/03	67	29	2002/03-2006/07	95	68
Katlehong	Converging crossover	2000/01-2003/04	87	35	2004/05-2008/09	22	11
Kliptown	Converging crossover	1996/97-1999/00	59	34	2000/01-2002/03	52	45

		2009/10-2010/11	88	24	2011/12-2012/13	11	52
Krugersdorp	Converging crossover	1998/99-2001/02	92	18	2001/02-2002/03	52	7
		2002/03-2005/06	36	30	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kwadabeka	Variable convergence	2005/06-2006/07	59	16	2006/07-2007/08	28	31
		2007/08-2010/11	51	62	2007/08-2010/11	51	62
Lusikisiki	Variable crossover	1994/95-1996/97	411	32	1998/99-1999/00	42	23
		1999/00-2000/01	41	24	2001/02-2002/03	46	25
Mount Frere	Variable convergence	1995/96-1997/98	800	57	1997/98-1999/00	40	32
		1999/00-2000/01	67	30	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mqanduli	Converging crossover	1995/96-1997/98	700	41	1997/98-1998/99	28	44
Ngcobo	Variable convergence	1995/96-1997/98	500	30	1997/98-1998/99	33	25
		2000/01-2003/04	46	30	2003/04-2007/08	65	14
Ngqeleni	Converging crossover	1998/99-2001/02	91	19	2004/05-2005/06	52	67
Orange Farm	Converging crossover	n/a	n/a	n/a	1996/97-1997/98	33	51
		1997/98-2000/01	71	21	n/a	n/a	n/a
Park Road	Converging crossover	1995/96-1997/98	132	23	1997/98-1998/99	47	11
		1998/99-1999/00	55	39	1999/00-2001/02	44	40
Pietermaritzburg	Converging crossover	1995/96-1997/98	52	29	2006/07-2007/08	47	29
Port St Johns	Variable inverted	1998/99-2000/01	85	46	2002/03-2003/04	35	111
		2003/04-2004/05	23	30	2010/11-2012/13	58	53
Sebokeng	Converging crossover	1995/96-1996/97	22	21	1999/00-2000/01	39	27
		2000/01-2001/02	47	12	2001/02-2002/03	29	24
Tembisa	Converging crossover	1998/99-2000/01	29	26	2004/05-2008/09	18	40
		2008/09-2009/10	55	18	n/a	n/a	n/a
Umlazi	Variable convergence	2000/01-2002/03	80	10	2002/03-2003/04	28	10
		2008/09-2010/11	64	43	n/a	n/a	n/a
Worcester	Converging crossover	1998/99-1999/00	43	24	1999/00-2000/01	25	18

Key: Major SAPS high-density operations

Sword & Shield	Crackdown/Tsipa	Sethunya
Combination of operations	Duty Calls or provincial operation	